India: The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, Vol. 11

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1942-7

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Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill. Facsimile of his letter of 4 July 1947.
Document 504.

CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1942-7

Volume XI The Mountbatten Viceroyalty
Announcement and Reception of the 3 June Plan

31 May — 7 July 1947

Editor-in-Chief

NICHOLAS MANSERGH, Litt.D., F.B.A.

Fellow of St. John’s College , Cambridge

Editor

PENDEREL MOON, M A.

Assisted by

DAVID M. BLAKE, M.A., M.Litt. and LIONEL CARTER, M.Sc., Ph.D.

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

© Crown Copyright 1982
First published 1982

isbn 0 11 580086 7*

Printed in England for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
by Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd, Thanet Press, Margate, Kent

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Page vii

Introduction to Volume XI

X

Abbreviations

xxxiv

Principal Holders of Office

xxxvii

Chronological Table of Principal Events

xli

Summary of Documents

xliii

Documents

1

Glossary

984

Index of Persons

987

Index of Subjects

1113

ILLUSTRATIONS

Frontispiece

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill. Facsimile of his letter of 4 July 1947. Document 504.
(Crown Copyright , Public Record Office)

Between pages 3 62 and 563

Meeting with the Indian leaders, Viceroy’s House, 2 June 1947. Document
23. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

Facsimile of Gandhi’s message to Lord Mountbatten written on the back of five
separate old envelopes on his day of silence. Document 24. (Trustees of the Broad-
lands Archives Settlement)

Gandhi and Pandit Nehru with refugees from the Punjab in a camp at Hardwar,
June 1947. Document 300, para. 2. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

Foreword

On 9 March 1966 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the
House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced
from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that the
range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two great
wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peacetime
history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea
Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents
relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these
subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to thirty
years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who would
be associated with their implementation.1

On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter-party
group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such proposals2
and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and to act as
Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio;
for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home; and for
the Liberal Party, Lord Ogmore.3

A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been
under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in
replying to a written question in the Llouse of Commons, announced that the
first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to
the Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:

As I informed the House on the 9th of March 1966, the Government have
decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice
of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations, sub¬
ject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors whose
composition I announced on the 8 th of June. I am happy to inform the
House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now
being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the
first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements
should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of Power
and the events leading up to it.

The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of
Documents on British Foreign Policy from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series,
the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted
access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publica¬
tion. Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the

1 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 725, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 561-3.

2 Ibid., vol. 733, cols. 1706-7. 3 Ibid., vol. 747, col. 1291.

Vlll

FORE WORD

British Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept

appointment as Editor-in-Chief, and the scheme will be in full operation by

the end of the year.4

Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and fulfilled the duties of
that office until his death on 23 January 1972, by which time the first three
volumes in the Series had been published and the fourth was in an advanced
stage of preparation.

Sir Penderel Moon, O.B.E., sometime Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford,
was appointed Assistant Editor in September 1972 when Volume IV was about
to go to press and the editing of Volume V to begin.

Mr D. M. Blake, who from the time of his appointment in March 1968, and
Dr L. J. Carter from August 1970 to September 1980 when, the editing of this
volume then being well advanced, he left to become Secretary /Librarian in the
South Asian Centre in the University of Cambridge, have assisted in the
assembly, selection, preparation and indexing of documents for publication.
The Editors would like to place on record their warm appreciation of
Dr Carter’s many contributions to the work of the Historical Section in the
decade in which he served as a member of it.

The Editors once again have pleasure in thanking Miss Lois Atkin who has
undertaken the typing necessary for the production of the Volume.

The series will cover the period 1 January 1942 to 15 August 1947. The
Volumes so far published with their subtitles and dates of publication are as
follows :

Volume I The Cripps Mission January- April 1942 (1970)

Volume II ‘Quit India’ 30 April-21 September 1942 (1971)

Volume III Reassertion of authority, Gandhi’s fast and the (1971)

succession to the Viceroyalty 21 September 1942-
12 June 1943

Volume IV The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty (1973)

15 June 1943-31 August 1944

Volume V The Simla Conference: Background and (1975)

Proceedings 1 September 1944-28 July 1945
Volume VI The post-war phase: new moves by the Labour (1976)

Government 1 August 1945-22 March 1946
Volume VII The Cabinet Mission 23 March-29 June 1946 (1977)

Volume VIII The Interim Government 3 July-i November 1946 (1979)

Volume IX The fixing of a time limit 4 November 1946- (1980)

22 March 1947

Volume X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Formulation of a (1981)

Plan 22 March-30 May 1947

FORE WORD

IX

The principles of selection, the arrangement of documents — which is in
chronological order throughout in so far as that has been ascertainable —
together with other details of presentation were explained in the Foreword to
the first Volume (pp. vi-x) with some further comments on particular points
added in the Foreword to Volume III (pp. viii-xii). There is no need, therefore,
to recapitulate what has been written on these matters here. It may, however, be
worth while restating the purpose of the Series. It is to make available to scholars
in convenient printed form the more important British historical records
relating to the Transfer of Power in India.

N. MANSERGH

Historical Section
India Office Records
March 1981

4 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 749, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 147-8.

Introduction to Volume XI

On 23 May 1947, the Cabinet had approved in principle the terms of a draft
Plan which, in the event of a failure to secure a compromise on the basis of the
Cabinet Mission Plan, the Viceroy was authorised to lay before the Conference
of Indian leaders convened for 2 June [Vol. X, Nos. 521 and 404] : on 30 May,
after a last meeting with members of the India and Burma Committee on
outstanding issues on 28 May [Vol. X, No. 553], the Viceroy had returned to
India. With his return years of debate and discussion on policy gave way to days
of decision, the Viceroy’s Conference with Indian leaders, begun on 2 and
resumed on 3 June, in fact determining the nature of the final Anglo-Indian
transfer settlement. The proceedings of the Conference, momentous in their
import, are recorded in Minutes [Nos. 23 and 39] in conjunction with which
reports of consequential conversations and related correspondence [e.g. Nos.
24 and 27] may profitably be read. So also may be the lively narrative account
of events in the round, as viewed from Viceregal vantage ground, and con¬
tained in Mountbatten’s Personal Report of 5 June [No. 91].

While the date — 2 June — of the Viceroy’s Meeting with the Indian leaders
was already settled some final arrangements had still to be made on his return
from London. First in importance was the question of attendance. On 13 May
Nehru had suggested that Acharya Kripalani as President of Congress should
be invited in addition to Nehru himself, Patel, Jinnah, Liaquat and Baldev
Singh, but the Viceroy on 17 May had explained his difficulty in acceding to
this request [Vol. X, Nos. 423 and 467]. Jinnah, when sounded, was most
averse to the idea: Nehru, on behalf of the Congress Working Committee,
insistent upon its adoption, the matter being finally resolved by the issue of an
invitation to Abdur Rab Nishtar on the League to balance one to Kripalani on
the Congress side [Nos. 4, 27 para. 6, and 91 para. 2; and 22 on possible addi¬
tional Sikh representation]. Procedure for the meeting was discussed with
Patel [No. 20] ; a draft for the Viceroy’s opening speech submitted by Ismay,
fmal amendments to the Plan and the text of the Viceroy’s post-Conference
broadcast further considered and sent off to London all on 3 1 May [Nos. 1, 2, 3
and 13], the Viceroy proposing the insertion in his broadcast as an apparent
‘aside’, of an understanding allusion to Gandhi’s objections, strongly voiced at
his Prayer Meetings, to the ‘vivisection of the motherland’ [Nos. 2 and 19], a
proposal which, however, did not commend itself to the Secretary of State or
the Prime Minister and was accordingly withdrawn [No. 30: for final text of
broadcast see No. 44].

While these arrangements were being made disturbing accounts of develop¬
ments in the Punjab continued to be received with the Governor writing of
communal tension throughout the Province being ‘extremely high’, amounting

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XI

to ‘mass hysteria’ and Liaquat Ali Khan making representations to the Viceroy
about what was happening especially in the Gurgaon district, (which the Vice¬
roy, with the Governor, visited on i June) and on the need for a prompt warn¬
ing to the rulers of certain Sikh States not to allow alleged participation by their
troops or civilians to continue [Nos. n, 12 and 16 and see also No. 5 and for
later comment Nos. 72, 179, 232 and 234, alsop. xx-xxi below] . With regard to
Bengal, the other Province likely to be partitioned, the nature of its govern¬
ment after the Announcement was the object of pressing enquiry from the
Viceroy to the Governor who felt that a coalition Ministry was the ‘obviously
ideal arrangement to manage Partition’ and indicated that he would not wish
to go into Section 93 [Governor’s rule], unless forced to do so in the interests of
law and order [Nos. 5, item 3, 10, 18 and 33].

The meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian leaders opened at 10 am on
2 June and lasted for two hours. At the outset the Viceroy remarked that he could
remember ‘no meeting at which decisions had been taken which would have
such a profound influence on world history’. He then gave an account of the
situation that existed as a result of his failure to obtain agreement on the Cabinet
Mission Plan which he still thought of as representing ‘the best solution’ and his
gradual recognition of a convergence of opinion on a partition, even though
partition was contrary to Congress principles and the League would not agree to
its application to Provinces [No. 23] . He had, he said, made clear ‘to His Majesty’s
Government the impossibility of fully accepting the principles of one side and
not of the other’. The Viceroy then dwelt upon particular problems consequent
upon an application of the principle of partition to individual provinces as well
as to the country as a whole — notably the position of the Sikhs (he did not think
‘that any single question’ had been discussed at such great length in London as
this) and the future of Calcutta. There was also the new and critically important
point of ‘Immediate Transfer of Power’ to meet Indian wishes. This last, the
Viceroy explained, was to be made possible under the Plan by an extension of
Dominion Status to the successor authorities that emerged, the Prime Minister
having ruled that in the event of its acceptability top priority was to be accorded
to the drafting of the necessary legislation and the leader of the Opposition,
Mr Churchill, having given an assurance that the Opposition would facilitate its
passage. It was understood on all sides that the new Indian government, or
governments, would be completely free to withdraw from the Commonwealth
whenever they wished.

Copies of the Plan were handed round to the Indian leaders, the Viceroy
asking that they should take them away for discussion with their respective
Working Committees, letting him know of their reactions by midnight. He did
not ask for specific agreement to the terms of the Plan but for assurances that
leaders and parties would ‘do their best to have it [the Plan] worked out
peacefully’.

Xll

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

In the discussion that followed Nehru sought elucidation of the difference
between agreement and acceptance while Jinnah explained that the constitu¬
tional procedures of the League precluded his entering into any immediate
commitment on its behalf, but adding in response to the Viceroy’s representa¬
tions, that while he felt unable to report the views of the League’s Working
Committee in writing he would make a verbal report to the Viceroy [Nos. 23,
27 for report to S/S, and 91, paras. 12-13].

Immediately after the meeting the Viceroy saw Gandhi who was observing a
day of silence. Gandhi handed the Viceroy a note written on the back of five
separate old envelopes; reproduced as the Centrepiece to this volume.
The Viceroy deemed what passed between them reassuring [Nos. 24, 27 and
91, paras. 14-15]. With Lord Ismay, he also saw Jinnah for an hour that evening
[Nos. 38 and 91, paras. 18-19: for brief for talk see No. 3].

The reactions of the Congress, the League and the Sikhs were conveyed
to the Viceroy late on 2 or early on 3 June, those of the Congress Working
Committee being in the form of a letter from the Congress President, J. B.
Kripalani [No. 35] : those of Jinnah being given verbally at the meeting men¬
tioned above and those of the Sikhs in a letter from Baldev Singh [No. 36]. The
Viceroy cabled the substance of these reactions to the Secretary of State, draw¬
ing attention to the key paragraphs in the letters from the Congress (para. 7),
the Sikhs (penultimate para) and repeating Jinnah’s verbal assurances that he
would support the Viceroy personally and ‘do his utmost to get the plan
accepted’, Jinnah’s delight at the Dominion status solution being described as
‘unconcealed’ [No. 3 8]. In the light of the expression of these views the Viceroy
further suggested to the Secretary of State that the formula for use in Parliament
should be that the Plan, including the offer of Dominion status, had been
‘favourably received by all three parties’ [No. 37].

When the meeting with the Indian leaders was resumed at 10 am on 3 June
the Viceroy reported initial reactions to the Plan and said he had been ‘very
happy and much relieved’ at the nature of them. The Indian leaders indicated
that the Viceroy had correctly represented their views [No. 39]. There followed
complaints from the Muslim leaders about the content of Gandhi’s speeches to
which the Congress leaders made rejoinder. The Viceroy then had circulated a
comprehensive paper, prepared by the Viceroy’s staff, entitled ‘The Administra¬
tive Consequences of Partition’, prefaced by a note by the Viceroy that it was
his intention that the Act transferring power to the new Dominions should be
brought into operation not later than 15 August [No. 28]. A very early date
was mentioned, he explained to the Secretary of State, for tactical reasons as he
was anxious to make the parties ‘realize that they must move quickly and that
vital decisions would have to be taken in the very near future’ [No. 53]. He
later recorded that the ‘severe shock that this [i.e. the paper on Administrative

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XIII

Consequences] gave to everyone present would have been amusing if it was not
rather tragic’ [No. 91, paras. 24-25].

Later that day, 3 June, the Viceroy telegraphed the Prime Minister to let him
know that while the three Indian leaders had not agreed to the Plan, ‘they had
virtually accepted it’, it being understood that their acceptance ‘stood subject
to ratification by the All-India Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim
League Council, meetings of both of which are being called with extreme
urgency’ [No. 40]. In the event such ratification was in essence forthcoming in
both instances, the Council of the League at its meeting on 9 June, while unable
to agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab, giving full authority to
Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise [No.
127; see Nos. 129 and 130 for Nehru and Patel’s critical reactions] while on 15
June the Congress Committee welcomed the decision of the British govern¬
ment on the early transfer of power and though regretting ‘the secession of
some parts of the country from India’ accepted such a possibility ‘in the
circumstances now prevailing’ [No. 205].

Meanwhile, still on 3 June, at 3.30pm the Prime Minister made his statement
in the House of Commons [for text see No. 45]. It was announced over All-
India Radio at the same time, preceded by the Viceroy’s broadcast and followed
by those of Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh [No. 41 : for texts see Nos. 44, 46,
47 and 48]. The Viceroy’s talk, relayed from Delhi and prefaced with an intro¬
duction by the Prime Minister, also went out on the B.B.C. Home and Light
Programmes in Britain that evening [No. 57].

The Prime Minister conveyed the congratulations of the whole Cabinet to
the Viceroy [No. 56; see also No. 75]. But possibly the Viceroy cherished even
more Gandhi’s allusion to ‘ “you and your magic tricks” in getting Congress and
the Muslim League to agree on anything’ [No. 69].

The Viceroy had invited Sardar Patel as Member for Information and
Broadcasting to preside at the Press Conference he was to give on 4 June [No.
50]. The number and range of questions put to the Viceroy at the Conference
may be seen from the considerable, though not complete, records of it that
survive and are reproduced in Nos. 59 and 60, while those parts of the An¬
nouncement which aroused the most interest or were most likely to be the
source of controversy in India may be inferred by a sharper concentration of
questioning upon them. Striking tributes were paid to the Viceroy’s mastery of
his complex subject and his handling of questions in a gathering of some 200
Press men whose reactions were described by Campbell-Johnson as ‘quite the
most enthusiastic I have ever known’ [Nos. 66 and 84].

With the Announcement made, the Plan unfolded, its principal features
explained in broadcasts and its implications elucidated in a Press Conference,
there remained urgent questions of how the settlement the Plan envisaged,

XIV

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

contemplating as its principal features the partitioning of historic provinces and
the transfer of power with consequential division of assets to two dominions,
was to be given effect within a period of six weeks between the end of June and
the target date of 15 August.

With regard to the first, the partitioning of Provinces, the Statement of
3 June declared that it was not the intention of H.M.G. to interrupt the work of
the Constituent Assembly but recognised that any constitution framed by it
could not apply to those parts of the country which were unwilling to accept it
[No. 45]. Accordingly the Statement had laid down a procedure by which the
wishes of the people in those areas might best be ascertained, the issue to be
submitted to them being whether their constitution should be framed in the
existing Constituent Assembly or in a new and separate Constituent Assembly
which would consist of the representatives of those areas which decided not to
participate in the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. ‘When this has
been done’, the Statement continued, ‘it will be possible to determine the
authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred’. The doing of it
was a matter of complexity involving, principally, the deciding of the issue in
four provinces, Sind and three critically poised, namely Bengal, the Punjab and
the North-West Frontier, to which were to be added Baluchistan and the
predominantly Muslim district of Sylhet in the predominantly non-Muslim
Province of Assam. The procedure outlined in the Statement contemplated
that in Bengal and the Punjab the members of the Legislative Assemblies should
sit in two parts according to Muslim and non-Muslim majority Districts for the
immediate purpose of deciding on partition, there being also provision for a
preliminary meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than
Europeans) to determine which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole
would join if it were decided by the two parts to remain united. It was empha¬
sised that should a decision be taken in favour of partition Boundary Com¬
missions would be set up to demarcate the final boundaries ‘on the basis of
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims’
with ‘other factors’ also to be taken into account. To meet ‘the exceptional
position’ of the North-W est Frontier Province it was provided that should the
Punjab decide on partition a referendum would be held there.

In the context of the partition assumed to be impending there were a number
of meetings between the Viceroy, his staff and Indian leaders designed to clarify
the issues and make recommendations on procedures to be adopted and a
programme of action to be pursued. The point of departure was the paper on
The Administrative Consequences of Partition copies of which, as has been noted,
were handed to the Indian leaders at the meeting on 3 June [No. 28]. The paper
came up for consideration in detail at The Viceroy’s Sixteenth Miscellaneous
Meeting on 5 June [No. 73]. One general question was posed which may
conveniently be indicated at the outset. It derived from a conceptual difference

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XV

about the nature of the partition that seemed certain to take place, Nehru
contending that while some parts of India were being given die opportunity to
secede, India as an entity would remain and the Government of India would
accordingly continue, inheriting the status, the treaty and other obligations of
its British predecessor, whereas Jinnah maintained that what would happen
would be not secession but division. The Viceroy noted that on any interpreta¬
tion there would have to be division in respect of the Staff of the Central Civil
departments and duplication of records relating to their work [No. 73]. As
regards the wider implications of the issue the Viceroy the same day (5 June) in
view of its ‘great importance’ sought a ruling from London [No. 7 6], and on
9 June forwarded a letter from Nehru [No. 116] reiterating his [Nehru’s] opinion
and asking if he might see in advance the text of legislation transferring power
on a dominion basis. ‘My own view’, the Viceroy commented to the Secretary
of State, ‘is that we shall meet far greater difficulties from Congress if we oppose
their view than from the League if we follow the Congress suggestion’ [No.

1 1 5]. The Secretary of State, in a memorandum dated 13 June and circulated to
the India and Burma Committee, likewise concluded that ‘on balance, the
advantage would seem to he, so far as concerns the international position, in
adopting the Congress doctrine and accepting Hindustan as the successor of the
former India’ [No. 188]. On 14 June the Viceroy, after a talk with Liaquat Ah
Khan, in the course of which Liaquat indicated that as ‘all he really wanted was
a fair proportionate division of assets and liabilities’ he did not wish ‘to waste
time arguing whether Hindustan should take the title of India or inherit
membership of U.N.O.’ [No. 202; see also No. 153], advised that the Congress
view on these questions of status should be accepted, with concurrent agreement
for division of assets and liabilities between Hindustan and Pakistan on an
equitable basis. ‘I am absolutely certain’, the Viceroy concluded, ‘that a wrong
approach to this issue will cause a complete breakdown in the present settle¬
ment’ [No. 202]. The India and Burma Committee on 17 June invited the
Secretary of State to inform the Viceroy that H.M.G. accepted Nehru’s view
‘that Hindustan will succeed to the position of India as an international entity’,
but assumed there will be ‘a financial adjustment of the assets involved’
[No. 244, Minute 2].

The Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting of 5 June chiefly concerned itself with
the specifying of arrangements to deal with the more important consequences
that would follow from partition. It agreed in the first place upon the setting
up ‘forthwith’ of a Partition Committee/Tribunal (both terms were used)
consisting of four members of the highest status nominated by the party leaders;
in the second upon the need for the selection of an Umpire experienced in
judicial matters from names, again submitted by the party leaders; and in the
third upon the appointment of a Steering Committee of Experts to assume a
large share of detailed responsibility [No. 73]. Action on all these matters

XVI

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

followed in due course. But more immediately a question of the proper source
of authority for action arose.

At a meeting of the Interim Government on 6 June the Viceroy explained to
members the reasons that had prompted him to discuss the administrative
consequences of partition at the meeting with Indian leaders before putting the
paper on the subject to members of the Interim Government. With the target
date for transfer fixed for 15 August, he had felt that, given the near-certainty
that ‘the vote in the Provincial Legislatures would be for Pakistan’ and that
consequently there would soon be two sovereign Governments in existence
with the Congress and the League the only bodies which could in the meantime
be said to represent them, there were sufficient reasons for including their
Presidents in the discussions (neither Jinnah nor Kripalani were members of the
Interim Government) [No. 95]. He considered moreover that, since the time
factor was so pressing, the Partition Committee should be a whole time body
and therefore ‘separate from the Cabinet’. ‘We were dealing’ he said ‘with an
unprecedented problem. We had only 71 days in which to solve it.’ The Cabinet
decided, however, that such a Partition/Separation Committee1 should be set
up only when partition had been legally decided on and the members of the
existing Cabinet, i.e. the Interim Government, had resigned. In the meantime
they would agree to the appointment of a Cabinet Committee, with the
Viceroy as Chairman, to work out the machinery for implementing partition.
They also decided that a panel of umpires should be set up to whom otherwise
unresolved points of difference could be referred.

On 7 June at the next succeeding meeting — the Seventeenth Miscellaneous —
with the Indian leaders the Viceroy reported that the ‘Cabinet’ had shown ‘a
certain air of slight grievance’ — later he wrote of ‘obviously strained feelings’
[No. 162] — at not having been taken into confidence earlier and had further
expressed the view that until a decision on Partition was taken it was necessary
to go circumspectly [No. 100]. The Viceroy said his own wish was to preserve a
balance between meetings with Indian leaders and those of the Cabinet: he
wanted to get policy guidance at the former but the Cabinet provided the legal
authority for setting up government committees and for supplying secretariat.
Jinnah, however, maintained that it was the responsibility not of the Interim
Government but for the Crown and H.M.G. to set up the necessary machinery.
They should ‘with no delay, tackle the business of partition’. The Viceroy
‘could consult anybody that he liked; but it would be the Governor-General
and not the Governor-General-in-Council who would issue the orders’. It was
agreed to obtain a legal opinion on this point — which was done ; but Jinnah
dissented from it [Nos. 102, with enclosure, and 108] — and in the meantime the
Viceroy said he intended to proceed with the appointment of a special (Cabinet)
Committee consisting of two representatives of the Congress and two of the

1 In the event it was termed the ‘Partition Council’.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XVII

League, all members ol the Interim Government, with the Viceroy as Chairman
with the responsibility of considering the steps to be taken to set up machinery,
including the formation of sub-Committees, for carrying out Partition and
that as soon as but not until a decision on Partition was known a Partition
Council should be established consisting of two ‘top ranking leaders of Congress
and two of the Muslim League’, the Viceroy being Chairman but without —
on this point he had been insistent throughout — having arbitral powers vested in
him [No. ioo ; see also No. ioi for further discussion with the League leaders
and 124 for a parallel talk with Congress leaders]. A narrative account of these
meetings and the tenseness of some of the proceedings will be found in the
Viceroy’s Personal Report of 9 June [No. 162].

The first meeting of the Special (Cabinet), generally referred to as the Parti¬
tion Committee, took place on 12 June with Patel and Rajendra Prasad as
Congress, and Liaquat and Nishtar as League, representatives [No. 152]. The
Committee agreed upon a two-man membership — H. M. Patel and Mohamad
Ali — of the Steering Committee, the terms of reference for which were defined,
the Steering Committee being thereupon given responsibility for the making of
recommendations in respect of terms of reference and membership of Expert
Committees, including that of the Armed Forces Committee, the relationship
of the last to the Partition Council and the Steering Committee to be exactly
similar to that laid down for the other Expert Committees. The recommenda¬
tions of the Steering Committee were circulated to members of the Special
Committee by H. M. Patel on 15 June [No. 210] and considered by the Com¬
mittee on 16 June [No. 217]. A paper by the Commander-in-Chief on the
problems involved in the division of the Forces was also before the Committee
and its adoption recommended. With reference to it, the Viceroy said that the
Commander-in-Chief, who had been ‘gloomy’ about the probable effects of
division on discipline and morale was now, as a result of the lead given by the
party leaders, ‘confident he could produce at the earliest reasonable moment
two Armies each of which would be as efficient as the existing one, provided the
advice of the experts on the question of divison was given due consideration’.
At the suggestion of the Viceroy, the Committee added to its more particular
conclusions the following Decision: ‘The Special Committee directed that the
work of partition should be undertaken in a spirit of friendship and goodwill,
and with the desire to give a fair deal to both sides’ [No. 217].

While these administrative arrangements were being worked out, discussion
proceeded about the Chairmanship of the Arbitral Tribunal, the League sug¬
gesting but Nehru dissenting from the idea that a member of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council be invited to serve [Nos. 101 and 175, item 3].
On 10 June, on representations from the Viceroy, the Secretary of State made
enquiry of the Lord Chancellor [No. 135]. The Lord Chancellor took soundings
and learned that Sir Cyril Radcliffe was prepared, subject to the fulfilment of

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

certain conditions, to undertake the task Nos. 185 and 224]. The Prime
Minister was reported to have considered the idea 'eminently suitable’. The
Secretary of State telegraphed the Viceroy that 'if in fact you do require a
Chairman for the Arbitral Tribunal from this country I am convinced that you
could not do better than secure Radcliffe’ [No. 224, note 2].

However, consideration was also being given at this time to the membership
of and terms of reference for the Boundary Commissions to be appointed to
determine the line of division in each of the Provinces to be partitioned, the
Viceroy alluding to the possibility of U.N.O. nomination of members [No. 101] ,
Nehru at first feeling doubtful by reason of the delay likely to be involved
[No. 124] and finally coming down against and favouring instead an indepen¬
dent Chairman with two representatives each of the Congress and the League
No. 128]. The alternatives were laid before the Viceroy’s Eighteenth Miscel¬
laneous Meeting on 13 June which decided in favour of the second [No. 175],
and names of members were submitted [Nos. 207, 262 and 317]. On 23 June
Jinnah suggested that, in view of the difficulty in finding a Chairman for the
Boundary Commissions, whoever was appointed Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal might also undertake the Chairmanship of the Boundary Com¬
missions [No. 311]. The Viceroy informed Jinnah that Radcliffe had been
suggested for the former, and on 26 June put forward his name to the Partition
Committee as suitable for appointment as Chairman of the Boundary Com¬
missions [No. 354]. This carried Congress as well as League support [No. 369,
para 11] and the Viceroy, stressing the urgency of the situation, much hoped
Radcliffe would see his way to accept [No. 378]. He did so [No. 378, note 3] and
his services were thus secured for the Chairmanship of the Boundary Com¬
mission, while Sir Patrick Spens was appointed Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal, membership of which otherwise consisted of one representative each
of India and Pakistan [No. 516]. Draft terms of reference for the Boundary
Commissions reproducing the language used in the Statement of 3 June were
submitted by Nehru on 12 June [Nos. 45, 124 and 158], they were discussed at
the Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting on 13 June [No. 175] and agreement on
them reached on 23 June [No. 311; for text see No. 369, para. 10]. The an¬
nouncement of terms of reference and membership was made on 30 June
[No. 415].

There is substantial documentation on the making of decisions in the three
Provinces the future of which was principally at issue. In each case there were
particular features and problems. In Bengal various possibilities had been can¬
vassed, autonomy or independence of the Province as a whole; partition with
Calcutta as a free city or partition tout simple. The Viceroy, on 1 June, took the
view that the Congress 'were determined to oppose any move towards an
independent but united Bengal’ : the Governor that it was too late (2 June) to
declare Calcutta a free City or a City under Joint Control, a possibility which

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XIX

Jinnah at one time was reported as favouring [No. io] and one that had also
been canvassed by the Premier (and others) in the event of a partition of the
Province [Nos. 18 and 33]. On 17 June the formation of a Coalition or regional
government for the interim period was explored by the Governor with the
Premier and the leader of the opposition K. S. Roy [No. 240] but a sounding of
Jinnah on 18 June on ‘whether he would be prepared to authorise Suhrawardy
to form a regional Ministry’ elicited ‘an absolute negative’ (No. 253; see also
Nos. 291 and 292]. The Governor concluded that there were ‘now only two
courses left — to continue present ministry ... or to go into Section 93 ’ and he
concluded, ‘now that Jinnah has apparently ruled out regional ministries, the
only way in which I can place the two parties on a level for the conduct of
partition negotiations seems to be by going into Section 93’ [No. 268]. On
20 June the Governor reported that members of the Bengal Legislative Assembly,
voting in accordance with prescribed procedure, had decided in favour of
partition with the amalgamation of Sylhet with East Bengal being agreeable to
the latter [Nos. 277, 278 and 369].

On 21 June the Governor, sensing acquiescence on the part of Suhrawardy in
the prospect of government under Section 93, sought the Viceroy’s concurrence
in proclaiming it [No. 289] but on representations from Jinnah action was
deferred [No. 291]. A paper by the Reforms Commissioner on the wider
implications of what was at issue concluded that either the Chief Minister
should reconstitute his Ministry acceptably to minorities or the Governor
should go into Section 93 as an assurance of an impartial caretaker in charge
[No. 306]. On 23 June Jinnah, after ‘hotly contesting’ the right of the Governor
to go into Section 93, was reported as having agreed to the Viceroy’s proposal
that the existing government should remain in office but that a shadow Cabinet
should be formed in West Bengal with a right of veto on all matters affecting
West Bengal [Nos. 311 and 379 and see p. xxiii-xxiv below].

In the case of the Punjab there was, as the Governor pointed out on 6 July,
little similarity to Bengal [No. 540]. There, there had been and was no question
of moving into Section 93, Governor’s rule being already in force and the
Governor having declined to accede to Muslim League requests earlier advanced
by the Nawab of Mamdot, its provincial leader, to be permitted to form a
government on the ground that the accession to office of what would in effect
be one party government, with at best a narrow majority, would provoke
protest and be likely to precipitate violence [see Vol. IX, Nos. 492-493, Vol. X,
Nos. 212, 248 and 335]. There was a report of a willingness on the part of one
Sikh leader, Giani Kartar Singh, to try to come to an agreement with Jinnah
for the inclusion of a Sikh ‘Khalistan’ in Pakistan [No. 22] but this was dis¬
counted altogether by Baldev Singh who in accepting the Statement of 3 June
on behalf of the Sikh leadership stated that Sikhs were unable to contemplate
being forced into a Sovereign state founded on Islamic principles against their

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

will, acquiesced in the inevitability of partition and expressed concern that the
Boundary Commission should be instructed to ensure that as large as possible a
percentage of the Sikh population should be included in the Eastern Punjab
[No. 36; see also Nos. 38 and 105]. When on 6 June the Governor held meetings
separately with the provincial leaders of the three parties, the Congress, League
and Sikhs, to elicit views on timing and arrangements for a decision on parti¬
tion, and asked them how they would regard a “divisible” coalition govern¬
ment for the province in the short period remaining before partition, he
received no positive response, only indication of preference for a continuation
of Section 93 government from the Congress and Sikh leaders. ‘It will not be
easy’, the Governor noted, ‘to get a Ministry or a Partition Committee going;
but so far the Partition Committee appears to be the easier altemative\ The
Viceroy indicated his own reluctant acquiescence in the continuation of the
Section 93 regime adding that the cooperation of the parties ‘in a Partition
Committee is in any case essential’ [No. 97 with note 4; for the report of a
discussion between Abell and the Governor on the detailed arrangements see
No. 98 and for criticism of them by Mamdot see No. 144, with note 1, and for
Liaquat’s representations to the Viceroy see No. 145]. On 15 June the Governor
reviewed the situation in the Province, remarking that the Statement had had
no discernible effect on communal relations and commenting upon the
atmosphere of fatalism that prevailed — ‘it was ordained from the first that the
communities should massacre and loot one another’ — and noting that ‘the old
administrative machine is rapidly falling to pieces’ while it was difficult to get
the politicians ‘to take the business [of partition] seriously and to undertake the
really arduous work which it involves’. He concluded ‘here in the Punjab
the boundary is vital’ [No. 209]. On 16 June, following upon a meeting with
the Provincial party leaders at which they undertook to advise the Governor
on the composition and formation of Partition, Steering and Interim Com¬
mittees he struck a more sanguine note — ‘I think we shall be able to get things
going’ [No. 219]. On 17 June the three leaders reported their agreed decisions in
respect of these committees [No. 233]. That there would be a boundary was
settled in principle on 23 June when, ‘with large section of Lahore and scores of
villages throughout the Province fire-blacked ruins’, the members of the
Legislative Assembly meeting first in joint and then in separate session decided
in accord with the prescribed procedures that the Province be partitioned
[No. 304].

Meanwhile the law and order situation in the Province was a source of
mounting protest and concern voiced by the party leaders, Nehru being repor¬
ted as having been highly critical of the British administration in a speech to
All India Congress Committee on 15 June [see No. 218 enclosure, and for
Governor’s reaction to Nehru’s allegations see letter ibid], while on 17 June
Liaquat once again conveyed information about the situation in the Gurgaon

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXI

area speaking of ‘the full-scale war of extermination’ being waged against the
Muslims there [No. 232 with enclosure], the Governor agreeing that while the
troops on the spot or arriving seemed adequate the district was in a very bad
way [No. 299]. On 22 June Nehru, after visiting a refugee camp at Hardwar
with Gandhi, wrote about Amritsar and more especially about Lahore ‘where
fires are raging’ and where at this rate ‘the city . . . will be just a heap of ashes in
a few days’ time. The human aspect ... is appalling to contemplate’ [No. 300].
On 24 June the Viceroy conveyed the substance of conversations he had had
with Jinnah and, separately, with Nehru, to the Governor, Jinnah asking for
utter ruthlessness in suppressing disorder in Lahore and Amritsar and Nehru
asking for a fresh approach with martial law declared forthwith in the two cities.
‘I entirely agree with Indian leaders’, commented the Viceroy to the Governor,
‘that something must be done’ and, subject to the Governor’s comments, he
proposed to raise the matter at the Cabinet [No. 320]. The Governor, supported
by the military commanders, did not think there was a case for introduction of
martial law, and contended that the real remedy was ‘active intervention' by
political leaders to control ‘their own goonda supporters’ [No. 327; see also No.
305 and for Ismay’s observations see No. 328]. The situation — ‘if we cannot
stop this arson’ was the Viceroy’s comment on it, ‘both cities will soon be burnt
to the ground’ [No. 369, para. 3] — and possible remedies were considered at a
meeting of the Indian Cabinet on 25 June at which the Viceroy, so he reported
two days later, was ‘violently attacked by leaders of both parties’ (ibid., para. 5)
but at which he finally obtained agreement that the Governor be invited to
form a Security Committee of the local leaders of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs
[No. 338; see also for sequel Nos. 339, 343, 357, 369 for the summary in the
Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, and 370]. The proposal regarding the forma¬
tion of a Security Committee was conveyed to the Governor immediatelv
[No. 343] and was followed by the Viceroy’s confirmation that he had pressed the
party leaders ‘to use their own influence to stop the trouble in Lahore’ [ibid.,
note 2 and No. 384], a decision that this would be done being recorded in the
Cabinet Minutes [No. 338]. On 6 July, despite action taken including formation
of a Security Committee [No. 357], the Governor reported the situation here
‘is generally explosive . . . Explosion may be touched off at any time and I
expect trouble when Boundary Commission reports’. This was one among
other reasons why he held to his view that the Punjab, much as he would
himself welcome a transfer of responsibility for law and order to Ministers,
could not follow the Bengal model of a Ministry with a shadow team to safe¬
guard minority interests [No. 540].

The Assembly vote in Sind, taken on 26 June, was, as anticipated, in favour
of the Province joining the new Constituent Assembly, i.e. in favour of parti¬
tion of India [No. 369, para 9]. In the North West Frontier the Statement of
3 June laid down that the question which of the two new dominions its people

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

wished to join should be determined in a referendum. The issue, however, was
clouded by mounting criticism of the Governor by the Congress Ministry,
taken up by and raised to an All-India level by the Congress leadership, Nehru
advising the Viceroy on 4 June that ‘there has been progressive deterioration in
the relations between the Provincial Government and the Governor and it is
hardly possible to carry on the administration with this continuous conflict
going on’ [No. 61]. On 5 June the Premier, Dr Khan Sahib, discussed with the
Viceroy the question whether an independent Pathanistan should be a third
choice to joining India or Pakistan in the contemplated referendum — a possi¬
bility which the Viceroy ruled out; on which the Governor commented ‘reality
of case is that Frontier could never stand alone’ ; and which Jinnah summarily
dismissed [Nos. 81, 83 and 321; see also No. 228 for Kripalani’s backing for it
and the Viceroy’s reply No. 237]. At the same time Dr Khan Sahib maintained
that it was ‘absolutely necessary’ that Sir Olaf Caroe be replaced before the
referendum took place [No. 81]. On 6 June the Viceroy wrote to the Governor
saying that he felt the time had come when ‘I must . . . replace you as Governor
of the N.W.F.P.’ [No. 96 and for the Governor’s reply see No. 142; for
Liaquat’s reactions No. 143, and the Secretary of State’s Minutes to Prime
Minister on the appointment of a successor Nos. 148 and 223 ; see also Nos
1 8 1, 21 1, 227 and 237]. Gandhi advanced suggestions whereby, given the
cooperation of Jinnah, a referendum in the N.W.F.P. and ‘with it the risk of
bloodshed’ might be removed [No. 156; see also Nos. 99, 139, 176-177 and
239]. They did not bear fruit though Gandhi and Jinnah met the Viceroy to
consider them [Nos. 230 and 239]. On 28/29 June Gandhi conveyed to the
Viceroy news of the Redshirts’ intention to abstain from the referendum since
there was to be no option for a free Pathanistan [No. 396 and for Viceroy’s
reply see No. 422]. The Provincial Ministry set out their position in a statement
sent to the incoming Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart, on 26 June
to whom they gave assurances of their desire that the referendum should
be peacefully conducted [No. 475]. The Viceroy’s misgivings about the likely
consequences of ‘persuasion’ to abstain were expressed to Gandhi on 4 July
[No. 496, for Gandhi’s reply see No. 515 and for the immediate sequel see Nos.
518, 530, 541]. The dates finally agreed upon for the holding of the referendum
were 6-17 July and its outcome, therefore, falls outside the period covered in
this volume.

When the Special/Partition Committee met on 26 June, the Viceroy noted
that Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, having all voted in favour of the partition of
India, the time had come when, in accordance with earlier decision [No. 100],
the Committee should be replaced by the Partition Council (the membership of
which was the same as that of the Committee with one notable exception,
namely that Jinnah came in, in place of Nish tar), the first meeting of which was
duly held the following day. The proceedings at the meetings of Committee

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XX111

[No. 354] and Council [No. 367] reflected renewed concern with the time table,
now that the question of partition was formally resolved. At the first meeting,
i.e. the last of the Committee, arrangements, including the supply of office
equipment, for the setting up of a new capital for Pakistan at Karachi, were
considered, not without acrimony [on this see also Liaquat’s earlier letter of
17 June to the Viceroy asking that the military authorities be requested to under¬
take provision of accommodation and furniture and the transportation of
stores to Karachi No. 231], it being decided that approved non-controversial
demands should receive top priority and that controversial items should come
before the Council on 27 June; a note by the Commander-in-Chief on the
retention of British officers in India in limited number and with a restricted role
in the service of the Dominion governments was agreed in principle; the actual
process of division of the armed forces and the administrative problems need¬
ing to be resolved in connection with it were reviewed, with the Viceroy
undertaking to prepare a paper for consideration by the Partition Council on
30 June; and the Viceroy also reported that, following discussions between
Field Marshal Montgomery and Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah, H.M.G. had
decided [see No. 381] that the withdrawal of British units should commence on
15 August and be completed by February 1948 at latest. (This was a question
which, at the request of the India and Burma Committee, had been considered
at the London end by the Chiefs of Staff whose observations rather different in
tenor were circulated on 26 June [No. 362].) The Viceroy’s note on the partition
of the Armed Forces [No. 372] was before the Partition Council on 30 June
where its recommendations on the procedures to be followed received general
approval [No. 416] the Viceroy later paying tribute to Sir C. Trivedi’s contri¬
bution to ‘one of the most important successes we have had to date, and
Auchinleck is delighted beyond measure’ [No. 506, para 21]. One of the most
important conclusions was for the setting up of a Joint Defence Council con¬
sisting of the Governor, or Governors, General, the two Defence Members and
the C.-in-C. India.

The future of the Interim Government was much at issue at the meetings of
Partition Committee and Partition Council on 26-27 June, at the first of which
the Viceroy noted that the reconstitution of the Bengal government was
inter-related with that of the Central government and said he was of the view
‘that the best way of handling the situation in Bengal was to appoint Congress
ministers for West Bengal, and to give them the right to veto any action . . .
likely to be harmful to the interests of West Bengal’ and that since ‘the position
at the Centre was no different from that in Bengal ... an identical course of
action should be pursued’ [No. 354]. In respect of Bengal, agreement was
reached at the Council’s Meeting the following day on instructions which were
sent to the Governor on 29 June [Nos. 367, 409, 410 for instructions and foot¬
note for action taken], but the analogy with die Centre was challenged, jinnah,

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

noting, first, that it was only a matter of 40 odd days till transfer, appealed ‘to
the Congress to rise to the occasion and not put forward a proposal which may
be humiliating to either side’ [No. 367] but combining that appeal with a
restatement of his opinion that ‘legally and constitutionally the proposal was
wrong and untenable’. The Congress, who had accepted the Bengal arrange¬
ment only, according to the Viceroy, ‘on the understanding that I was going to
impose an identical set of conditions upon the League in the Interim Govern¬
ment at Delhi’, were quite uncompromising, threatening resignation unless the
Interim Government were reconstituted on the same lines [Viceroy’s Report
No. 506, paras 9 and 10; see also Nos. 73 and 80 for an early (5 June) indication
of Nehru’s view that it would be Very difficult to carry on as at present’ despite
the Viceroy’s feeling that with the shortening of the period before transfer the
seriousness of the position had diminished]. On 29 JuneJinnah followed up his
objection with a note setting out the basis of it, which the Viceroy forwarded to
the Secretary of State with a covering telegram saying he was sure he should go
ahead with reconstruction of the government provided the means contemplated
were not unconstitutional [Nos. 412 and 413 ; see also No. 433 for Secretary of
State’s and India Committee’s reactions]. On 30 June the Viceroy again alluded
to the possibility of Nehru’s resignation if he did not do so [No. 437; for an
earlier reference see No. 379], but the India and Burma Committee meeting on
the same day felt that while the Viceroy’s discretion should not be fettered he
should know Ministers felt there was ‘much force in the contentions in Mr Jinnah’s
note’ [No. 421]. The Prime Minister conveyed these reservations [No. 447]
while the Viceroy reported hopes of modifying Nehru’s views [No. 448].
‘Situation here incredibly explosive and more dangerous than any I have seen
to date’ the Viceroy cabled the Prime Minister on 2 July : ‘Congress leaders are
firmly united in their complete refusal to be dictated to by Jinnah any longer’
[No. 458]. But the Secretary of State’s reservations had ‘come as a Godsend’
since he (the Viceroy) could now point out that he had inadequate legal cover
for action until the Independence Bill was enacted. He went on to suggest the
terms of an appropriate telegram on this point to be sent him by the Prime
Minister. The possibility was considered by the India and Burma Committee on
the same day [No. 465] and in substance approved. The Prime Minister’s
telegram followed [No. 468]. Also on 3 July the Viceroy learned through
Krishna Menon that there was now a chance that the Congress would accept
continuation of the Interim Government for a further period [No. 478] and on
4 July at a meeting of the Cabinet, he asked his colleagues, the question of
partition being legally decided, to tender their resignations but coupled this
request with a statement of his intention to invite them to carry on with their
present portfolios until the Indian Independence Bill was passed, when he
would reconstitute his government [No. 493]. Legal opinion on the constitu¬
tional validity of reconstruction on the lines contemplated is set out in No. 454.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXV

In his telegram of 3 July [No. 468] the Prime Minister had stated that he was
taking every possible step ‘to ensure speeding up’ of the Bill through Parlia¬
ment, with 20 July as a target date for its enactment. Drafting of and consulta¬
tion on its provisions were a major preoccupation of the period and, as may be
seen from the Chapter in the Summary of Contents devoted to the Bill, the
documentation, which aims at being sufficiently comprehensive to enable the
reader to identify all the more important considerations which went to the
shaping of it, is substantial. The basic reason for this was evidently the range of
consultation with other departments, notably the Dominions Office and the
Ministery of Defence in Whitehall [e.g. Nos. 122, 13 1, 134, 186], and above all
with the Viceroy and his advisers in Delhi where the text of the Bill was exa¬
mined and commented upon clause by clause, as deemed necessary or desirable,
in seeking to give final legislative form to the unravelling of an historic and
complex relationship. A major point of difference to arise between Whitehall
and New Delhi concerned the question whether the Independence Act should
equip the new Dominions with as complete a transitional constitution as
possible. The Viceroy, prompted by V. P. Menon’s representations of Congress
opinion on the matter, urged strongly (and in the event successfully) that this
should be done. Prominent among his reasons was the hope that, if the interim
constitution provided by the Independence Act worked well, then this would
give Dominion Status a better chance of lasting [Nos. 255, 280, 286, 290, 293,
324, 347, 348; see also No. 419 for a subsequent opinion from the Attorney-
General (Shawcross) broadly in agreement with the Viceroy’s view].

On 31 May, on his return from London, the Viceroy had informed all
Governors that ‘the parliamentary draftsmen are already busy on the Bill’
[No. 15]. On 13 June a draft of the Bill [No. 191] was circulated to the India
and Burma Committee by the Secretary of State who explained that the aim
was to introduce the Bill not later than 7 July. He also summarised its more
important provisions [No. 190]. Copies were sent to the Viceroy with the
assurance that the India and Burma Committee would take no decisions until
his views were known [Nos. 189 and 214]. On 17 June the India and Burma
Committee gave first consideration to the Bill and approved the Prime Minis¬
ter’s suggestion that what had hitherto been entitled the ‘Indian Dominions
Bill’ should be called the ‘Indian Independence Bill’ [No. 244].

In a covering note sent with the Bill from the India Office to the Viceroy’s
Private Secretary attention was drawn to two points, one whether the Indian
political leaders should be consulted on the terms of the Bill and the other, the
extreme secrecy of the clause relating to the Andaman Islands [No. 189].

With regard to consultation Nehru had written to the Viceroy on 7 June
indicating his hope, and expectation, that the fullest opportunities would be
given to the Indian leaders to see and comment upon drafts of legislation on
matters so closely concerning the future of India [No. 116]. The Viceroy asked

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

to be allowed to give a ‘categorical assurance’ that this would be so and on
receiving a temporising reply from the Secretary of State telegraphed ‘I
consider it absolutely essential that the Indian leaders should be shown the draft’
[N os. 1 15, 138 and 172]. In a Memorandum to the India and Burma Com¬
mittee die Secretary of State advised against showing the text of the Bill but in
favour of oral exposition to the Indian leaders [No. 193]. The India and Burma
Committee in turn decided that there should be consultation with the Opposi¬
tion before reaching any conclusion. In conveying the Committee’s view to the
Viceroy the Secretary of State noted that it would be contrary to Parliamentary
practice to show the text of a Bill to other than members of Parliament before
publication and essential to get Opposition concurrence for such a departure,
and favoured ‘at most’ perusal in the Viceroy’s presence [No. 257]. Nehru
remained firm in his expressions of a wish to be able to study the text of the
Bill in reasonable time, in consultation with colleagues and without undue
restrictions [Nos. 356, 397, 408, 41 1 and 435]. On 30 June the India and Burma
Committee, subject to Opposition concurrence, which was later forthcoming,
concluded that it would not be possible to refuse to comply with the wishes of
the Indian leaders and that it should reasonably be assumed that Parliament
would recognise the existence of special circumstances justifying a departure
from convention [Nos. 421 and 438]. The upshot was that after a certain
amount of correspondence as to who should study the text — Gandhi was
invited at Nehru’s suggestion — and where [Nos. 408, 423, 424, 425, 436 and
439] the Congress and League leaders on 1 July [No. 452] foregathered to do so
in adjoining rooms in the Viceroy’s House ‘for nearly three days (and nights !)’
[No. 506, para. 4] with their comments being forwarded by the Viceroy to the
Secretary of State on 3 July [Nos. 479, 480, 484 and 485; see also Nos. 441,
452, 460 and 463]. The draft Bill itself, as shown to Indian leaders, together with
the changes made to it in the light of their comments, may be studied in
Document No. 428.

The question of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands may be briefly stated. At a
meeting of the India and Burma Committee on 28 May 1947 the Minister of
Defence said the islands were of vital importance in the scheme of Common¬
wealth Defence and the Committee considered nothing should be done to
suggest H.M.G. accepted the view that they could be regarded as an organic
part of British India [Vol. X, No. 553]. It was noted on 10 June in the India
Office that a specific provision would be needed in the Bill if the islands were
not to pass under Indian sovereignty, together with observations on likely
Indian reactions if one were included [No. 132]. The Secretary of State sub¬
mitted the question to the India and Burma Committee [No. 165] and the
Viceroy commented that ‘any attempt by His Majesty’s Government to claim
the Andaman Islands as colonies, to be treated in the same way as Aden, will
cause an absolute flare-up throughout the length and breadth of India’ [No. 162,

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXV11

para. 25]. Despite the representations of the Chiefs of Staff who pressed
strongly for the islands to be retained by Britain for strategic reasons [No. 221]
and the Minister of Defence, the India and Burma Committee concluded that
in the hght of the Viceroy’s opinion it would not be possible to pursue the
suggestion of separating the islands from India [No. 244; for League objection
to placing the islands under Indian as against Pakistani jurisdiction see Nos. 460
and 536].

The Princely States lay outside the scope of the 3 June Statement though
their future was bound to be greatly affected by the British withdrawal,
the transfer of power to Indian successor states and the ending of paramountcy.
On the day, 3 June, the Plan was made public, the Viceroy met with
members of the States Negotiating Committee and underlined some of its con¬
sequences, chief among them being firstly that it was improbable that the two
new dominions would have ‘such loose Centres as that at present envisaged by
the existing Constituent Assembly’ and secondly that the two new dominions
would be ‘voluntarily accepted into the Commonwealth’ which he believed
would be welcome to the States in view of their past associations and loyalties.
In reply to questioning the Viceroy said his instructions were that paramountcy
should lapse on transfer and it was his belief that its impending lapse made
negotiations possible by the States ‘on a basis of complete freedom, even at the
present time’ [No. 43]. On the same day the Nawab of Bhopal resigned as
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes [No. 64] reputedly on the ground that
the Chamber had no further official authority [No. 68]. Nehru accepted that
this was so but maintained that some machinery had to continue to deal with
States’ problems during the transition period if complete administrative chaos
were to be avoided [Nos. 68 and 73].

Briefs were prepared by the Political Department on machinery for deahng
with the questions of common concern between the States and the successor
governments and submitted for consideration at the Viceroy’s ‘Miscellaneous’
Meeting with Indian leaders on 13 June [Nos. 146 and 175]. At its opening
Nehru remarked that this was the first time members of the Interim Govern¬
ment had been invited to discussions concerning the States. There were sharp
exchanges of view on the role of the Crown Representative and the Political
Department Nehru contending, and Sir Conrad Corfield, the Political Adviser,
disputing, that with the impending lapse of paramountcy all other matters dealt
with by them were Government of India matters and would continue. There
were also differences of opinion on whether any State could claim indepen¬
dence, Nehru maintaining this was precluded, Jinnah with Corfield, that it was
not. Agreement was reached upon the advantages firstly of the Government of
India setting up a new ‘States Department’ to deal with matters of common
concern and secondly on a ‘Standstill Formula’, information on both being sent
to Residents on 14 June [Nos. 197 and 198; see also Nos. 196 and 287].

XXV111

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

On 12 June the Nizam of Hyderabad had announced his intention not to send
representatives to either Constituent Assembly, and stated that on the departure
of the Paramount Power, he would in law become Sovereign with any rela¬
tionship to the successor states to be determined later [No. 163]. Sir Walter
Monckton, acting for the Nizam, expressed himself as very troubled about
how ‘shamefully’ H.M.G. were treating old friends and allies, something of
which the British people should know, and indicated that, while he had made
it plain to the Nizam that H.M.G. would not consider Hyderabad entering the
Commonwealth as a dominion, he asked for modification of the Viceroy’s
statement to the effect that there could be ‘no negotiation between H.M.G. and
the States’ [No. 199]. He discussed with Ismay the possibility of proceeding by
way of a Parliamentary question and answer, drafts of both being sent to the
Secretary of State [No. 261 ; see also No. 296]. On 17 June Jinnah reaffirmed his
view on States’ sovereignty [No. 225] and in face of Congress criticism the
Maharaja of Travancore decided upon a declaration of independence on the
lapse of paramountcy [No. 226, and see also No. 295]. On 19 June Nehru set out
Congress views in a letter to Lord Ismay so that ‘there should be clarity about
this matter’. It was, he wrote, of the highest importance that the States should
‘fit properly into the picture of India’ ; it was quite inconceivable for a State to
become independent in the legal sense; it was bad enough for India to be
partitioned without being ‘Balkanised’ [No. 264]. H.M.G.’s views on the lapse
of paramountcy were questioned on the grounds of excess rigidity on the
Congress side as may be seen in an exchange of letters between Rajagopalachari
and Cripps [Nos. 107 and 303]. On 20 June the Viceroy forwarded a letter from
the Nawab of Bhopal for the Prime Minister with the observation that while
Congress would never have agreed to the Plan if there had been more than two
dominions ‘some of the States feel very unhappy, particularly . . . Hyderabad
and Bhopal’ [No. 273]. A memorandum on the constitution of the proposed
States Department was sent to Nehru on 21 June [No. 288] and on 25 June the
Indian Cabinet decided that it should be established [No. 338]. On 26 Tune the
India and Burma Committee decided in respect of the proposed parliamentary
question and answer that no new statement should be made on the ground that
if H.M.G. admitted at this stage that they were prepared to maintain separate
relations with States they would be charged with disintegrating India [No. 360;
see also No. 326]. The Viceroy visited Kashmir 18-23 June, with accounts of
his conversations being given in a note of 22 June [No. 294], a record of an
interview with Nehru [No. 319] and in the Viceroy’s Personal Report of
27 June [No. 369, para 30]. Arrangements for a visit by Gandhi to Kashmir
were being made [Nos. 369, para 31, 386 and 387].

Matters arising from the forthcoming transfer of power were the subject of
communication with Tibet and Bhutan [No. 245] while Afghan expressions of
interest in the future of the North-West Frontier Province and its people elicited

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXIX

uncompromising rejoinder [Nos. 140, 212, 272, 309, 377, 395, 431 and 483].

An issue of considerable constitutional moment, latent for some time, was
brought to the point of decision by the testing of an assumption implicit in the
provisions of the Bill. It related to the office of Governor-General in the two
new dominions. On 17 May Nehru had conveyed Congress wishes that Mount-
batten should continue as Governor-General of India and he hoped for an
interim period of both dominions. The Viceroy had indicated acceptance of the
invitation in respect of India but pointed out how difficult it would be for him
to remain on as Governor-General of one Dominion only. The Viceroy soun¬
ded outjinnah with Liaquat Ali Khan. Jinnah was opposed to the suggestion of
a common Governor-General and thought it would be better to have two
Governors-General with Mountbatten as a supreme arbitrator responsible for
the division of assets between the two Dominions. Mountbatten indicated
objections and said that he could not consider taking such a post, but asked
Jinnah to send him a letter giving a full description of his suggestion of a
supreme arbitrator. No such letter was ever written [No. 521 for summary;
see also Vol. X, Nos. 471 and 473]. On 18 June the Secretary of State in com¬
menting upon the text of the draft Bill suggested that the Viceroy should
consult appropriate representatives of India and Pakistan enquiring whether or
not they wished Mountbatten to serve as Governor-General of each of the new
dominions after 15 August [No. 256]. On 23 June the Reforms Commissioner,
V. P. Menon, pointed out that it was apparent from the relevant provision of
the Draft Bill that the India Office was assuming that the Viceroy would be
invited by Congress and League to become Governor-General of each of the
new dominions when power was transferred and advised that the correctness of
the assumption ought to be tested as far as Jinnah was concerned as a matter of
urgency [No. 308]. On the same day the Viceroy made enquiry of Jinnah of his
wishes both in respect of the first Governor-General of Pakistan and of Gover¬
nors of the Pakistan Provinces [No. 3 11]. Jinnah deferred an answer both then
and again, to the Viceroy’s astonishment, on 2 July [No. 457]. Eventually, on
the evening of 2 July, Jinnah told the Viceroy that while he wished to have
British Governors in every Province except Sind and had already agreed to the
heads of the Pakistan Defence Services being British he wished, partly by way of
counter-balance, to be himself first Governor-General of Pakistan [Nos. 470
and 506, paras. 23-25].

The advantages and disadvantages of the Viceroy staying on as Governor-
General of India alone and of other possible courses of action were set out at a
Staff Meeting on 2 July [No. 470]. The following day after spending four hours
trying to make Jinnah ‘realise the advantages that Pakistan would gain from
having the same Governor-General as India for the initial period, until partition
is complete’, the Viceroy cabled the Prime Minister to let him have fore¬
warning of ‘the appalling problem’ facing him of whether to accept Nehru’s

XXX

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

offer to stay on as Governor-General of India or 'whether to pull out on August
15th’ [No. 483; see also following telegram to Prime Minister No. 508]. The
Viceroy decided that Ismay should go to London taking with him a paper
setting out the history of the Governor-Generalship question as background
No. 521] and a second paper setting out the reasons for and against Mount-
batten’s staying on as Governor-General of India [No. 522]. Lady Mountbatten
contributed a further appraisal [No. 524; see also Nos. 545, 551, 557, 558, 561].
The Secretary of State composed a minute to which was attached a note from
the India Office on the Situation if there are Two Governors-General from 15th
August, for the Prime Minister [No. 562; see also No. 563 for a critique of the
India Office note by the P.M.’s P.S.] and the issue was considered by the India
and Burma Committee on 7 July, the Prime Minister remarking that it was no
easy matter for H.M.G. to decide what advice to give Lord Mountbatten but
that for his part he felt ‘there were decisive arguments in favour of pressing him
to accept the invitation of the Congress leaders to become Governor-General of
India’. Members of the Committee concurred and further agreed that a state¬
ment be made by the Prime Minister on the Second Reading of the Indian
Independence Bill and the Opposition consulted [No. 564].

The question that arose on the filling of the offices of Governor-General
derived its importance from the Commonwealth foundation of the 3 June
Statement. That had implications outside as well as within India. At the
constitutional apex there was the Prime Minister’s advice to the King that as
from the date of the transfer of power, when inter alia the Paramountcy of the
Crown over the Indian Princes would cease, the Royal Title should be varied
through provision of the Indian Independence Act by the omission of the
words ‘Emperor of India’, a change to which the King gave assent and which
under the Statute of Westminster further required the concurrence, which was
forthcoming, of dominion governments and parliaments [Nos. 164, 184, 203
and 322 with note 3]. At the first meeting of a newly appointed Cabinet
Committee on Commonwealth Relations held on 2 June there was approval of
the idea of the appointment of a Secretary of State charged with responsibility
for Commonwealth Relations which would include not only relations with the
existing dominions but also countries such as Ceylon, Burma and India if they
desired to retain a link with the Commonwealth [No. 31]. On 9 June at the
second meeting of the Committee, the Prime Minister suggested there should
be a review at Ministerial level of the status and inter-relationship of different
parts of the British Commonwealth with reference to the possibility that India
as a republic might desire membership [No. 118]. On 12 June the Prime
Minister enquired of dominion Prime Ministers whether they would be
agreeable to a change in the title of the Dominions Office to Commonwealth
Relations (or Affairs) Office which would have the advantage of making easier
the conduct of relations with India and possibly other Asian members [No.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXXI

1 66]. The proposal was ‘warmly welcomed’ by Dominion Governments as
well as being thought acceptable to successor Indian Governments [Nos. 443
and 451]. Dominion governments were kept informed of developments and
evinced a warmly welcoming interest in the 3 June Anno uncement with its
prospect of India’s Commonwealth membership [Nos. 62 , 63 with note, 87 and
89].

A further proposition was later laid before them. On learning that the Bill
was to be entitled ‘The Indian Independence Bill’ the Leader of the Opposition,
Mr Churchill, indicated ‘much concern’. The correct title, he thought, was
The Indian Dominions Bill’ [No. 445]. The India and Burma Committee
agreed that despite likely Opposition criticism no change should be made but
thought it would be very helpful if some expression of support could be ob¬
tained from the Dominion Prime Ministers [No. 465]. The Prime Minister
had enquiries made of his Dominion colleagues [No. 481] but with Mackenzie
King mindful of the diplomatic exertions required ‘to coax’ General Hertzog
out of the use of the word ‘independent’ in 1926 [No. 488] ; the Labour Prime
Ministers of Australia and New Zealand not happy in the first instance about the
use of the word and in the second about the opening it might give to the
Opposition [Nos. 492 and 494] and General Smuts finding the use in a South
African setting ‘regrettable and embarrassing’ [No. 531] there was nothing to
be done, despite assurances of dominion goodwill, but to withdraw as gracefully
as might be [Nos. 512 and 555].

The Bill was published on 4 July and the following day the Reforms Com¬
missioner held a Press Conference with Sardar Patel in the chair [No. 542]. It
was reported that first reactions in India were ‘extremely favourable’, the
Statesman commenting ‘there is that master stroke, the title: the Indian Inde¬
pendence Act, 1947’ [Nos. 542 and 543].

By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents reproduced in
this volume, are drawn from the official archives of the India Office in the
custody of the India Office Records or from the Mountbatten Papers.

The documents reproduced from the India Office Records are from the
following series of which the three most important are asterisked :

Economic Department Files (including Communications and
Overseas Department)

Financial Department Collections
Information Department Files
Private Office Papers

Political Department Miscellaneous (including Governors’ Re¬
ports)

Political Department Files
Political Department Collections
Political Department Transfer of Power Papers

L/E/8

L/F/y

L/I/i

*L/PO
L/P Sc] Is

L/P&J/y
L/P &J/8
*L/P &J/10

XXX11

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

L/P &S/12 External Department Collections
L/P&S/13 Political ‘Internal’ Department Collections
L/S &G/ 7 Services and General Department Collections
L/WS/i War Staff Files
R/i Crown Representative’s Records

*R/3/i Papers of the Office of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy2
Every document in these series is referred to in the text by the appropriate
series notation followed by the number assigned to the particular file, collection,
or volume in which the document is filed or bound. Thus the notation L/P &J/
10/40 refers to the fortieth file in the series called Political Department Transfer
of Power Papers. Each document in a file, collection, or volume is identified
by a folio reference.

The Editors are indebted to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives Settle¬
ment for the loan of their microfilms of those official and demi-official Indian
Papers of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma which are in their custody and for
permission to make copies of documents from those microfilms. Documents
from this source are cited in the present Volume as the ‘Mountbatten Papers’.

Some documents, not in any of these archives, have been obtained from
elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office.3 The
Editors have also consulted those papers of Sir Stafford Cripps which are now
in the keeping of the Public Record Office, and those of Sir John Tyson,
I.C.S., in the India Office Records, and one or two documents from these
sources have been included.

The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the
Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One
category of telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the
letter ‘S’, or ‘S.C.’ if the Viceroy was at Simla or in Camp i.e. on tour. During
the Viceroy’s visit to Kashmir telegrams sent from there carried the suffix ‘K’
while those sent from Delhi by the Viceroy’s staff continued to carry the suffix
‘S’. Another category consisted of ‘U’ telegrams, which were reserved for the
most secret and personal matters, the letter ‘U’ indicating the nature of the
telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a ‘Secret’ or ‘Private’
prefix. ‘U’ telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private
Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Some ‘S’ or ‘S.C.’ telegrams
were marked ‘Superintendent Series’ which indicated to Superintendents of
Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.
Certain changes in the channels of communication between the Viceroy and the
Secretary of State, made at the beginning of Lord Wavell’s Viceroyalty, may
be studied in the Appendix to Volume IV, and a small alteration in these ar-

2 This series includes three files (R/3/1/176-8) from the Office of the Secretary to the Governor of the
Punjab.

3 A file (R/30/1/11) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXX111

rangements — made with regard to the likely wishes of members of an. Interim
Government — is recorded in the Appendix to Volume VIII.

It may also be helpful to mention that of the Papers and Minutes of the India
and Burma Committee of the Cabinet those relating solely to Burma are
excluded as treating of matters outside the scope of this Series.

In conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge once again the friendly
assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office
Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Director,
Mr B. C. Bloomfield, and the Deputy Archivist, Mr Martin I. Moir.

N. MANSERGH
PENDEREL MOON

A.D.C.

A.F.P.F.L.

A.F.R.C.

A.G.

A.G.G.

A.H.Q.

A.I.C.C.

A.I.S.P.C.

A.O.A.

A.O.C.-in-C.

A.P.S.V.

A.R.D.Tp

A. R.P.

B. B.C.

Bde Gps

B. T.I.

C. A.

C.-in-C.

C.C.C.

C.G.S.

C.I.D.

C.I.G.S.

Coy

C.P.

C. P.W.D.

c.v.s.

D. B.S.T.

D. C.G.S.
D.I.B.

D.I.G.

D.P.R.

D. P.S.V.

E. A. and
C.R.D.

E.C.O.

Abbreviations

Aide-de-Camp

Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (Burma)

Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee
Adjutant-General ; Accountant-General
Agent to the Governor-General
Army Headquarters ; Air Headquarters
All-India Congress Committee
All-India States’ People’s Conference
Air Officer in charge of Administration
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Army Remount Depot Troop
Air Raid Precautions

British Broadcasting Corporation
Brigade Groups
British Troops in India

Constituent Assembly

Commander-in-Chief

Central Constitutional Committee

Chief of the General Staff

Criminal Investigation Department

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Company

Central Provinces

Central Public Works Department

Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff

Double British Summer Time
Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Director of the Intelligence Bureau
Deputy Inspector-General
Director of Public Relations
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy

External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department

Emergency Commission Officer

ABBREVIATIONS

XXXV

F.A.D. &S.

Financial Adviser Defence and Supply

F.O.

Foreign Office

G.C.M.G.

Knight Grand Cross of St Michael and St George

G.G.

Governor-General

G.H.Q.

General Headquarters

G.M.T.

Greenwich Mean Time

G.O.C.

General Officer Commanding

G.R.

Gurkha Rifles

G.S.

Governor’s Secretary; General Staff

H.E.

His Excellency

H.E.H.

His Exalted Flighness

H.H.

His Highness

H.M.

His Majesty; Honourable Member

H.M.G.

His Majesty’s Government

H.Q.

Headquarters

I. A.

Indian Army

I.C.S.

Indian Civil Service

I.D.C.

Imperial Defence College

I.E.F.C.

International Emergency Food Council

I.N.A.

Indian National Army

I.P.

Indian Police

I.S.T.

Indian Standard Time

J.P.S.V.

Joint Private Secretary to the Viceroy

M.F.A.

Minister for Foreign Affairs

M.L.A.

Member of the Legislative Assembly

M.S.V.

Military Secretary to the Viceroy

N.H.Q.

Naval Headquarters

N.W.F.P.

North -W est Frontier Province

P.M.

Prime Minister

P.Q.

Parliamentary Question

P.R.O.

Public Relations Officer; Public Record Office

P.S.V.

Private Secretary to the Viceroy

P. & T.

Posts and Telegraphs

Q.M.G.

Quarter-Master General

XXXVI

ABBREVIATIONS

R.A.F.

Royal Air Force

RAJ RIF

Raj pu tana Rifles

R.I.

Rex Imperator

R.I.A.F.

Royal Indian Air Force

R.I.N.

Royal Indian Navy

R.N.

Royal Navy

R.S.S.S.

Rashtriya Sway am Sevak Sangh

S.E.A.C.

South-East Asia Command

U.K.

United Kingdom

U.N.O.

United Nations Organisation

U.P.

United Provinces

U.S.A.

United States of America

U.S.S.R.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V.C.I.G.S.

Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff

V.C.N.S.

Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff

V.C.P.

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

W.C.

Working Committee

W.M. &P.

Works, Mines and Power

Principal Holders of Office

United Kingdom

cabinet

Members of the India and Burma Committee are italicised.1

Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury

Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House of Commons
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Minister without Portfolio
Chancellor of the Exchequer
President of the Board of Trade
Minister of Defence
Lord Chancellor
Secretary of State for the Home
Department

Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs (Commonwealth Relations
from 3 July 1947) and Leader of the
House of Lords
Secretary of State for Scotland
Secretary of State for the Colonies
Secretary of State for India and for
Burma

Minister of Labour and National
Service

Minister of Fuel and Power

Minister of Health

Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries

Minister of Education

Lord Privy Seal

Mr Clement Attlee

Mr Herbert Morrison

Mr Ernest Bevin
Mr Arthur Greenwood
Mr Hugh Dalton
Sir Stafford Cripps
Mr A. V. Alexander
Viscount Jowitt
Mr J. Chuter Ede

Viscount Addison

Mr J. Westwood
Mr A. Creech Jones
Earl of Lis tow el

Mr G. A. Isaacs

Mr E. Shinwell
Mr Aneurin Bevan
Mr T. Williams
Mr George Tomlinson
Lord Inman

1 In addition the following were also members of the Committee: Mr Hugh Dalton (for financial
questions only), Mr C. P. Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs),
Mr A. G. Bottomley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs), Mr Arthur
Henderson (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and for Burma), and Lord Chorley.
P.R.O. CAB. 21/1739.

XXXV111

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

OTHER MINISTERS

Minister of Transport
Minister of Food
Minister of Works
Attorney-General
Parliamentary Secretary to the
Treasury and Chief Whip

MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

Mr Alfred Barnes
Mr John Strachey
Mr. C. W. Key
Sir Hartley Shawcross
Mr W. Whiteley

INDIA

Secretary of State
Permanent Under-Secretary

Parliamentary Under-Secretary
Deputy Under-Secretary
Assistant Under-Secretaries

Private Secretary to the Secretary of
State

OFFICE

Earl of Listowel

Sir David Monteath

Sir Archibald Carter (from 25 June

1947)

Mr Arthur Henderson
Sir William Croft
Sir Paul Patrick
Mr G. H. Baxter
Mr R. M. J. Harris

Viceroy, Governor-General and
Crown Representative
Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff
Principal Secretary to the Viceroy
Private Secretary to the Viceroy

Reforms Commissioner

India

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Lord Ismay
Sir Eric Mieville
Mr G. E. B. Abell (cr. K.C.I.E.

25 June 1947)

Mr V. P. Menon

INTERIM GOVERNMENT

External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations
Finance

Home, Information and Broadcasting,
and (from 5 July 1947) States
Commerce
Food and Agriculture
Communications
Education and Arts
Industries and Supplies
Transport
Health

(executive council)
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

Mr I. I. Chundrigar
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
Mr C. Rajagopalachari
Dr John Matthai
Mr Ghazanfar Ah Khan

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

XXXIX

Defence

Labour

Works, Mines and Power
Law

Sardar Baldev Singh
Mr Jagjivan Ram
Mr C. H. Bhabha
Mr Jogendra Nadi Mandal

special (i.e. partition) committee (12-26 June 1947)
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar

PARTITION COUNCIL (from 27 JUNE 1947)

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Dr Rajendra Prasad

GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES

Madras

Bombay

Bengal

United Provinces
Punjab

Central Provinces and Berar

Assam

Bihar

North-West Frontier Province

Orissa

Sind

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald
Nye

Sir John Colville
Sir Frederick Burrows
Sir Francis Wylie I.C.S.

Sir Evan Jenkins I.C.S.

Sir Frederick Bourne I.C.S.

Sir M. S. A. Flydari I.C.S.

Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.

Sir Olaf Caroe I.C.S.
Lieutenant-General Sir Rob
Lockhart (acting from 26 June 1947)
Sir Chandulal Trivedi I.C.S.

Sir Francis Mudie I.C.S.

PRIME MINISTERS (PREMIERS) OF PROVINCES

Mr O. P. Ramaswamy Reddiar
Mr B. G. Kher
Mr H. S. Suhrawardy
United Provinces Pandit G. B. Pant

Central Provinces and Berar Pandit R. S. Shukla

Madras

Bombay

Bengal

xl

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

Assam

Bihar

North-West Frontier Province

Orissa

Sind

Mr Gopinath Bardoloi

Mr Sri Krishna Sinha

Dr Khan Sahib

Mr Harekrishna Mahtab

Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah

The Punjab was administered by the Governor under Section 93 of the Govern
ment of India Act 1935.

Chronological Table of Principal Events

June

1

2

3

4

5-7

9

12

13

15

17

18-23

1947

Mountbatten, accompanied by Governor of Punjab, visits riot
torn areas of Gurgaon District

Mountbatten meets Indian leaders and gives them
Partition Plan

Indian leaders indicate acquiescence in Partition Plan
at resumed meeting with Mountbatten
Mountbatten meets States Negotiating Committee
and gives them Plan

Mountbatten gives broadcast on Plan over All India
Radio

(3.30 pm Double British Summer Time)

H.M.G.’s Statement on Indian Policy containing
Partition Plan is broadcast over All India Radio and
read out by Prime Minister to House of Commons
and by Secretary of State to House of Lords
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh give broadcasts on
Plan over All India Radio
Bhopal resigns as Chancellor of Chamber of Princes
Mountbatten gives Press Conference on Plan
Mountbatten discusses partition machinery with Indian leaders
and Indian Cabinet

All-India Muslim League Council authorise Jinnah ‘to accept the
fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise’

First meeting of Partition Committee

Nizam of Hyderabad issues Firman announcing decision not to
send representatives to either Constituent Assembly
Agreement at meeting between Mountbatten and Indian leaders
that Government of India should set up a States Department
Draft ‘Indian Dominions Bill’ is circulated to India and Burma
Committee and despatched to Mountbatten
All-India Congress Committee ‘accepts the proposals embodied
in the announcement of June 3’

India and Burma Committee considers draft Bill for first time
and agrees, inter alia, to Attlee’s suggestion that it should be
called the ‘Indian Independence Bill’

Mountbatten visits Kashmir

10 am1

10 am

4 Pm
7 pm
7.10 pm

1 Indian Standard Time unless otherwise stated.

xlii

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

June

20

21

23

25

26

27

29

30

July

1-3

2

3

4

5

7

Votes in Bengal Legislative Assembly result in decision that
Province should be partitioned
Gandhi and Nehru visit refugee camps at Hardwar, Punjab
Votes in Punjab Legislative Assembly result in decision that
Province should be partitioned
Indian Cabinet agrees to establish States Department
Sind Legislative Assembly decides that Province should join
Pakistan Constituent Assembly

Partition Committee agrees that it should be replaced by Parti¬
tion Council

Attlee reports to Cabinet that ‘the main lines of the Bill were now
settled’

Partition Council meets for first time

Representatives of Baluchistan decide that Province should join
Pakistan Constituent Assembly

Announcement of appointment and terms of reference of
Boundary Commissions for Bengal and the Punjab
Attlee discusses draft Bill with Opposition leaders
Partition Council agrees on establishment of Joint Defence
Council

Leaders of Congress and Muslim League examine draft Bill
Jinnah informs Mountbatten that he (Jinnah) wishes to become
Governor-General of Pakistan

India and Burma Committee finalise terms of Bill in light of
Congress and League comments
Indian Independence Bill is published

Announcement of appointment of RadclifFe as Chairman of both
Boundary Commissions

On coming into being of States Department, Patel makes
statement containing assurances to States regarding future
Ismay leaves for London to discuss with H.M.G. question whether
Mountbatten should remain as Governor General of India only
After discussion with Ismay, India and Burma Committee
express hope that Mountbatten would be prepared to accept
Congress nomination to become Governor-General of India

Summary of Documents

Chapter

1 The 3 June Plan . Meetings with Indian leaders; preliminary
discussions on arrangements for partition; League and Congress
resolutions on Plan: 31 May to 15 June 1947

2 Provincial Decisions on Partition. Continuing discussions on
partition arrangements; problems of law and order in the
Punjab; decisions on Plan in Bengal, Punjab and Sind Legislative
Assemblies: 16 June to 26 June 1947

3 Implementation of the Plan. Establishment of Partition Council;
crisis over reconstitution of Executive Council; question of the
Governor-Generalship: 26 June to 7 July 1947

4 The Indian Independence Bill

5 The States

Page

xliv

lxv

lxxviii

c

cxiv

xliv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

The 3 June Plan . Meetings with Indian leaders; preliminary discussions on

arrangements for partition ;

League

31 May to 15 June 1947

Name and Number

Date

1947

May

1 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

3i

V.C.P. 58

2 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fourth 31
Staff Meeting
Items 1-7

3 Ismay to Mountbatten 31

Minute

4 Nehru to Mountbatten 3 1

Letter

5 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fifth 31
Staff Meeting
Items 2-3

6 Cabinet India and Burma 3 1

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)91

7 Cabinet India and Burma 31

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)94

and Congress resolutions on Plan :

Main subject or subjects Page

Circulates alternative versions of broadcast 1
to be made by Mountbatten on 3 June
depending whether it appears probable
that Bengal would be partitioned or remain
unified

(1) Viceroy’s broadcast; (2) prospects of 1

Bengal remaining united with status

similar to that of Indian State; future of
Calcutta; (3) movement of troops to
Punjab; (4) Gandhi’s recent utterances;

(5) appointment of Governor (s) General;

(6) Timetable of events; (7) best means of
persuading Jinnah to accept plan for transfer
of power

Submits draft briefs for (1) Mountbatten’s 6

opening speech at conference with Indian
leaders on 2 June; (2) his talk with Jinnah
Asks that Kripalani, as Congress President, 1 1
be invited to the Conference on 2 June
despite any objections raised by Jinnah;
offers to stand down himself to enable
meeting to be kept small

(2) Mountbatten accepts minimum force 12

rule in suppression of disturbances;

arranges question to be put at his Press
Conference to enable him to state that
Interim Govt unanimously of opinion that
violence could not be tolerated;

(3) government of Bengal after announcement
is made

Memorandum by Listowel commenting on 13
Nehru’s interview with Norman Cliff (Vol.

X, No. 560, Enclosure (iii))

Memorandum by Listowel drawing 15

attention to wide powers recommended for
Centre by reports of Union Powers and
Advisory Committees of Constituent
Assembly; suggests authors had given up any
idea of securing Muslim League
participation, and points out possible adverse
effect on willingness of States to adhere
to Union

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlv

Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

Name and Number

May

8 Mackenzie King to Attlee 3 1

Tel. 109 via Canadian High

Commissioner in London and
Dominions Office

9 Nehru to Mountbatten 31

Letter

10 Suhrawardy to Mieville 31

Letter

1 1 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 3 1
Letter

12 Jenkins to Mountbatten 31

Letter 678

13 Mountbatten to Listowel 31

Tel. 1221-S

14 Caroe to Mountbatten 31

Tel. CA/99

15 Mountbatten to Provincial 31

Governors
Tel. 1223-S

Sends assurance of Canadian Govt’s 18

goodwill; suggests Royal style and titles
might be discussed at conference of
Commonwealth P.Ms

Suggests that a Commission should meet the 19
Jirgas and a referendum be held in Quetta
Municipality to ascertain wishes of people ot
Baluchistan regarding future of that
Province

Reports points made by Jinnah in interview 20
with him, particularly need for referendum
in Bengal and for Calcutta to become a
free city

Has visited Gurgaon with Ghazanfar Ali 20

Khan; asserts that disturbances there are
pre-meditated plan to suppress Muslim Meo
community and that troops from Alwar
and Bharatpur are involved; urges that
Indian rulers should be warned to keep
their subjects out of disturbances, that more
military forces of mixed communal
composition should be sent to assist, and
that machine-gunning from air should be
considered

Communal tension amounting to mass 23

hysteria throughout Punjab ; situation in
Lahore and Amritsar, where during last
fortnight authorities defeated by incendiarism,
and Gurgaon; interviews with Liaquat,

Baldev Singh, Nehru (who thought there
might be a short ‘civil war’ in Punjab)
and Swaran Singh; visiting members of
Central Government behave ‘as communal
leaders and not as responsible Ministers’ ;
growth of communal feeling in Services
including High Court Judges ; conference
with senior military, police and civil
officers on security arrangements for 3 June
announcement; crime prevention; food
situation

Final amendments to text of draft 27

announcement

Reports on negotiations between Congress 28
and League leaders possibly for coalition
ministry

Outlines background to, and implications 29
of, accelerated programme for transfer of
power on basis of Dominion Status;
indicates action to be taken in particular
provinces

xlvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

1 6

17

18

19

20

22

23

June

Mountbatten to Liaquat Ali Kban 1

Letter 133/14

Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Sixth 1

Staff Meeting
Items 2 and 4

Mountbatten to Burrows 1

Tel. 1237-S

Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1249-S

Unsigned Note undated

Thompson to Corfield 2

Minute

Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 2
Indian Leaders
First Day

Refers to No. 11; has himself visited
Gurgaon and informed himself of position;
describes action being taken on two of
points mentioned in No. 1 1
(2) Procedure for British Baluchistan to
decide which Constituent Assembly it
would join; (4) Suhrawardy’s letter (No. 10)
Acknowledges No. 554 in Vol. X;
requests views on necessity of going into
Section 93 in Bengal ; prospects of forming
coalition government to work out
partition and Suhrawardy’s plea for
Calcutta to be made free city
Proposes to insert references to Gandhi in
his broadcast

Report of discussion between V. P. Menon
and Patel on: Calcutta; procedure at
meeting with Indian leaders; titles for
Princes; Interim Govt issue; States
Reports interview with Raja of Faridkot
in which latter stated that Kartar Singh was
ready to reach agreement with Jinnah for
inclusion of ‘Khalistan’ within Pakistan, but
admitted split in Sikh leadership
Mountbatten in opening speech refers
inter alia to following points : world
importance of occasion; terrific sense of
urgency in effecting transfer of power ;

Muslim League rejection of Cabinet Mission
Plan (Jinnah signifies assent) ; differing
views of parties on principle of partition
and its implications; Cabinet and opposition
views; position of Sikhs; reasons for rejecting
referendum in Calcutta; new para. 20 in
statement (No. 45) providing for early transfer
of power on Dominion Status basis;
procedure for appointment of Governors-
General. Copies of statement handed round
and Mountbatten asks for reactions of
Working Committees by midnight that
night; explains he does not ask either side
specifically for agreement to it, but
requests assurances from both that they
would do their best to help work it out
peacefully; Nehru states Congress did not
approve, but did accept, plan and Viceroy
would receive that evening letter giving
Working Committee’s reaction; Jinnah
states that his Working Committee could
not commit League as a whole to acceptance
which would have to come later but

3i

32

35

36

37

38

39

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlvii

Name and Number

Date

June

Main subject or subjects

23 (cont.)

24 Record of Interview between 2

Mountbatten and Gandhi

25 Rowlatt to Simpson 2

Letter

26 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Seventh 2

Staff Meeting
Item 2

27 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1258-S

28 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 2

V.C.P. 63

29 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 7105

30 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 66

31 Cabinet Committee 2

Gen. 186/ist Meeting

32 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)29th Meeting
Minutes 4-5

promises personal support for plan; feels
unable to report his Working Committee’s
opinions in writing but will report verbally
to Viceroy. Agreement that Mountbatten
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh should
each make broadcasts following day
Gandhi observing day of silence; hands
Mountbatten a note in which he denies
having said ‘one word’ against him; wishes
to talk about one or two things ‘but not
today’ ; conveys Ghaffar Khan’s request for
Caroe’s removal, recommending it ‘If it
can be done decorously’

Encloses letter to Wilson Smith pointing
out that assumption apparently made in
C.-in-C.’s paper on division of Indian
Army (Vol. X, No. 547) that a common
Governor General could in some degree
be responsible to H.M.G. in London, cut
across fundamental conception of Dominion
Status embodied in draft India Bill
Consideration of procedures whereby
people of Baluchistan could make a choice
about adherence to the existing or a new
Constituent Assembly
Summarises No. 23 ; believes ‘God must
be on our side’ since it was Gandhi’s day
of silence (see No. 24)

Circulates paper on Administrative
Consequences of Partition listing matters
for decision to enable partition to be put
into effect and making proposals for
administrative machinery to perform task;
prefatory note indicates intention to
transfer power by 15 August
Arrangements to enable Ranee to inform
Aung Sang of general outline of
announcement before it is made public
Opposes insertion in Broadcast proposed
in No. 19.

Discussion of paper on Future of India
and Burma Offices and concurrence in its
recommendation that the work of these
Offices and Dominions Office should
become reponsibility of a new Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations
Note taken of amended text of
announcement; agreement on text of
Attlee’s broadcast

Page

48

48

5i

52

53

59

59

60

63

xlviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

33 Burrows to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 142-S

34 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 7132

35 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 3

V.C.P. 64

36 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 3

V.C.P. 65

37 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1276-S

38 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1277-S

39 Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 3

Indian Leaders
Second Day

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to No. 18; may be forced into 64

Section 93 position for short time;
indicates likely courses of action in other
eventualities ; now too late to declare
Calcutta a free city

To forestall questions in Parliament asks 65

for information as to Working Committee’s
acceptance of plan and attitude to transfer
of power on Dominion basis
Ciculates letter from Kripalani which 66

states : Congress has consistently upheld
unity of India and any separation of part
painful to contemplate, but Working
Committee accept proposed announcement
as variation of Cabinet Mission Plan and
in order to achieve fmal settlement ; this is
dependent on Muslim League acceptance
and on clear understanding no further
claims will be put forward ; draws
attention to particular points, including
the predicament of Sikhs, and need for
referendum in N.W.F.P. to provide for
independence option; Committee will
recommend ‘acceptance generally’ of
H.M.G.’s statement ‘as a settlement of our
political and communal problems’

Circulates letter from Baldev Singh which 69
states: Sikhs have always stood for a
united India and are unable to contemplate
being forced into sovereign state likely to be
based on Islamic principles ; plan for division
of India must ensure that Sikh community
is not irreparably injured; brings certain
matters to notice including Sikh fears
regarding formation of Interim Ministries in
Punjab and views on Boundary
Commission ; accepts ‘principle of division
as laid down in the plan’ with the hope
that views expressed above will be met in
Boundary Commission’s terms of reference
Refers to No. 34 and No. 38; suggests 71

formula for use in Parliament on reactions
of parties

Reports terms in which Congress Working 71
Committee and Sikhs have accepted plan
and on interview with Jinnah; summarises
reactions to para, on Dominion Status
Mountbatten reports reactions of Working 72
Committees to plan; Jinnah, Kripalani
and Baldev Singh state they consider he
has ‘correctly interpreted and recorded

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlix

Name and Number Date

June

39 (cont.)

40 Mountbatten to Attlee 3

Tel. 1282-S via India Office

41 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 317-G.T.

42 Cabinet 3

C.M.(47)5ist Conclusions

Minute 1

44 Text of Mountbatten’s Broadcast 3

45 Statement by H.M.G. on Indian 3

Policy

46 Text of Nehru’s Broadcast 3

47 Text of Jinnah’s Broadcast 3

48 Text of Baldev Singh’s Broadcast 3

Main subject or subjects Page

their views’ ; all concur in need to restrain
subordinates from making speeches of
recrimination; discussion of Gandhi’s
speeches; paper on The Administrative
Consequences of Partition handed round (see
No. 28, Annex II); initial reactions to it;
division of armed forces; agreement to
defer Sterling Balances negotiations
Reports virtual acceptance of plan by 78

leaders of all three parties

Transmits small amendment (made at 79

Jinnah’s request) to his broadcast;
indicates order of broadcasts that evening
Attlee communicates Mountbatten’s 79

report that plan had been favourably
received by Indian leaders

Explains background to plan; states that 86

need for earliest possible transfer of power is
reason for adoption of Dominion Status
solution; notes that special function of
India Office will no longer have to be
carried out; refers to freedom of new
Dominions to decide their relationship to
each other and to British Commonwealth;
appeals for peace

Full text of Statement as published 89

Reviews events since Interim Government’s 94
assumption of office; commends British
Government proposals ‘with no joy in my
heart’; appeals for end to violence; India
will seek to build anew relations with
England on friendly and cooperative basis
Appeals to every community and 97

particularly Muslims to maintain peace
and order; does not wish to prejudge
decision of League Council whether plan
should be accepted as compromise but
reaction in League circles in Delhi has been
hopeful; since plan provides for referendum
in N.W.F.P. calls for end of civil disobedience
there and for verdict in favour of Pakistan ;
appreciates sufferings of all Muslims who
had participated in movement, and hopes
for peaceful referendum

Comments on troubled background in 99

country to announcement of plan; commends
its acceptance as a settlement; urges all
communities to turn from past quarrels to
build for future; refers to strong measures
taken to enforce law and order; expresses

1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

48 ( cont .)

49 Mountbatten to Nehru 3

Letter 1446/2

50 Mountbatten to Patel 3

Letter

51 Patel to Mountbatten 3

Letter

52 Bevin to Listowel 3

Letter F 6535/905/G

53 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1284-S

54 Mountbatten to Burrows 3

Tel. 1287-S

55 Abell to Turnbull 3

Tel. 1288-S

56 Attlee to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 7185 via India Office

57 Text of Attlee’s Broadcast 3

58 Krishna Menon to Mountbatten 4

Letter

59 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s Press 4

Conference

60 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s Press 4

Conference

61 Nehru to Mountbatten 4

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

encouragement and support for servicemen
engaged in these duties

Asks him to tell Khan Sahib that C.-in-C. is 101
being asked to provide nine British Officers
to supervise referendum in N.W.F.P.

Invites Patel as Member in charge of 102

Information to take chair at Press

Conference

Protests at partisan references to N.W.F.P. 102
injinnah’s broadcast

Refers to Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2 and 103
requests reconsideration of decision not to
include in treaty with India provision to
ensure future observance by India of
certain treaties concluded in the name of the
Crown or the U.K. Govt

Refers to No. 38; describes how he has 104

dealt with points raised by leaders between
the two meetings and summarises
proceedings at second

Refers to No. 33 ; now appears League will 106
acquiesce in scheme; hopes Burrows will be
able to persuade Suhrawardy to form
coalition

Congress will not object to use of term 107

‘Dominion’ in Bill

Refers to No. 40 and conveys Cabinet's 107

congratulations

Asserts that maintenance of Indian unity 107
has been a prime object of British policy
but that failure of Indian leaders to agree
makes partition inevitable; twofold purpose
of plan is to promote harmony between
Indian parties, and facilitate orderly and
early transfer of power by British; appeals
for calm consideration of proposals which
have ‘the full support of the British
Government’ ; assures Indians of British
goodwill whatever course they choose
Reports that Gandhi ‘is very disturbed’
and proposes to speak about his anxieties 109
that day; also that Nehru wants him
[Menon] to talk over some points of detail
and principle relating to the plan with the
Viceroy

Mountbatten’s opening remarks no

Questions and Answers 115

Acknowledges No. 49; urges change of 122

Governors in N.W.F.P.

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

li

Name and Number Date

June

62 Fraser to Addison 4

Tel. 109

63 Fraser to Addison 4

Tel. no

65 Caroe to Mountbatten 4

Tel. CA/105

66 Campbell-Johnson to Brockman 4

Minute

69 Record of Interview between 4

Mountbatten and Gandhi

70 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Eighth 4
Staff Meeting
Items 1-3

71 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 7251

72 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 118-G

73 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixteenth 5

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 1

75 Mountbatten to Attlee 5

Tel. 1307-S via India Office

Main subject or subjects Page

Asks him to give Attlee No. 63 and his 123

congratulations

Transmits text of press statement on India 124

Refers to No. 15, para. 12; reports 126

discussion with Qazi Attaullah and Mehr
Chand Khanna who say: Ministry will
press that issue in referendum should be
between independent Pathanistan and
Pakistan; if Jinnah had agreed to this
Ministry would have agreed to coalition ; if
referendum is on choice between India and
Pakistan Khudai Khitmagars will boycott it.

Caroe will forward representation which
Ministry is preparing ; he urges early public
statement that referendum issue will be that
in No. 45, para. 4

Summary of reactions to Plan (No. 45) 127

and Press Conference (Nos. 59 and 60)

Gandhi suggests tripartite agreement 13 1

between Britain and two new Dominions;
speaks of Viceroy’s ‘magic tricks’ ;

Mountbatten says plan should be called
‘Gandhi Plan’, and describes how he has
followed Gandhi’s advice throughout;

Gandhi agrees he has not been averse to
Dominion Status in past. Krishna and V. P.

Menon subsequently report that line taken

with Gandhi has been successful

(1) Bhopal’s resignation; (2) interviw with 133

Gandhi (No. 69) ; question whether Gandhi,

Nehru or Mountbatten should visit

Kashmir; (3) consideration of No. 28, and

discussion of Nehru’s wish for

reconsitution of Interim Government

into two committees

Conveys comments by F.O. on proposals 135
made for appeals against decisions of
Boundary Commission

Situation in Lahore, Amritsar and 136

Gurgaon; first intelligence reports show
reception of partition plan ‘very mixed’
in Lahore and Amritsar

Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 137
leaders on (1) Administrative Consequences
of Partition (No. 28) with agreement,
inter alia , to establish Partition Tribunal and
Steering Committee

Thanks for No. 56 and for personal 144

backing of Attlee and Cabinet during
negotiations

lii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

7 6 Abell to Turnbull 5

Tel. 1308-S

77 Mountbatten to Burrows 5

Tel. 1312-S

78 Listowel to Mountbatten 5

Letter

79 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Letter 1446(16)

80 Nehru to Mountbatten 5

Letter

8 1 Record, of Interview between 5

Mountbatten and Khan Sahib

82 Mountbatten to Jenkins and Burrows 5
Tel. 1318-S

83 Caroe to Mountbatten 5

Tel. CA/106

84 Campbell-Johnson to Joyce 5

Tel. 1316-S

85 Caroe to Mountbatten 5

Tel. 192-CB

86 Hydari to Mountbatten 5

Letter (extract)

Main subject or subjects Page

Question whether Hindustan will inherit 144

India’s international personality or whether

two new states will be created

Suhrawardy states that Roy thinks forming 145

coalition for a few months is not worth

while

Congratulations; prospects of plan’s 145

ratification by All-India bodies of Congress
and League; good reception of
announcement in Parliament; coverage
given it by B.B.C.; favourable U.K. press
reactions ; Burmese reactions and need to
convince Indian and Burmese leaders of
advantages of Commonwealth; removal
of colour bar in recruitment to Royal
Navy and Army; Chundrigar’s London
visit; honours questions

Proposes that he himself, the Governors 148

and Chief Commissioners should off er
their resignations on date of transfer of
power

Refers to No. 73 ; does not like idea of 148

continuing in present way with Interim
Government; clarifies his ideas on
administrative machinery required for
partition

Refers to No. 65; Mountbatten explains 150
reasons against allowing option of
independent Pathanistan ;

Khan Sahib considers that Caroe should
be removed and referendum take place
under new Governor ; welcomes proposal
that military officers should run it and
promises cooperation

Refers to questions on boundaries at 1 5 1

Press Conference and emphasises need to
stress their provisional nature and that they
will not pre-judge work of Boundary
Commission

Refers to No. 65; reports Chief Secretary 15 1
and other officials suggest peaceful
referendum more likely if Pathanistan
issue is included; discusses pros and cons
of doing this

Summarises press reactions to Press 152

Conference

Reports cessation of Muslim League 153

agitation; League jubilant, minorities
depressed

Reactions of Assam Ministers to 153

announcement of 3 June

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

liii

Name and Number Date

June

87 Baring to Dominions Office 5

Tel. 168

88 Butler to Mountbatten 5

Letter

89 Clutterbuck to Dominions Office 5
Tel. 496

90 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Letter

91 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5

paras. 1-9, 12-26, 28-34

92 Shone to Brook 6

Tel. IRKU 360

93 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Ninth 6

Staff Meeting
Items 11, 14

95 Indian Cabinet Meeting 6

Case 137/30/47

Main subject or subjects Page

Transmits text of statement by Smuts on 154
India

Writes from America to congratulate 155

him; Press there has carried very full
reports and Britain’s stock appears to have
risen

Transmits text of statement by Mackenzie 155
King on India and reports initial
Canadian press reactions

Jagjivan Ram’s visits to Geneva and 157

London; question of appeals to Privy

Council after transfer of power; Colville

as Acting Viceroy and Ramamurty as

Acting Governor of Bombay

Suhrawardy’s wish for Calcutta to be free 158

city and Patel’s reaction; Nehru’s insistence

that Kripalani should attend forthcoming

meetings ; Jinnah’s demand for referendum

of Scheduled Castes in Bengal; Gurgaon

riots; first meeting on 2 June with leaders

(No. 23); interview with Gandhi; Burma

Star reunion; reactions of Commanders-

in-Chief and Army Commanders to plan;

meeting with Jinnah on evening of 2 June;

Congress and Sikh letters on plan;

meeting with Nehru on morning of

3 June; second meeting on 3 June with

leaders (No. 39); meeting with Kartar

Singh; broadcasts; Press Conference;

Suhrawardy’s plans for Eastern Pakistan; third
meeting on 5 June with leaders (No. 73) ;

Caroe’s telegram, and Mountbatten’s
interview with Khan Sahib, on question
of securing N.W.F.P. Ministry’s cooperation
in referendum; number of people report
announcement has relieved communal
tension

Suggests possibility that a separate 165

British High Commissioner should be
appointed for Pakistan

(11) Pakistan’s diplomatic representation; 166

(14) Nehru’s letter on the administrative
consequences of partition (No. 80) ; role
of Krishna Menon

Discussion of administrative machinery 169

required to effect partition; relationship
of proposed Partition Committee to
Cabinet; agreement (i) to appoint
Cabinet Committee with Viceroy as
Chairman to work out machinery; (ii)
to set up Separation/Partition Committee

liv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

95 (cont.)

9 6 Mountbatten to Caroe 6

Letter 1450

97

Jenkins to Mountbatten

6

Letter 680

98

Note by Abell on discussions with

7

Jenkins

99 Ismay to Mountbatten 7

Minute

100 Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventeenth 7

Miscellaneous Meeting
Items 1-5

Main subject or subjects Page

when question of partition legally decided
and members of existing Cabinet had
resigned; (iii) to set up tribunal to which
points of difference could be referred

Has recently been bombarded with 172

representations from Caroe’s detractors;
feels he must at any rate for the moment
replace him as Governor of N.W.F.P. ;
in view of possibility that Pakistan Govt
might reappoint him, suggests he should
go on leave till 15 August; points out
advantages of this course

Discusses arrangements for implementing 173

partition in Punjab and describes his talks
with party leaders on this subject

Arrangements for implementing 177

partition in Punjab; Jenkins is pessimistic
on question whether British officials in
Punjab will be willing to stay on after
transfer, Abell is less so ; Jenkins unwilling to
stay on in either of Punjab Provinces;

Annex: note by Jenkins on programme
he proposes for effecting partition

Comments on Gandhi’s suggestions (set 182

out in attached note) (1) that
Mountbatten should persuade Jinnah to
win over N.W.F.P. without a referendum;

(2) deal similarly with West Bengal and
East Punjab; (3) that Jinnah should be
encouraged to talk to Congress leaders
direct; (4) that H.M.G. should announce
their wish to have identical agreements
with Hindustan and Pakistan

Meeting between Mountbatten and 184

Indian leaders on (1) Administrative
Consequences of Partition with Jinnah
arguing that Governor-General, rather
than Govemor-General-in-Council, is
proper authority to give legal effect to
partition, and agreement, inter alia , to
obtain legal opinion (if possible that of
Chief Justice) on this point; and to set up
fact-finding Partition Committee consisting
of members of Interim Government,
followed (as soon as any one province
had decided on partition) by Partition
Council and Arbitral Tribunal ; (2) future
employment for Sir E. Jenkins; (3)
mistranslation of broadcasts ; (4)
inflammatory articles in press ; (5) the States

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lv

Name and Number Date

June

i oi Record of Interview between 7

Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat and
Nisbtar

102 Abell to Jinnah 7

Letter

103 Listowel to Mountbatten 7

Letter

104 Mudie to Mountbatten 7

Letter d.o. 45 3 /FR (extract)

105 Jenkins to Mountbatten 7

Tel. 121-G

106 Ismay to Monteath 8

Tel. 1354-S

108 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth 9

Staff Meeting
Items 2-4, 6, 8-10

Main subject or subjects

Page

Selection of Chairman of Arbitral

190

Tribunal, and Chairmen and members of
Boundary Commissions; question of
agreements between H.M.G. and two
new Dominions; resolution on plan which
Jinnah would put before League Council;
meeting joined by Diwan of Bahawalpur;
discussion of position of that State;

Jinnah believes existing agreements with
States would be legally binding on
successor authorities

Encloses legal opinion by Spence on 19 1

question whether Governor-General, or
Govemor-General-in-Council, is
authority competent to confer requisite
powers on partition machinery; conveys
Mountbatten’s hope that Jinnah will let
him see draft resolution for League
Council

Reserves H.M.G.’s right to link question 192
of financial liability for payment of
compensation to negotiations on Sterling
Balances

Reaction in Sind to announcement of 193

3 June

Situation in Lahore, Amritsar and 194

Gurgaon; generally, Hindus in West and
Moslems in East are dissatisfied; Sikhs
pin faith on Boundary Commission and
say they will accept no western boundary
short of Chenab

Asks that King’s unofficial approval be 195

obtained for arrangements to replace
Caroe with Lockhart

(2) Dominion Status — question of 198

Mountbatten becoming Governor-General
of both Dominions for an interim period;
need to ascertain Jinnah’s views on this ;
position of a constitutional Governor-
General ; discussion of ways in which his
influence and good offices might be
useful in advisory capacity; (3) N.W.F.P. —

Khan Sahib to be shown list of officers
to run referendum ; change of Governors ;

(4) legal authority for partition —

Jinnah’s disagreement with Spence’s
opinion (Enclosure to No. 102) and
demand that Chief Justice’s opinion be
obtained; (6) ceremonies on date of
transfer of power; (8) Mountbatten to see
Congress leaders on Boundary

lvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

108 ( cont .)

1 1 3 Mountbatten to Jinnab
Letter 1446/16

1 14 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

1 15 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1358— S

1 16 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1368-S

1 17 Ismay to Monteath
Tel. 1359-S

1 18 Cabinet Committee
Gen. i86/2nd Meeting

1 19 Wylie to Mountbatten
Letter U.P. 83 (extract)

120 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1364-S

121 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
I.B.(47)30th Meeting

123 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute (extract)

124 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel and

Kripalani

125 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

126 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty First

Staff Meeting
Items 1-2, 4-5

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

Commissions and other matters ; (9)

Gandhi’s latest suggestions (Annex to No.

99); (10) Auchinleck to submit views on
withdrawal of British forces

9 Suggests he should prepare lists of persons 218
suitable for appointment as Governors,
Ambassadors, etc

9 Suggests Jinnah should be told of 218

decision to replace Caroe before public
announcement

9 Refers to No. 116; asks permission to 219

give Nehru assurance that party leaders
will be shown Bill ; recommends that
Nehru’s view on international position
should be supported

9 Repeats letter of 7 June from Nehru 220

outlining Congress view on continuing
entity of India and asking to see draft
legislation on this subject

9 Asks for material to dispel 221

misunderstanding about meaning of
Dominion Status and powers of
Governor-General thereunder

9 Discussion on structure of British 221

Commonwealth and agreement to appoint
Ministerial Committee, assisted by
Official Committee, to consider subject;
and to consult Dominions about change of title
of Dominions Office

9 Reactions in U.P. to announcement of 225

3 June

9 Discusses question of composition and 226

terms of reference of Boundary
Commissions

9 Burmese request for immediate transfer 226

of power on Dominion Status

10 Refers to No. 108, Item 2 and reports 230

discussion at staff meeting on question of
Mountbatten’s becoming constitutional
Governor-General of both Dominions
10 The States; composition and terms of 232

reference of Boundary Commissions;
Chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal
10 Will mention suggestions made in Annex 235
to No. 99 to Jinnah; will follow up idea in
fourth para, with H.M.G.

10 (1) Jai Prakash Narain; (2) Dominion 236

Status — question of Mountbatten becoming
Constitutional Governor-General of both
Dominions; staff he would need;

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lvii

Name and Number Date

June

12 6 ( cont .)

127

Liaquat to Mountbatten

10

Letter

128

Nehru to Mountbatten

10

Letter

129

Nehru to Mountbatten

10

Letter

130 Patel to Mountbatten 10

Letter

13 1 Machtig to Monteath 10

Letter

132 India Office Minutes 10/11

135 Listowel to Jowitt 10

Letter

136 Lowis to Abell 10

Tel. CA 108

137 Abbott to Abell 10

Tel. 1126-G

138 Listowel to Mountbatten 10

Tel. 7496

139 Gandbi to Mountbatten 10/11

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

withdrawal of British troops and division
of Indian Armed Forces; June 1948 date
now of no significance ; international
status of India and Pakistan; (4) N.W.F.P.

— Khan Sahib has no objection to officers
selected to run referendum; (5) Boundary
Commissions

Encloses resolution of Council of League 240

on H.M.G.’s statement of 3 June (No. 45)

Congress proposals for formation of 241

Boundary Commissions

Comments on Enclosure to No. 127 242

which ‘is not at all satisfactory’ ; demands
that Jinnah should now accept plan ‘in
its entirety as a settlement’ in writing on
behalf of League before date of meeting
of A.I.C.C.

Comments on Enclosure to No. 127 244

and on Intelligence Bureau report

(enclosed) of proceedings of League

Council; states that unless Jinnah issues

clear statement accepting plan there would

be difficulties at A.I.C.C. meeting

Encloses note by Dominions Office 250

on Structure of Commonwealth and

functions of Govemors-General

Line to be taken on question of 253

withholding Andaman and Nicobar

Islands from India

Asks him to consider who might be 258

suitable for appointment as Chairman of
Arbitral Tribunal

Reports objections of N.W.F.P. 259

Ministry to announcing dates of
referendum; considers they should be
announced at once

Transmits message from Jenkins for 260

Auchinleck suggesting that additional
troops be sent to Gurgaon

Refers to No. 115; must defer definite 260

answer about showing Bill to Indian
leaders until after India Committee have
considered it; fears that to do so might
give rise to delay

Believes that, before N.W.F.P. 261

referendum is held, Jinnah should visit
Province to explain Pakistan scheme and
that possibly Congress or Constituent
Assembly should do likewise in respect
of Hindustan; comments on other
matters including need for ‘homogeneous

lviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

139 ( cont .)

140 H.M. Minister, Kabul to S.
Tel. 47

141 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter 133/14

142 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter

143 Liaquat to Mountbatten
Letter

144 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter

145 Liaquat to Mountbatten
Letter 41-PSFR/47

147 Abell to Croft
Letter 1446/11

of S.

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

ministry’ at centre; states the attempt to
please all parties ‘is a fruitless and
thankless task’

11 Reports Afghan press and radio comment 262
expressing deep disappointment that
‘Afghans living between the Durand line
and River Indus’ had not been given
independence option; reports interview
with Afghan Foreign Minister in which
latter has expressed same opinion; asks
for instructions

1 1 Encloses letter from Patel criticising 263

handling by Deputy Commissioner
(Brendon) of disturbances in Gurgaon;
reports unanimous condemnation of D.C.
in Cabinet and feels ‘it may now be only
fair to Brendon to transfer him’

11 Refers to No. 96; accepts Mountbatten’s 265
judgement that, at any rate for a time,
an officiating Governor must be put in;
suggests that he (Caroe) should take
initiative and say that he wished to take
leave for two months to make clear his
determination that it should not be said
he had used his authority to influence
referendum

1 1 Outlines arguments against proposal to 267

replace Caroe during referendum; if
Mountbatten agrees to Congress request
for removal of Governor he should also
agree to League demand for removal of
Ministry; suggests he should discuss
matter with Jinnah before taking decision

11 Opposes Mamdot’s proposals for 268

composition of partition machinery in
Punjab indicating he would resign if
such arrangements were accepted;
enclosure: letter from Mamdot to Jenkins
of 10 June outlining case for selection of
official personnel of partition machinery
in consultation with representatives of
parties

11 Summarises controversy between Mamdot 270
and Jenkins regarding composition of
partition machinery in Punjab, and asks
Mountbatten to intervene

1 1 Reception of announcement ; utility of 279

V. P. Menon’s influence with Patel ; League
realisation that plan represented maximum
they could get out of H.M.G.

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lix

Name and Number

148 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 88/47

152 Meeting of Special Committee
of Indian Cabinet
Items 1-3

153 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Patel and Liaquat

154 Mountbatten to Caroe
Letter

155 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

156 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

157 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

158 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

159 Auchinleck to Mountbatten
Letter D.O. No. 80/V-1/47/8

Date

June

11

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to Vol. X, No. 417 and No. 106 280

in this Vol. and seeks approval for putting
in hand change of Governors in N.W.F.P.

(1) partition machinery in Punjab and 284

Bengal ; Governors to consult party

leaders ; (2) partition machinery at Centre ;

scope of Special Committee ; composition

and terms of reference of Steering

Committee; latter to make recommendations

for setting up Expert Committees;

provisional basis for division of officers

and staffs; (3) Armed Forces Committee;

its relationship to Special Committee/

Partition Council and Steering
Committee

Discussion of Enclosure to No. 127; 287

Mountbatten suggests Jinnah should

accept plan in letter to him which he

would pass to Congress; question of

international status of India and Pakistan

and division of assets of existing G. of I. ;

safety of Congress M.L.As in Bengal

Refers to No. 142; suggests decision on 289

change of Governors during referendum

should be made public by means of

exchange of letters between Caroe and

himself, and proposes draft of this

exchange

Thanks for No. 139 and will bear Gandhi’s 290
comments in mind

Refers to Annex to No. 99; Jinnah agrees 290
to suggestion he should visit N.W.F.P. to
put case for Pakistan, provided Gandhi
can obtain undertaking from Congress
not to interfere

Proposes that Arbitral Tribunal should 291

consist of three judges of Federal Court
and opposes suggestion that its Chairman
should be member of Judicial Committee
of Privy Council

Encloses Congress suggestion for terms 292

of reference of Boundary Commissions;
expresses desire to leave issues before
Commissions ‘as clear and simple as
possible’ ; explains why they do not wish
to include Thar Parkar (Sind) and Purnea
(Bihar) districts in terms of reference
Encloses paper on role of British troops 293

retained in India and Pakistan after grant
of Dominion Status; timing of their
withdrawal ; system of command

lx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

Mountbatten to Kripalani

Letter

June

12

Mountbatten to Listowel

Letter

12

162 Viceroy’s Personal Report 12

No. 9

164 Attlee to Adeane 12

Letter

165 Cabinet India and Burma 12

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)97

Main subject or subjects

Page

Reports that, subject to A.I.C.C.

297

accepting plan, Jinnah has given his word
to sign joint document with Congress
accepting plan as settlement

Refers to No. 78; difficulties caused by 298

League resolution (Enclosure to No. 127) ;

Gandhi’s desire that H.M.G.’s agreements
with India and Pakistan should be the
same ; favourable reception of plan in
Parliament and India; work on
administrative consequences ; ‘transfer of
power’ honours; Caroe’s replacement,
gaffe by American Ambassador Elect;

Mountbatten to visit Simla and Kashmir

Reactions to 3 June announcement 301

continue to be favourable ; interview with
Gandhi ; announcement has eased tension
throughout country except in Gurgaon;
reactions in armed forces ; strong protests
from Congress against League resolution
(Enclosure to No. 127) and difficulties
about satisfactorily registering League
acceptance of plan; ‘very difficult’ Cabinet
meeting about high grade appointments;
agreement at meetings of Cabinet and
with Indian leaders (Nos. 95 and 100) to
set up partition machinery; discussions in
progress on composition of Arbitral
Tribunal and Boundary Commissions;
question of H.M.G.’s wish to retain
Andaman and Nicobar Islands ; progress
and prospects on setting up coalition
Governments and partition machinery in
Punjab and Bengal; tension in Calcutta
greatly eased by 3 June announcement;
difficulties expected in both Provinces over
Boundary Commission; prospects of
British officials staying on; Jenkins and
Burrows each believes he should not remain
as Governor of either half of his Province;

Caroe’s replacement

Asks him to lay before King proposals for 310
procedure for U.K. and Dominion
Parliaments to assent to alteration of Royal
Title, and for disposal of Indian crown

Memorandum by Listowel submitting 312

draft telegram to Mountbatten raising
question of possible repercussions if
Andamans and Nicobars are taken from
India before transfer of power

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxi

Name and Number Date

June

1 66 Attlee to Mackenzie King, Chifley, 12

Fraser and Smuts
Tel. D. No. 520 via British High
Commissioners

167 Ismay to Monteath 12

Tel. 1416-S

168 Abell to Monteath

12

Tel. 1418-S

169 Mountbatten to Jenkins

12

Tel. 1419-S

170 Abell to Lowis 12

Tel. 1420-S

1 71 Mountbatten to Listowel 12

Tel. 1414-S

172

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 1421-S

173

Mountbatten to Attlee

12

Tel. 1422-S via India Office

174

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 1423-S

175 Minutes of Viceroy’s Eighteenth 13

Miscellaneous Meeting
Items 2-5

176 Gandhi to Mountbatten 13

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

Requests views on proposed change of 313

titles of S/S for Dominion Affairs and
Dominions Office

Refers to No. 149; thanks for Enclosures 314
to No. 13 1 ; warns that any proposal to
reserve powers to Governor-General, or
that he should have any arbitral authority
whatever ‘would blow the whole scheme
sky high’

Question of possible appointment of 315

Rowlands to advise Pakistan
Summarises interview with Mamdot 316

regarding composition of partition
machinery in Punjab; has suggested
solution of adding Muslim members to
committees already set up and urges
Jenkins to accept this

Refers to No. 136; reports Mountbatten’s 317
agreement to announcement of dates and
outlines what should be said ; Mountbatten
agrees all delaying moves should be
resisted

Outlines India’s food position; requests 317

assistance from H.M.G. for crucial period of
July-Sept. 1947; ‘gesture by H.M.G. would
have very valuable results at this particular
juncture’

Refers to No. 138; considers it absolutely 318

essential to show Indian leaders draft Bill

Suggests visit by Montgomery should be 319

used to settle question of Gurkhas

Reports press comment on future of 319

Andamans and Nicobars; feels there can be

no question of raising this controversial

subject at present delicate stage of political

negotiations ; proposes to take line that

matter is one of many to be settled by

treaty or agreement

Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 320
leaders on (2) Boundary Commissions —
agreement on method of composition ;
terms of reference to be further considered;

(3) Arbitral Tribunal — Patel and Liaquat
to consider further its composition; (4)
winding up of Calcutta Enquiry; (5)

N.W.F.P. election posters

Refers to Nos. 155 and 156; Jinnah’s 329

condition regarding his visit to N.W.F.P.
is ‘dangerous in its implication’; visit should
be to convert Ministers, Badshah Khan

lxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

17 6 ( cont .)

177 Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

178 Kartar Singh to Mountbatten

179 Auchinleck to Jenkins
Tel. (unnumbered)

180 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 681 (extract)

1 81 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter

182 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

and Khudai Khitinatgars not a propaganda
tour; enclosure: letter to Jinnah stating he
does not understand condition
13 Encloses: (i) copy of Enclosure to No. 176; 330

(ii) copy of reply stating that he thought
it quite clear he meant Congress should
undertake not to interfere with people of
Frontier ‘in any way whatsoever’

13 Refers to question of safeguards for Sikh 331
interests ; premature to say anything in
respect of Western Punjab; many people
have moved to Eastern Punjab and before
demarcation of boundary impossible to
say how many Sikhs will remain in West;

Sikhs trust Boundary Commission will
maintain integrity of community in Eastern
Punjab; lists suggestions for safeguards
there and elsewhere

13 Refers to No. 137; explains why troops 332

in Gurgaon have been ‘thin on the ground’ ;
infantry brigade now taking over;
situation at present under control from
military point of view

13 Refers to No. 169; will deal with Mamdot 333
as desired by Mountbatten, but adds that
leaders of all parties must be consulted;
will form Partition Committee as soon as
possible and put point to them
13 Refers to No. 154; encloses letter on lines 334
suggested asking that, in view of wider
political considerations and to avoid
slightest suspicion over conduct of
referendum, he should be allowed to go
on leave for about two months
13 Refers to Nos. 90 and 91 ; has read 335

Nos. 23, 39 and 43 with great interest;

Radcliffe a possible candidate for
Chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal;
composition of Boundary Commissions
and danger of parties staking out claims
in advance; Suhrawardy’s economic plans
for East Bengal and offers made by
American businessmen contrasted with
slower methods of British; Caroe; plans
to establish Commonwealth Relations
Office; draft Indian Bill; attendance of
Indian Officers at U.K. military colleges ;

India Office in close touch with British
commercial and industrial organisations
with interests in India; Govt of India’s
temporary scheme for handling its

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxiii

Name and Number

182 (cant.)

183 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 89/47

184 Adeane to Attlee
Letter

185 Jowitt to Listowel
Letter

186 Stapleton to Monteath
Letter

187 Chiefs of Staff Committee
Paper J.P. (47) 87 (Final)

188 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47)99

192 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper I.B.(47)ioi

193 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper 133.(47)102

195 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7673

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

diplomatic relations with smaller European
countries; excluded and partially excluded
areas of Assam; Burma likely to opt for
complete independence outside
Commonwealth

13 Refers to No. 79; thinks it inappropriate for 339
Mountbatten and Governors to resign on
day of transfer of power; suggests
alternative means of publicising fact that
persons appointed to these offices hold
them by wish of Indians ; believes
Mountbatten’s remaining as common
Governor-General would facilitate partition
13 King agrees with proposals contained in 340
No. 164, but points out that some
Dominions may raise question of further
changes in Royal Title; King hopes any
such discussion may be avoided at present
13 Refers to No. 135; has sounded Radcliffe 341
who is prepared to undertake task;
financial and other terms on which
Radcliffe would accept appointment
13 Chiefs of Staff note that draft Bill does 343

not appear to conflict with British military
requirements, but wish to be advised on
how negotiations concerning those
requirements are to be conducted
13 Report by Joint Planning Staff concluding 344
that Laccadive Islands should be transferred
from Govt of Madras to H.M.G. to ensure
that necessary facilities for air route to Far
East remain available

13 Memorandum by Listowel on the 345

International Status of the Indian
Dominions concluding that, on balance,

Congress doctrine should be adopted and
Hindustan accepted as successor of former
India

13 Memorandum by Listowel on assumption 375
of international obligations by successor
authorities supporting Bevin’s request
(No. 52) for reconsideration of question
13 Memorandum by Listowel opposing 377

Mountbatten’s recommendation that
Indian leaders should be shown draft Bill
and suggesting instead he should tell them
orally what its main provisions will be
13 Refers to No. 120 and conveys Foreign 38

Office views on method of constituting

O

Boundary Commissions

lxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

14

V.C.P. 76

Krishna Menon to Mountbatten
Letter

14

202 Mountbatten to Listowel 14

Tel. I439-S

204

Abbott to Abell

Tel. 131-G

15

205

Resolution of All-India Congress
Committee

15

207

Nehru to Mountbatten

Letter

15

208

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1451-S

15

209 Jenkins to Mountbatten 15

Letter 683

2io Note by H. M. Patel 15

Main subject or subjects

Page

Circulates paper by V. P. Menon

388

reporting discussion with Nehru, Patel
and Krishna Menon on reconstitution of
Executive Council, and outlining proposals
for timetable and method of
reconstitution

Reports plan for transfer of power 390

encountered ‘heavy weather’ at A.I.C.C.

meeting; mentions his fears that Britain

still thought in terms of Empire and

hoped to use territory of North-West

Frontier and Kashmir as part of an

imperial strategy; if N.W.F.P. and

Kashmir go to Pakistan ‘all hopes of the

plan being a settlement will prove

fanciful’ ; enclosure : note by Menon

outlining his conception of how proposed

Parliamentary legislation should be

framed

Discusses question of international status of 394
India and Pakistan; advises that H.M.G.
should take view that India minus
Pakistan inherits international entity and
obligations of present G. of I. and that
agreement should be reached between two
new Govts regarding division of assets
etc. ; prophesies ‘untold trouble’ if course
he suggests is not adopted

Casualty figures in Punjab communal 397

disturbances, Nov. 1946-May 1947
Acceptance of FLM.G.’s statement of 397

3 June (No. 45)

Congress nominations for membership of 401
Boundary Commissions

Refers to No. 195 ; reports decisions 401

reached on composition of Boundary

Commissions in No. 175, Item 2; asks

that no further action be taken on

suggestion that U.N.O. be approached

Reactions in Punjab to 3 June plan; 402

doubtful whether many British officials

will wish to serve new Governments ;

reactions among Indian members of

Services ; ‘the old administrative machine

is rapidly falling to pieces’ ; difficulties which

Jenkins foresees in implementing partition;

situation in Lahore, Amritsar, Gurgaon

and elsewhere ; liaison with Army

Command

Circulates to members of Partition 406

Committee (1) Recommendations of

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxv

210 (cont.) Steering Committee regarding Expert

Committees, their terms of reference and
personnel; (2) Paper by Auchinleck on
Reconstitution of the Armed Forces in
India

21 1 Monteath to Ismay 15 Arrangements for announcement of 414

Tel. 7702 change of Governors in N.W.F.P. ;

Listowel and Attlee are opposed to
resumption of Governorship by Caroe
after referendum

CHAPTER 2

Provincial Decision on Partition. Continuing discussions on partition arrange¬
ments; problems oflaw and order in the Punjab; decisions on Plan in Bengal,
Punjab and Sind Legislative Assemblies: 16 June to 26 June 1947

Name and Number

212 S. of S. to PI.M. Minister, Kabul
Tel. 51

213 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

215 Abell to Mountbatten
Minute

216 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Third

Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 3

217 Meeting of Special Committee

of Indian Cabinet

218 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 684

219 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 685 (extract)

220 Colville to Mountbatten
Report No. 84 (extract)

Date

1947
June
1 6

16

16

16

1 6

Main subject or subjects

Refers to No. 140; reports representations
to Foreign Office by Afghan Minister in
London of his Government’s views on
question of N.W.F.P.

Criticises recommendations for withdrawal
of British troops made in Enclosure to
No. 159; Viceroy’s staff submit that
proper policy is to commence withdrawal
on 15 August and carry it out as rapidly as
possible

Question whether appeals should be
made to British officials in India or
Pakistan to stay on
(1) Mountbatten’s discussions with
Auchinleck on division of Armed Forces ;
suggestion that Trivedi should come to
Delhi to help with this matter; (3)
question of H.M.G.’s relations with any
Indian States declaring themselves
independent

Consideration of Enclosures to No. 210

Paoe

o

415

416

418

419

421

16 Defends British officers against attacks 427

made by Nehru in speech to A.I.C.C. on their
handling of disturbances; asks how far
Nehru’s views are endorsed by H.M.G.
and Viceroy

16 Encloses note on meeting with Punjab 430

Party Leaders on partition arrangements
in Punjab

16 Reactions in Bombay to announcement 43 1

of 3 June

lxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

221 Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.O.S.(47)76th Meeting
Minute 4

Date

June
1 6

222 Attlee to Listowel
Minute M. 246/47

223 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 90/47

224 Listowel to Jowitt
Letter

227 Mountbatten to Caroe
Letter 1450

228 Kripalani to Mountbatten
Letter

230 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Gandhi and Jinnah

16

16

16

17

17

17

Main subject or subjects Page

Agreement that it was of utmost 432

importance for H.M.G. to retain Andaman,

Nicobar and Laccadive Islands but that

timing and method of approach was

matter for political decision; Annex:

minute by Hollis to Minister of Defence

reporting these views and drawing

attention to absence from draft Bill of any

provision for holding negotiations on

British military requirements

Encloses and asks for his views on exchange 435

of letters with Halifax in which latter

refers to importance of holding India in

Commonwealth, notes that Indians are

‘much more moved by sentiment than by

reason’, and suggests that King and Queen

should visit Delhi in autumn for purpose

of ‘formally saying goodbye, and

wishing them [the Indians] good luck’

Refers to No. 148 and reports on 436

arrangements for change of Governors in
N.W.F.P.

Is grateful for Jowitt’s efforts (see No. 185) 437

towards securing Radcliffe’s services for

chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal

Refers to Enclosure to No. 181; is 439

convinced there is no truth in allegations

made against Caroe; latter’s offer to take

leave during referendum ‘will be widely

recognized as prompted by your public

spirit and your devotion to the people of

the Frontier’ ; will recommend Lockhart

as Acting Governor; sends ‘warmest

thanks’ for all Caroe has done

Refers to difficulties concerning Governor 440

in N.W.F.P. ; reviews position taken up by

Congress and Frontier Ministers on

question of N.W.F.P. ; Ghaffar Kban has

again represented that referendum should

be on issue of independence, failing which

he would advise his followers to abstain

from participating in it

Gandhi’s wish that Jinnah should visit 448

N.W.F.P. Congress leaders to woo them
for Pakistan and his dissatisfaction with
outcome of his correspondence with
Jinnah; meeting arranged between Gandhi,

Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan; Gandhi urges
Mountbatten not to make immediate
statement on position of States who
declared their independence

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxvii

Name and Number Date

June

231 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 17

Letter

232 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 17
Letter

233 Mamdot, Swaran Singh and 17

Sachar to Jenkins
Letter

234 Ismay to Ghazanfar Ali Khan 17

Letter

235 Ghazanfar Ali Khan to Ismay 17

Letter

236

Mountbatten to Kripalani

17

Letter 1446/3

237

Mountbatten to Nehru

17

Letter 1446/3

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth 17
Staff Meeting
Items 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9

Main subject or subjects Page

Asks that the military authorities be 449

requested to undertake provision of
accommodation, furniture, telephones, etc.
for the Pakistan Govt at Karachi, and the
transportation thither of personnel and
stores

Encloses letter from Daulatana on 451

situation in Gurgaon area ; Muslims there ‘feel
helpless and unprotected against the
full-scale war of extermination which is
being waged against them’ ; repeats appeal
to Mountbatten that handling of situation
should not be left entirely to non-Muslim
troops and hopes he ‘will take more
personal interest in this matter’

Refers to Enclosure to No. 219; agreed 454

decisions of Punjab Party leaders regarding
partition machinery in Punjab
Encloses statement supplied by C.G.S. 456

showing class composition of troops
employed in Gurgaon area; is shocked
to fmd Muslim Company of 3/15 Punjab
regiment not due to arrive until after
1 July; Auchinleck is being asked to see
whether any other Muslim troops could be
moved to area in near future; C.G.S.
emphasises difficulty of dealing with
disturbances on communal basis
Refers to No. 234; comments pointedly 458

on fact that Muslim Company of 3/15
Punjab has been left behind; notes C.G.S.’s
remark but wdiole point of Muslim
complaint is that disturbances are actually
being dealt with on communal basis ; asks
whether British troops could be made
available; fears clashes between Muslim
villagers and troops unless reassuring steps
are taken

Refers to No. 228; not feasible to alter 459

terms of referendum; draws attention to
No. 237

Refers to No. 228 ; encloses copy of 459

exchange of letters with Caroe; points out

that both his (Mountbatten’s) and Nehru’s

position would be untenable if either of

them were to go back on arrangement

that Provinces should not have independence

option

(1) Mountbatten’s conversation with 463

Gandhi and Jimiali about N.W.F.P.;

(3) resignation of Governors;

lxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

239 (cont)

240 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 159-C

241 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 92/47

242 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/3

244 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)3ist Meeting
Minutes 1-4

245 G. of I., External Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations Dept.,
to S. of S.

Tel. 4694

251 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)115

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

(5) reconstruction of Executive Council;

(6) withdrawal of British forces ; (8) Sir C.

Trivedi; (9) Dominions Office papers on
Dominion Status (Enclosures to No. 131)
to be sent to Indian leaders

17 Reports talks with Suhrawardy and Roy 470
on formation of coalition Government
(which neither wanted) and alternative of
regional Ministries proposed by Roy and
which Suhrawardy did not turn down;
partition machinery also discussed

17 Refers to No. 222; points out practical 471

difficulties of Royal visit to India and
Pakistan in current year; but thinks that,
given assurance of cordial welcome, visit
to inaugurate new Dominions might be
valuable, possibly in cold weather of
1948-9; until Princes have defmed their
relations with new Dominions, Royal visit
might cause embarrassment in that regard

17 Thanks for note about Kashmir; indicates 473
importance he attaches to meeting
arranged next day, with Ismay in chair,
between Gandhi, Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan
about N.W.F.P.

17 Consideration of (1) draft Bill (No. 191); 474

agreement on certain amendments including
suggestion by Attlee that it should be
called ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;

(2) international status of new Dominions;
agreement that H.M.G. should accept
Nehru’s view that Hindustan would
succeed to India’s position as international
entity; (3) assumption of international
obligations by successor authorities;
agreement that assurance on this point be
sought from Interim Govt on behalf of
both future Dominions; (4) Andamans
and Nicobars ; agreement to omit clause in
existing form on these Islands from Bill and
to seek Mountbatten’s advice on alternative;
also to seek by negotiation facilities in
Laccadive Islands

17 Question of explaining to Govts of Tibet 483

and Bhutan effect of constitutional
developments in India on H.M.G.’s
relationships with those countries

18 Memorandum by Listowel on Indian 491

Food Situation; supports on political

grounds Mountbatten’s request (No. 171)
for gesture by H.M.G. to assist India;

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxix

Name and Number

251 [cont .)

252 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper I.B.(47)ii6

253 Mieville to Mountbatten
Minute

254 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. i-S.K.

257 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7841

258 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7842

259 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 5-S.K.

262 Mountbatten to Jinnah
Letter

263 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter 1224/5

265 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
I.B.(47)32nd Meeting
Minutes 1-2

266 Turnbull to Harris
Minute

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

suggests Australia and Canada might be
asked to assist as matter of Commonwealth
interest

18 Note by Listowel circulating Nos. 248 493

and 249; Annex: extracts from telegrams
exchanged in 1935 concerning India
Office building and its contents

1 8 Reports inconclusive result of meeting 494

between Ismay, himself, Gandhi, Jinnah
and Ghaffar Khan; also Jinnah’s refusal in
private conversation with Ismay to authorise
Suhrawardy to form Regional Ministry in
Bengal

18 Is ‘immeasurably shocked’ that his promise 495
to Liaquat that Muslim troops would be
sent to Gurgaon has not been honoured

18 Refers to No. 115 and communicates 500

India and Burma Committee’s views on
question of showing draft Bill to Indian
leaders

18 Refers to Nos. 174 and 162, paras. 24-25; 501

communicates India and Burma Committee’s
views on question of Andaman and

Nicobar Islands

19 Refers to No. 173 ; suggests despatch of 502

further telegram to London pointing out
advantage of getting Gurkha question

settled before Nehru discovers proposal to
exclude Andamans and Nicobars from India

19 Refers to No. 175, Item 2; outlines 506

position reached regarding composition of
Boundary Commissions; informs him of
names suggested by Nehru and asks for
his suggestions

19 Refers to No. 218; explains difficulties 508

with Nehru, and what he proposes to say
to him about onslaught on British officers;
neither he nor H.M.G. believe a word of
such charges

19 Consideration of (1) terms of service of 513

British Officers continuing to serve in
Indian Armed Forces; (2) Indian Food
situation

19 Refers to No. 161, para. 4; argues that any 517
statement on H.M.G.’s relations with
India and Pakistan ‘should be a little less
pro-Gandhi than the Viceroy’s formula’,
and should neither state that there can be
no question of differentiation between the
two new Dominions, nor refer to a
tripartite arrangement

lxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

267 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1497-S

268 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 163-C

272 S. of S. to H.M. Minister, Kabul
Tel. 52

273 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter 1446/18

274 Auchinleck to Ismay
Letter

Date

June

19

Main subject or subjects

19

269 Ismay to Mountbatten

19

Tel. 1503-S

270 Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Tel. 7893

20

20

20

Page

519

Refers to Nos. 256 and 257; staff are
considering former; communicates terms
of telegram they suggest Mountbatten
might send in reply to latter on question of
showing draft Bill to Indian leaders
Refers to No. 253, note 4; reviews 520

position in light of Jinnah’s rejection of
proposal to form Regional Ministries ;
suggests Section 93 may now offer best chance
of securing cooperation of both parties in
partition of Bengal

Comments on No. 256, paras. 6 and 20. 522

Refers to No. 115; communicates India 523

and Burma Committee’s decision that
H.M.G. should accept that Hindustan
would continue existing India’s international
personality, subject to equitable division
of central assets

Transmits gist of note received from 526

Afghan Minister in London, following
interview reported in No. 212, in which
he outlines his Government’s views on
question of N.W.F.P.

Encloses letter and note from Bhopal to 528

be passed to Attlee; has explained to
Bhopal and Zafrullah Khan that Congress
would never have agreed to plan if there
were to be more than two Dominions; but
some States, particularly Hyderabad and
Bhopal, feel very unhappy; enclosure:

Bhopal’s letter alleging that, if H.M.G.’s
treatment of States is based on hope of
conciliating Congress, that hope will
prove futile; that Congress will be
dominated by left wing whose socialism
‘is only a thin veneer covering a mass of
rank communism’ ; and that decisions
already made by Constituent Assembly
offer little incentive to States to join
Hindustan

Adheres to advice given in Enclosure to 530

No. 159 on withdrawal of British troops;
contests Ismay’ s statement that ‘handful’
remaining could do little to safeguard
British lives and requests his opinion be
conveyed to H.M.G. ; points out that
Indian Army will soon be undergoing
reconstitution; wishes to make it clear to
Viceroy and H.M.G. that he ‘can no
longer be responsible in grave emergency

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxi

Name and Number

274 (cont)

275 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

276 Menon to Abell
Tel. 1504-S

277 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 978-S

278 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 979-S

279 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 8-S.K.

281 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

for the protection of British lives and
property’ once British forces have left

20 Reports talk with Liaquat on (1) despatch 532
of Muslim troops to Gurgaon; (2) his
request for assistance of military officer in
making plans for accommodation of
Pakistan Govt at Karachi; (3) his request
for help in fmding a ‘Controller of
Currency’ ; (4) composition of Arbitral
Tribunal; (5) composition of Boundary
Commissions; (6) question whether there
was to be common Governor General
and procedure for appointing Governors ;

(7) Governor General’s Bodyguard;

(8) Liaquat’s doubts about speed at which
Army was being partitioned and his and
Jinnah’s insistence that they would not
take over the reins of Government in
Pakistan without an Army on the spot
under their control; (9) Liaquat’s suggestion
that British troops should remain in India
while Indian Army was in process of
transition

20 Nehru now agrees that decision on future 535
of Baluchistan should be taken by Shahi
Jirga (excluding Sardars nominated by
Kalat State) and non-official members of
Quetta Municipality; Ismay is putting
proposal to Jinnah

20 Reports joint meeting of Bengal Legislative 536
Assembly has voted to join new
Constituent Assembly if Province remains
united

20 Reports West Bengal M.L.As have voted 536
for partition and to join existing
Constituent Assembly; East Bengal M.L.As
have voted against partition and to join
new Constituent Assembly and to agree to
amalgamation of Sylhet

20 Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20; question 537
of consultation with Indian leaders on
particular points arising on draft Bill;
agrees with Reforms Office and Political
Dept in deprecating formal denunciation
of treaties with States

20 Refers to Nos. 161 and 162; A.I.C.C. 538

resolution on 3 June plan; need for Very
careful watching and handling’ of Gandhi ;
question of agreements between H.M.G.
and two new Dominions; change of
Governors in N.W.F.P.; Mountbatten’s

lxxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

281 ( cont .)

284 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1512-S

285 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1513-S

289 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 166-C

291 Ismay to Burrows
Tel. 1533— S

292 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1534-S

298 Jinnah to Ismay
Letter

299 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter

300 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

meetings with leaders on administrative
implications of partition and composition
of Arbitral Tribunal and Boundary
Commissions; intensity of work in New
Delhi and London; Congress pressure and
H.M.G.’s policy on States; food situation;
Ramamurty as Acting Governor of
Bombay

20 Refers to No. 258 and transmits draft 544

reply for Mountbatten to send to it,
pressing strongly for complete exlusion from
draft Bill of any reference to Andaman
and Nicobar Islands

20 Refers to No. 270 on international status 544
of India and Pakistan and transmits draft

reply for Mountbatten to send agreeing
with it

21 Refers to No. 268; reports discussion with 550
Suhrawardy at which latter appeared to
acquiesce in prospect of Section 93 and
promised full cooperation in processes of
partition; stresses cordiality of talk and,

since he is assured of cooperation of
League as well as Congress, seeks
Mountbatten’s formal concurrence in
Section 93 proclamation

21 Informs him of message from Jinnah that 553
Suhrawardy has telephoned saying that
Burrows ‘threatened’ him with Section 93
which Jinnah argues is ultra vires; indicates
to Burrows that he should take no final
decision until he hears from Mountbatten

21 Reports events described in No. 291 and 554
his instructions to Burrows

22 Is unable to approve proposal (see No. 559

276) for body to decide future of

Baluchistan

22 Reports on visit to Gurgaon; troops on 560

spot now seem adequate but district is in
‘a very bad way’; Brendon sent on leave;

Bharatpur Very seriously disturbed’ and
refugees from there may add to Punjab
problems

22 Describes conditions in Punjab, especially 561
Lahore; mentions inter alia allegations made
against police and that ‘insistent demand
is either for the military to take charge, or
for the withdrawal of the police and the
military so that the people can look after
themselves’ ; suggests appointment by
Central Govt of Relief Officer to collect

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxiii

Name and Number

300 ( cont .)

301 Note by C. P. Scott

302 Note by I. D. Scott

3 04 Reuter report

305 Note by Jenkins

306 Viceroy’s Conference Paper
V.C.P. 88

307 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 90

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth

Staff Meeting
Items 1, 3-1 1

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

necessary data for formulation of relief
policy

23 Tyson has reported on telephone that 564

(1) Suhrawardy has written stating Bengal
League Party prefer Coalition or Regional
Ministry to Section 93 ; (2) Burrows has
asked whether Suhrawardy shares this
view; (3) great difficulty is being found in
drafting Section 93 Proclamation within
terms of Act

23 Tyson has reported on telephone that 565

Suhrawardy has replied to Burrows (see
No. 301) that, as between Section 93 and
Regional Ministry, he considers latter
‘lesser of two evils’

23 Joint meeting of Punjab Legislative 566

Assembly votes to join new Constituent
Assembly if Province remains united;

East Punjab M.L.As vote for partition and
to join existing Constituent Assembly;

West Punjab M.L.As vote against
partition

23 Record of conversation with Mamdot, 567

Sachar and Swaran Singh on: law and
order situation (Jenkins stresses contribution
parties could make by controlling their
followers; party leaders want British
officers in charge of disturbed areas
replaced by Indians) ; Constituent Assembly
elections; setting up of Partition
Committee. Separate talk with Sachar and
Swaran Singh on: League resolution
against Jenkins; alleged misconduct of an
official and difficulties facing Services
generally

23 Circulates paper by V. P. Menon on 570

position of Government in Bengal and
implications of decision there for Punjab,
N.W.F.P., and Centre

23 Circulates draft telegram on withdrawal 572

of British forces

23 (1) composition of body to decide future 573

of Baluchistan; (3) reconstitution of Govt
in Bengal; (4) reconstitution of Executive
Council; (5) Governor-Generalship of new
Dominions; (6) withdrawal of British
forces; (7) arrangements for showing draft
Bill to Indian leaders; (8) ceremonies on day
of transfer of power; (9) poster for N.W.F.P.
referendum; (10) Berar; (11) Hyderabad

lxxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

309 H.M. Minister, Kabul to G. of I.,
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Dept
Tel. 51

310 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter GH-93 (extract)

Date

June

23

Main subject or subjects

23

3 1 1 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Jinnah

23

312 Note by Auchinleck
C.-in-C.’s paper 4/47

23

313 Mackenzie King to Attlee

Tel. 122 via Dominions Office

314 Hydari to Mountbatten
Tel. 145-MSG

315 Montgomery to Simpson

Tel. 1547-S via Viceroy and India
Office

316 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 92

23

23

23

24

Page

577

Refers to No. 272; reports further
interview with Afghan Foreign Minister
on Afghan interest in N.W.F.P. ; Afghan
Govt wish to send Mission to have talks
with Indian political leaders in Peshawar
and Delhi

Outlines policy he believes should be adopted 578
towards tribes ; Afghan interference and
need for successor authority to make it clear
that benefits tribes at present enjoy from
India will continue; asserts that most of
troubles in dealing with tribes date from
Nehru’s assumption of responsibility for
tribal affairs

(1) Governor-Generalship of Pakistan and 580
Governorships of Pakistan Provinces;

(2) terms of reference, composition and
chairmanship of Boundary Commissions;

(3) agreement on formation of shadow
Cabinet in Bengal with veto over
decisions affecting West Bengal;

(4) agreement on composition of body to decide
future of Baluchistan; (5) agreement on
suggestion that Jenkins should issue firm
statement on putting down violence in
Punjab; (6) Jinnah’s insistence on having

an army and an operational C.-in-C. under
Pakistan Govt orders by 15 August;

(7) proposal that first meeting of Pakistan
Constituent Assembly should be held in
Legislative Assembly Chamber in Delhi
Explains need for retention of British 583

Officers and other ranks and requests
public announcement on this subject by
Partition Committee; urges that Indian
leaders should ‘say publicly that they need the
help of British officers’

Refers to No. 166; indicates agreement 585

with proposed change ; prefers title
‘Commonwealth Relations’ to
‘Commonwealth Affairs’

Communicates Assam Ministers’ wish for 586

separate Boundary Commission for

Assam and recommends compliance

Reports discussions with Nehru on 586

withdrawal of British troops and

employment of Gurkhas

Circulates extract from telegram from 587

Jenkins on possibility of establishing
neutral zone in Punjab, with comments by
Abell and Menon doubting its feasibility

317

3i8

319

320

321

322

327

328

329

330

331

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxv

Name and Number

Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

Shone to Tyson
Letter

Record, of Interview between
Mountbatten and Nehru

Mountbatten to Jenkins
Tel. 1569-S

Statement by Ghaffar Khan
Cabinet

C.M.(47)56th Conclusions
Minute 4

Jenkins to Mountbatten
Tel. (unnumbered)

Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

Montgomery to Simpson
Tel. 1560-S via Viceroy and India
Office

Montgomery to Attlee
Tel. 1565-S via Viceroy and India
Office

Montgomery to Nehru
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

24 Refers to No. 262; discusses chairmanship 588
of Boundary Commissions and Arbitral
Tribunal; submits nominations for
membership of Boundary Commissions

24 Refers to Vol. IX, No. 552 and outlines 589

position regarding maintenance of law and
order and protection of British lives and
property during period before final
transfer of power

24 (1) Nehru’s alleged statements at Hardwar 591
regarding N.W.F.P. referendum;

(2) Sylhet referendum; (3) place of meeting of
Pakistan Constituent Assembly; (4) Kashmir

24 Reports discussion with Jinnah and Nehru 594
on situation in Lahore and Amritsar; both
demanded ‘utterly ruthless’ action to
suppress disturbances and latter proposed
declaration of martial law; subject to
Jenkins’s comments Mountbatten proposes
to raise this in Cabinet and issue
announcement

24 Announces boycott of N.W.F.P. 594

referendum

24 Note taken of need for U.K. and 596

Dominion Parliaments to give assent to
change in King’s title ; Govt of Eire to be
consulted also

24 Refers to No. 320; reports discussions 605

with military and police officers and party
leaders on possibility of declaring martial
law and outlines arguments against it;
argues ‘real remedy is active intervention
by political leaders’ to ‘bring genuine
private pressure to bear on their goonda
supporters’

24 Refers to No. 327; finds Jenkins’s 606

arguments convincing; suggests
Mountbatten should read expurgated
edition to Indian Cabinet and urge
necessity to control extremists through
local contacts

24 Refers to No. 315; reports discussion with 607
Jinnah on withdrawal of British troops

24 Reports Nehru’s agreement in principle 608

to employment of Gurkhas in British
Army

24 Has reported agreement in principle on 609

Gurkha question to Attlee and encloses
copy of No. 330; notes that they will plan
to begin withdrawal of British troops on

lxxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

331

(cont)

332

Nehru to Montgomery

24

333

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8122

24

334 S. of S. to G. of I., External 24

Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Dept
Tel. 8125

335 Mountbatten to Listowel 24

Tel. 1570-S

336 Burrows to Mountbatten 24

Tel. 170-S

337 Shone to Secretary to Cabinet 25

Despatch 61

338 Indian Cabinet Meeting 25

Cases 152 and 155/32/47

339 Jenkins to Mountbatten 25

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

15 Aug. 1947 and aim to complete it by
end of Feb. 1948

Acknowledges No. 331 609

Discusses question of assumption of 610

international obligations by new
Dominions; enquires whether assurance
on this point would be likely to be
forthcoming from Interim Govt on behalf
of both new Dominions

Refers to Vol. X, No. 219; H.M.G. will 612
not wish to maintain separate Mission at
Lhasa; discusses question of treaty relations
with Tibet and suggests G. of I. should
state that they will assume obligations
under 1914 Simla Convention
Conveys Auchinleck’s views on withdrawal 613
of British troops but, for wider ‘overriding’
considerations, recommends withdrawal
should start on 15 August; suggests terms
of announcement

Agrees to proposal for shadow Cabinet 615

for West Bengal provided his special
responsibilities (including that for food)
are not affected

Montgomery’s conversations with Nehru 616
on Gurkha question; enclosure: note of
conversation on 23 June on this subject,
and on withdrawal of British troops,
partition, and French and Portuguese colonies
in India

(1) Decision to establish States Dept of 620

Govt of India; (2) discussion of
communal situation in Lahore and
Amritsar; Mountbatten summarises expert
advice against imposition of martial law;
lack of confidence expressed in officers
handling disturbances; Gurgaon situation
considered; agreement that (i) Jenkins
should invite Punjab party leaders to make
agreed recommendations of officers to be
posted in Lahore and Amritsar, and to
form security committee of officials and
non-officials; (ii) Baldev Singh should again
examine composition of troops in Gurgaon;

(iii) party leaders should continue to use
influence to encourage local leaders to
stop violence

Analysis of situation in Lahore and 623

Amritsar and of reasons for failure to
control it; believes remedies are
(a) genuine effort by party leaders to stop

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxvii

Name and Number

339 (amt.)

341 Menon to Abell
Letter D.O. 24-S/47-R

342 Caroe to Mountbatten
Tel. CA/126

343 Abell to Abbott
Tel. 1571-S

344 Minutes ot Viceroy’s Forty Seventh

Staff Meeting
Item 7

345 Hollis to Alexander
Minute

346 Hollis to Alexander
Minute

347 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
13.(47)3 5th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

352 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8185

353 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8194

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

trouble by pressure on their own goondas,

(b) better intelligence, and (c) speedier
justice; partition developments; signs of
dissension within Muslim League;
indications that Sikhs may go back on
partition plan or delay progress; Punjab
‘reasonably quiet’ outside Lahore, Amritsar
and Gurgaon

25 Reports position reached regarding 632

destruction of confidential records in
Reforms Office

25 Refers to No. 309; states there is reason 633

to believe Afghan move was to some
extent inspired by Frontier Congress
leaders ; interference by Afghan Mission in
Indian constitutional and political issues
seems ‘more than objectionable’ ; in no case
could it be given access to tribal territory or
Frontier States

25 Reports Mountbatten ‘has just had a very 633
difficult time in Cabinet over Lahore’, and
that it was unanimously agreed that he
should request Jenkins (i) to replace local
officials by ones agreed by all three parties
in whom they would undertake to repose
complete confidence, and (ii) to form
Standing Security Committee of local
leaders

25 Decisions that there should not be 634

separate Boundary Commission for Assam
and on miscellaneous points concerning
Commissions

25 Reports views he believes Chiefs of Staff 636
would wish to express on (a) Andaman
and Nicobar Islands; (b) relations of
H.M.G. with India and Pakistan

25 Reports views of Chiefs of Staff on 637

withdrawal of British forces, and that they
are ‘very worried’ about line taken by
Mountbatten on Andamans and Nicobars

25 (1) recruitment of Gurkhas to British 638

Army; (2) withdrawal of British forces

25 Discusses position of Governors of split 648

Provinces as from appointed day and in
particular question of whose advice should
be taken on filling new appointments

25 Refers to No. 284 and communicates 649

Cabinet Committee’s views on inclusion
of revised Clause on Andamans and

lxxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

353 (cont.)

June

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report

27

No. 10, paras. 7-9

Main subject or subjects Page

Nicobars in draft Bill to be shown Indian
leaders

Reports decisions on 20, 23 and 26 June of 679
Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and
Punjab in favour of partition, and of Sind
in favour of joining Pakistan

CHAPTER 3

Implementation oj the Plan . Establishment of Partition Council; crisis over
reconstitution of Executive Council ; question of the Governor-Generalship :
26 June to 7 July 1947

Name and Number

354 Meeting of Special Committee of
Indian Cabinet
Items i-ix

356 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

357 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 687

Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947

June

26 (i) procedure for appointment of Provincial 650
Governors; (ii) replacement of Special
Committee by Partition Council ;

(iii) arrangements for setting up Pakistan Govt
at Karachi ; (iv) retention of British Officers
in Indian Army; (v) letter regarding option
to S/S’s Officers; (vi) division of Armed
Forces; agreement that two Dominions
should each have operational command of
their respective armed forces but that, for
an interim period, there should be joint
administrative control (possibly under a
Joint Defence Council) ; (vii) withdrawal of
British Army; (viii) Boundary Commissions;
suggestion by Mountbatten that Radcliffe
might be considered for Chairmanship;

(ix) reconstitution of Govts at Centre and
in Bengal ; members of Partition Council
asked to consider alternatives
26 Recalls that Indian leaders have been 658

informed that, before legislation to
transfer power is introduced, they will have
opportunity of examining it ; outlines his
conception of form such legislation should
take, emphasising in particular need for a
separate Act for each new Dominion
26 Refers to No. 343 ; in compliance with 659

instructions has asked party leaders to
suggest new teams of officers for Lahore
district, and has formed Security
Committee ; is not hopeful of quick
partition proceedings

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxix

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects

June

358 Auchinleck to Mountbatten 2 6

Paper 6/47

359 Note by Patel 26

360 Cabinet India and Burma 26

Committee
I.B.(47)36th Meeting
Minute 3

361 Cabinet 26

C.M.(47)57th Conclusions

Minute 4

362 Chiefs of Staff Committee 26

Paper C.0. 8.(47)134(0)

363 Burrows to Mountbatten 26

Tel. 174-S

364

Burrows to Mountbatten

26

Tel. 175-C

367

Partition Council Meeting

27

Case Nos. P.C.1/1/47 and 5/1/47

368 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Letter

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report 27

No. 10, paras. 1-25 and 37-43

Refers to Nos. 315 and 329; asks for
official instructions on withdrawal of
British troops; comments on certain
points in No. 329

Refers to No. 103, note 4; considers
Indian Cabinet should restate their position
on question of linking liability for payment
of compensation to negotiations on
Sterling Balances

(3) agreement not to accede to Gandhi’s
request for an assurance that H.M.G.
would not differentiate between India and
Pakistan in agreements made with them
Report by Attlee on progress in drafting
Indian Independence Bill ; agreement that
he should discuss it with Opposition and
that Mountbatten should show it to Indian
leaders

Report by Chiefs of Staff concluding
(i) that British forces could only be
retained in India on request; (ii) if request
for retention was received from India and
Pakistan, or even Pakistan alone, it should
be accepted

For reasons indicated in No. 364 presses
that Chittagong Hill Tracts be treated, at
least temporarily, as part of East Bengal
pending negotiations between two
Dominions

Pvefers to No. 363 and discusses position of
Chittagong Hill Tracts
(1) consideration of question of
reconstitution of Govts at Centre and in
Bengal with agreement on arrangements
for Bengal (and Punjab) ; (2) Mountbatten
announces arrangements for enabling
Indian leaders to study draft Bill
Refers to Nos. 182 and 281; possible
appointment of Radcliffe as Chairman of
Arbitral Tribunal and of Boundary
Commissions; welcomes proposal to
establish Commonwealth Relations Office —
title ‘Dominion’ is becoming ‘almost
unpopular’ ; need for looser form of
Commonwealth association; Ceylon;
possible renewal of invitation to India to
participate in U.K. military colleges, etc;
‘transfer of power’ honours; late hours
worked

Internal situation much quieter except for
Punjab; disturbances in Lahore, Amritsar

Page

660

66 1

662

664

665

671

671

675

677

679

lxxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

369 (cont.)

370 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter

371 Moon to Ismay
Letter

372 Note by H. M. Patel

374 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 102/47

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

and Gurgaon; Very difficult’ Cabinet
meeting resulting in decision to establish
Security Committee of local Punjab leaders;
decisions in Legislative Assemblies of
Bengal and Punjab on partition, and in
Sind to join Pakistan; agreement on
Boundary Commissions’ terms of
reference and on appointment of
Radcliffe as Chairman; controversy over
Liaquat’s request for printing press;
conversion of Partition Committee into
Partition Council; Jinnah member of latter;
crisis over reconstruction of Interim
Government; stalemate over composition of
Arbitral Tribunal; method of election in
Baluchistan; sterile meetings among
Gandhi, Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan regarding
N.W.F.P.; position regarding S/S’s
Officers continuing to serve India or
Pakistan; Nehru’s alleged statement at
Hardwar regarding N.W.F.P. referendum;
rejection by Congress leaders of proposal
that Pakistan Constituent Assembly should
meet in Delhi; Montgomery’s visit; plans
for division of Army

27 Acknowledges No. 299; will not show 691

Nehru No. 218 as latter is in ‘rather a
difficult state of mind’ at present ; only
overriding necessity of achieving political
settlement compels Mountbatten to avoid
anything tending to a break with Indian
leaders

27 Explains possibility that Sikhs can be 692

brought to accept that East Punjab should
join Pakistan which will avert (otherwise
inevitable) civil war; suggests inter alia
that East Punjab should be given strongest
possible Sikh complexion by detaching
certain Flindu districts from it

27 Circulates to members of Partition Council 693
note by Mountbatten on Partition of Armed
Forces; Annexures: I: Outline proposals
for control of armed forces during
reconstitution (including proposal for
Joint Defence Council); II: Draft terms of
reference for Armed Forces Reconstitution
Committee

27 Refers to Nos. 373 and 366; attaches draft 701
of letter from Attlee to Lascelles explaining
position regarding procedure for

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxi

Name and Number

Date

374 (< :ont .)

June

376 Listowel to Mountbatten

Letter

27

377 H.M. Minister, Kabul to G. of I., 27

External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Dept
Tel. 52

378 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Tel. 1610-S

379 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Tel. 1616-S

381 Listowel to Mountbatten 27

Tel. 8284

382 Gandhi to Mountbatten 27/28

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

appointment of Governor-General and
Governors

Refers to No. 161, para. 4 and explains why 704
India Committee are unwilling to agree to
Gandhi’s request for an assurance from
H.M.G. that they would not differentiate
between India and Pakistan in agreements
made with them, or to state that they
desired tripartite arrangements; food
question; programme for discussion of
draft Bill with Opposition and Indian
leaders; Bhopal’s views on H.M.G.’s
policy towards States; Burmese goodwill
Mission and policy on Burma

Refers to Nos. 342 and 309; reviews 707

position of Afghan Govt and possible
courses of action open to it regarding
N.W.F.P.; suggests Afghan Mission might
be permitted to visit Delhi

Reports proceedings of Partition Council 708

regarding Chairmanship of Boundary
Commissions, and of Arbitral Tribunal;
requests that Radcliffe should be asked to
accept Chairmanship of both Boundary
Commissions

Reports proceedings in Partition 709

Committee and Partition Council (see
Nos. 354, Minute ix, and 367) and
private talks with Patel and Jinnah on
reconstitution of Governments at Centre
and in Bengal and Punjab ; explains he will
be telegraphing Jinnah’ s objections to
reconstitution at Centre for legal opinion,
asks for early reply, and indicates course of
action he intends to pursue

Refers to No. 335 and conveys H.M.G.’s 712
agreement to start withdrawal of British
forces on 15 August; discusses timing and
terms of announcement

Argues that Mountbatten must choose 713

between parties, taking his advisers from

League if he believes Jinnah is more

correct than Congress ; argues that there is

no need to ‘put a premium’ on ‘initial

mistake of the British being party to

splitting India into two’ ; contests view

that if partition had not been made during

British occupation, Hindus would never

have allowed it; belief that ‘Hindu society

by reason of its mere superiority in

lxxxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

382 ( cont .)

June

383 Mountbatten to Jenkins

Letter 40/5

28

384 Mountbatten to Jenkins 28

Letter 133/14

388 Shone to Secretary to Cabinet 28

Despatch 63

389 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Eighth 28

Staff Meeting
Item 1

390 Mountbatten to Gandhi 28

Letter

391 Listowel to Mountbatten 28

Tel. 73

392 Nehru to Mountbatten 28

Letter

393 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 28
Letter

394 Tyson to Abell 28

Letter d.o. 113-C.R.

Main subject or subjects Page

numbers can crush millions of Muslims is
an outstanding myth’

Refers to No. 339; believes if all three 715

parties could agree on appointment of set

of local officials ‘it would make a great

deal of difference’ ; mentions proposal for

two sets of advisers in Punjab; is having

Jenkins’s proposals for speedier justice

examined but ‘formidable difficulties’

usually arise over proposals of this sort

Refers to No. 357; mentions he did press 716

party leaders in Cabinet to use their

influence to stop trouble in Lahore;

confirms Jenkins will be free to leave on

15 August but probably not before

Encloses note by Nehru on his talks with 720

Montgomery about withdrawal of British

troops, and employment of Gurkhas in

British Army

Refers to No. 382; Mountbatten states 726

Gandhi has misinterpreted what he had
said to him

Refers to No. 382; he (Mountbatten) must 727

have failed to make his meaning clear; is

glad letter has not been shown to others

since he would be sorry ‘that views should

be attributed to me which I did not, in

fact, express’ ; hopes they may discuss

these matters again

Refers to No. 352; enquires about 727

possibility of political leaders agreeing to

appointment of existing Governors of

Bengal and Punjab as Governors of both

halves of their respective Provinces

Refers to No. 356, note 2; points out that 728

legislation to transfer power is of ‘utmost

consequence to India’ ; thinks it ‘an entirely

wrong approach to proceed secretively’ ;

trusts that full opportunity will be given

them to consider Bill before it is

introduced in Parliament

Encloses draft terms of reference for 729

Boundary Commissions

Reports that Ghosh has rejected, but 730

Suhrawardy agreed to, proposals for
reconstitution of Government in Bengal
and Ghosh is flying to see Congress High
Command

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxiii

Name and Number Date

June

395 G. of I., External Affairs and 29

Commonwealth Relations Dept,
to S. of S.

Tel. 5047

396 Gandhi to Mountbatten 28/29

Letter

397 Mountbatten to Nehru 28/29

Letter

398 Mountbatten to Jinnah 29

Letter

399 Ismay to Mountbatten 29

Minute

400 Mountbatten to Dow 29

Letter 592/92

404 Cabinet India and Burma 29

Committee
I-B. (47)131

405 Abell to Harris 29

Tel. 1643-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Outlines Govt of India’s views, in the 730

light of Afghan Govt’s press campaign,
regarding the position of the peoples living
between the Durand Line and the Indus
river; suggests H.M.G. might consider
requesting U.S. Govt to utter an informal
warning to Afghan Minister in
Washington

Reports that Ghaffar Khan has written to 732
him stating his followers will abstain from
voting in referendum, and drawing
attention to certain other matters regarding
conduct of referendum

Refers to No. 392; encloses invitation 733

(already drafted) to study draft Bill ; trusts
Rau’s presence will meet need for
constitutional and legal advice ; Enclosure :
letter from Mountbatten to Nehru inviting
him to come to Viceroy’s House on 1 July
to study draft Bill; arrangements made for
Congress and League representatives to
study Bill in separate rooms; Patel,

Jinnah and Liaquat also invited; indicates

expert advisers who will be present

Refers to Nos. 399, Item 2, and 393 ; 735

reviews discussions regarding Boundary

Commissions’ terms of reference to which

he and staff have not had ‘a shadow of

doubt’ that League had agreed; notice is

being issued next day ; is sure Jinnah will

agree that delay resulting from re-opening

question should not be incurred

Reports talk with Jinnah and Liaquat 736

(on 28 June) on (1) reconstitution of

Interim Govt; (2) Boundary Commissions’

terms of reference; (3) Purnea; (4)

N.W.F.P. referendum; (5) possible
appointment of Cunningham as Governor
of N.W.F.P.; (6) proposed appointment of
Rowlands as Financial Adviser and general
administrator in Pakistan

Explains Boundary Commission’s work 738

will not include consideration of Bihar (or
Sind) boundaries

Memorandum by Listowel circulating 742

No. 379, a draft reply, and the relevant
statutory provisions governing conduct of
business in Executive Council

Attitude of Muslim League and Jinnah to 744
use by areas adhering to existing

lxxxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

405 ( cont .)

June

406 Mountbatten to Listowel

29

Tel. 1650-S

407 Abbott to Abell 29

Express letter G.S. 401

408 Nehru to Mountbatten 29

Letter

409 Mountbatten to Burrows 29

Tel. 165 1 -S

410 Mountbatten to Burrows

29

Tel. 1652-S

41 1 Mountbatten to Listowel

29

Tel. 1653-S

412 Mountbatten to Listowel 29

Tel. 1655-S

413 Mountbatten to Listowel 29

Tel. 1656-S

415 Gazette of India 30

Extraordinary-

Notification by G. of I., Secretariat
of Governor-General (Reforms)

A lain subject or subjects Page

Constituent Assembly of title ‘India’ rather
than ‘Hindustan’

Refers to No. 391 ; no chance of 745

persuading parties to agree to Burrows
and Jenkins staying on temporarily as
Governors of both new halves of their
Provinces

Transmits note by Jenkins opposing 745

proposal to establish two bodies of
Advisers in Punjab

Refers to No. 397 and Enclosure; points 746
out legislation is going to affect future of
India vitally; complains they are only being
given chance to see draft at last stage; Rau’s
presence will be welcome, but they wish
to consult others ; Gandhi should also see
draft Bill ; if ‘willing assent of all parties
concerned’ is not obtained, object of Bill
‘is somewhat nullified’ ; earnestly requests
him to consider matter afresh and if
necessary consult H.M.G.

Refers to No. 410; this gives Burrows 747

exact instructions regarding reconstitution
of Govt in Bengal which he
(Mountbatten) is satisfied will be acceptable
to Congress

Transmits list of instructions referred to in 748
No. 409

Reports Nehru’s request in No. 408 that 748
Bill be shown to Gandhi and others in
addition to those already invited;

Mountbatten thinks request should be
granted, and hopes by so doing to carry
Congress leaders with him despite Nehru’s
protest at procedure adopted for
consideration of Bill

Refers to No. 413 ; is advised that his 749

proposal is legal; reports Jinnah’s remark
that legal objection was device to enable
Mountbatten to postpone reconstitution if
he wished; but Mountbatten believes he
‘must go ahead if the course proposed is
not unconstitutional, since Nehru in
particular is most insistent’

Refers to No. 412 and transmits text of 750

Jinnah’s note objecting to legality of
proposal for reconstituting Interim Govt
Announcement by Governor-General of 755
composition and terms of reference of
Boundary Commissions

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxv

416

417

Name and Number

Date

June

Partition Council Meeting

30

Case P.C.7/2/47

Record of Interview between

30

Mountbatten, Kartar Singh and
Baldev Singh

421 Cabinet India and Burma 30

Committee
LB. (47) 3 7th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

422 Mountbatten to Gandhi 30

Letter 1446/3

423 Mountbatten to Gandhi

30

Letter 1446/8

424 Mountbatten to Nehru

30

Letter 1446/8

425 Mountbatten to Jinnah 30

Letter 1446/8

426 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter (extract)

30

Main subject or subjects Page

Consideration and approval, subject to 756

minor amendments, of Mountbatten’s
note (No. 372) on partition of Armed
Forces

Mountbatten refers to No. 178; discussion 760
of weightage and safeguards demanded by
Sikhs; Kartar Singh refers to possibility of
partitioning East Punjab to enable separate
Punjabi-speaking Province to be formed;

Sikh demands regarding demarcation of
boundary and transfer of population, and
that Mountbatten’s broadcast (No. 44)
should be given to Boundary Commission;
Mountbatten undertakes to write to Indian
leaders to put Sikh point of view; Annex:
note by Kartar Singh on demarcation of
boundaries, transfer of population, and
safeguards demanded by Sikhs
(1) Future of India Office and its contents; 768
decision that this matter should be left for
negotiation with Indian Govt; (2) future
of Interim Govt; decision that
Mountbatten’s discretion in handling this
question should not be fettered but that he
should be informed that Ministers considered
there was ‘much force’ in Jinnah’s note
Refers to No. 396; is glad referendum will 772
proceed without interference by Ghaffar
Khan’s followers; is sending No. 396 to
Lockhart so that he may take any
necessary action on other points mentioned;
reports what he has done regarding
Kashmir

Invites him to meeting to see Indian 773

Independence Bill

Refers to No. 408; agrees to additional 773

persons mentioned therein attending
meeting to study draft Bill; emphasises need
to avoid any leakage; has told Jinnah he
could also increase his party

Is glad to know Jinnah is satisfied with 774

composition of his party to consider draft

Bill; emphasises need to avoid any leakage;

mentions invitation to Gandhi; refers to

clause enabling one person to be appointed

to both Governor-Generalships and asks

whom Jinnah wishes to nominate as

Governor-General of Pakistan

Meetings of Security Committee; Jenkins 775

thinks party leaders have ‘really tried to

restore peace’; discussions regarding

lxxxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

426 (cont.)

430 Minutes by Erskine Crum, Abell

and Mountbatten

431 G. of I., External Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations Dept,
to S. of S.

Tel. 5078

433 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8360

435 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

selection of district staffs in Lahore and
Amritsar; membership of Punjab Partition
Committee; Steering Committee ‘seems to
be working all right’ ; proposal for two
teams of Advisers ; party leaders think
Jenkins’s proposals for special tribunals too
severe; interview that day with Mamdot
and Sadiq Hassan; Mamdot is ‘clearly not at
all happy about the communal position*
and ‘particularly sore’ at search operation
at Misri Shah, and wants another Muslim
added to Security Committee

30 Question whether to raise issue of 798

Chittagong Hill Tracts at meeting with
Indian leaders

30 Refers to Nos. 309, 377 and 395; contests 799
Afghan Govt’s claims regarding territory
between Durand Line and Indus River and,
in particular, rejects proposal to send
mission to India and suggestion that
territory should be free to join Afghanistan
or separate from both successor Govts ;
notes territory can claim ‘fullest
autonomy’ within framework of one of
successor Govts ; G. of I. desire ‘nothing
but friendship with Afghanistan’ ;
reiterates suggestion that friendly third
party, e.g. U.S.A., should be asked to put
in word of caution to Afghan Govt

30 Refers to Nos. 379, 412 and 413 and 801

conveys Ministers’ views thereon; comments
on obscurities in draft announcement on
reconstitution of Interim Govt; outlines
legal position indicating that something
on lines Mountbatten proposes can be
done provided it carries general agreement
of all Members of Council; Ministers
consider Jinnah has made out ‘strong case’
and that his alternative solution would be
preferable course to adopt; H.M.G.
authorise Mountbatten to deal with
situation as seems best to him but point out
Parliamentary importance of being able to
maintain that partition is being carried out
by agreement — ‘smooth and quiet passage
of bill . . . might turn on this’ ; discusses
arrangements for release of statement and
general line to be taken on reconstitution
of Govt

30 Thanks for No. 424; will convey 803

invitation to additional experts and

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxvii

Name and Number Date

June

435 [cont.)

43 6 Mountbatten to Attlee 30

Tel. 1675-S via India Office

437 Mountbatten to Listowel 30

Tel. 1677-S

438 Listowel to Mountbatten 30

Tel. 8380

July

439 Attlee to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 8393 via India Office

440 Listowel to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 74

441 Listowel to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 75

Main subject or subjects Page

lawyers to attend meeting; his intention
was however to consult Cabinet colleagues ;
gives assurance to make every effort to
prevent leakage and asks to have a copy of
Bill to show Cabinet colleagues; Gandhi
may not attend meeting as time is
inconvenient

Reports Krishna Menon has warned him 804

that Nehru threatens resignation unless

allowed to take away copy of Bill;

mentions Nehru’s promise to make every

effort to prevent leakage; requests

authority to use discretion to avert crisis

Refers to Nos. 412 and 413 ; reviews 805

position regarding reconstitution of

Interim Govt and in particular what

Jinnah could do if he decided to oppose it;

notes possibility of Jinnah contacting

Opposition and consequently of Bill not

passing this Session in which event ‘we

would be in an absolutely irretrievable

mess’; if, to avoid Nehru’s resignation, he

has to proceed with reconstitution,

suggests Opposition be kept fully in touch

to enable them to judge any approach from

Jinnah 806

Refers to No. 41 1; notifies Opposition

concurrence in Bill being shown Indian

leaders; Cabinet Committee feel that,

because of shortage of time, drafting

points cannot be considered but only points

of principle ; suggests arguments to counter

Nehru’s complaint that other Dominions

had opportunity for full consideration of

their Bills; opposes communique stating

that Indian leaders were being consulted

Refers to No. 436; agrees he may allow 807

Nehru to take draft Bill away; desirable

to give Jinnah similar facilities

Refers to No. 366; sends revision of proviso 808

relating to possibility of same person

being Governor-General of both

Dominions; has no objection to this

revision but feels it might be better to try

out proviso as it stands

Reports that Opposition leaders adopted 809
helpful attitude in discussions on 30 June;
main criticisms were on use of title India
for Hindustan and expression

lxxxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

441 (cent.)

442 Report of remarks by Gandhi 1

443 Cabinet C.M.(47)58th Conclusions 1
Minutes 2, 6

444 Attlee to Churchill 1

Letter

445 Churchill to Attlee 1

Letter

447 Attlee to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 8402 via India Office

448 Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1681-S

449 Cripps to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 78 via India Office

451 Carter to Ismay 1

Tel. 8413

453 S. of S. to H.M. Minister, Kabul 1

Tel. 56

454 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8453

Main subject or subjects Page

‘Independence Bill* rather than ‘Indian
(Self Government) Bill’

In an after prayer speech on 30 June 810

Gandhi commented on referendum in
N.W.F.P. and Ghaffar Khan’s attitude to
Pathanistan and Afghanistan
Dominions Office — change of title; 810

agreement not to change title of Indian
Independence Bill but special effort to be
made to explain implications of title
Has discussed Indian legislation with 812

Eden and others ; doubts whether he can
hold up Second Reading until Churchill
returns

Expresses concern that Bill is to be called 812
‘Indian Independence Bill’ ; says he only
supported Mountbatten proposals because
they establish the phase of Dominion status
which is not the same as independence
Refers to No. 437; Viceroy will see from 814
No. 433 that Ministers do not feel that his
Interim Govt proposals are fair to Jinnah;

H.M.G. will support Viceroy if it is
essential to reach decision next day, but
they hope he may secure more time; open
Congress-League split would endanger
passing of Bill

Refers to No. 433 ; considers there is still 815
slight hope that he can persuade Nehru not
to insist on reconstitution of Govt ; asks for
tel. expressing their doubts on legality of
procedure which he could show Nehru
Cripps sends message to be passed to Nehru 815
if Viceroy wishes; in message Cripps
appeals to Nehru not to jeopardise
independence date by insisting on particular
form of Interim Govt for remaining few
weeks

Explains that one reason for change in title 817
of Dominions Secretary and Dominions
Office is to prepare for different set-up of
S. of S. for India and India Office
Refers to No. 431; says H.M.G. wishes to 820
reply to No. 272 on the basis that the
area in question is an integral part of India
and H.M.G. cannot admit right of any
foreign govt to intervene; suggests answers
that should be given to Afghanistan’s specific
requests; asks for G. of I.’s views urgently
Says that legal advice he has received on 821
Viceroy’s proposals is to the effect that

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxix

Name and Number Date

July

454 ( cont .)

455 Mamdot to Jenkins 2

Letter

456 Baldev Singh to Nehru 2

Letter

457 Mountbatten to Jinnah 2

Letter

458 Mountbatten to Attlee 2

Tel. 1690-S via India Office

461

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1701-S

2

462

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1702-S

2

464 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1714-S

Main subject or subjects Page

they could be adopted provided there is
general agreement among Members of
Council on them

Outlines Muslim grievances on law and 822

order matters; says that before they
‘finally decide to sever our connection’
they desire: (1) an increase in the Muslim
members of the Security Council to two ; (2)
the ending of all repressive measures; (3)
an assurance that necessary measures will
only be adopted after consultation with
Security Council; (4) parity of Muslim
and non-Muslim Officers in Special
Police Staff

Expresses concern at provisions in draft 824

Bill relating to disputed districts in Western
Punjab; asks him to ensure amendments
are made so that administration of them
does not go over to Pakistan automatically
when Bill becomes law

Says he was astounded that Jinnah is 825

unable to let King have advice on future
Governor-General by 4 July; asks to see
him later that day

Says situation is incredibly explosive and 826
he is advised Congress will not compromise
on different system for Interim Govt; will
take line that he cannot legally put
proposals through until Bill has been
passed; Krishna Menon believes Congress
will accept a 20 July target date for
enactment of Bill; as League Members are
moving to Karachi on 7 August this would
mean they would only serve under new
conditions for fortnight; considers this
might prove acceptable compromise; says
tel. as in No. 468 would be of utmost help

Is delighted with invitations in No. 462; 830

has telegraphed Nye and Colville urging
them to stay on

Refers to No. 461 and sends text of letter 831
from Nehru in which he expresses hope
that Colville and Nye will stay on as
Governors in addition to Trivedi and
Hydari ; new Governors needed elsewhere

Reports discussion in Partition Council 833

on 30 June on partition of Armed Forces
and withdrawal of British troops; feels
time has come to issue announcement on
latter subject

xc

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

465 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)39th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

467 Listowel to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8509

468 Attlee to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8510 via India Office

470 Note by Erskine Crum 3

471 Draft Note by Campbell- undated

Johnson

472 Jenkins to Mountbatten 3

Express letter 689

473 Ismay to Baldev Singh 3

Letter

474 Ismay to Moon 3

Letter

Main subject or subjects Pages

(1) Consideration of No. 458; agreement 834

that tel. asked for by Viceroy should be

sent (see No. 468) but it should be

modified to emphasise need for immediate

finality on terms of Bill; (2) decision to

retain title ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;

desirability of Dominions support for this

Refers to No. 458; explains changes to his 838

draft that have been made in No. 468

Explains that H.M.G. cannot sanction 838

reconstruction of Interim Govt until

legal position is assured by passing of Bill;

is speeding up passage of Bill to aim at

target date of 20 July; important they

should have Indian leaders’ comments on

draft Bill immediately

Note of Viceroy’s meeting on 2 July to 839

discuss Jinnah’s wish to be Governor-
General of Pakistan; courses considered
were : (A) to accede to request and for
Mountbatten to stay as G.-G. of India
alone ; (B) to accede to request and for
Congress to nominate someone other than
Mountbatten as G.-G.; (C) to devise
formula enabling Mountbatten to remain
G.-G. of both Dominions while satisfying
Jinnah’s vanity

With reference to No. 470, considers 842

course (C) offers best solution from every
point of view but feels course (A) would
be favourably received; course (B) would
not avoid serious criticism

Informs him of Mamdot’s resignation 843

from Security Committee; comments on
Mamdot’s grievances; outlines courses open
to them; favours carrying on as before
although he has suspended search
programme

Refers to No. 456; corrects Baldev’s 846

interpretation of discussion in Partition
Council regarding control of Armed
Forces in disputed areas; states possibility of
joint administration of disputed areas has
invariably been ruled out as impracticable
Thanks for No. 371; reports Viceroy’s 846

interview with Baldev Singh and Giani
Kartar Singh (No. 417); doubts very much
whether there will be any settlement
between Sikhs and Muslims; considers
things have now gone too far for H.M.G.
to adopt his proposal and feels that any

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Name and Number

474 ( cont .)

475 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Letter GH 106

477 Smith to Ismay
Letter 191/CGS

478 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty First
Staff Meeting
Items 2, 3, 5

481 Commonwealth Relations Office to

British High Commissioners in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa
Tel. Z 37

482 Addison to Attlee
Minute

483 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1725-S via India Office

Date Main subject or subjects

July

redrawing of boundaries must be done by
successor authorities

3 Forwards statement by N.W.F.P. Ministry
on proposed referendum; has been unable
to persuade Ministers to modify para, in
which it is argued that referendum is
unnecessary; Ministers have assured him
of their desire that referendum should be
conducted peacefully

3 Sends copy of note from Auchinleck to
Baldev Singh with which Auchinleck sent
copy of his Minute in No. 476; Auchinleck
noted that if, after 15 August, a Dominion
Govt wished to use the armed forces to
coerce States, it would be necessary to decide
the position of the British Officers in
command; he is taking matter up with
Viceroy; Smith adds that in no circumstances
can British Officers in Pakistan and
Hindustan be used in operations against
each other

3 (2) Viceroy says that Krishna Menon had

told him that there was now a chance that
Congress would accept continuation of
present Interim Govt for further period ;
arrangements for Viceroy to approve
orders and appointments made by Members ;
(3) composition of Arbitral Tribunal;

(5) Governors of Provinces after
independence

3 Explains why it is considered essential that
Indian legislation is passed that month;

High Commissioners to ask Dominion
Prime Ministers whether the title ‘India
Independence Bill’ is acceptable; if it is,
H.M.G. would like to be able to say so
publicly

3 Sends text of formula agreed with de
Valera for use if they are asked in
Parliament whether Eire had been
approached on the omission of the words
‘Emperor of India’ from King’s Title

3 Reports that Jinnah told him previous
night of his wish to become Governor-
General of Pakistan; Mountbatten is
therefore faced with ‘appalling problem’
of whether to stay as Governor-General of
India or to leave on 15 Aug; suggests
Attlee takes no action at present

XC11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Juh

486 Cabinet India and Burma 3

Committee
I.B.(47)40tli Meeting
Minutes 1-4

487 Listowel to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8560

488 Clutterbuck to Commonwealth 3

Relations Office
Tel. 572

489 Mountbatten to Listowel 4

Tel. 1732-S

490 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 8578

492 Costar to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 193

493 Meeting of Indian Cabinet 4

Cases 162, 170 and 171/33/47

494 Hankinson to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 451

Main subject or subjects Page

(1) defence arrangements in India; (2) 866

consideration of No. 464; no announcement
on withdrawal of British Army to be made
in advance of Second Reading of Bill; (3)
consideration of tels. giving Congress’s
and League’s reactions to draft Bill;
amendments to meet points raised; (4)
relations with Afghanistan

Draws his attention to military and 871

defence questions which must be resolved
with the new Dominions; says H.M.G.
must decide: (1) on method of approach to
Indians; (2) on their detailed requirements;
seeks his views on (1) and on what should
be said in Parliament

Refers to No. 481 ; Mackenzie King feels 873
word ‘independence’ will be taken to
mean independence of Commonwealth ;
he cites 1926 precedent; he does not feel
Canadians will be unduly excited but
suggests title ‘India (transfer of Powers)

Bill’

Refers to No. 447; explain why he feels 874

his Interim Govt Plan is fair to League ;
forwards text of instructions to Burrows
which indicates how scheme would work at
Centre

Refers to No. 369, note 13; explains that 875
there is no longer any system whereby
H.M.G. can ensure priority for supply of
items like printing plant

Refers to No. 481; Fraser is consulting 876

others before replying but feels himself
that term ‘independence’ is unfortunate; he
much doubts whether Opposition will
agree in view of their attitude on the
change of the Dominions Office title

(1) Financial liability arising out of the 877

payment of compensation to the officers
of the Secretary of State’s Services; (2)

Afghan claims on the North West Frontier;

(3) Reconstitution of the Central Govt;
modifications to be made to procedure
under ‘standstill’ agreement

Refers to No. 481 ; reports that in 880

preliminary talk Chifley and Evatt felt
that while proposed title was unlikely to
create any real difficulty for Australia,
they were not happy about use of word
‘independence’ ; however they recognised

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XC111

Name and Number Date

My

494 ( cont .)

495 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 4

V.C.P. 107

496 Mountbatten to Gandhi 4

Letter 1446/3

497 Mountbatten to Nehru 4

Letter 592/63

498 Mountbatten to Jinnah 4

Letter 592/63

499 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Second 4

Staff Meeting
Item 2

500 Mountbatten to Jinnah 4

Letter 1446/16

502 Nehru to Vellodi 4

Tel. 5211

503 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4

Letter 690

504 Attlee to Churchill 4

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

problem and could not immediately think
of better word

Question of Mountbatten remaining 881

Governor-General of India only; need for
Jinnah to re-affirm that he would welcome
this; possible amendments to Bill
In the light of No. 396, trusts he will be 883
able to persuade Ghaffar Khan to implement
the policy of allowing referendum in
N.W.F.P. to take place without interference
by Red Shirts

Explains Sikh anxieties regarding their 884

position in Punjab and Union of India;
also their wish for special representation in
existing Constituent Assembly; and that
transfer of population should be considered;
says he much sympathises with the Sikhs
and hopes Nehru will be able to help them
Sends similar letter to No. 497; Sikhs urge 884
that transfer of population should be
considered; they also desire special
consideration in Central Legislature and
Government of Pakistan; Viceroy hopes
everything possible will be done to allay
Sikh fears

Consideration of No. 495; Mountbatten 885

decides to leave proviso in Bill allowing

for appointment of same person as

Governor-General of both Dominions

Asks him to send in writing immediately 887

name recommended for Governor-General

of Pakistan

Refers to No. 450; doubts whether agents 888

of Indian States in London can produce

much effect; outlines Congress position

on States; explains that decision of

Frontier Congress to boycott referendum

does not mean that it is demanding

separate, independent status for Province

Says that after that morning’s meeting of 890

Partition Council, Swaran Singh told him:

(1) that partition proceedings could not
go very far until boundary was finally
settled, and that Panthic Party would not
agree to installation of two new Govts on
basis of ‘notional’ boundary; (2) time
allowed for proceedings was much too
short

Refers to No. 445; does not agree with 891

point he makes ; feels term ‘independence’
emphasises the complete freedom of

XC1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

504 (cont.)

505 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter

506 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 11

507 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 173 6-S via India Office

508 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1743-S via India Office

Date

July

4

4

4

4

Main subject or subjects Page

members of Commonwealth from control
by others

Refers to No. 376; Attlee’s line on 892

Gandhi’s proposal for similar agreements
with both Dominions will have reasonably
good effect in India; is sorry Burma is
likely to leave Commonwealth; wonders
whether Burma could not go ahead on
basis of interim Dominion period; is glad
clause in draft Bill allows for continued
use of Privy Council; Nehru’s suggestion
for London discussion on position of
Indians in certain Empire countries;
difficulty of Interim Govt question

Trivedi’s role in persuading both parties 893
to accept scheme for partition of armed
forces; Nehru’s request (No. 462) for Nye
and Colville to stay as Governors ; discussions
with Congress and League on draft Bill;
situation generally quiet except in Punjab ;
Mamdot’s resignation from Punjab
Security Committee; Calcutta Riots
Enquiry Commission to be dissolved;
arrangements in Bengal during interim
period; background to Congress insistence
on reconstitution of Interim Govt; No. 468
finally convinced Congress of impossibility
of immediate reconstitution ; arrangements
for conducting business until Govt
reconstituted; Jinnah’s complaints on Sylhet
referendum; Baluchistan votes to join
Pakistan; Viceroy’s correspondence with
Gandhi (Nos. 382, 390 and 496); refugee
problem; cruiser for, and loan of Royal
Navy personnel to, Indian Navy;
discussions with Jinnah on proposal for
Mountbatten to remain as Governor-
General of both Dominions until 3 1
March 1948 (paras. 21-34); Mountbatten in
complete quandary as to what he should
do and is sending Ismay home to seek
guidance

Refers to No. 468; reports that Nehru has 900
been persuaded not to press matter until
Bill is passed; Cabinet that morning reacted
quite peacefully; is sending Ismay home to
explain difficulties of situation

Refers to Nos. 483 and 500; would be 901

grateful for guidance from H.M.G. on
Governor-General question; asks for

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Name and Number

508 ( cont .)

509 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten
Letter

510 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

51 1 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1744-S

512 Commonwealth Relations Office to
Costar
Tel. 188

515 Gandhi to Mountbatten
Letter

516 Partition Council Meeting
Case No. P.C. 25/3/47

517 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8631

518 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter 1446/3

Date Main subject or subjects

My

Opposition to be brought into discussion
and hopes they will concur in advice

4 League tenders advice to King that Jinnah
be appointed Governor-General of
Pakistan; League would be glad if
Mountbatten decided to accept Governor-
Generalship of India

4 Indian Independence Bill presented in

Commons that morning; Congress insistence
on change in Interim Govt is considered
unreasonable in London but it is recognised
that they must try to meet it ; is pleased
with Radcliffe’s appointment; change in title
of Dominions Office; is pleased with
invitations to Colville and Nye to stay on

4 Refers to No. 381; outlines limited functions
he considers British troops should have
after 15 Aug; gives views on system of
command; explains why he feels all British
troops should be withdrawn by Dec. 1947

4 Refers to No. 492; appreciates Fraser’s
position but feels he should not consult
Opposition; informs Costar personally of
Mackenzie-King’s reaction in No. 488
and says there is no question of saying
publicly that Dominion P.M.’s favour
term ‘independence’; no change in title of
Bill now ‘possible’

5 Refers to No. 496; Ghaffar Khan and Red
Shirts are carrying on agitation to tell
people not to participate; there should be
no demonstration during voting days or
approach to voters during voting time ;
would be willing to refer to matter in these
terms at his evening prayer; will adopt
quicker means of reaching Ghaffar Khan if
Viceroy suggests any

5 Composition of Arbitral Tribunal

5 Refers to No. 463 ; explains that League’s
unwillingness to consider Pakistan successor
of all applicable treaty rights and obligations,
if adhered to, will undermine basis of reply
to Afghanistan on N.W.F.P.

5 Thanks for No. 515; would be grateful
if Gandhi could deprecate any agitation
before the polling days; thinks it
important that Ghaffar Khan has Gandhi’s
advice as soon as possible and will arrange
for it to be sent by air; Resident in Kashmir
to see Maharaja

xcv

Page

902

902

904

905

908

909

909

910

XCV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

519 Nehru to Mountbatten 5

Letter

521 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 5

V.C.P. 1 15

522 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 5

V.C.P. 116

523 Mountbatten to Attlee 5

Letter

524 Lady Mountbatten to Mountbatten 5

Note

526 Carter to Abell 5

Letter

527 Abell to Mountbatten 5

Minute

529 Abbott to I. D. Scott 5

Tel. 161-G

530 Gandhi to Mountbatten 5

Letter

531 Baring to Commonwealth Relations 5
Office
Tel. 202

Main subject or subjects Pages

Says he and colleagues would like to see 91 1
Slim become C. in C. of Army of Indian
Union

Circulates brief prepared for Ismay on 914

‘The history of the views expressed and
decisions reached by the Indian Leaders on
the appointment of Governor-General’

Circulates papers giving reasons for and 917

against Mountbatten staying on as
Governor-General of India

Explains background to Governor- 921

Generalship problem; considers situation
to be his own fault

Considers that Mountbatten should have 922

further discussions with Congress leaders
on Governor-Generalship in light of Jinnah’s
attitude; he should ascertain whether their
offer on the Governor-Generalship of Indian
Union is confirmed; Congress should be
in complete agreement on time limit
proposed for appointment

Refers to No. 451; describes probable 927

ministerial set-up in Whitehall for handling
relations with the two new Dominions
from 15 August 1947

Reports telephone conversation with 928

Abbott who said that Punjab Security

Committee had ceased to sit but League

were participating in most friendly way on

Partition Council; Jenkins would like to

carry 011 as he is for the moment but

wishes to be informed on position regarding

twin Cabinets in Bengal; Abell proposes to

fly to Calcutta and later to Lahore

Jenkins advises strongly against Radcliffe 93 1

staying at Government House as close

personal contacts between Governor and

Boundary Commission would be

misinterpreted

Refers to No. 518; says he has sent Ghaffar 931
Khan a message through a Khudai
Khidmatgar who visited him about noon;
part of the message is reproduced in a letter
he encloses (see No. 541) ; Mountbatten
may send this on if it covers new point
raised ; Gandhi hopes there will be no
disturbance by Ghaffar Khan and his
followers

Refers to No. 481; sends message from 932

Smuts saying that term ‘independence’ is
regrettable and suggesting substitution of

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XCV1I

Name and Number

531 (cont.)

532 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8677

533 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Jinnah

534 Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

536 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1771-S

537 Extract from Letter of Tyson

Date Main subject or subjects

July

‘sovereignty’; Smuts suggests that
announcement of Dominion agreement
should be avoided ; he feels term may lead
Burmese to go for independence rather
than Dominion Status

Page

5 Sends text of Statement which might be 933
made in Parliament debate on succession
to the international personality of India
and to international rights and obligations ;
hopes they might be able to add that
Indian leaders accept views expressed; asks
whether League have reconsidered view
given in No. 463

5 Jinnah says he intends to accord Scheduled 93 5
Castes in Pakistan really fair treatment ;
question of Pakistan citizens being eligible
again for decorations ; Jinnah confirms he
would wish Mountbatten to be Chairman
of Joint Defence Council if he stayed as
Governor-General of India ; design of
Pakistan Flag; Mountbatten to attend
Farewell Ceremony in Karachi on 14 Aug;
venue for, and date of, Pakistan Constituent
Assembly; discussion of candidates to head
Pakistan Defence Services; Jinnah’s protest
on two matters relating to Independence
Bill; Jinnah denies writing to Maharaja of
Kashmir urging him to join Pakistan;

Viceroy warns Jinnah that he will be
compelled to reconstitute Interim Govt after
20 July

5 Encloses message in No. 536 and asks him 937
to send it to Attlee and Churchill; says he
is examining position regarding the
execution and enforcement of the partition
award and will wish to send message on this
on 7 July

5 Sends message from Jinnah complaining at 938
allocation of Andamans and Nicobars to
India in Bill and stressing that Pakistan’s
claim to them is very strong ; asks for this
injustice to be rectified in Parliament

5 Important point in published Bill is that it 939
names 15 August as date for British departure
regardless of whether partition is complete ;
Mountbatten’s tactic has been to ‘hustle’
everyone; believes British will withdraw
in fairly peaceful conditions and this will
make for better future relations between
Britain and India

XCV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

539 Listowel to Mountbatten 5

Tel. 8685

540 Jenkins to Abell 6

Tel. 163-G

541 Abell to Latimer 6

Tel. 1784-S

544 Mountbatten to Liaquat Ali Khan 7
Letter 1446/16

545 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Third 7

Staff Meeting
Items 2-3

546 Record of Meeting of Special 7

Committee of Indian Cabinet

547 Nehru to Mountbatten 7

Letter

548 Jinnah to Mountbatten 7

Letter

549 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 7
Letter

Alain subject or subjects Page

Sends text of Statement which might be 942
made in Parliamentary debate on position
of the tribal areas after 1 5 August
Explain why he does not consider Bengal 942
model of dual Cabinets could be followed
in Punjab; adds that any attempt to form
Ministry would divert attention from
partition work and risk inflaming law and
order situation which is ‘generally
explosive’ with ‘hatred and suspicion . . .
universal and undisguised’

Sends message for Ghaffar Khan from 943

Gandhi; in this Gandhi says Khudai
Khidmatgars should avoid every occasion
for clash with Leaguers ; there should be
‘no fuss, no procession, no disobedience of
any orders from authority’ ; boycott of
referendum by bulk of Pathans in such
circumstances would be moral defeat for
Pakistanis

Thanks for No. 509; wishes to make it 946

clear that he lias not yet decided whether
to stay as Governor-General of India
(2) Question of Mountbatten staying as 946

Governor-General of India; (3) course to be
adopted if League Members fail to send in
their resignations from Interim Govt
Position of members of non-S. of S.’s 949

Services (both Central and Provincial) ;

H.M.G. to be authorised to announce that
leaders of Indian Parties had guaranteed
existing terms and conditions of service of
all their employees including Europeans
Refers to No. 497; says they appreciate 951

Sikh anxieties but feel that weightage is a
fundamentally wrong principle ; transfer of
population must be seriously considered if
people concerned desire it

Refers to Nos. 534 and 536; sends further 951
message for Attlee and Churchill relating
to the enforcement of the Arbitral and
Boundary awards ; League considers that
H.M.G. alone is appropriate authority to
guarantee awards; Bill should be amended
to provide for this or declaration be made
during Parliamentary debate
Refers to Viceroy’s request in No. 493 953

for the resignations of League Members of
Interim Govt; asks to be told basis and
details of plan for reconstitution of Govt
so decision can be taken

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XCV1X

Name and Number Date

July

551 Attlee to Mountbatten 7

Tel. 79 via India Office

552 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1798-S

553 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1799-S

554 Draft Memorandum, from Chiefs of 7

Staff to Minister of Defence

555 Commonwealth Relations Office 7

to Baring
Tel. Z 39

556 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1800-S

557 Mountbatten to Ismay 7

Tel. 1802-S via India Office

558 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1807-S

561

Bhopal to Mountbatten

7

Letter

562

Listowel to Attlee

7

Minute 115/47

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to Nos. 483 and 508; Jinnah’s 956

position on Governor-Generalship is indeed
a surprise ; is glad he sent Ismay home ; feels
no one could have done more or better
than Mountbatten

Feels draft in No. 539 is satisfactory except 956
for one point

Agrees with terms of proposed statement 957
in No. 532 but feels it should be confmed
to an expression of H.M.G.’s view of the
situation

British strategic requirements in India and 957
Pakistan

Sends message for Smuts, in reply to his 961
message in No. 531, expressing regret if
term ‘independence’ had caused
embarrassment; other Dominion P.M.’s had
also expressed reservations and there w~as
no question of H.M.G. saying that term was
acceptable to Prime Ministers of other
Commonwealth countries; explains why
term was adopted

Refers to No. 487; agrees that provision 962
of military aircraft transit facilities must be
dealt with immediately ; explains difficulties
of beginning immediate negotiations on
external defence and British strategic
requirements; suggests procedure for
negotiations after transfer of power;
believes responsibility for safety of British
subjects must rest with Dominion
concerned; urges that no statement be made
in Parliament

Refers to Nos. 521 and 522; comments 964

critically on certain arguments in No. 522;
reports conversation with Auchinleck that
morning on question of whether he would
stay on; asks Ismay not to circulate these
papers in their present form

Suggests that Ismay takes Enclosure to No. 966
548 round to Churchill, and explains that
Jinnah was told from the outset that only
practical solution was a common
Governor-General who could secure fair
play and implementation of awards
Explains why he feels Mountbatten should 968
not stay as Governor-General of India only
Sends note by India Office on ‘Situation 971
if there are two Governors-General from
15 August’; discusses date when decision
to appoint separate Governors-General

c

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

563

Rowan to Attlee

7

Minute

564

Cabinet India and Burma

7

Committee I.B.(47)4ist
Meeting Minutes 1-2 (incorporating
Confidential Annex)

Main subject or subjects Page

might be made public; suggests statement
which might be made at opening of
Parliamentary Debate

Refers to No. 562; explains his anxieties 975
on suggested statement

Withdrawal of British Forces from India; 976

Govemors-General of the two Indian

Dominions ; Committee wishes

Mountbatten to accept Congress invitation

for nomination as Governor-General of

India; agreement on form of statement to

be made in Commons by Attlee on

situation; Attlee to consult Opposition

leaders

CHAPTER 4

The Indian Independence Bill

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947

June

59 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s 4

Press Conference

1 1 5 Mountbatten to Listowel 9

Tel. 1358-S

1 16 Mountbatten to Listowel 9

Tel. 1368-S

122 Turnbull to Stephenson 9

Letter

132 India Office Minutes 10/11

133 India Office Minutes 10

134

Stephenson to Turnbull

10

Letter

138

Listowel to Mountbatten

10

Tel. 7496

Mountbatten’s opening remarks ... on no

legislative programme

Refers to No. 116; asks permission to give 219
Nehru assurance that party leaders will be
shown Bill; recommends that Nehru’s
view on international position should be
supported

Repeats letter of 7 June from Nehru 220

outlining Congress view on continuing
entity of India and asking to see draft
legislation on this subject

Asks for comments on general layout of 229

draft India Bill and on two particular

points

Line to be taken on question of withholding 253
Andaman and Nicobar Islands from India
Possibility that clauses in draft Bill 255

dealing with Governor-General might lead
to creation of a Dominion with a President
not appointed by King

Refers to No. 122 and comments from 256

Dominions Office point of view on draft
India Bill

Refers to No. 115; must defer definite 260

answer about showing Bill to Indian
leaders until after India Committee have
considered it; fears that to do so might
give rise to delay

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

Cl

Name and Number Date

June

149 Monteath to Ismay 11

Tel. 7521

165 Cabinet India and Burma 12

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)97

167 Ismay to Monteath 12

Tel. 1416-S

172

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 142 i-S

182

Listowel to Mountbatten

13

Letter, para. (7)

186

Stapleton to Monteath

13

Letter

189

Turnbull to Abell

13

Letter

190

Cabinet India and Burma

13

Committee

Paper I.B.(47)ioo

191

Draft Indian Dominions Bill

13

193 Cabinet India and Burma 13

Committee
Paper I. B. (47) 102

194 Monteath to Ismay 13

Tel. 7668

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to No. 117; is sending copies of 281

Enclosures to No. 13 1; warns that Bill is
likely to make provision for exercise by
Governor-General, for limited period and
exceptional purposes, of powers otherwise
than on Ministerial advice

Memorandum by Listowel submitting 312

draft telegram to Mountbatten raising

question of possible repercussions if

Andamans and Nicobars are taken from

India before transfer of power

Refers to No. 149; thanks for Enclosures 314

to No. 13 1 ; warns that any proposal to

reserve powers to Governor-General, or

that he should have any arbitral authority

whatever ‘would blow the whole scheme

sky high’

Refers to No. 138; considers it absolutely 318
essential to show Indian leaders draft Bill
Draft Indian Dominion Bill 335

Chiefs of Staff note that draft Bill does 343

not appear to conflict with British
military requirements, but wish to be
advised on how negotiations concerning
those requirements are to be conducted
Sends copies of draft Bill; outlines 348

timetable for its consideration; encloses
explanatory note on some points in Bill
Memorandum by Listowel circulating 353

draft India Bill, summarising its main
provisions, and commenting on points to
which he thought Committee should give
particular attention

Draft of a Bill ‘to make provision for the 361
setting up in India of two independent
Dominions’ and for other consequential or
connected matters

Memorandum by Listowel opposing 377

Mountbatten’s recommendation that

Indian leaders should be shown draft Bill

and suggesting instead he should tell them

orally what its main provisions will be

Refers to Nos. 167 and 149; explains more 378

fully conception of special role of

Governor-General in transitional period

for which Bill makes allowance; Bill’s

silence on whether Governor-General’s

powers are exercised on advice or not

follows Dominion precedent; it is only in

practical application, not in anything

Cll

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

June

194 (1 cont .)

203 Attlee to Chifley, Fraser and Smuts 14
Tel. via British High Commissioners

214 Abell to Mountbatten 16

Minute

216 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Third 16
Staff Meeting
Item 2

‘appearing on the face of the Bill’, that
differences from Dominion precedent will
appear

Explains background to proposed clause in
India Bill regarding alteration of King’s
Title; asks whether Dominion Govts are
prepared to take similar action and, if so,
whether they will authorise him to make
parliamentary statement to that effect

Reports arrival of draft India Bill,
circulation given to it and preliminary
timetable for its consideration

(2) Draft Bill — Menon to prepare draft
telegram on it; Mohammed Ali to be
shown Bill

221 Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.O.S.(47)76th Meeting
Minute 4

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth
Stah Meeting
Item 2

244 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)3ist Meeting
Minutes 1-4

248 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1480-S

16 Agreement that it was of utmost
importance for H.M.G. to retain
Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadive Islands
but that timing and method of approach
was matter for political decision; Annex:
minute by Hollis to Minister of Defence
reporting these views and drawing
attention to absence from draft Bill of any
provision for holding negotiations on
British military requirements

17 (2) Discussion of draft Bill

17 Consideration of (1) draft Bill (No. 191);
agreement on certain amendments
including suggestion by Attlee that it
should be called ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;
(2) international status of new Dominions ;
agreement that H.M.G. should accept
Nehru’s view that Hindustan would
succeed to India’s position as international
entity; (3) assumption of international
obligations by successor authorities;
agreement that assurance on this point be
sought from Interim Govt on behalf of
both future Dominions ; (4) Andamans
and Nicobars; agreement to omit clause
in existing form on these Islands from Bill
and to seek Mountbatten’s advice on
alternative ; also to seek by negotiation
facilities in Laccadive Islands

17 Notifies dispatch of No. 249 and outlines
timetable for consideration of draft Bill,
including consultation with Indian leaders,
which he hopes to follow

Page

396

418

419

432

463

474

486

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

Clll

Name and Number

Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

June

249

Mountbatten to Listowel

18

Sends comments on, and proposes

487

Tel. 1481-S

amendments to, draft Bill

■255

Menon to Turnbull

18

Sends comments and suggestions

496

Tel. 1487-S

supplementary to No. 249, proposing
inter alia a clause to maintain in force

provisions of 1935 Act relating to
distribution of powers between Federal
and Provincial legislatures

256

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to draft Bill (No. 191) and

497

Tel. 7840

communicates points and amendments
made by India and Burma Committee
(No. 244, Minute 1)

2 57

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to No. 115 and communicates

500

Tel. 7841

India and Burma Committee’s views on
question of showing draft Bill to Indian
leaders

258

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to Nos. 174 and 162, paras. 24-25;

501

Tel. 7842

communicates India and Burma

Committee’s views on question of

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

265

Cabinet India and Burma

19

(3) Viceroy’s comments (No. 249) on draft

513

Committee

Independence Bill

I.B.(47)32nd Meeting

Minute 3

267

Ismay to Mountbatten

19

Refers to Nos. 256 and 257; staff are

519

Tel. 1497-S

considering former; communicates terms
of telegram they suggest Mountbatten
might send in reply to latter on question of
showing draft Bill to Indian leaders

269

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1503-S

19

Comments on No. 256, paras. 6 and 20.

522

270

Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Refers to No. 115; communicates India

523

Tel. 7893

and Burma Committee’s decision that

H.M.G. should accept that Hindustan
would continue existing India’s international
personality, subject to equitable division
of central assets

271

Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Reports that India and Burma Committee

524

Tel. 7897

have considered (No. 265, Minute 3)
Mountbatten’s preliminary comments (No.
249) on draft Bill and communicates their
conclusions

279

Mountbatten to Listowel

20

Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20;

537

Tel. 8-S.K.

question of consultation with Indian leaders
on particular points arising on draft Bill;

agrees with Reforms Office and Political

Dept in deprecating formal denunciation of

treaties with States

280

Turnbull to Menon

20

Refers to No. 255 which arrived too late

537

Tel. 7944

for consideration by Committee; enlargement

of Bill proposed in No. 255 not considered

CIV

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

280 (cont)

June

282

India Office Minutes

20/21

283

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1511-S

20

284

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1512-S

20

286 Ismay to Mountbatten 20

Tel. 1514-S

290 Menon to Turnbull 21

Tel. 1528-S

293 Mountbatten to Listowel 21

Tel. 19-S.K.

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth 23

Staff Meeting
Item 7

322 Cabinet 24

C.M.(47)56th Conclusions

Minute 4

323 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1. 6.(47)121

324 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)122

325 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)127

Main subject or subjects Page

desirable or necessary; comments on its
other points

Effect of deletion of Clause 19 (2) (a) from 542
draft Bill on disposal of records of S. of S.
in Council and S. of S.

Refers to No. 256 on draft Bill and 543

transmits draft reply for Mountbatten to
send to it

Refers to No. 258 and transmits draft reply 544
for Mountbatten to send to it, pressing
strongly for complete exclusion from draft
Bill of any reference to Andaman and
Nicobar Islands

Refers to No. 271 on draft Bill and 545

transmits draft reply for Mountbatten to
send to it, stressing inter alia the advantage
of starting new Dominions with as complete
a constitution as possible

Refers to No. 280; explains reasons for 552

equipping new Dominions with as complete
a constitution as possible; feels both
Congress and League would welcome
continuance of Governor-General’s,
transformed into Dominion, control over
Provinces

Explains background to insistence on 554

certain points mentioned in No. 286 is
Congress wish to continue present
distribution of powers between Centre and
Provinces but to be able to secure control
over Provinces in emergency

(7) arrangements for showing draft Bill to 573
Indian leaders

Note taken of need for U.K. and Dominion 596
Parliaments to give assent to change in
King’s title ; Govt of Eire to be consulted
also

Memoandum by Listowel circulating 597

summary of points regarding draft Bill on
which full agreement is still to be reached
with Mountbatten

Memorandum by Listowel discussing 599

points of major importance on draft Bill
requiring decision

Memorandum by Listowel discussing pros 603

and cons of including in Bill guarantee of
conditions of service to officers continuing
in service under future Govts in India

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CV

Name and Number Date

June

347 Cabinet India and Burma 25

Committee
I.B. (47)3 5th Meeting
Minute 3

348 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8156

349 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8162

350 Listowel to Shawcross 25

Letter

351 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8184

353 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8194

356 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

26

361 Cabinet 26

C.M.(47)57th Conclusions
Minute 4

365 Mountbatten to Listowel 26

Tel. 1598-S

Main subject or subjects

(3) consideration of points outstanding on
draft Bill

Refers to No. 286; Cabinet Committee
have agreed to substantial revision and
rearrangement of draft Bill to meet strong
views expressed in Nos. 255, 286, 290 and
293 ; explains that, because of pressure of
time table, Mountbatten must now choose
between this revision and existing layout
Refers to Nos. 246 and 247; explains why
it is felt Political Dept’s view must be
accepted that all agreements with States
must lapse and advocates retention of clause
to this effect in Bill
Explains position reached in preparing
draft Bill and invites his comments on it
and proposed amendments to it
Refers to No. 348 and communicates
Cabinet Committee’s conclusions on other
outstanding points regarding draft Bill
Refers to No. 284 and communicates
Cabinet Committee’s views on inclusion
of revised Clause on Andamans and
Nicobars in draft Bill to be shown Indian
leaders

Recalls that Indian leaders have been
informed that, before legislation to
transfer power is introduced, they will have
opportunity of examining it ; outlines his
conception of form such legislation should
take, emphasising in particular need for a
separate Act for each new Dominion
Report by Attlee on progress in drafting
Indian Independence Bill; agreement that
he should discuss it with Opposition and
that Mountbatten should show it to Indian
leaders

Gives his views on matters contained in
Nos. 348-9 and 351-3 ; states inter alia that
Provincial Governors will be appointed
after informal consultation between himself
and all-India leaders (see No. 352), that
Nehru ‘will vehemently protest’ against
denunciation of States’ treaties (see No.

349), that his advisers unhesitatingly accept
redraft of Bill (see No. 348), and that
clause on Andamans and Nicobars ‘will be
entirely unacceptable to Congress’ (see No.

Page

638

642

643

645

646

649

658

664

672

CV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and number

Date

June

366

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1600-S

26

367

Partition Council Meeting

Case No. P.C. 5/1/47

27

373

Listowel to Attlee

Minute 98/47

27

374

Listowel to Attlee

Minute 102/47

27

375

Beards to Attlee

27

Minute

376

Listowel to Mountbatten

27

Letter, para. 8

380

Listowel to Mountbatten

27

Tel. 8270

392 Nehru to Mountbatten 28

Letter

397 Mountbatten to Nehru 28/29

Letter

408 Nehru to Mountbatten 29

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

Proposes redraft of Clause in draft Bill 674

relating to common Governor-General

(2) Mountbatten announces arrangements 675

for enabling Indian leaders to study draft

Bill

Refers to Nos. 365 and 366; attaches 699

summary of outstanding points of
difference with Mountbatten on draft Bill
Refers to Nos. 373 and 366; attaches draft 701

of letter from Attlee to Lascelles explaining
position regarding procedure for
appointment of Governor-General and
Governors

Arrangements for Opposition leaders to 703

see draft Bill and for Attlee’s meeting
with them

Programme for discussion of draft Bill 704

with Opposition and Indian leaders

Refers to No. 100, Item 1; points out that 71 1

under draft Bill it is contemplated that

administrative consequences of partition

will be dealt with by Governor-General’s

order; suggests there is some practical

force in Jinnah’s contention that Interim

Govt is not suitable body to decide such

matters and that Mountbatten should seek

Indian leaders’ agreement to set up partition

machinery by method proposed in Bill

Refers to No. 356, note 2; points out that 72$

legislation to transfer power is of ‘utmost

consequence to India’ ; thinks it ‘an entirely

wrong approach to proceed secretively’ ;

trusts that full opportunity will be given

them to consider Bill before it is introduced

in Parliament

Refers to No. 392; encloses invitation 733

(already drafted) to study draft Bill; trusts
Rau’s presence will meet need for
constitutional and legal advice ; Enclosure :
letter from Mountbatten to Nehru inviting
him to come to Viceroy’s House on 1
July to study draft Bill; arrangements made
for Congress and League representatives to
study Bill in separate rooms; Patel, Jinnah
and Liaquat also invited; indicates expert
advisers who will be present
Refers to No. 397 and Enclosure; points 746
out legislation is going to affect future of
India vitally; complains they are only being
given chance to see draft at last stage;

Rau’s presence will be welcome, but they

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CV11

Name and Number

408 ( cent .)

41 1 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1653-S

414 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1657-S

419 Shawcross to Listowel
Letter

420 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 103/47

421 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
LB. (47)3 7th Meeting
Minutes 1 and 3

423 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter 1446/8

424 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/8

425 Mountbatten to Jinnah
Letter 1446/8

428 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 97

Date Main subject or subjects

June

wish to consult others ; Gandhi should also
see draft Bill ; if ‘willing assent of all
parties concerned’ is not obtained, object of
Bill ‘is somewhat nullified’ ; earnestly
requests him to consider matter afresh and
if necessary consult H.M.G.

29 Reports Nehru’s request in No. 408 that
Bill be shown to Gandhi and others in
addition to those already invited;
Mountbatten thinks request should be
granted, and hopes by so doing to carry
Congress leaders with him despite Nehru’s
protest at procedure adopted for
consideration of Bill

29 Proposes amendment to draft Bill to

enable new Dominion legislature to amend
Independence Act itself ; believes Congress
acceptance may depend on this issue

30 Refers to No. 350; prefers second version
of draft Bill ; does not consider it gives
wider powers than those enjoyed by
existing Dominions; legalistically minded
M.P.s could doubtless raise numerous
Committee points ; hopes Opposition will
be persuaded not to put down detailed
amendments in Committee

30 Briefs him on certain points regarding
draft Bill in readiness for meeting that
afternoon with Opposition Leaders

30 (1) Future of India Office and its contents;

decision that this matter should be left for
negotiation with Indian Govt; (3)
consideration of points outstanding on draft
India Bill

30 Invites him to meeting to see Indian
Independence Bill

30 Refers to No. 408; agrees to additional
persons mentioned therein attending
meeting to study draft Bill; emphasises
need to avoid any leakage; has told
Jinnali he could also increase his party

30 Is glad to know Jinnah is satisfied with
composition of his party to consider draft
Bill; emphasises need to avoid any leakage;
mentions invitation to Gandhi; refers to
clause enabling one person to be appointed
to both Governor-Generalships and asks
whom Jinnah wishes to nominate as
Governor-General of Pakistan

30 Draft Indian Independence Bill as
amended to 29 June

Page

748

754

765

7 66

768

773

773

774

779

CV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

429

Note on Indian Independence Bill

30

432

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1674-S

30

434

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8361

30

435 Nehru to Mountbatten 30

Letter

436 Mountbatten to Attlee 30

Tel. 1675-S via India Office

438 Listowel to Mountbatten 30

Tel. 8380

Main subject or subjects Page

Points for discussion with Indian leaders 795
Refers to No. 414 and explains main point 800
of amendment is to allow India to declare
independence by legislation
Refers to No. 414; points out inconsistency 803

of proposed amendment with intention
embodied in revised version of Bill to
limit powers of Dominion legislatures, but
agrees to it if Mountbatten judges it
desirable

Thanks for No. 424; will convey 803

invitation to additional experts and lawyers
to attend meeting ; his intention was
however to consult Cabinet colleagues ;
gives assurance to make every effort to
prevent leakage and asks to have a copy of
Bill to show Cabinet colleagues; Gandhi
may not attend meeting as time is inconvenient
Reports Krishna Menon has warned him 804
that Nehru threatens resignation unless
allowed to take away copy of Bill;
mentions Nehru’s promise to make every
effort to prevent leakage; requests
authority to use discretion to avert crisis
Refers to No. 41 1; notifies Opposition 806

concurrence to Bill being shown to Indian
leaders; Cabinet Committee feel that,
because of shortage of time, drafting points
cannot be considered but only points of
principle; suggests arguments to counter
Nehru’s complaint that other Dominions
had opportunity for full consideration of
their Bills; opposes formal communique
announcing that Indian leaders were being
consulted

439 Attlee to Mountbatten
Tel. 8393 via India Office

440 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 74

441 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 75

July

1 Refers to No. 436; agrees he may allow 807
Nehru to take draft Bill away; desirable to
give Jinnah similar facilities

1 Refers to No. 366; sends revision of proviso 808
relating to possibility of same person being
Governor-General of both Dominions ; has
no objection to this revision but feels it
might be better to try out proviso as it
stands

1 Reports that Opposition leaders adopted 809
helpful attitude in discussions on 30 June;
main criticisms were on use of title India
for Hindustan and expression ‘Independence

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

C1X

Name and Number Date

July

441 ( cont .)

443 Cabinet C.M. (47)58^1 Conclusions 1

Minutes 2, 6

444 Attlee to Churchill 1

Letter

445 Churchill to Attlee 1

Letter

452 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1684-S

456 Baldev Singh to Nehru
Letter

458 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1690-S via India Office

460 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1695-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Bill’ rather than ‘Indian (Self Government)

Bill’

Dominions Office — change of title; 810

agreement not to change title of Indian
Independence Bill but special effort to be
made to explain implications of title
Has discussed Indian legislation with Eden 812
and others; doubts whether he can hold up
Second Reading until Churchill returns
Expresses concern that Bill is to be called 812
‘Indian Independence Bill’ ; says he only
supported Mountbatten proposals because
they establish the phase of Dominion Status
which is not the same as independence
Has given Congress and League leaders 818

copies of draft Bill ; Jinnah’s preliminary
reactions were very favourable but Congress
raised three points ; these related to : (1)
insertion of words ‘this or’ in Clause (6)2
(see No. 434); (2) ability of Constituent
Assembly to include in fundamental laws
provision for accession of States; (3) the
wiping out of all treaties and agreement
with States

Expresses concern at provisions in draft 824

Bill relating to disputed districts in Western
Punjab; asks him to ensure amendments are
made so that administration of them does
not go over to Pakistan automatically when
Bill becomes law

Says situation is incredibly explosive and 826
he is advised Congress will not compromise
on different system for Interim Govt; will take
line that he cannot legally put proposals
through until Bill has been passed; Krishna
Menon believes Congress will accept a 20
July target date for enactment of Bill; as
League Members are moving to Karachi
on 7 August this would mean they would
only serve under new conditions for fortnight ;
considers this might prove acceptable
compromise; says tel. as in No. 468 would
be of utmost help

Sends note of points made informally by 829
League on draft Bill; these include: (1)
wish to insert a sanction respecting division
of property between the Dominions ; (2)
question of participation of representatives
of tribal areas in Constituent Assembly;

(3) objection to Andamans and Nicobars
being included in Dominion of India

cx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

463 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1703-S

465 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)39th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

466 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8499

468 Attlee to Adountbatten 3

Tel. 8510 via India Office

469

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8511

3

479

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1719-S

3

480 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1723-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Sends further note of points made informally 831
by League on draft Bill ; also reports that
League could not accept view that
Dominion of India would inherit
international personality of existing India ;
they would withdraw acceptance of Plan
if such a provision were inserted in Bill ;
they pointed out importance of Andamans
and Nicobars if India refused land passage
between East and West Pakistan

(1) Consideration of No. 458; agreement 834
that tel. asked for by Viceroy should be
sent (see No. 468) but it should be
modified to emphasise need for immediate
finality on terms of Bill; (2) decision to
retain title ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;
desirability of Dominions support for this

Comments on points in No. 452; explains 836
why there are insuperable objections to
Congress request that treaties and agreements
with States should be continued in existence
by Parliamentary legislation

Explains that H.M.G. cannot sanction 838

reconstruction of Interim Govt until legal

position is assured by passing

of Bill; is speeding up passage of Bill to

aim at target date of 20 July; important

they should have Indian leaders’ comments

on draft Bill immediately

Refers to No. 468; sends text of amendment 839
to draft Bill to cover legal position about
reconstitution of Interim Govt

Sends text of Congress comments on 854

draft Bill; these include: (1) emphasis on
the importance of the new Dominion of
India continuing international personality of
existing India; (2) concern at complete
wiping out of all treaties with the Indian
States; (3) anxiety that powers and
functioning of Constituent Assemblies
should be placed beyond doubt

Sends text of League comments on draft 858
Bill; these include: (1) claim that
Andamans and Nicobars should be
allocated to Pakistan ; (2) request that it be
specifically indicated which would be
appropriate authority to negotiate with
each of tribal areas; (3) request that
provisions are included to make awards of
Boundary Commissions and Arbitral Tribunal

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CXI

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

July

480 (cont.)

481 Commonwealth Relations Office to 3

British High Commissioners in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa
Tel. Z 37

482 Addison to Attlee 3

Minute

484 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1728-S

485 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1729-S

486 Cabinet India and Burma 3

Committee
I.B.(47)40th Meeting
Minutes 2 and 3

488 Clutterbuck to Commonwealth 3

Relations Office
Tel. 572

491 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 8587

492 Costar to Commonwealth Relations 4

Office
Tel. 193

494 Hankinson to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 451

495 Viceroy’ Conference Paper 4

V.C.P. 107

final and binding; H.M.G. should enforce
awards

Explains why it is considered essential that 861
Indian legislation is passed that month ;

High Commissioners to ask Dominion
Prime Ministers whether the title ‘India
Independence Bill’ is acceptable; if it is,

H.M.G. would like to be able to say so
publicly

Sends text of formula agreed with de 862

Valera for use if they are asked in

Parliament whether Eire had been

approached on the omission of the words

‘Emperor of India’ from King’s Title

Sends comments on points raised by 863

Congress (No. 479) on draft Bill

Sends comments on points raised by 865

League (No. 480) on draft Bill

(2) Consideration of No. 464; no 866

announcement on withdrawal of British

Army to be made in advance of Second

Reading of Bill; (3) consideration of tels.

giving Congress’s and League’s reactions to

draft Bill; amendments to meet points

raised

Refers to No. 481; Mackenzie King feels 873
word ‘independence’ will be taken to mean
independence of Commonwealth ; he cites
1926 precedent; he does not feel Canadians
will be unduly excited but suggests title
‘India (transfer of Powers) Bill’

Arrangements for publication of Bill; 875

explains that any further discussion of
points raised by Congress and League would
have imperilled passage of Bill that Session
Refers to No. 481; Fraser is consulting 876

others before replying but feels himself that
term ‘independence’ is unfortunate; he
much doubts whether Opposition will
agree in view of their attitude on the change
of the Dominions Office title
Refers to No. 481; reports that in 880

preliminary talk Chifley and Evatt felt that
while proposed title was unlikely to create
any real difficulty for Australia, they were
not happy about use of word ‘independence’ ;
however they recognised problem and
could not immediately think of better word
Question of Mountbatten remaining 88 1

Governor-General of India only; need for

CX 11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

495 (cont.)

Date

July

499 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Second 4
Staff Meeting
Item 2

504 Attlee to Churchill 4

Letter

506 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 11,

paras. 4 and 5

507 Mountbatten to Attlee
Tel. 1736-S via India Office

510 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, paras. 1 and 2

513 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8652

514 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8653

531 Baring to Commonwealth
Relations Office
Tel. 202

4

4

512 Commonwealth Relations Office to 4
Costar
Tel. 188

Main subject or subjects Page

Jinnah to re-affirm that he would welcome

this; possible amendments to Bill

Consideration of No. 495; Mountbatten 885

decides to leave proviso in Bill allowing

for appointment of same person as

Governor-General of both Dominions

Refers to No. 445; does not agree with 891

point he makes ; feels term ‘independence’

emphasises the complete freedom of

members of Commonwealth from control

by others

Discussions with Congress and League on 893
draft Bill

Refers to No. 468; reports that Nehru has 900
been persuaded not to press matter until
Bill is passed; Cabinet that morning reacted
quite peacefully; is sending Ismay home
to explain difficulties of situation
Indian Independence Bill presented in 902

Commons that morning; Congress
insistence on change in Interim Govt is
considered unreasonable in London but it is
recognised that they must try to meet it
Refers to No. 492; appreciates Fraser’s 905

position but feels he should not consult
Opposition; informs Costar personally of
Mackenzie-King’s reaction in No. 488 and
says there is no question of saying publicly
that Dominion P.M.s favour term
‘independence’ ; no change in title of Bill now
‘possible’

Notes that, despite objections in Nos. 349 906

and 466, standstill proviso covering
agreements with States has been inserted in
Bill; though precise legal result may be
disputable, proviso gives cover to a
standstill in practice when neither party has
done anything

Sends brief explanation of reasons why 907

India and Burma Committee did not feel
able to accept some of suggestions made by
Congress and League on Bill

Refers to No. 481; sends message from 932

Smuts saying that term ‘independence’ is
regrettable and suggesting substitution of
‘sovereignty’; Smuts suggests that
announcement of Dominion agreement
should be avoided; he feels term may lead
Burmese to go for independence rather
than Dominion Status

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CX111

Name and number Date

July

534 Jinnali to Mountbatten 5

Letter

535 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Tel. 1767-S

536 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Tel. 1771-S

542 Nicholls to Joyce 6

Tel. 1789-S

543 Mountbatten to Listowel 6

Tel. 478-GT

548 Jinnah to Mountbatten 7

Letter

550 Minutes by Croft and Turnbull 7

555 Commonwealth Relations Office 7

to Baring
Tel. Z 39

Main subject or subjects Page

Encloses message in No. 536 and asks him 937
to send it to Attlee and Churchill; says he is
examining position regarding the execution
and enforcement of the partition award
and will wish to send message on this on
7 July

Sends text of note received from Nehru on 937
points in Bill which Congress feel strongly
should be changed; these relate to: (1) the
continuation of the international personality
of India; (2) the proviso added to clause
7(i)(b) and (c); (3) the proviso to clause 19(3)

Sends message from Jinnah complaining at 93 8
allocation of Andamans and Nicobars to
India in Bill and stressing that Pakistan’s
claim to them is very strong; asks for this
injustice to be rectified in Parliament
Reports that first reactions to Bill have 945

been extremely favourable and British have
come out well; V. P. Menon’s Press
Conference held to explain Bill went off
well; main attack was on position of States
and, in particular, Berar

Refers to No. 542 ; sends extracts from 945

Press comments on Bill

Refers to Nos. 534 and 536; sends further 951
message for Attlee and Churchill relating
to the enforcement of the Arbitral and
Boundary awards; League considers that
H.M.G. alone is appropriate authority to
guarantee awards; Bill should be amended
to provide for this or declaration be made
during Parliamentary debate
Powers of the Central Executives of the 954

new Dominions under clause 8 of the Bill
Sends message for Smuts, in reply to his 961
message in No. 531, expressing regret if
term ‘independence’ had caused
embarrassment; other Dominion P.M.s had
also expressed reservations and there was
was no question of H.M.G. saying that
term was acceptable to Prime Ministers of
other Commonwealth countries ; explains
why term was adopted

CX1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER 5

The States

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947
Ad ay

7 Cabinet India and Burma 3 1

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)94

Memorandum by Listowel drawing 15

attention to wide powers recommended
for Centre by reports of Union Powers and
Advisory Committees of Constituent
Assembly; suggests authors had given up
any idea of securing Muslim League
participation, and points out possible
adverse effect on w illingness of States to
adhere to Union

June

17 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Sixth 1

Staff Meeting
Item 1

20 Unsigned Note undated

21 Corfield to Abell 2

Letter

43 Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 3

Members of the States Negotiating
Committee

45 Statement by H.M.G. on India 3

Policy para. 18

60 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s 4

Press Conference

64 Mountbatten to Bhopal 4

Letter

67 Abell to Mountbatten 4

Minute

68 Nehru to Mountbatten 4

Letter

(1) Mountbatten describes conversations 32

with Bhopal and Bikaner and indicates line

he will take in meetings with States

Report of discussion between V. P. Menon 37

and Patel : — titles for Princes ; States

Proposed amendment to sentence about 37

States in Viceroy’s broadcast

Mountbatten describes reasons for adoption 80
of present plan; points out implications for
States were that new Dominions would
have stronger centres than previously
envisaged, but would both be in
Commonwealth; discussion follows on date
of lapse of paramountcy; need for
standstill agreements with successor
Dominions and machinery for negotiating
them; relations of States with new
Dominions and nature of Committee(s)
required to negotiate on this subject;

Mountbatten concludes with need for States,

in coming to decisions, to consider likely
situation in India and the world in ten
years’ time

Policy towards States remains unchanged 89

Questions and Answers 115

Accepts, with regret, Bhopal’s resignation 125

as Chancellor of Chamber of Princes
Line to be taken on Nehru’s claim that 128

Central Government should inherit

machinery of paramountcy, particularly as
regards facilities such as buildings, etc.

Refers to Bhopal’s resignation and intention 129
to declare his State independent; outlines
continuing need for machinery to deal with

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXV

Name and Number

68 ( cotit .)

Date

June

70 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Eighth 4
Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 2

73 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixteenth 5

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 2

74 Corfield to Abell 5

Letter

91 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5

para. 10, 11 and 27

94 Corfield to Abell 6

Letter

100 Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventeenth 7

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 5

101 Record of Interview between 7

Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat and
Nishtar

107

Rajagopalachariar to Cripps

Letter

8

108

Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth

Staff Meeting

Item 1

9

109

Nehru to Mountbatten

Letter

9

no Nehru to Mountbatten 9

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

administrative matters concerning States
and attacks Political Dept’s policy of
dismantling it; asserts that ‘it is impossible
for us to admit the right’ of any State to
independence

(1) Bhopal’s resignation; (2) interview with 133
Gandhi (No. 69) ; question whether Gandhi,

Nehru or Mountbatten should visit Kashmir
Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 137

leaders on (2) the States — Mountbatten
describes meeting in No. 43, Nehru
complains that Political Dept’s policy
regarding lapse of paramountcy was likely
to lead to administrative chaos
Refers to No. 68; defends programme for 143
retraction of paramountcy; suggests
Mountbatten might consult Standing
Committee of Chamber of Princes
Conversations with Bhopal and Bikaner; 158
meeting with States Negotiating Committee
Refers to Nos. 74 and 68; summarises 167

discussion between Mountbatten and
certain representatives of the States at which
latter opposed location of agents of Central
Govts in their territories and proposed
appointment of own agents to Central
Govts

The States 184

Meeting joined by Dewan of Bahawalpur; 190
discussion of position of that State; Jinnah
believes existing agreements with States
would be legally binding on successor
authorities

Contests doctrine that ‘paramountcy’ ends 196
with transfer of power

(1) Hyderabad and Kashmir 198

Proposes establishment of some central 205

agency to deal with States problems on

behalf of Govt of India ; no further steps

should be taken to liquidate work of

Political Dept in Residencies without

consultation with Govt of India

Protests at steps being taken by Political 208

Dept to liquidate itself and hence relations

of Govt of India with States without

reference to G. of I. and in particular at

proposals for disposal of buildings, etc. in

CXV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

no ( cont .)

in Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

1 12 Monckton to Ismay
Letter

124 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel and
Kripalani

146 Corfield to Scott
Letter

150 Herbert to Corfield
Tel. R-59

15 1 Standing Committee of All India

States’ People’s Conference
Resolutions (2) and (3)

163 Firman issued by Nizam of
Hyderabad

175 Minutes of Viceroy’s Eighteenth
Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 1

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

States which may belong to G. of I. ;
suggests proposed return of cantonments to
States be considered with G. of I. before
action taken; proposes that representative
from G. of I. should visit Residencies to
inspect buildings etc. and report
9 Encloses note by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami 210
Iyer on ‘The disappearance of Paramountcy,
the emergence of Independent Sovereign
States and the Balkanisation of India’

9 Is worried about way States are being 214

handled; encloses note summarising
Hyderabad case ; if nothing is done will be
compelled to raise hypothetical question of
(independent) relations with H.M.G. and
return to London to pursue matter through
political channels 232

10 The States

11 Encloses briefs on (1) machinery for dealing 272
with questions of common concern

between States and successor Govts; (2)
interim standstill arrangements; (3) disposal
of Crown Representative’s records ; gives
his views on Nos. 109, no and in

n Regrets it has proved impracticable to 282

prevent issue of No. 163

n/12 (2) Position of States in regard to statement 282
of 3 June; (3) Administrative functions of
paramountcy

12 Announces decision not to send 308

representatives to either Constituent
Assembly; states that on departure of
Paramount Power he will in law become
independent Sovereign, but that question of
association or relationship between his

State and units of British India remains for
decision when their constitutions have been
determined

13 Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 320
leaders on (1) the States — Nehru attacks

and Corfield defends Political Dept’s
policy for, and actions to implement,
withdrawal of paramountcy ; Nehru argues
that States cannot claim independence;

Jinnah asserts they are sovereign states
which Nehru contests; discussion of
Enclosures to No. 146 with agreement,
inter alia, on establishment of ‘States
Department’ of G. of I.; on despatch to

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXV11

Name and Number Date

June

175 ( cont .)

196 Corfield to Erskine Crum 14

Letter

197 Secretary to Crown Representative 14

to Residents
Letter F.45~R(S)/47

198 Secretary to Crown Representative 14

to Residents
Letter F.4<5-R(S)/47

199 Monckton to Mountbatten 14

Letter

206

Resolution of All-India Congress

15

Committee

225

Reuter Report

17

226

Fortnightly report of Madras States

17

Residency

229

Nehru to Mountbatten

17

Letter

238

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

17

V.C.P. 81

Main subject or subjects Page

States of draft standstill formula and on
holding meeting between Indian leaders and
representatives of States (probably in July)
to discuss it ; and on principles to govern
disposal of Crown Representative’s records
Refers to No. 175, Item 1; hopes that 381

Mountbatten will explain to Indian
Cabinet that jurisdiction over administered
areas (e.g. railways and cantonments) will
revert to States; that this reversion will not
be affected by standstill agreement; and
that negotiations for practical arrangements
for these areas, on basis of changed jurisdiction,
should not be delayed

Machinery for dealing with questions of 382

common concern: States Dept, to be

established; Residents to enquire whether

States would prefer successor Govts to

station Agents with them, or v ice versa

Standstill Formula: draft standstill 384

agreement enclosed; Residents to explain

it is only a ‘cockshy’ to provide basis for

discussion and negotiation at Conference

between representatives of States and

Successor Govts to be held at end of July

Is very troubled about way his Hyderabad 386

clients are being treated; outlines Nizam’s

viewpoint on apparent intention to deny

Hyderabad any direct relations with H.M.G.

and his difficulties in trusting in Hindustan

for his future; is being pressed by Nizam to

return to England; will feel reluctantly

bound to go to ensure that British public

are aware how ‘shamefully’ their ‘old

friends and allies’ are being treated

Statement of Congress views on position 399

of Indian States

Statement by Jinnah on Indian States 438

Controversy between Ramaswami Aiyar, 43 8
and Congress and States’ People’s Congress,
over Travancore’s decision to declare
independence on lapse of paramountcy
Encloses long note (reprinted in full) on 442

Kashmir

Circulates letter and proposals from Nehru 461
regarding constitution and functions of
proposed new Dept., possibly called the
States Dept., of Govt of India to deal writh
matters of common concern with States

CXV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth
Staff Meeting
Items 4 and 7
241 Listowel to Attlee

Minute 92/47, para. 6

247 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1484-S

250 Secretary to Crown Representative
to Residents
Letter F.63-R(S)/46

260 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

261 Ismay to Mountbatten
Letter

264 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

273 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter 1446/18

Date

June

17

17

Main subject or subjects

Page

243

Mountbatten to Listowel

17

Tel. 1482-P

246

Mountbatten to Listowel

17

Tel. 1483-S

17

18

19

19

19

20

(4) Nehru’s proposals for establishment of 463
States Department; (7) Bahawalpur

Refers to No. 222; points out practical 471

difficulties of Royal visit to India and
Pakistan in current year ; until Princes have
defined their relations with new Dominions,

Royal visit might cause embarrassment in
that regard

Requests extension of style ‘His Highness’ 474

to Rulers with salute of 9 guns

Conveys view of Reforms Office on 484

question whether agreements of commercial,

economic or financial character between

States and paramount power will continue

to be binding on States and successor

Governments

Refers to No. 246 and conveys Political 485

Dept.’s conflicting view

Authorises resumption of destruction of 490

ephemeral records and gives instructions
for transfer of certain confidential records
to U.K. High Commissioner by 15 August
1947

Following talks with Chhattari, Monckton 503
and Corfield, submits recommendations of
Mieville and himself on how to handle
Berar problem

Has had long discussion with Monckton on 504
drafting Parliamentary Question and
Answer on H.M.G.’s relations with States
after transfer of power which will be
sufficiently acceptable to Nizam to prevent
his sending Monckton home to mobilise
opinion on treatment of States; Monckton
is writing to Butler to get Question put;

Annex: letter to Montea th enclosing draft

Reviews position regarding States; 509

emphasises they must ‘fit in properly into

the picture of India’; it is ‘quite inconceivable

that a State can become independent’ and

have external relations; indicates trade is to

be regarded as part of external relations ;

trusts States Dept, will soon be constituted;

enclosure: note emphasisising need for

political arrangements to take place of

paramountcy as well as for arrangements

for matters of common concern

Encloses letter and note from Bhopal to be 528

passed to Attlee; has explained to Bhopal

and Zafrullah Khan that Congress would

CH. 5 THE STATES

CX IX

Name and Number Date

June

273 (cont.)

279 Mountbatten to Listowel 20

Tel. 8-S.K.

287 Secretary to Crown Representative 21
to Residents
Letter F.46-R(S)/47

288 Ismay to Nehru 21

Letter

294 Record of Interview between 22

Mountbatten and Kak

295 Nehru to Mountbatten 22

Letter

296 Monckton to Ismay 22

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

never have agreed to plan if there were to be
more than two Dominions; but some
States, particularly Hyderabad and Bhopal,
feel very unhappy; enclosure: Bhopal’s
letter alleging that, if H.M.G.’s treatment of
States is based on hope of conciliating
Congress, that hope will prove futile; that
Congress will be dominated by left wing
whose socialism ‘is only a thin veneer
covering a mass of rank communism’ ; and
that decisions already made by Constituent
Assembly offer little incentive to States to
join Hindustan

Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20; question 537
of consultation with Indian leaders on
particular points arising on draft Bill;
agrees with Reforms Office and Political
Dept in deprecating formal denunciation
of treaties with States

Refers to No. 198, para. 4; July Conference 546
on Standstill arrangements : Residents to
seek to ensure that (a) every State is
represented, (b) representatives are authorised
to sign agreement, (c) as many States as
possible combine to send joint representative;
there is no suggestion of ‘permanent
commitment’, but, to avoid administrative
dislocation, standstill agreement is
necessary

Refers to No. 238; encloses memorandum 548
on constitution and functions of proposed
States Dept which Mountbatten proposes to
include in agenda for Indian Cabinet
meeting next week

Mountbatten clarifies advice given to 555

Maharaja regarding future of Kashmir
In view of statements by or on behalf of 556
Ramaswami Aiyar regarding independence
of Travancore, Govt of India will not be
prepared to recognise Travancore’s Envoy
to Delhi ; considers statement that Pakistan,
on its establishment, will receive representative
of Travancore is ‘extraordinary in many
respects’ ; thinks Ramaswami Aiyar should
be informed that such statements are
‘mischievous and harmful’

Refers to Govt of India’s inaction in matter 557
of removing its troops from Hyderabad ; if
no reply to Hyderabad’s latest
representation is forthcoming P.Q. will be
put asking whether this ‘Army of

cxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

296 (1 tout .)

297 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

303 Cripps to Rajagopalachariar
Letter

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth
Staff Meeting
Items 10 and 11

319 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten and Nehru, para. 5
326 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)128

338 Indian Cabinet Meeting
Case 152/32/47
340 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

349 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8162

355 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/32

360 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)36th Meeting
Minute 2

365 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1598-S

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10,
paras. 26-36

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

Occupation’ will be permitted to remain;
is under pressure from Kashmir to go there
for few days

22 Refers to No. 288; notes that memorandum 559
on States Dept does not cover need for
political arrangements with States and

suggests this might be dealt with in
Standstill agreement

23 Cannot concur in historical and 565

constitutional arguments in No. 107

regarding lapse of paramountcy but
recognises practical problems which he
feels call for ‘cooperation and goodwill on
the administrative level . . . like so much
of the business now before you all in
India’

23 (10) Berar; (n) Hyderabad 573

24 Kashmir 591

24 Memorandum by Listowel opposing 604

proposal made by Ismay and Monckton
(Annex to No. 261) for P.Q. about policy
towards States

25 (1) Decision to establish States Dept of 620

Govt of India

25 Encloses (1) amended draft of standstill 629

agreement with States, and (2) explanatory
notes on clauses

25 Refers to Nos. 246 and 247; explains why 643
it is felt Political Dept’s view must be

accepted that all agreements with States must
lapse and advocates retention of clause to
this effect in Bill

26 Refers to No. 264; agrees accommodation 657
between States and two Dominions is
most desirable; this must be reached by
parties themselves but will do what he can
to promote agreed settlement

26 (2) Agreement not to make statement on 662
Indian States in answer to P.Q. proposed by
Monckton and Ismay

26 States inter alia that Nehru ‘will vehemently 672
protest’ against denunciation of States’

treaties (see No. 349)

27 Difficult meeting about States; 679

establishment of States Dept and
forthcoming meeting between it and

States’ representatives; Mountbatten’s visit

Name and Number

369 (< cont .)

376 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, para. 9

385 Corfield to Mountbatten
Letter

386 Mountbatten to Kashmir
Letter

387 Mountbatten to Webb
Letter

401 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter

402 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter

403 Abell to Mountbatten
Minute

418 Mountbatten to Corfield
Letter 592/89

CH. 5 THE STATES

cxxi

Date Main subject or subject $ Page

June

to Kashmir; renewal of Nehru’s proposal to
visit Kashmir and Mountbatten’s suggestion
that Gandhi should go instead; interview
with Bhopal, Monckton and Zafrullah
Khan; Bhopal’s pleasure at Patel’s
appointment to States Dept

27 Bhopal’s views on H.M.G.’s policy 704

towards States

28 Suggests two amendments to draft of No. 716
386; also that Jinnah should be informed

of background to Gandhi’s proposed visit to
Kashmir to allay suspicion of it in Pakistan
27/28 Reports discussions with Nehru and 717

Gandhi about Kashmir; they now wish that
one of them should visit Kashmir ;

Mountbatten has agreed to put case to
Maharaja for visit by Gandhi; stresses need
for tactful handling of matter; Enclosure:
official letter from Mountbatten to
Maharaja (dictated in Gandhi’s presence)
suggesting that Maharaja should agree to
visit by Gandhi ; latter has given assurance
not to make speeches or any form of
propaganda

28 Asks him to warn Maharaja it will be 719

dangerous to postpone Gandhi’s visit to
Kashmir too long; Enclosure: letter written
earlier describing background to proposal

for visit by Gandhi

29 Protests at agitation ‘engineered against 739

Travancore’; urges that it is necessary for

each side to desist from action contrary to
3 June plan in order to create right
atmosphere for forthcoming talks between
States Dept and States on Standstill
arrangements

29 Asks Mountbatten to ensure that proposed 740
legislation clearly provides for lapse of
paramountcy after transfer of power

29 Submits advice, after consultation with 741

V. P. Menon, on action to be taken on

No. 340

30 Reports conversation with Raja of Bilaspur 764
about future of Punjab States and advice he

has given him regarding negotiation of
standstill agreements and accession of
States to one or other of two Dominions ;
has told Bilaspur that he (Mountbatten)

‘had made it a point of principle not to
advise any State which of the two
Dominions they should join’; asks Corfield,

CXX11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

418 {cont)

427 Qureshi to Davy 30

Letter d.o. No. 370

July

44 6 Record of Interview between 1

Mountbatten and Panikkar

450 Velio di to Nehru 1

Tel. 1016

452 Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1684-S

459 Rajagopalachariar to Cripps 2

Letter

466 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8499

476 Minutes by Auchinleck and Abell 3-6

477 Smith to Ismay 3

Letter 191/CGS

Main subject or subjects Page

through V. P. Menon, to sound views of
India and Pakistan representatives in States
Dept

Communicates Bhopal Govt’s reply regarding 777
creation of States Dept and negotiation of
Standstill arrangements; raises certain other
matters, e.g. retrocession of jurisdiction over
railways and of railway lands, supply of
arms and ammunition, States’ share in
Sterling Balances; Bhopal Govt observes
that States are only party to suffer and be
neglected in programme for transfer of
power and trusts that Crown Representative
will take necessary action in these matters

Panikkar speaks of detrimental effect if 813

States’ agreement were to be terminated at
short notice under Standstill Agreement; he
suggests standstill agreements of two years
on more fundamental subjects; he says that
embarrassment would be caused by
disputed succession cases

Says there are signs that agents for Indian 817
States are active in London; object is to
mislead public on question of States’
independence ; seeks guidance on counter¬
measures

Lias given Congress and League leaders 818

copies of draft Bill; Congress raised three
points; these related to . . . (3) the wiping out
of all treaties and agreements with States
Refers to No. 303 ; feels H.M.G. has taken 828
on ultra-legalistic position on the States;
admits that H.M.G.’s obligations under the
Treaties may cease on independence but
believes that obligations between States
and G. of I. must continue; does not
consider that Parliamentary legislation on
matter should extend to new Dominion of
India

Comments on points in No. 452; explains 836
why there are insuperable objections to
Congress request that treaties and
agreements with States should be continued
in existence by Parliamentary legislation
Position if Travancore were to ask for 850

military assistance to deal with disorder
Sends copy of note from Auchinleck to 851

Baldev Singh with which Auchinleck sent
copy of his Minute in No. 476;

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXX111

Name and Number

477 ( cont .)

479 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1719-S

484 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1728-S

486 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)40th Meeting
Minute 3

502 Nehru to Vellodi
Tel. 5211

513 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8652

520 Viceroy’s Conference Paper
V.C.P. 112

525 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)136
528 Text of Statement by Patel

533 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten and Jinnah, para. 10
538 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1777-P

Date

JulY

3

3

3

Main subject or subjects

Aucliinleck noted that if, after 15 August, a
Dominion Govt wished to use the armed
forces to coerce States, it would be
necessary to decide the position of the
British Officers in command; he is taking
matter up with Viceroy; Smith adds that in
no circumstances can British Officers in
Pakistan and Hindustan be used in
operations against each other
Congress comments on clauses 2(3) and
7(1 )(b) of draft Bill relating to States
Refers to No. 479 and recommends
something should be done to meet
Congress points

Committee are impressed by Congress
criticisms of clause 7(i)(b)

4 Refers to No. 450; doubts whether agents
of Indian States in London can produce
much effect; outlines Congress position on
States ; explains that decision of Frontier
Congress to boycott referendum does not
mean that it is demanding separate,
independent status for Province

4 Notes that, despite objections in Nos. 349
and 466, standstill proviso covering
agreements with States has been inserted in
Bill; though precise legal result may be
disputable, proviso gives cover to a
standstill in practice when neither party has
done anything

5 Circulates paper giving League’s comments
on Congress comments (No. 479) on Bill

5 Memorandum by Listowel on the position
of Berar and the Nizam’s probable
attitude towards negotiations

5 Statement issued on occasion of coming
into being of Indian States Dept; Patel
appeals for States to join Constituent
Assembly and assures them that nothing
more than a three subject accession is
sought; Congress have no desire to interfere
with the domestic affairs of the States;

States Dept will not conduct its relations
with States in any manner savouring of
domination

5 Jinnah denies writing to Maharaja of
Kashmir urging him to join Pakistan

5 Explains why he does not favour formal
dissolution of Chamber of Princes ;

Page

854

863

866

888

906

912

924

928

935

941

CXX1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

July

538 (cont)

542

Nicholls to Joyce

Tel. 1789-S

6

545

Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Third
Staff Meeting

Item 4

7

559

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1805-S

1

560

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1806-S

7

Main subject or subjects Page

recommends it should be allowed to die

natural and unobtrusive death

Reports that first reactions to Bill have 945

been extremely favourable and British have

come out well; main attack was on position

of States and, in particular, Berar

(4) V. P. Menon says he personally drafted 946

No. 528

Explains background to Note in No. 560; 966

says be had not realised position on petty
States ; is sending Note to Corfield
Sends text of Note by Rau expressing 967

concern over aspects of the Proviso to
Section 7(i)(b) and (c) of Bill as drafted; Rau
points out that Rulers of 327 petty States
would be given extensive powers they had
never enjoyed in the past; he suggests that
existing proviso be replaced by two
separate provisos

I

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 58
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J1 May I947

THE VICEROY’S BROADCAST

1. Attached are copies of two alternative broadcast statements which His
Excellency the Viceroy recorded in London on 28th May.

2. One or other of these broadcasts will be played from London and made
by the Viceroy from Delhi on 3rd June.

3. Broadcast ‘A’ will be used if it appears probable that Bengal will be
partitioned: Broadcast ‘B’ if it appears probable that Bengal will remain
unified.1

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

1 Alternative ‘A’ was the same, except for minor amendments, as the Broadcast as made (No. 44).
Alternative ‘B’ was the same as ‘A’ except that an additional para, on Bengal was included after the
one on the Sikhs (No. 44, p. 87) which read as follows:

‘Bengal was one of the Provinces for whom partition was demanded, but the newly formed
Coalition Government of Bengal have asked for their case to be reconsidered; and this is reviewed
in the statement which is shortly to be read out.’

Also, the reference to ‘Bengal and part of Assam’ was deleted from the previous para, but one.

2

Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fourth Staff Meeting , Items 1-7

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi, on 31 May
1947 at 11 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Sir J. Colville,
Lordlsmay , SirE. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman
Mr I. D. Scott, Air Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum.

a

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item l

THE VICEROY’S BROADCAST

his excellency the viceroy said that he had recorded in London two
alternative versions1 of the Broadcast which he intended to make directly before
the issue of the Announcement. One would be used if it appeared probable, on
the day, that Bengal would be partitioned; and the other if it appeared probable
that Bengal would remain united.

liis excellency the viceroy said that, in view of the fact that the Prime
Minister had decided that the Announcement should be made in Parliament at
3.30 p.m. D.B.S.T. on 3rd June, he would make his Broadcast over All-India
Radio at 7 p.m. I.S.T. It would last about eight minutes. The recorded Broad¬
cast in London would be introduced by a speech by the Prime Minister.
his excellency the viceroy —

(i) directed Pers. Sec. to draft, for his approval, a telegram to ask His
Majesty the King’s permission for him to include a message of goodwill
from His Majesty in his broadcast;

(ii) directed Press Attache to arrange for him to broadcast over All-India
Radio at 7 p.m. I.S.T. on 3rd June;

(iii) directed Press Attache to draft for inclusion in his Broadcast a reference —
as an apparent “aside” — to his basic agreement with Mr Gandhi that the
partitioning of India wTas wrong.

Item 2

BENGAL

his excellency the viceroy referred to a letter2 which he had received
from the Governor of Bengal, who asked him to grant an interview to Mr
Suhrawardy, and stated that both parties in Bengal were preparing to be
attacked if there was a decision in favour of the partition of that Province.
Such a situation was in his opinion very likely to lead to serious trouble.

his excellency the viceroy asked Sir Eric Mieville to arrange for him
to see Mr Suhrawardy that afternoon. He went on to point out that His
Majesty’s Government had declared themselves willing to agree to an indepen¬
dent Bengal — in fact willing to agree to any solution for Bengal with which the
Leaders of the principal parties agreed. Llowever, Pandit Nehru had stated that
he would not agree to Bengal being independent.3 Therefore the only profi¬
table line of negotiation at present was to find out whether the leaders would
agree to Bengal being given a status similar to that of an Indian State and being
allowed to negotiate its own separate agreements with either side.

sir john Colville stated that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had told him that he
considered that the future of Calcutta was the most difficult point of all. his

MAY 1947

3

excellency the viceroy pointed out that His Majesty’s Government had
decided that it would not be practicable to declare Calcutta a free city. They
had also ruled that Dominion status would not be granted to Eastern Bengal
independently. In his opinion, Eastern Bengal was likely to be a great embarrass¬
ment to Pakistan. Presumably Pandit Nehru considered that Eastern Bengal
was bound sooner or later to rejoin India.

his excellency the viceroy stated that His Majesty’s Government had
agreed that the possible transfer of Purnea to Eastern Bengal should not be
considered in the present statement but should, like the transfer of parts of Sind,
form the subject of separate negotiations and consideration by a Boundary
Commission.1 2 3 4

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed Prin. Sec. to arrange for him to see Mr Suhrawardy that day.

Item 3

THE PUNJAB

sir eric mieville said that Sir Evan Jenkins had telegraphed that the whole of
4 Indian Division would not be in position in the Punjab by the date of the
Announcement. However, he had seen Lieut. General Sir Arthur Smith and it
had been arranged that the last trainload of the Division should arrive at Lahore
on 3rd June. There would be a total of 16 battalions in and around Lahore.

sir John Colville said that the reason why the Reconnaissance Regiment
of 4 Indian Division was not being sent to the Punjab was that there were other
armoured units there in sufficient quantity.

Item 4

MR GANDHI

rao bahadur menon said that it was Sardar Patel’s opinion that not too

1 See No. 1.

2 Vol. X, No. 554. For Lord Mountbatten’s discussions with the India and Burma Committee referring
to Bengal, see Vol. X, No. 485; No. 494, Minutes 2 and 4; No. 517, Minute 2; No. 525; and No.
553, Minutes 1-3 and 5(d).

3 See Vol. X, Nos. 552 and 560, Enclosure (iii).

4 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 5.

4

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

much account should be taken of the recent utterances of Mr Gandhi in favour
of a united India.5

sir john colville stated that he had recently seen Mr Gandhi. He did not
think that it was Mr Gandhi’s intention to sabotage the present Plan, nor that it
was his primary object to attempt to humiliate the British.

After consideration of various ways of issuing a counter-statement to what
Mr Gandhi had recently said, his excellency the viceroy decided that the
only action which it was desirable to take was for him to make some reference
to Mr Gandhi’s views in his Broadcast (see Conclusion (iii) of Item i above). At
the same time he pointed out that it was quite impossible (and Sir Stafford
Cripps had agreed with this) to impose the Cabinet Mission’s Plan by force, as
was apparently suggested by Mr Gandhi. The essence of that plan was agree¬
ment.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Press Attache to consider the desirability of arranging for a
question to be asked at the Press Conference which he was going to hold
which would give him an opportunity to point out that the essence of the
Cabinet Mission’s Plan was agreement and that it could not be imposed.

Item 5

THE APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNORS GENERAL

his excellency the viceroy drew attention to the embarrassing situation
which would be created if any of the party leaders made public statements
during the coming weeks about whom they wished to nominate for the posts
of Governor General of the two different Dominions which it was intended to
set up. He pointed out that it would make matters much simpler if both
Dominions chose the same man for the two appointments. He made it clear
that he did not consider that, if this did happen, the Governor General should
have the powers of an arbitrator. He personally would in no circumstances
accept the appointment of arbitrator.

lord ism ay suggested that it should be pointed out to the leaders that it was
not customary for Prime Ministers of Dominions to say publicly whom they
wanted for Governors General before His Majesty had approved their nomina¬
tions. To make such a public statement would be most improper and dis¬
courteous.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided to make a personal appeal to the Indian leaders at the forthcoming
meeting to refrain from publicity on this matter; and to use the line
suggested by C.V.S.

MAY 1947

5

Item 6

TIMETABLE OF EVENTS
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed C.V.S. to prepare for consideration at a Staff Meeting later that
day a draft timetable of events on June 2nd, 3rd and 4th;

(ii) directed Prin. Sec. to discuss the suggested timetable with Pandit Nehru
and with Mr Jinnah or Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.

Item 7

MR JINNAH

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy recalled that Sir Stafford Cripps had sug¬
gested, at a Cabinet Committee Meeting,6 that Mr Jinnah might be threatened,
if he appeared likely to reject the Plan, by a suggestion that the notional
partition would be drawn more in favour of the Sikhs, lordismay gave his
opinion that such a threat would be striking at the whole basis of the Plan and
that Mr Jinnah would not be taken in by it.

hisexcellencytheviceroy said that another possibility was to threaten
Mr Jinnah that the referendum in the N.W.F.P. would be run by the Provincial
Government and not by the Governor General if there was strife there, stirred
up by the Muslim League, lord ismay agreed that it might be possible to
threaten Mr Jinnah with this; but mrabell gave his opinion that it would not
be right to threaten Mr Jinnah at all.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that he would be
more likely to prevail upon Mr Jinnah by a display of “hurt feelings” rather
than by threats. With this view there was general agreement.

his excellency the viceroy said that he also intended to pass on to Mr
Jinnah Mr Churchill’s message that it was “a matter of life and death” for him
to accept the Plan.7 He would give Mr Jinnah permission to inform his Work¬
ing Committee of this message so long as it was not quoted in the newspapers.

5 According to The Times of India of 30 May, in a report dated 29 May, “Since his return to New Delhi
five days ago, Mr Gandhi has, every evening, at his prayer meeting, preached against Vivisection of
the motherland’ in terms disquietingly militant.” In the same issue it was also reported that Mr
Gandhi, at his prayer meeting on 29 May, had said: ‘that the Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16,
1946, had been accepted by the Congress and the British Government, and if either of them went
back on it, it would be a breach of faith. He hoped that Britain would not depart from the letter and
spirit of the May 16 statement unless the parties, of their own free will, came to an agreement of any
variation’. On 31 May the same paper reported that Mr Gandhi after his prayer meeting on 30 May
had said: “I made it clear yesterday that if I had my will there would never be Pakistan before
peace, and certainly not through British intervention . . . Let Mr Jinnah establish peace, with or with¬
out my association, and afterwards convene a meeting of Indian leaders of all classes and communi¬
ties and plead with them the cause of Pakistan, and wait till he has carried conviction to them”.

6 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 2 and 553, Minute 1. 7 See Vol. X, No. 513.

6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided, in inducing Mr Jinnah to accept the Plan, not to use threats, but
rather to point out what an embarrassment to him personally Mr Jinnah’s
recent statement8 had been; and to pass on to Mr Jinnah Mr Churchill's
message.

8 Sec Vol. X, No. 502.

3

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I150: ff 151-8

31 May 1947

H.E.

I submit herewith briefs :

(a) For your opening speech at the Conference on 2nd June:
and

(b) For your talk with Mr. Jinnah subsequent to the Conference.

2. I have included a paragraph about the interim period [see para. 12], but
perhaps this should be omitted until you have decided on a definite plan?1

Enclosure 1 to No. 3

ISMAY

DRAFT BRIEF FOR H.E. S OPENING SPEECH AT CONFERENCE ON
2ND JUNE, I947

[announcement unchanged]2

1. The final text of H.M.G.’s announcement3 has been handed round to you.
You will find that, except for paragraph 20, it is exactly the same in substance
as the one which I discussed with each of you in great detail before I went to
London.4 A few amendments have been made on points of detail and these are
underlined in your copies.5 Their sole object is clarification, and if there is ob¬
jection to any of them, I shall not press for their inclusion.

[HELPFUL ATTITUDE OF H.M.G.]

2. I ought to mention that H.M.G. were extraordinarily kind and helpful
during my visit to London, and that they gave me first call on their time.
Considering the pressure under which they were working, this shows you how
much importance they attach to a satisfactory outcome of the India problem. I
am very pleased to say that they have approved in their entirety the proposals
which I put to them after discussion with you.

MAY 1947

7

3. I propose that we should have a few minutes silence to read the document
again, but, before doing so, may I make some preliminary observations.

[secrecy

4. First is the question of secrecy. FI.M.G. have emphasised that it will cause
them great embarrassment if the announcement leaks before it is made in
Parliament at 3.30 p.m., G.M.T. tomorrow, 3rd June, i.e. 7.0 p.m. Indian
Standard Time. Your Working Committees have come here, some of them
from very long distances, and I feel it only fair that you should be free to discuss
the plan with them as soon as this meeting is over, even though it is not going to
be given out to the world until tomorrow evening : but I must ask you to give
me your personal guarantee that you will impress upon every member of your
Working Committees that they must not give away anything to the Press
before that hour. Indeed, it is only on that understanding that I feel justified in
letting you have copies of the announcement to discuss with them.

[h.m.g. have finally approved]

5. In placing the plan before the Working Committees, I would ask you to
make it clear that it represents the result of all my discussions out here, and that
H.M.G. have finally approved and are determined to implement it.

[request for support of working committees]

6. Naturally I should like to have the complete agreement of your Working
Committees when we meet again at 10.0 a.m. tomorrow, but realise that time
is short. I sincerely trust, however, that they will, whether they agree with
every word of it or not, express their willingness to do their best to make it
work.

[appeal TO NEHRU AND JINNAH TO BROADCAST]

7. The announcement is to be broadcast from Delhi Station at 7.0 p.m.
tomorrow, i.e. simultaneously with its being made known to Parliament in
London. I shall myself make a short broadcast introducing the plan, and I
appeal most sincerely to Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah to make broadcasts after
the conclusion of the announcement, calling on their followers to co-operate
in working the scheme. If they would consent to do this, and to draw attention
to the fact that H.M.G. have left the vital decisions to the people of India
themselves, they would make an enormous contribution towards putting an

1 Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power, Part IV(a) contains revised
versions of the two briefs. Differences (except for minor verbal ones) between these revises and the
drafts reproduced here are indicated in footnotes.

2 Pleadings in square brackets have been inserted from the revise.

3 See No. 45 in this Volume.

4 For the draft announcement as taken by Lord Mountbatten to London see Vol. X, No. 476.

5 For minor amendments made in London see Vol. X, Nos. 485, Item (a) and 516, Annex II. See also
No. 13 in this Volume.

8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

end to the existing conditions of strife and bloodshed and, what is more,
towards preventing the almost unlimited reign of violence to which the present
state of communal tension is leading.

[cabinet mission’s plan finally rejected?]

8. In saying what I have said I have assumed that there is now no possibility of
agreement on any form of Unitary Government for India. H.M.G. have always
beheved in a Unitary India and I myself shall say in my broadcast how strongly
I myself am of this opinion : and I would like you to confirm, before we go any
further, that there is no hope of agreement either on the Cabinet Mission Plan
or on any other plan for a Unitary India.

[dominion status]

9. The new paragraph 20 about Dominion Status is of course the important
addition to the Announcement since we last met.6 When I left India there was
general agreement that for the purpose of an early, or indeed an almost imme¬
diate, transfer of power, the two separate States which may emerge from the
plan should each be given Dominion Status. Though Mr. Jinnah has since said
that this would be a question for his Constituent Assembly,7 H.M.G. were very
glad to hear of this development, which gives a real chance of continuity and of
avoiding confusion during the transitional period. Both parties have demanded
an immediate transfer of power and H.M.G. have done their best to meet this
request by undertaking to legislate in the current session of Parliament, i.e. the
session which ends at the end of July or early in August. Considering their
tremendous programme of legislation and the necessity of securing the support
of the Opposition, this is a considerable undertaking on their part.

[much administrative work to be done]

10. If two separate administrations in India are to be set up by the end of this
summer, there is a tremendous amount of work to be done, and I think we
should get on to this as soon as possible and perhaps set up immediately a
Committee of the Cabinet to get the necessary administrative work started.8

[no premature comment on governors-general]

11. The question may be raised almost at once who will be the Governors-
General of the two new Dominions. They will of course be appointed on the
recommendations of the Heads of the two Governments. The respective Prime
Ministers will have to make their recommendations after the Governments
have been set up and I suggest that it would be both wise and courteous to
avoid any party commitments on this subject for, say, two months. At the end
of that time it will no doubt be known who the Prime Ministers will be and the
necessary recommendations can be made then.

12.9 I want to emphasise that under this scheme, though I should hke the
members of the present Interim Government to carry on, we shall be in a sort

MAY 1947

9

of caretaker period when all our main endeavour will be directed towards
securing an early and successful partition. I propose, therefore, to ask that each
member of the Interim Government should place his resignation in my hands,
though I shall certainly ask them to continue in office. I feel that for both the
major parties a move of this kind will be valuable as indicating our anxiety to
get on to the next and final stage of our work when the two Governments, if
there are to be two Governments by the will of the people, are set up.

13. I now propose that we should have a few minutes’ silence, so that you
may read the plan through again. We can then continue our discussion thereon.

Enclosure 2 to No. 3

DRAFT BRIEF FOR H.E.’s TALK WITH MR. JINNAH

I am sure that you will not be happy with the details of the plan contained in the
announcement, but at least it contemplates the partition for which you have
fought for so many years. Indeed, you have yourself said that you would
sooner have a few acres of the Sind desert, provided that it was your very own,
rather than have a united India with a majority rule. To that extent, therefore,
you must be satisfied.

[no reservations]10

2. That you will be much disturbed by the prospect of the partition of Bengal
and the Punjab goes without saying, but, honestly, neither I nor H.M.G. nor
indeed your many friends in the Opposition party in England could possibly
contest the justice of this arrangement. I beg, therefore, that in the interests of
the peace of India, and of the good relationship between Pakistan and Great
Britain, you should accept — I do not say ‘entirely agree with’ — the scheme as it
stands. If you should, at this stage, mention any reservations, it will give your
opponents the opportunity of saying that they too are not prepared to accept
this scheme, except as a final settlement: and we shall then be back exactly

6 For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3, and entry for Dominion
Status in Index of Subjects in that Volume for question of Dominion Status generally.

7 See Vol. X, Nos. 489 and 493.

8 Following para. 10 in the revise there is a new paragraph, headed the sikhs, which reads as fol¬
lows : ‘There is one point in the announcement to which I should like to draw special attention. If
the people of the Punjab decide in favour of the partition of the Province the position of the Sikhs
will be a specially difficult one. They themselves have pressed for partition, though they have always
wanted it on the understanding that it would give them a larger territory than they are likely to
obtain by any application of the principle laid down in the Statement. There is provision for a
Boundary Commission on which the Sikhs will themselves be represented. I have discussed the
proposals in great detail with my friend Sardar Baldev Singh, and I do hope he will do all he can to
steady opinion among the Sikhs and to persuade them to support the scheme and co-operate in the
procedure laid down.’

0 This para, is omitted from the revise.

10 Headings in square bracke s inserted from the revise where they appear in manuscript in the margin.

10

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

where we started. After all, nothing is final in this world. You have often told
me that your experience as a lawyer leads you to believe that once a decision has
been made, both parties will forget their previous hostility and do their utmost
to make it work. So let it be with this scheme. There is nothing final in this
world, and I feel confident that, provided there is good will on both sides, all
equitable adjustments will become apparent with the passage of time and will be
duly made.

[dominion status]

3 . I now turn to the question of Dominion status. You have frequently told me
and members of my staff that it was your wish that Pakistan should remain
within the British Commonwealth. I was therefore very hurt when I saw an
account of the interview which you had given to Reuters.11 Only the previous
day12 I had, in the presence of Mr. Attlee, told Mr. Churchill and the Opposi¬
tion leaders of the possibility that both the League and Congress would wish, in
the interests of a very early transfer of power, to start on a Dominion status
basis: and they had welcomed the idea. Consequently, when your article
appeared, they could not but think that I had misled them. Fortunately Mr.
Chundrigar, who was in London, was able to assure me that the Muslim League
attitude towards Dominion status would, in the end, almost certainly be
favourable. I reported this to Mr. Attlee, and I also saw Mr. Churchill again.
The latter asked me to give you the following personal message: — “It is a
matter of life and death for Mr. Jinnah to accept this offer/’13 You are at liberty
to mention this message to your Working Committee, if you think there is
anything to be gained by it, though it is vital that it should not get into the
Press.

[heavy responsibility]

4. A very heavy responsibility now rests with you. In your hands, perhaps
more than anyone else’s in the world, lies the possibility of ending all this
bloodshed that is bringing so much suffering to India, and of achieving a
permanent and satisfactory solution of this long-standing problem.

11 Vol. X, No. 502.

12 No note of this interview has been traced, but see Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 513.

” See Vol. X, No. 513.

MAY 1947

II

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma 1

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference ,
Indian Political Leaders , etc., Issue of Invitations to

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, Ji May lp 47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I hope you are not too tired after your strenuous labours in London and your
journey. Perhaps the short change to the pleasanter climate of England in May
was agreeable.

2. You will remember that I wrote to you on the 13 th May2 about the Presi¬
dent of the Congress representing the Congress formally at the conference of
the 2nd June. You replied to me on the 17th May3 stating that you appreciated
my point but felt that it would be better to see him separately on the same day.

3. We had a meeting of our Working Committee this afternoon and the
very first point that was raised there by a member was about the invitations to
your conference. Was the Congress represented in any way, I was asked, or
were only the members of the Interim Government represented ? If the latter
was the case, in what capacity was Mr Jinnah invited? Such questions were
raised. I told them that I had written to you in the matter and gave them the
purport of your reply. They were far from satisfied and felt that the exclusion
of the Congress President meant that Mr Jinnah disapproved of him or his
presence. It is a small matter whether anyone of us goes to your formal con¬
ference or not as we shall in any event discuss the subject at issue amongst
ourselves and possibly later with you. But a certain formal procedure has to be
adopted on formal occasions and the exclusion of the Congress President will
be felt as a slight on the Congress by a large number of persons. It will be his
business to give the lead to the Working Committee and to steer any pro¬
posals that are made through the Committee. The fact, if it is a fact, that Mr
Jinnah objects to his presence surely cannot be allowed to govern the normal
procedure. We have frequently had to vary this procedure because of Mr
Jinnah’s likes and dislikes and this has given rise to a great deal of resentment
among our people. You will remember how Mr Jinnah objected to Mr

1 This letter appears to have crossed one from Lord Mountbatten to Pandit Nehru of the same date
which read as follows: ‘I shall be glad if you will come to see me at 10 am on Monday morning
June 2nd. I am also inviting Messrs Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev
Singh.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference, etc.

2 Vol. X, No. 423.

3 Vol. X, No. 467.

12

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Kripalani’s signature being attached to the joint statement issued by Gandhiji
and Mr Jinnah.4

4. I have been asked by the Congress Working Committee to write to you
and request you to reconsider this matter in the light of what I have said above.
As it is your desire to keep the meeting as small as practicable, I would suggest
that I might be left out of this meeting and that I might see you separately on
that day. There will be nothing unusual about this as I often see you separately.
In the alternative we have no objection to any additional person being invited.
Both Sardar Patel and I would feel embarrassed if we have to go to this con¬
ference without Mr Kripalani.

5. The matters at issue, as you realise more than anyone else, are of grave
import and it will be unfortunate if anything is done to prejudice a fair examina¬
tion on the merits. I do not know what the final shape of the proposals is, but
some of the proposals made previously run counter to the outlook which the
Congress has had for a large number of years, and it will not be a simple
matter for the Committee to change this outlook. It may be necessary to
convene a meeting of the full All India Congress Committee to consider these
important proposals.

6. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to invite the Congress President,
Mr Kripalani, to your conference of June 2nd.5

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

4 See Vol. X, Nos. 125, 136, 140, 152, and 153.

5 For the outcome of this request see Nos. 27, para. 6, and 91, para. 2.

5

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Fifth Staff Meeting , Items 2-3

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 31 May
1947 at 3-45 Pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Lord Ismay ,
Sir E. Mieville , Mr Abell , Captain Brockman , Mr I. D. Scott , Mr Campbell-
Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 2

THE USE OF FORCE TO SUPPRESS DISTURBANCES
his excellency the viceroy said that he wished to make it clear that he

MAY I947

13

had accepted the viewpoint that the present laws provided for the use of mini¬
mum force to suppress disturbances and that he had no intention of attempting
to change these laws.1

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that he had included in his Broadcast2
the words “We cannot afford any toleration of violence. All of us are agreed on
that”.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Press Attache to arrange for a question to be put at his Press
Conference, asking him to define “all of us”; he would explain that this
referred to the unanimous opinion of the Interim Government.

Item 3

BENGAL

his excellency the viceroy said that it had not yet been decided how to
carry on the government of Bengal after the issue of the Announcement. Two
possibilities were to go into Section 93 Government; or for a Coalition Ministry
to be formed.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to draft for his approval a telegram to the Governor of
Bengal asking for his proposals on this matter.

1 See Vol. X, No. 468, note 2. 2 See No. 44.

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.5.(47)91
L/P& JI10I79: ff 12-13

Pandit Nehru’s Interview with Mr Norman Cliff

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

india office, 31 May 1947
The full text of this interview,1 to which the Viceroy referred at the last meeting
of the Committee,2 is attached.

2. I wish to draw my colleagues’ attention to the following points: —

(i) The very restricted wording of Nehru’s answers in regard to variation
of the Cabinet Mission’s plan. The conception advanced is that by a
variation of the Mission’s plan parts of India can opt out of the Union

1 Vol. X, No. 560, Enclosure (iii). 2 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 2.

14

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

now instead of at a later stage, but that this would involve the partition
of the Punjab and Bengal. “Afterwards those parts which opted out
could deal directly with a Union of India in regard to future relations
and common subjects.” Though this phrase is consistent with partition
into two States it could also be consistent with the idea of small units
standing out separately and having individual relations with the Union
as opposed to two States of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(ii) The flat refusal to contemplate Bengal remaining united unless it stays
inside the Union.

(iii) Referendum. Nehru’s reply may indicate that Congress will demand a
referendum everywhere or nowhere.

(iv) The emphasis placed on the necessity of a final settlement as the con¬
dition of Congress agreement to any form of partition, and emphasis on
agreement to partition only by such agreement and not by imposition
by the British Government.

(v) India and the Commonwealth. Nehru emphasises in reply to a question
whether there will be a temporary association that India is going to be a
republic but that the form of its relations with the Commonwealth
cannot be defined now.

(vi) Bases. Nehru makes it clear that the establishment of British bases in
Pakistan would adversely affect relations with Hindustan.

(vii) Division of the Army :

“If any division takes place it will be fatal and weaken the Central
authority or the area which it controls.

If in case of division the Army also has to be divided it cannot be
controlled by some kind of dyarchial system that would make it useless at a
time of emergency such as the present .”

3. This interview is certainly disappointing and leaves opportunity on a
variety of subjects for the Congress to run out of the tentative agreement. Read
with the Statements made by Kripalani and Gandhi,3 it looks as if the latter was
mobilising his forces to frustrate partition.

L.

3 Vol. X, No. 560, Enclosures (i) and (ii).

MAY I947

15

7

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. {47)94
LIP&JI10I65: ff 22-4

Constituent Assembly: Committee Reports

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 31 May 1947
I circulate for the information of my colleagues a note prepared in my Office
summarising the report of the Union Powers Committee of the Constituent
Assembly. This report and the Advisory Committee’s interim report on
justiciable fundamental rights were produced towards the end of April for
submission to the recent Session of the Assembly and are documents of con¬
siderable significance.1

2. The Report of the Union Powers Committee puts a very wide interpreta¬
tion on paragraph 15(1) of the Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16th, 1946,
and would, in fact, convert the Union Centre into something very different
from what the Mission contemplated. For example, “Defence” is defined to
include “Defence Industries”, which under modem conditions may mean
almost all basic industries; and “Foreign Affairs” is defined to include the
implementing of treaties and of the decisions of international bodies, and also
“trade and commerce with foreign countries”. As regards finance, it will be
recalled that at the Simla discussions of the Cabinet Mission the Muslim League
contended that the Union should be financed by contributions from the Group
Governments; and Congress that it should have its own sources of revenue.2
The report wholeheartedly adopts the latter alternative, allotting to the Union
all the important existing Central sources of revenue. In addition, the powers
specified in the report as inherent in the express powers of the Union include the
Reserve Bank, Public Debt, Currency, and powers to deal with grave economic
emergencies in any part of the Union affecting the Union. It is also provided
under the heading “Defence” that the Union Government should have powers
similar to those contained in Sections 102 and 126- A of the Government of
India Act, which would give them control of Provincial affairs in times of
emergency. If all these recommendations are adopted, the effect will be to give
a Union Government almost all the powers of the existing Centre.

3. The interim report on fundamental rights discloses the same tendency.

1 Copies of the reports are on L/P &J/10/65 : ff 44-9.

2 See e.g. Vol. VII, Nos. 194 and 253.

1 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Thus, the justiciable rights with which the report is concerned would be incor¬
porated in the Constitution so as to be binding upon all authorities throughout
the Union; and they would abrogate all existing laws etc. in so far as these might
be inconsistent with them. Moreover, the list of rights includes rights for every
citizen to move freely throughout the Union, to settle in every part of the
Union, to acquire property and to follow any occupation; provision is also
made for freedom of trade and commerce between the Units. These stipula¬
tions, if adopted, would preclude Muslim areas from protecting themselves
from the activities of Hindu business men and money lenders, which they might
well wish to do. They would also invalidate such measures as the Punjab
Alienation of Land Act, which are designed to prevent agricultural land from
passing out of the hands of the actual cultivators into those of money lenders
and other non-agriculturists. The Punjab Act, for example, has afforded very
valuable protection to agricultural interests (not merely Moslem) against
urban and financial interests (mainly Hindu).

4. It has always been assumed that if the Congress and the Muslim League
were to set out to frame a workable constitution on the basis of the Cabinet
Mission’s scheme, they would probably find it impracticable in modern
conditions to adhere to a rigidly narrow interpretation of the list of Union
subjects formulated by the Mission. It has also been assumed that, given a
measure of good-will between the Hindu and Muslim territories of a future
Indian Union, the powers of the Centre would tend to increase as time went
on. But for Congress unilaterally to attribute such wide powers to the Union is
a very different matter, and suggests that the authors of these reports had given
up any idea of securing Muslim League participation in the framing of an
agreed constitution.3 Moreover the very wide powers proposed to be vested
from the outset in the Centre may have the effect of deterring Indian States, up
to now secure in the exercise of their internal sovereignty subject to benevolent
protection by paramountcy, from adhering to the Union without sweeping
reservations.

L.

Annex to No. 7

REPORT OF THE UNION POWERS COMMITTEE

Detailed recommendations are made as to the scope of the subjects proposed to
be allotted to the Union in paragraph 15(1) of the Statement of the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy of May 16th 1946. Inter alia, it is recommended that
“Defence” should include “defence industries”, atomic energy and powers
similar to those contained in Sections 102 and 126-A of the Government of
India Act 1935 (these would enable the Union to control the affairs of the Units
in times of emergency) ; that “Foreign Affairs” should include the implementing

MAY I947

1 7

of the decisions of international conferences, associations and other bodies, the
implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries, naturalization
and aliens, trade and commerce with foreign countries, and foreign loans ; and
that “Communications” should include airways, certain highways and water¬
ways, posts and telegraphs, the regulation and control of all telephones and
broadcasting, Union railways, the regulation and control of other railways in
certain respects, maritime shipping and navigation, and major ports. The
sources of the revenue required to finance these subjects should, in existing
circumstances, include customs and excise duties, taxes on income other than
agricultural income and, except in regard to agricultural land, taxes on capital
and succession and estate duties. In view, however, of the uneven levels of
industrialisation between British India and the States and among the States
themselves, the Constitution should provide that, for an agreed period, not
exceeding 15 years, after the establishment of the Union, uniformity of taxa¬
tion throughout the units need not be insisted upon and the administration in
the States Units of the taxes allotted to the Union should be subject to agree¬
ments between those Units and the Union Government.

The Committee, while considering it impossible to enumerate the powers
implied or inherent in or resultant from the express powers of the Union, has
specified 14 such powers, including the Union judiciary, the Reserve Bank of
India, currency, coinage and legal tender, and powers to deal with grave
economic emergencies in any part of the Union affecting the Union.

The Committee has added a list of subjects which, though outside the scope
of those whose allotment to the Union was recommended by the Cabinet
Mission, should in the Committee’s opinion be entrusted to the Union by
agreement. This list consists of insurance; company laws; banking; negotiable
instruments; patents, trade marks and designs, copyright; planning; ancient
and historical monuments and standard weights and measures.

3 The Union Powers Committee Report was dated 17 April 1947 and signed by Pandit Nehru,
Pandit Pant, Sir B. L. Mitter, Mr Jairamdas Daulatram, Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Mr K. M.
Munshi, Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Mr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Mr Biswanath Das and Mr A. Krishna-
swami Ayyar.

The Interim Report on Fundamental Rights was dated 23 April and signed by Sardar Patel,
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc.

i8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

8

Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Attlee ( via Canadian High Commissioner in London and

Dominions Office)

Telegram , L/P &JI 10/81: f 369

immediate 31 May 1947 , 1.08 pm

top secret and personal Received: 2 June, 6pm

No. 109. Your Secret and Personal telegrams Circular D. No. 469 and 470 of
May 23rd,1 and Nos. 128 and 129 of May 28th.2 India.

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I have read with much interest your messages in the above telegrams on
arrangements being worked out for the future of India by the two Govern¬
ments concerned. I realize how difficult and complicated the problem is for the
United Kingdom Government and how important it is for future peace and
prosperity in Asia, and indeed in the world, to find a solution which will meet
the desires of the Indian people for self-government and make its contribution
to the stabilisation and progress of the East. You will not, I am sure, expect me
to comment further on current developments in this matter except to assure
you and the United Kingdom Government of the good-will and sympathetic
understanding of the Canadian Government in your efforts to achieve the ends
mentioned above.

2. I need hardly add that, when agreement has been reached by Indian
leaders and the Indian people on the future political status of that country, it
can be expected that the Canadian Government will do nothing to impede or
delay the carrying out of the agreement. This, as regards India, would be
Canada’s attitude, even though we recognise that the agreement might have as
one result the enlargement of the number of member states within the Com¬
monwealth.

3. Regarding the deletion of “Emperor of India” from the Royal style and
titles, the Canadian Government instructed its High Commissioners some time
ago to consult with the other Commonwealth Governments on the desira¬
bility of discussing at the next conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers
the revision of the Royal style and titles. If our suggestion is acted upon, the
Indian suggestion3 could be considered along with other possible modifications.
Ends.

1 See Vol. X, No. 527.

2 Tel. 128 contained a message to Mr Mackenzie King in the same terms as the last two paras, of No.
555 in Vol. X. Tel. 129 contained the text of the paragraph on Dominion Status which was to be
inserted in the announcement (i.e. para. 20 of No. 45 in this Volume). L/PO/6/121: If 91, 95.

3 See Vol. X, No. 527, para. 5.

MAY 1947

19

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

^bl1 1155: ff 10-11

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, J1 May 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Mr. Abell has written1 to me asking me to send proposals for obtaining a
representative for Baluchistan. I have no particular proposal to put forward at
this stage. I was under the impression that the first thing to be done was to
ascertain the wishes of the people of Baluchistan regarding the position of that
Province in the future set-up of India. This too becomes necessary in the event
of certain changes taking place in regard to the Punjab and Bengal.

2. You suggested to me in Simla, I think, that possibly a way of ascertaining
the wishes of the inhabitants would be to send a Commission to meet the full
Jirgas of the various Tribes and to report on their reactions to the proposals
made. I am inclined to think that some such procedure might be feasible and
desirable. A Commission might be appointed consisting of suitably chosen
senior judicial officers and possibly representatives of the External Affairs
Department. This Commission should arrange for full meetings of the Jirgas
and attend them explaining the points at issue. They may or may not take
votes. They should really find out the general sense of each meeting and report
accordingly. If necessary the Commission should split up into smaller sections
to meet some of the Jirgas.

3. The point is that they should consult as large a number of people as
possible and not confine themselves to the selected few of the Shalii Jirga.

4. As regards the people of Quetta Municipality, it should be possible to
take a referendum of them or at any rate of the voters in the Municipality.

5. The Commission should submit a consolidated report giving their views
of what the people of Baluchistan desire in the matter. They should also suggest
the best means of representation in the Constituent Assembly.

6. I discussed this matter today with Sir Geoffrey Prior, the AGG in Baluchi¬
stan, and he seemed to think that the method of appointing a Commission to
ascertain views would be feasible.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 A reminder, dated 3 1 May 1947, referring to Vol. X, No. 461, and asking Pandit Nehru to send Lord
Mountbatten his proposals for obtaining a representative for Baluchistan as soon as possible.
R/3/1/155: f 8.

20

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

10

Mr Suhrawardy to Sir E. Mieville

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal , Situation in , Part 1(a)

SECRET 6 CANNING ROAD, May I947

Dear Sir Eric,

I have had an interview with Mr Jinnah. He asked me if I had seen H.E. and,
may the Lord forgive me, I told him “no” as I did not want him to think H.E.
had seen me.1 (Please show this to H.E.). He told me that if H.E. were to see me
tomorrow, I should impress upon him the necessity for ascertaining the wishes
of the people on the question of partition by utilising the electoral roll on the
basis of 1941 census.2 He says this is very important , and he does not know what
H.E. has brought back from London on this point. He says that getting the
wishes of the present members of the Legislature would not be fair, as the
opinion of the Scheduled Castes will not be expressed — and we must not let
the Scheduled Castes down. He seemed to think that we could create sufficient
atmosphere to maintain peace after the announcement. I hope the appeal of the
Leaders, accepting though not agreeing or even deliberating, will be simul¬
taneous with the announcement in the interests of peace. He insists that Calcutta
should be a free city,3 otherwise it will always remain a bone of contention. I
have made clear to him my views regarding the Commonwealth, and I have
every hope — all in good time. For this reason I am even reconciling myself to
partition (if it is inevitable) and if zone A does not come within the Common¬
wealth. If it does, then, of course, the Congress can have no objection if inde¬
pendent Bengal also comes into the Commonwealth : if it does not and Bengal
is independent, I shall have to work hard to get it in. I wonder if I am clear.4

Yours sincerely,

H. S. SUHRAWARDY

1 For an account of this interview see No. 91, para. 1.

2 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 256 and 463. 3 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 446 and 463.

4 No reply to this letter is on the file; see however No. 17, Item 4.

II

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rhl1l9o: ff 122~3

NEW DELHI, 31 May 1947

Dear Lord Mounthatten,

Accompanied by my colleague the Hon’ble Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, I visited
certain parts of Gurgaon district today, including the District headquarters as

MAY 1947

21

well as the headquarters of the small military force which is assisting the civil
authorities in checking the widespread rioting in the District. We had an
opportunity of discussing the situation with the Deputy Commissioner and
certain other officials as well as with Muslims who came to us on hearing about
our arrival.

Our discussions with the local officials brought out a few points very clearly,
which deserve to be brought to your notice immediately.

(a) It is not merely a spontaneous flare-up of communal feelings in this part
of the country, but a planned, pre-meditated and well organised attack
that has been launched with the object of completely suppressing the
Muslim community of Meos numbering about one million and forming a
more or less compact Muslim belt in a predominantly Hindu area.
Possibly it is intended to pave the way for the establishment of a Jat
province by force. The idea of the Jat province has been openly favoured
not only by the Jat Hindu population on both sides of the Punjab-U.P.
border, but also by certain rulers of Indian States. A sinister aspect of the
present attack is that armed troops from the Indian States of Bharatpur
and Alwar have been frequently entering the Gurgaon district territory.
They have been noticed in uniforms. It is not improbable that a number
of them in plain clothes have been mixing up with the rioters during the
present trouble and using their modern weapons against the Meo villa¬
gers. The impression in Gurgaon district is widespread that arms and
ammunition are freely pouring into the riot affected areas from the Indian
States.

The present trouble started, according to all reports, with a treacherous
attack by Hindu jats on a Muslim village, Naurangpur, after an elaborate
series of meetings, held under official auspices, at which pledges and
undertakings were given for the maintenance of peace. From there the
disturbances have rapidly spread over a wide area and assumed the form
of an offensive on a very wide front against the Meo villages by large
crowds drawn from Hindu jats, Ahirs, and Gujars of several districts in
the Punjab as well as the U.P., among whom are no doubt certain number
of trained soldiers, carrying arms belonging to the Alwar and Bharatpur
States.

(b) The military force which has been sent to help in stopping this carnage is
altogether inadequate. It consists of four companies with a total strength
of about 500. One of them is a Gurkha Company. The other three until
today were the Rajputana Rifles. The Rajputana Rifles have a mixed
composition but, it is an unfortunate accident the three companies sent to
Gurgaon were all Hindu. Today they have been replaced by Sikh com¬
panies. There is no doubt that in a situation like this a military force of
mixed composition can alone ensure fairness and inspire confidence in the

22

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

population. What I regard as another unfortunate accident is that the visit
of the Hon’ble Members for Home and Defence to Gurgaon yesterday
should have been followed by replacement of the Hindu companies by
Sikh soldiers today. I know that there is no connection between the two,
but it is difficult to convince unintelligent and panic stricken villagers.

(c) It was explained to us that owing to its inadequate strength the military
force can make its presence felt only in one sector. This leaves killing,
looting and arson practically unchecked in other parts. An additional
reason for the inability of the forces to control the situation in these latter
areas is their inaccessibility and lack of motorable roads.

In view of the points mentioned above I would make the following submissions
for your immediate consideration :

(1) The rulers of Indian States clearly need a prompt warning to keep their
civilians and soldiers out of these disturbances. The need of such a
warning is also indicated by the fact that armed men and soldiers from
certain Sikh states in Central Punjab have recently been mixed up with
the disturbances in Lahore and Amritsar.

(2) More military force should be sent to the disturbed areas in Gurgaon
district immediately. It will be appreciated that an attack on a minority
on such a big and organised scale in the neighbourhood of India’s capital
may have most unfortunate repercussions in remoter parts of the country,
if it is not promptly checked. What is equally important is that the force
to be sent there should be of a mixed composition. This is a point on
which I cannot lay too much emphasis.

(3) In view of the inaccessibility of those areas where rioting, killing and
arson are now at their worst, the use of such cavalry as can be assembled
immediately and the need of machine-gunning from the air may also be
seriously considered. I would further submit that the rioting in Gurgaon
district must be controlled immediately, if the Meo community is to be
saved from almost complete effacement.

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

MAY 1947

23

12

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I178: ff 58-61

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, Ji May 1947

No. 678

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

During the second half of May serious communal disturbances continued in
Lahore and Amritsar, and there was a recurrence of the earlier trouble between
the Meos, who are Muslims, and various Hindu tribes in the Gurgaon district.
Communal tension throughout the Punjab is extremely high, and amounts to
mass hysteria. Nearly all districts report acute uneasiness, and in many districts
there have been incidents including bomb explosions, cases of arson and
communal murders.

2. In Lahore and Amritsar we were during the fortnight defeated by incen¬
diarism. In Lahore there has been practically no rioting, and the burnings and
stabbings have been carried out by individuals who are seldom seen or appre¬
hended. After the first day or two few buildings were fired at ground level —
nearly all the fires broke out in an upper storey. Various incendiary devices
have been used — usually fire balls or bottle bombs which are thrown from
adjoining roofs into open windows. In some cases it is suspected that incendiary
compounds with a delayed action have been employed. Many of the houses
were evacuated when trouble began, and our problems resembled those in
London during the fire blitz. Lahore is now gradually being provided with
defences resembling an A.R.P. service, and these arrangements coupled with
mass arrests under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, have in some
degree caused the improvement of the past few days. But we have evolved no
real remedy for the kind of incendiarism with which we have had to deal.
Casualties in Lahore have been heavy — I should say by now about 120 dead
and perhaps 190 injured. The Muslims have been responsible for most of the
burning and for about two-thirds of the deaths. They have had something
approaching their proper share of the injured. There was one organised raid by
non-Muslims on a settlement of Muslim Gujars, in which firearms and incen¬
diary bombs were used.

In Amritsar our troubles resembled those in Lahore, and we have been no
more successful in dealing with incendiarism. The casualties have been on
approximately the same scale as in Lahore, and in Amritsar also there was one
organised raid on a Muslim suburb. We were able to trace some of the raiders
through the police dogs, and I hope that we may be able to arrest the whole
party.

24

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

There were two scares during the fortnight owing to the arrival in Lahore
of armed parties from the Faridkot and Nabha States. These incidents have been
reported separately, and it is now being made clear to the Governments of the
Punjab States that they must not send armed parties or service vehicles into the
Punjab without permission.

The Police at Lahore and Amritsar have had a very bad time. The maximum
shade temperature in Lahore averaged about 116 degrees for a week, and has
not, I think, dropped below 112 during the fortnight. It has been impossible to
arrange regular reliefs, and many policemen have been on duty continuously for
14 days with irregular meals and little sleep. In return for their efforts they have
had nothing but abuse from all communities. There have no doubt been cases
in both cities of apathy and indiscipline; the surprising thing is that the Police
have stood up so well to physical fatigue and to the vicious communal bom¬
bardment in which at least one Member of Your Excellency’s Government
has taken a prominent part.

3. I hope to accompany Your Excellency to Gurgaon on 1st June. It appears
that the trouble began on this occasion with an attack by Ahirs on a Muslim
village named Naurangpur not far from Gurgaon itself. This was followed by a
second attack on another Muslim village. The Meos then took the offensive on
a wide front and did considerable execution. The disturbances seemed to be
dying down by 29th May; but I learn today that a counter offensive has been
launched by the Hindus.

Gurgaon is always rather a special worry, because it relies for troops on the
independent Delhi District. It is impossible for me to be in close touch with the
Delhi District Commander, and whereas I have the fullest military information
about everything that happens in Northern Command, my news from
Gurgaon is always scanty. I understand that about a Battalion and a half of
troops are deployed in the district and that about 50 villages have been burnt. I
would have gone to Gurgaon a day or two ago if I had not been involved in
other urgent work here.

4. During the fortnight I have seen three Members of Your Excellency’s
Government — Liaquat Ali Khan, Baldev Singh and Jawahar Lai Nehru. Copies
of notes1 recorded by me on my talks with the first two were sent to Brockman.
Liaquat Ali Khan was full of the usual Muslim complaints ; on the bigger political
issue he said that the Muslim League would never agree to partition and added
at the end of our talk that the British could not “evade their responsibility” and
must give a decision and enforce it. I was left in some doubt as to what he really
meant— Jinnah’s intention may be to acquiesce in the plan without actively
accepting it. On the other hand, he may intend simply to pass the responsibility
to His Majesty’s Government.

Baldev Singh was also intensely communal. In his view Jinnah had no

MAY 1947

25

intention of accepting the plan, and he thought that if Jinnah rejected it, the
Congress would also reject it.

I had a very amicable conversation with Nehru,2 who was not inclined to
sponsor local complaints. He took a gloomy view about the prospects of a
settlement and said that the plan would be acceptable to Congress only if it
were in fact treated as a settlement. He thought that there was no sound middle
course between the enforcement of an award (which seemed to him imprac¬
ticable) and the abandonment of India. A plan which H.M.G. did not intend to
enforce and which the parties would not accept would be of little value. In the
long run the Indians must settle their disputes themselves, and if they could not
do so now, they must do so after the British left. He believed that there might
be “civil war” in the Punjab, but he did not think it would last for long.

Gandhi’s latest statement which appeared in the newspapers of 3 1st May is of
some interest.3 Like other statements of the kind, it has been carefully timed and
may be a prelude to the rejection of the plan by the Congress. The trouble
about Gandhi is that although he is “not even a four anna member”, his
personal interventions are almost always effective.

I have just had an interesting interview with S war an Singh, the former
Development Minister.4 I had let it be known that I thought the Sikh leaders,
including himself, were far too bellicose, and he assured me that they had no
intention of making trouble as long as the Section 93 administration lasted. Like
all other leaders, he is bitterly communal, and it is not easy to make him see
what a deplorable effect communal attacks must have on the services. He
brought me an astonishing letter from Master Tara Singh, who now thinks that
there is a conspiracy on the part of Muslim Police officers to murder him. I gave
this letter back to Swaran Singh and asked him to tell Tara Singh that it was
rubbish and that I would pretend that I had not seen it.

5. Visits by Members of Your Excellency’s Government are very far from
helpful. The Members who have come to the Punjab since the Muslim League
agitation started on 24th January have without exception behaved as com¬
munal leaders and not as reponsible Ministers. Nehru is a good deal better than
the others, because he keeps the Press at arm’s length, and while he listens to
communal complaints, he usually refrains from commenting on them. But
even Nehru has practically no contacts with the Muslims. Baldev Singh is
entirely mischievous. While he was in Lahore he listened to many com¬
munal complaints, which are largely or wholly untrue, and gave a long Press
interview which was intended to embarrass me and the Security Services. The

1 Vol. X, No. 537; a note of a further interview with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on 26 May 1947 will be
found on R/3/1/176: ff 185-6.

2 A note of this interview on 30 May 1947 is on R/3/1/17 6: ff 187-9.

3 See No. 2, note 5.

4 A note of this interview on 31 May 1947 is on R/3/1/176: ff 190-1.

26

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

non-Muslim Members of the Central Government are showing an increasing
desire to interfere in provincial affairs, and there is much talk of Martial Law
and so on. Messervy, with whom I recently discussed this tendency, agrees
with me that what Baldev Singh really wants is to push the Provincial authori¬
ties on one side and to use the troops to suppress the Muslims. I strongly
suspect that Patel is of the same opinion. In fact the Central Government have
no more resources than those available to a Provincial Government — even
supposing that they assume control of the provincial machine. There are so
many policemen, so many troops available inside the Province, and so many
troops on application to G.H.Q. Baldev Singh incidentally is entirely ignorant
of military organisation, and told me blandly that he had “arranged to send me
four Divisions”. He was apparently unaware that the supply of troops had been
arranged under Your Excellency’s orders a month ago, and I did not think he
knew what troops were actually coming. (He had doubtless been told, but I
should say that he had not taken in the information given to him.)

6. I wrote separately5 to Sir John Colville about the growth of communal
feeling in the services. I see from a recent fortnightly letter6 from Wylie to
Your Excellency that a similar process of disintegration is beginning in the U.P.
In the Punjab Members of the Central Government are unquestionably to some
extent responsible for the growth of communal feeling. It is now common talk
that even the Judges of the High Court are affected. I notice that Teja Singh J,
who is hearing some habeas corpus applications of a communal kind, called on
Nehru while the latter was at Lahore. I do not suggest that Teja Singh J will
not decide the cases on the merits, but few Muslims are likely to believe that he
will do so. Our Chief Justice is closely related to Begum Shah Nawaz and others
who are actively concerned with Muslim League affairs. The belief that the
Punjab will be partitioned has intensified the communal split and most officials
are wondering who their new masters will be and how best they can secure
their own future. This is altogether a most unhealthy state of affairs.

7. I held a conference on the morning of 31st May with the Army Com¬
mander, the Commander Lahore Area, the Commander 4th Indian Division,
the Inspector General of Police, all Commissioners of Civil Divisions, all
Deputy Inspectors General of Police in charge of Ranges, and certain other
senior officials to go over our arrangements to prevent communal disturbances
when the expected announcement is made early in June. I think that our
resources will be adequate, though many Battalions are under-strength.
Detailed instructions have been issued to District Officers, and I think it has
been made clear to everyone that they will be supported in all bona fide action
to maintain order. Messervy is establishing his Tactical headquarters at Govern¬
ment House, Lahore, from the evening of 3rd June, and will be able to try out a
plan which he made some time ago for the control of serious disturbances. He

MAY 1947

27

will be in immediate touch with me and within easy reach of the three Major-
Generals commanding the Northern, Central and Eastern Areas. The Gurgaon
District, as I have noted above, comes under the Delhi Military District and is
not included in our general plan.

8. Crime is still unusually high, but the Police and the villagers in several
districts have recently had successful encounters with dacoit gangs. In one case
in the Muzaffargarh district some Hindus were attacked by a Muslim gang (not
for communal reasons) and were defended by a Muslim Pahlwan, who woun¬
ded one or two of the dacoits and so enabled the Police to follow them up and
arrest them. In a village in the Amritsar district the people turned out en masse
and fought a gang n strong under the notorious Puran Singh. The villagers
lost two killed, but killed six of the dacoits, and we hope to arrest the remaining
five. During the past two or three months there have been at least half a dozen
incidents of this kind, and it is encouraging that at times like these we are still
able to deal with dangerous criminals.

9. Special arrangements have been made to keep our food supplies going
during disturbances. By 5th June I hope to have nearly three months’ stocks in
all our rationed towns, and we are holding an emergency reserve of 4800 tons
in railway wagons to be shifted as required if there is any local shortage or if we
have a refugee problem.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

5 Not on file. 6 Report U.P. 81 of 18 May 1947, para. 3. L/P &J/5/276.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listoivel

Telegram , L/P &Jjiol8o: f 6 5

immediate new Delhi, 31 May 1947, 5.20 pm

Received: 31 May, 4.23 pm

1221-S. I have decided to incorporate amendments suggested in London in
announcement before discussing it with Indian leaders.

2. These amendments are detailed in the “Memorandum of Amendments 1
handed by Erskine Crum to Harris. They concern
(a) paragraphs No. 7, 9 and 15 of announcement.

1 This memorandum listed the amendments (including those to be made only at the Viceroy s dis¬
cretion after discussion with the Indian leaders) which had been agreed between the Viceroy and the
India and Burma Committee since the circulation of the draft announcement under reference I.B.
(47)74 of 20 May (see note 5 below). These amendments are contained in Vol. X, No. 516, Annex II,
and No. 553, Minute 3, passage sidelined ‘X’.

28

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(b) New penultimate paragraph, under heading “Immediate Transfer of
Power.” In this I am incorporating words “to one or two successor
authorities” and not “to such successor authorities.”2

3 . I have also decided to exclude all the Roman numerals from text. Thus the
announcement will no longer be in numbered parts ; the headings will of course
stay in.

4. Please also in paragraph No. 16 (A) delete “prospective” substitute
“respective.”

5. I have not yet decided on a procedure for British Baluchistan (paragraph
No. 12). I will telegraph as soon as I have.3

6. I suggest that you now have a new draft typed incorporating these
amendments. It is to this new draft, which for ease of reference let us call draft
“X”,4 and not to I.B. (47)74,5 that I shall refer in any future telegrams.6

2 In tel. 7067 of 2 June Lord Listowel suggested, in order to make new words fit into text of new para.
20, that passage should read: ‘to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a
result of this announcement’. Lord Mountbatten concurred, subject to agreement of Indian leaders
the following day, in tel. 1273 -S of 2 June. L/P&J/10/80: ff 64, 30.

3 See No. 17, note 5.

4 Not printed; for announcement as published see No. 45.

5 I.B. (47)74 of 20 May circulated the draft attached to No. 476 in Vol. X incorporating the amend¬
ments made to paras. 4 and 15 at the meeting of the India and Burma Committee on 19 May (Vol.
X, No. 485).

6 In tel. 1225-S of 31 May Lord Mountbatten transmitted an additional amendment inserting the
words ‘contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946’ after ‘towards Indian
States’ in para. 18. L/P&J/10/80: f 62.

14

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral ViscountMountbatten

of Burma

Telegram, Rfe/i/ifi: f 91

important 31 May 1947, 5.45 Pm

confidential Received: 3 1 May, 11.13 pm

No. CA/99. Following background may be useful. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
Dr. Khan Sahib took with them by air to Delhi yesterday League leaders Abdul
Qayum and Samin Jan who were released on parole for the purpose. Apparently
this follows on the suggestion by the two League leaders to Jinnah that latter
should permit some kind of discussions between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and them¬
selves in Delhi. Local indications are that negotiations have been proceeding in

MAY 1947

29

Peshawar possibly for coalition with Abdul Qayum [and] Samin Jan holding
office. Both were at one time Congressmen.

2. Main body of League workers in Peshawar apparently distrust this
development and yesterday sent three representatives by train to Delhi to
contact Jinnah.

3 . Genuine coalition is what I have been urging on Ministry for long time
past and would go far to steady frontier if private armies at the same time were
allowed to disappear. Matters may be complicated by introduction of Pathan-
istan issue into discussions arising from 2nd [3rd] June announcement.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to all Provincial Governors

Telegram , Rfe/ 1/150: ff 132-4

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, May I947 , 11. 50 pm

SECRET

No. 1223-S. I have sent you by a separate telegram1 the important new para¬
graph 20 which is to be inserted in the announcement.

2. Before I left Delhi both the Congress and the League leaders told me that
they wanted to stay, for the time being at any rate, in the British Common¬
wealth.2 Both also have stated publicly their demand for an early transfer of
power.

3 . It was clear to me that if we waited till constitutions for both Hindustan
and Pakistan had been framed and all the negotiations about partition settled we
should have to wait a very long time, and things would get more difficult
instead of easier. There would be likely to be chaos in June 1948 if we could not
get a transfer of power to two Governments (or of course to one if the Partition
claim were dropped) on some basis which would facilitate a smooth transition,
and give India a chance of using our help in the armed forces. I therefore
pressed that H.M.G. should legislate at once and set up two dominion Govern¬
ments, if the people voted in favour of partition, each having a constitution
based on the Government of India Act 1935, but with the right to frame a new
constitution at any time.

4. Though the League withdrew their clear request for dominion status after
I had gone to London, H.M.G. accepted my views and decided to insert the
new paragraph 20 in the announcement.

1 Not printed. For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3.

2 For question of Dominion Status generally see Index of Subjects in Vol. X.

30

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. The parliamentary draftsmen are already busy on the Bill — it will provide
for a separate constitutional Governor General for each dominion ; though the
same man may, if recommended by both new Governments, hold both posts.
The posts of Governors will continue but they may have to be replaced if there
is a demand for a change. In any case they will be constitutional Governors
acting on advice. If the Punjab and Bengal are partitioned there will have to be
new Governors for the two new Provinces.

6. It is hoped that the Bill will be passed through Parliament by the end of
July and that it should come into force as early as possible thereafter and in any
case not later than 1st October this year.

7. Much of the detail of the legislation will have to be done by Governor-
General’s Orders in Council, and the Act will provide for this.

8. This greatly accelerated programme will of course mean that an immense
amount of work will have to be done very quickly in dividing up the machin¬
ery, assets and services of the Central Government and of any partitioned
Provinces. It is therefore essential that the options provided under the announce¬
ment should be exercised at the earliest possible moment.

9. (To the Governor of Sind only). Please arrange to summon your legis¬
lature as soon as possible to take the decision indicated in para. 9 [10] of the
announcement. The summons should not of course go out before the announce¬
ment is made.

10. (To the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal only). I am sending
separately a draft notification laying down the procedure for ascertaining the
wishes of your legislature. As soon as you have accepted the draft I will put out
the notification and the legislature should then be summoned without delay. I
think 10 days notice should be enough. It is unfortunate that the N.W.F.P.
decision cannot be known till later but it cannot be helped.

11. (To the Governor of Bengal only). It looks as though the chances of an
agreement for a united and independent Bengal were now slender. The
announcement will however be changed if there is agreement.

12. (To Governor of the N.W.F.P. only). Please arrange for immediately
setting in train of preliminaries for referendum. Your telegrams Nos. GH-54
dated nth May and CA-89 dated 23rd May are being answered fully but
separately today.3 We must somehow get a result in six weeks. I realise what a
difficult time you are likely to have but will do my best to get the party leaders
to secure moderation.

13. Clearly the Secretary of State’s Services will cease to exist as such when
the new Governments are set up, but it should be possible to get essential men
to continue for a few months on special terms if they are wanted, even though

MAY 1947

31

they may not wish to stay on permanently, and H.M.G. naturally very much
hope that those who are wanted will carry on.

14. British troops will probably be withdrawn directly after the transfer of
power, but it is likely that with both Pakistan and Hindustan in the Common¬
wealth arrangements will be made to allow British officers to serve on in the
Indian Army and Navy if they are wanted; some R.A.F. personnel may be lent
too. A committee will shortly examine in the U.K. what arrangements can be
made. Probably all such British officers of the Indian armed forces will be
transferred first to the British service and then seconded.

15. (To Governors of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam only). We must go
ahead at once with provisional administrative plans for partition and I will
telegraph shortly about this.

16. (To all Governors except the Punjab). You may show the announcement
to your Premier only an hour before publication which is at 7 p.m. 1ST on the
3rd June, if you wish.

17. 1 have left H.M.G. in no doubt about the possible dangers and difficulties.
These are now fully appreciated at home. But H.M.G. are confident they can
rely on all of us to do our best, and I know we can rely on them to back us up.

3 These two telegrams from Sir O. Caroe and Lord Mountbatten’s reply in tel. 1230-S of 31 May 1947
dealt with arrangements for holding the referendum, in particular its legal basis and the question
whether fresh electoral rolls should be prepared for it. R/3/1/151 : ff 78, 82, 94.

16

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan

Rfa/ifco:/ 133

133/14 1 June 1947

Dear Mr Liaquat Ali Khan,

Thank you for your letter of the 3 1st May1 about the situation in Gurgaon. I
have been there myself today with the Governor of the Punjab, and have
informed myself of the position.2

1 No. 11.

2 In a situation report contained in tel. 115-G of 1 June Sir E. Jenkins reported on this visit to Gurgaon.
He stated that the position was ‘not satisfactory’, the area affected being about 800 square miles, with
raiding and counter raiding by Meos and Hindus on the Mewat border, and Hindus attacking
Muslim pockets in the Palwal area. He reported at least 50 villages destroyed, that casualties ‘must be
heavy’, and that police and military had had ‘to fire frequently’, adding that in his opinion the num¬
ber of troops employed (only 365) was inadequate. On 4 June Mr Abell informed the Governor’s
Secretary that ‘an extra battalion is going in, and a few cavalry from Remounts are being provided*.
R/3/1/90: ff 134, 139-

32

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I saw Brigadier Vaughan, die District Commander, and he will go at once to
G.H.Q. to see about strengthening the garrison.

The reports of intervention by members of the Indian States forces from
neighbouring States are probably exaggerated, but I am instructing the Political
Department to draw the attention of the Resident to the reports, and do
everything possible to see that such intervention is prevented.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTJBATTEN OF BURMA

Minutes of Viceroy's Thirty Sixth Staff Meeting , Items 1-2 and 4

Mounthatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 1 June
1947 at 4.1^ pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
SirE. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V.P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D.
Scott, Mr Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy said that he had seen the Nawab of Bhopal
that day and given him a general outline of the Announcement to be made by
His Majesty’s Government. The Nawab of Bhopal had pledged his word of
honour not to divulge this information. He had asked whether it was intended
that Dominion status should be granted to the States, his excellency the
viceroy said that he had explained that this was not the intention of His
Majesty’s Government and the reasons for their decision.1 The Nawab of
Bhopal had thereupon complained that His Majesty’s Government had once
more let the States down. He had pointed out that the Cabinet Mission Plan
had always been adhered to by the States; and had complained that, if there was
partition, the two new Constituent Assemblies would have very “tight”
Centres. The Nawab of Bhopal had expressed the fear that 60% of his revenue
would be taken by the Centre and had declared that he would not j oin either
Constituent Assembly in these circumstances.
his excellency the viceroy said that he had later discussed this matter

JUNE 1947

33

with the Maharaja of Bikaner. The latter had explained to him the great
welcome which had been extended by Congress to those States which had sent
representatives to the Constituent Assembly; and had given his opinion that the
rulers of the States which did not send representatives had been activated purely
by selfish reasons. He had pointed out that the States were not committed to
accept a “tight” Centre but were at liberty to negotiate the degree of attach¬
ment. his excellency the viceroy said that he had asked the Maharaja
of Bikaner to give him in writing a resume of the position of the States to date.
It appeared that Travancore, Mysore, Hyderabad and Bhopal were almost the
only ones which were not likely to join one or other Constituent Assembly.

his excellency the viceroy said that he intended to see the States
Negotiating Committee a second time on 4th June. He had invited the Maha¬
raja of Bikaner to come half an hour before that meeting. He had also asked the
Nawab of Bhopal to come and see him twenty minutes before the first meeting
with the States Negotiating Committee, and had asked Sir Conrad Corfield to
come early. These timings would have to be confirmed.

hisexcellencytheviceroy said that he did not intend, as was suggested
in the brief1 2 which had been approved by H.M.G., to make a formal statement
before the members of the States Negotiating Committee that he hoped that
the States would join one of the two new Dominions. He would give this
advice separately and personally to the various rulers.

his excellency also drew attention to the sentence in this brief which read
“On the other hand, should any State eventually not enter into relationship
with a Dominion, we should in fact be forced to consider a separate relationship
with it.” He said that he would answer any questions from the representatives
of the States on this matter by saying that this was a purely hypothetical ques¬
tion which, when it arose, he would refer to H.M.G.

sir eric mieville pointed out that if a State failed to join either Con¬
stituent Assembly it would be outside the British Commonwealth and no
longer eligible for decorations.

his excellency the viceroy:

(i) invited the Reforms Commissioner to find out what were the likely
Congress reactions to the continued award of decorations to the States;

(ii) directed P.S.V. to arrange for him to meet the members of the States
Negotiating Committee a second time on 4th June; and to confirm the
separate interviews which he had promised to the Maharaja of Bikaner,
the Nawab of Bhopal and Sir Conrad Corfield.3

1 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 6; 523; 533; and 553, Minute 4.

2 Vol. X, No. 533 (circulated to the Viceroy’s staff as V.C.P. 57).

3 Lord Mountbatten saw the States Negotiating Committee on 3 June (see No. 43) but there appears to
be no record of a second meeting on 4 June or of the separate interviews referred to here.

34

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 2

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

MR abell read out a letter4 which had been received from Pandit Nehru
concerning possible methods of finding out which Constituent Assembly
British Baluchistan wanted to join. Pandit Nehru suggested the possibility of
sending a Commission to meet the Jirgas and of holding a referendum in the
Quetta municipality, mr abell said that he had spoken concerning these
suggestions to Sir Geoffrey Prior, who had considered that a non-official
Commission would be out of the question. Sir Geoffrey Prior was also opposed
to the idea of an official Commission and had put forward the suggestion that
one representative elected from each tribe should meet together in Quetta to
make the decision. He was going to send in detailed recommendations when he
returned to British Baluchistan.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Con. Sec. to draft a telegram to the Secretary of State saying that
the present Paragraph 12 of the Announcement would have to remain
in.5

Item 4

BENGAL

Reference was made to a letter6 addressed to Sir Eric Mieville by Mr
Suhrawardy. The two points which Mr Suhrawardy stressed were:

(a) The necessity for holding a referendum in Bengal, so that the true wishes
of the Scheduled Castes could be ascertained, and

(b) the desirability of Calcutta being a free city, if only for a limited period.
rao bahadur menon said that Congress reaction against any suggestion of

Calcutta becoming a free city was likely to be extremely strong. However,
Congress might consider it if it was only for a limited period and under a
neutral authority, preferably the Governor General.

MR abell said that he considered that any changes in the Draft Announce¬
ment at this stage, to deal with either the opinions of the Scheduled Castes or
special arrangements for Calcutta, would prejudice the chance of Congress
accepting the Plan as a whole.

his excellency the viceroy said that he entirely shared this viewpoint.
The question of Calcutta could come up after the main meetings. If, however,
he was attacked on this point or on the Scheduled Castes at these meetings, it
was essential that he should be properly briefed to give the right replies.
his excellency the viceroy:

directed P.S.V. to obtain, either by telegram or telephone, the views of the

JUNE I947

35

Governor of Bengal on the possibility of Calcutta being a free city for a
limited period7 and the question of the opinion of the Schedules Castes.8

4 No. 9.

* In tel. 1247-S of 1 June Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that, as it would not be possible
to decide on a procedure for British Baluchistan before the issue of the announcement, the present
wording of para. 12 would have to remain. He also replied to Pandit Nehru’s letter (No. 9) saying
that he thought the paragraph would have to be left as it stood for the moment. R/3/1/155: ff 14-15.

6 No. 10.

7 See No. 18, para. 5.

8 In tel. 1248-S of 1 June Lord Mountbatten asked Sir F. Burrows for material for ‘turning down’ Mr
Jinnah’s request for a referendum to ascertain the opinion of the Scheduled Castes. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bengal, Situation in, Part 1(b). The Governor’s reply has not
been traced, but possibly a brief on the Scheduled Castes circulated under reference V.C.P. 61 of
2 June was based on material supplied by him. The record of Lord Mountbatten’s remarks on
Calcutta in No. 23 closely follows the wording of this brief.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal )

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Bengal , Partition of Part 11(a)

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 June 1047

SECRET

No. 123 7-S. Thank you for your secret letter of 28th May1 and copy of your
admirable broadcast2 which I have seen on my return.

2. I shall do all I can to get Jinnah and Nehru to broadcast on the lines you
suggest.

3 . It looks as if the Congress were determined to oppose any move towards
an independent but united Bengal. If this idea has to be abandoned do you think
it will be necessary to go into Section 93 and if so at what stage? I doubt myself
whether you need go into Section 93 until it is known that the decision is in
favour of partitioning the Province. Are you in favour of going into Section 93
then ? If so what are your prospects (a) if the League acquiesce in the Plan and
(b) if they do not?

4. Alternatively can any form of coalition government be formed to work
out partition ?

* Vol. X, No. 554.

2 Sir F. Burrows enclosed a copy of this broadcast (not printed) in his letter of 28 May, remarking that
he had given it the previous evening ‘with a view to steadying public opinion’.

36

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. Suhrawardy would like Calcutta to be declared a free city3 or at any rate
under joint control for the interim period whilst partition is being worked out,
to avoid bloodshed and in the hopes of better sense prevailing later. Request
your views.

3 cf. Nos. 10, 17, Item 4, and 91, para. 1.

19

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/150:/ 168

most immediate new Delhi, i June 1947, 10 pm

SECRET

PRIVATE

No. 1249-S. Reference your telegram No. 65 of 31st May.1

1. The text of my broadcast was submitted to you and the Prime Minister2
and was redrafted by me on the Prime Minister’s instructions3 and then passed
by him. I much regret that in the great pressure of my last day in London the
final redraft was not shown to you before the record was made.4 I agree to the
omission of the clause in question.

2. In view of the line which Gandhi has been taking recently, I propose to
make the following additions to the text of my broadcast:5

(a) In the sentence in which the omission occurs6 after the words “in my
opinion” insert “which I share with that great fighter for India’s freedom,
Mahatma Gandhi”.

(b) Fifty three words later after “but there can be no question” insert “as,
once again, I know Mahatma Gandhi agrees”.

3. I presume that it will not be possible to include these additions in the
recorded version, if that has to be used. But please include them in the copies of
my broadcast which you will issue to the Press, and let theB.B.C. know of these
amendments.

1 See Vol. X, No. 557 and its note 4. 2 See Vol. X, No. 507.

3 See Vol. X, No. 532. 4 See Vol. X, No. 557, note 1.

s See, in this Volume, No. 2, Item 1, conclusion (iii), and Item 4.

6 i.e. the second sentence of para. 5 of No. 44.

JUNE 1947

37

20

Unsigned Note 1
R/3l 1/150: f 204

POINTS DISCUSSED WITH PATEL

(1) Calcutta — Not for 6 hours.2

(2) Procedure3 — H.E. to make introductory remarks, hand over document —
decision to be communicated in 24 hours. If Jinnah raises any question,
H.E. to reply that the W.C.’s decision should be communicated in 24
hours. This is only for the information of H.E. It has been practice with
Jinnah to wait for the Congress decision and then make up his own mind.
Congress would not allow him to do so this time. In other words, Jinnah
should come out with his decision independently of the Congress.

(3) I raised Bikaner and the question of title. He saw no objection to con¬
ferring titles on Ruling Princes but he was not quite enthusiastic about it.

(4) Congress would not raise the issue of Interim Govt in these discussions.

(5) He raised the question of States and I did not say anything to him.

1 Possibly by V.P. Menon; at all events it reports a talk between Menon and Patel: see No. 91, para. 1,
last sentence. A manuscript note, dated 2 June 1947, by Mr Scott states that: ‘V.P. Menon has told
H.E. the above’.

2 See No. 91, para. 1. 3 i.e. the procedure at the meeting with the Indian leaders (No. 23).

21

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell
R^/i/ijo:/ 179

TOP SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 2 June I947

Dear George,

I did not realise that changes could be made at this stage in the enclosure to
V.C.P. 581 or I would have made the suggestion to H.E. on Saturday evening
that the sentence about States should read as follows:

“I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of His
Majesty’s Government are concerned with the transfer [of] power in British
India.”

1 i.e. the draft of the Viceroy’s broadcast circulated by No. 1 in which the sentence about the States
read: ‘I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of His Majesty s Govern¬
ment do not affect their position’.

38

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It is not correct that ‘the position of the States’ is not affected, but the
sentence as redrafted evades this issue without making a mis-statement.2

Yours,

CONRAD

2 Mr Abell replied on 2 June indicating that the broadcast would be amended as proposed by Sir C.
Corfield. The India Office was informed of the amendment in tel. 1267-S of 2 June and they in turn
notified the Prime Minister’s Private Office. L/PO/6/124: ff 6- 7.

22

Mr Thompson to Sir C. Corfield

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference , Indian

Political Leaders , etc., Issue ofi Invitations to

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 2 June I947

The Raja of Faridkot came to see me at 9.40 a.m. this morning. Giani Kartar
Singh, President, Shiromani Akali Dal, is staying with him at Faridkot House
and at breakfast time had agreed that if invited to His Excellency’s conversations
with political leaders today, he would do his utmost to come to an amicable
agreement with Mr Jinnah in regard to the inclusion of “Khalistan” within
Pakistan.

2. Raja argued that since Messrs Jinnah and Kripalani, as Presidents of the
League and Congress, were invited it was only logical to invite Giani Kartar
Singh also. He admitted, however, that there was a split amongst the Sikhs with
Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh in one camp and Kartar Singh in
the other. On the other hand Mr Jinnah was agreeable to the inclusion of the
Sikh States within Pakistan, giving them a very substantial measure of inde¬
pendent action. Further Mr Jinnah had promised not to give any statement on
any such question without first consulting the Raja.1

J. H. THOMPSON
Resident on special duty

1 Sir C. Corfield put this note up to Lord Mountbatten who minuted: ‘I will see Giani Kartar Singh at
245 pm on 3rd. M of B 2/6.’ For some account of this interview see No. 91, para. 26.

JUNE 1947

39

Minutes of the Meeting of the

Viceroy with the Indian Leaders , First Day

LlP&Jliol8i:Jf 401-9

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 2 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru ,
Sardar Patel , Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Mr Nishtar , Sardar
Baldev Singh , LorJ Ismay,1 Sir E. Mieville; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
( Secretariat )

His Excellency’s Opening Remarks

his excellency the viceroy explained that he asked the minimum num¬
ber of party leaders to come to the meeting so that it could be held in a friendly
atmosphere round a small table. He said that, during the last five years, he had
taken part in a number of momentous meetings at which the fate of the war had
been decided; but he could remember no meeting at which decisions had been
taken which would have such a profound influence on world history as those
which were to be taken at the present meeting. The way in which power was
transferred would affect not only India, but the whole world.

The Necessity for Speed

Before he had left for India in March, he had been given no indication in
London of the necessity for speed in formulating proposals for the transfer of
power. He had been led to believe that, if his recommendations were submitted
in time for legislation to be introduced by the beginning of 1948, that would be
time enough. However, from the moment of his arrival a terrific sense of
urgency had been impressed upon him by everybody to whom he had spoken.
They had wanted the present state of uncertainty to cease. He had come to
realise that the sooner power was transferred the better it would be.

The Cabinet Mission’s Plan

He had tried at first to obtain agreement on the Cabinet Mission’s Plan. His
Majesty’s Government set great store by that Plan. At different times all
parties had agreed to it. He had, however, now had to report to His Majesty’s
Government the view of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League that they could

1 In a letter dated. 2 June, presumably sent just before this Meeting was due to begin, Lord Ismay wrote
to Lord Mountbatten:

‘This is like D day 1944 — and not less exciting: and I just want to send you this line of good cheer
and good luck.’

Mountbatten Papers, Papers of Special Interest, (5) of 1947-

40

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

not withdraw their rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan and that they felt that
it could not be made to work. He asked Mr. Jinnah whether, in this, he had
reported him correctly.

mr. jinnah signified assent.

his excellency the viceroy went on to say that he still thought that
the Cabinet Mission Plan represented the best solution. It meant a great deal to
the States, the majority of which set much store by it.

The Principle of Partition

his excellency the viceroy said that gradually, over the course of the
last two and a half months, he had begun to see the degree of acceptance by the
different parties of the various alternative plans. Mr. Jinnah had stated a claim
for complete Pakistan. From discussions which he had had with Pandit Nehru
and Sardar Patel, on the other hand, it was clear to him that the partition of
India was fundamentally contrary to Congress principles. But Congress had
now accepted the principle that no area which contained a majority of Muslims
should be coerced into joining the existing Constituent Assembly. In doing so
they had made it clear that they could only see their way to accepting the
principle of Partition so long as it was applied also to the non-Muslim majority
areas which had been included in the original Pakistan plan. Mr. Jinnah, on the
other hand, had pointed out that he could never agree to the partition of
Provinces, which he considered fundamentally wrong. Thus he himself was
faced with the position that Congress would not agree to the principle of the
partition of India (although they accepted the principle that Muslim majority
areas should not be coerced) ; while Mr. Jinnah, who demanded the partition of
India, would not agree to the principle of the partition of Provinces. He had
made clear to His Majesty’s Government the impossibility of fully accepting
the principles of one side and not of the other.

His Excellency’s Recent Visit to London

his excellency the viceroy stated, that during his recent visit to London,
he had attended a number of Cabinet Committee meetings.2 At these the whole
question of the Cabinet Mission Plan had once again been thrashed out; the
principle of partition, and to what extent it should be applied, had been con¬
sidered. He had tried to put forward what he believed to be the points of view
of both parties on the different matters — not only at the Cabinet Committee
meetings, but also separately to the Prime Minister, Sir Stafford Cripps and to
members of the Opposition, including Mr. Churchill.3 He explained that he
had been most distressed (as a non-Party man) to find, when he had been
appointed Viceroy, that India had, to some extent, become a matter of Party
Politics in the United Kingdom. Therefore he had all the more welcomed the
opportunity of meeting members of the Opposition; and he was happy to state

JUNE 1947

41

that they were broadly in agreement with the policy which His Majesty’s
Government intended to adopt. In fact both parties in the United Kingdom
were united in their desire to help India. He himself had been very impressed in
London by the intense feeling of goodwill for India, which extended from His
Majesty the King (who had spoken to him on the subject almost every evening
with a great understanding and well-wishing) down to his friends in all walks of
life.

The Sikhs

the viceroy, continuing, said that he was most distressed about the position
of the Sikhs. He did not think that any single question had been discussed at
such great length in London as this. He had repeatedly asked the Sikhs whether
they desired the partition of the Punjab, as they were so spread over that Pro¬
vince that any partition would necessarily divide their community, and they
had repeatedly replied that they did. Different formulae had been tried, but it
was apparent that there would be frightful difficulties if attempts were made to
work, for the notional partition, on any principle other than division between
the majority Muslim and majority non-Muslim areas. It had therefore been
agreed that the notional partition would be entirely provisional. The Boundary
Commission, on which Sikh interests would of course be represented, would
have to work out the best long-term solution.

Calcutta

his excellency then turned to the question of Calcutta. This was another
problem which had been given careful consideration in London. The question
had arisen as to whether a referendum should be held in Calcutta4 as, according
to Mr. Mandal’s views, the vote of the Scheduled Castes there might result in a
decision in favour of Calcutta joining Eastern Bengal. He had sought the
Governor’s advice on this point5 and it had transpired that, out of the ii
million Hindus in Calcutta, only 55,000 were recorded as Scheduled Castes in
the last census (the Muslim population was 498,000). It was true that about f of
the Hindus did not record their caste — and some of these might be Scheduled
Castes ; but there were indications that the number of Scheduled Castes was in
any case not large enough to affect the issue. In 1936 the population figures were
examined to decide how many seats should be reserved for the Scheduled
Castes. In all Bengal 30 seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes; but it was
not considered necessary to earmark one single seat for the Scheduled Castes
in Calcutta. There were two Scheduled Castes seats in the neighbouring
district of 24 Parganas. Both had gone at the last election uncontested to
the Congress. Many of the poorer Hindus in Calcutta came from “up-

2 Vol. X, Nos. 485, 494, 517, and 553. 3 Vol. X, No. 513.

4 See e.g. No. 10. 5 See No. 17, note 8.

42

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

country” (Bihar, the United Provinces, etc.). A proportion of these were
Scheduled Castes but there was nothing to suggest that they would prefer
Muslim to Hindu rule. During the disturbances in Calcutta the Scheduled
Castes had contributed their full share of the casualties on the Hindu side. It
would be impossible to hold a referendum of the Scheduled Castes in Calcutta
at short notice because there was no separated Scheduled Castes Electoral Roll;
because, on the Hindu Roll, there were many cases where caste was not entered
or needed checking ; because the police and military were so stretched that an
elaborate referendum in Calcutta itself was out of the question; and because the
principle, if applied in Calcutta, would have to be applied elsewhere — which
would result in endless complications.

He had done his best, while in London, to be advocate of the different party
issues on Calcutta, but the definite decision of the Cabinet6 had been that no
exception to the general rule could be made in this case.

The India Office

the viceroy said that he had represented to the Cabinet Committee that the
new arrangements would involve the abolition of the India Office. This view
had been accepted and details were now being worked out.7

The Transfer of Contiguous Areas

his excellency recalled that he had been asked by both parties, before
leaving for London, to consider arrangements whereby certain contiguous areas
in which there was a majority of the opposite community should be transferred
from one side to the other. This applied particularly to the Purnea district and
to parts of Sind, his excellency the viceroy said that this matter had
been omitted from the present Announcement. It would have to be dealt with
separately, by agreement between the two parties and through the medium of
the Boundary Commission.8

Dominion Status

his excellency said that there was included in the Statement one new
presentation — the new Paragraph 20 under the heading “Immediate Transfer
of Power”.9 He recalled that it had always been impressed upon him by all the
leaders present at the meeting, that they wanted partition (if it was decided
upon) and, thereafter, the transfer of power to take place with the utmost
speed. Moreover, he felt that the British owed it to the Indians, to give them
all the help which they required after the transfer of power. This could only be
done if it were arranged that the transfer should take place not only before
June 1948, but also as long before that date as possible. Therefore, after dis¬
cussion with the leaders, he had taken it upon himself to ask for legislation to
be rushed through during the present Parliamentary session to give Dominion

JUNE I947

43

status to the successor authorities that would emerge. The Prime Minister had
given orders that this should have top priority and the Lord Chancellor and
Law Officers of the Crown had set to work at once.10 Mr. Churchill had given
a written assurance11 to the Prime Minister that the Opposition would facilitate
the passage of this Bill. It was hoped that it would create an all time world¬
wide legislative record, as the present session of Parliament was due to end in
late July or early August. Power would, therefore, be demitted on a Dominion
status basis in the first instance. Thereafter the new Indian Government or
Governments would be completely free to withdraw from the Commonwealth
whenever they so wished. The only objection which he could see to such an
early transfer of power was a possible accusation that the British were “quit¬
ting” on their obligations. Therefore, it was abundantly clear that British
assistance should not be withdrawn prematurely if it was still required. He
considered that it was the duty of the British to continue to help — not to rule —
India. They would stay at the disposal of the Indians for as long as the latter
wished.

The Need for Secrecy

the viceroy said that the Prime Minister had particularly impressed upon
him the supreme need for secrecy concerning the Statement until it was made
in the House of Commons. He therefore asked that every possible step should
be taken to prevent a leakage before the following afternoon. This applied
particularly to the new Paragraph 20. There had already been speculation in the
Press on the possible grant of Dominion status, but this had been somewhat
wide of the mark. He asked the Indian Leaders for their assurances that they
would do their best to prevent their Working Committees from “leaking”.
pandit nehru and mr. jinnah signified assent.

Defence Arrangements & Treaties

his excellency the viceroy said that, on another point which had been
raised, His Majesty’s Government had expressed a wish to be associated in any
defence agreement or treaty between the two new States which were to be set
up.12 They felt that it would be an impossible situation if either of these States,
having British officers and equipment, were to allow other nations to come in
and establish bases on their territories.

The Appointment of Governors-General

the viceroy then explained the procedure for the appointment by Dom-

6 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 4. 7 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 4, and 521.

8 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 5.

9 For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3; see Dominion Status in
Index of Subjects in Vol. X for question of Dominion Status generally.

10 See Vol. X, Nos. 485, Conclusion (2); 494, Minute 2; and 553, Minute 5.

” Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 513. 12 See Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 6.

44

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

iiiions of consitutional Governors-General. He said that it fell to the Heads of
the Governments of such States (presumably the Prime Ministers) to recom¬
mend to His Majesty the King whom they wanted for Governor-General. It
was customary for His Majesty the King always to accept this advice. It was
similarly the custom for Dominion Premiers in no circumstances to disclose the
names of their nominees until the consent of His Majesty had been accorded.
Obviously one of the first matters on which speculation would start would be
the names of the new Governors-General. his excellency the viceroy
asked the Indian Leaders to bear in mind the custom of not disclosing their
intentions in this respect.

British Officers and Officials

his excellency the viceroy said that His Majesty’s Government were
willing and anxious to help with the continued supply of British officials and
of British officers for the Indian Armed Forces ; but it was far more difficult to
persuade British officers to serve on at the present time than it had been a
year previously. The principal reason for this was the increase in communal
warfare and strife. However, before he had left London, a Committee had been
set up under the Minister of Defence13 in order urgently to examine how it
would be possible to make available to the two new States in India the greatest
possible number of British officers and officials that they wanted to keep. In the
case of officers, it was probable that they would be transferred to the British
Service and then loaned back to the Dominion Governments. The same
principle had applied to the Australian Navy. It was, however, obviously
going to be a difficult problem.

His Majesty’s Government’s Statement

his excellency the viceroy pointed out that he had formulated the plan
as a result of many talks with five of the seven Indian Leaders present at the
meeting. It had been changed to meet their wishes during the last few days
before he had left for London,14 and he had been agreeably surprised then to
find that the majority of suggestions made by one side had not been rejected by
the other. He explained that there were small drafting alterations in the State¬
ment since it had last been seen by the Indian leaders. These were designed
purely for clarification and it had been agreed by His Majesty’s Government
that they should not be included unless he and both the major Indian parties
agreed. He had His Majesty’s Government’s authority to strike out any pro¬
posed amendment that was not agreed.15

Copies of the Statement16 were then handed round to the meeting, his
excellency the viceroy reiterated that five of those present at the meeting
had been associated with him in the drafting of the statement. He was gratified
to feel that their support would continue. At this juncture, mr. jinn ah,

JUNE 1947

45

MR. LIAQUAT ALI KHAN, PANDIT NEHRU, SARDAR PATEL and SARDAR

baldev singh all signified assent.

his excellency the viceroy asked the Leaders to take copies of this
Statement to their Working Committees and discuss it with them that day. He
asked them to let him know by midnight that night what their Working
Committees thought of it. He did not intend to ask either side specifically to
agree to the terms of the Statement, but requested assurances from both that
they would do their best to have it worked out peacefully. He explained that
he felt that it would be asking the Indian Leaders to go against their con¬
sciences if he requested full agreement. He was, however, asking them to
accept it in a peaceful spirit and to make it work without bloodshed, which
would be the inevitable consequence if they did not accept it.

pandit nehru asked for a further definition of the difference between
agreement and acceptance, his excellency the viceroy explained that
agreement would imply belief that the right principles were being employed.
He had had to violate the principles of both sides, so could not ask for complete
agreement. What he asked was for acceptance, in order to denote belief that the
plan was a fair and sincere solution for the good of the country, pandit
nehru stated that there could never be complete approval of the plan from
Congress, but, on the balance, they accepted it. mr.nishtar pointed out that
acceptance of the plan really implied agreement to make it work, his excel¬
lency the viceroy agreed with this.

MR. jinnah said that it was perfectly true to say that neither side agreed
with certain points in the plan. Its formal acceptance by the Muslim League,
which would have to come later, and the Constitutional procedure of the
League had to be considered. The decision could not be left to the leaders and
the Working Committee (of which there were 21 members) alone. There were
many important people outside the Working Committee. The leaders and the
W orking Committee would have to bring the people round. Much explana¬
tion would be necessary. Rather than a few representatives of the Muslim
League immediately committing themselves, he would rather say that the plan
had been fully examined and that they would do their best to see that the
proposals were given effect to peacefully and without bloodshed.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was willing to take the risk of
accepting the words of the leaders and the backing of their Working Com¬
mittees. He was completely confident in the loyalty and straightforwardness of
the leaders. He would be happy so long as he knew that they were loyally

13 Ibid., Minute 8.

14 For the plan as taken to London by Lord Mountbatten see Vol. X, No. 476.

15 For minor amendments made in London see Vol. X, Nos. 485, Item (a) ; and 516, Annex II. See also

No. 13 in this Volume.

16 See No. 45.

46

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

trying to get the Plan accepted. But he had to ask for the preliminary agree¬
ment of the Working Committees to support the Plan.

MR. jinn ah said that he could speak only for himself. He entered into the
spirit of the proposals but he would like the Viceroy to consider that, in order
to give a definite answer, it was necessary to make the people understand. The
Muslim League was a democratic organisation. He and his Working Committee
would have to go before their masters, the people, for a final decision.

his excellency the viceroy said that there were times when leaders
had to make vital decisions without consulting their followers and trust to
carrying them with them at a later stage. In democratic countries, Parliaments
could always disagree with the decisions taken by Prime Ministers and by
Cabinets. A decision taken at the top and afterwards confirmed by the people
would be in accord with democratic processes.

MR. jinnah said that, if a ready-made decision was put before the All-
India Muslim League Council, which he could convene in a week, they would
declare that they had already been committed without having been given an
opportunity to express their views. They would be upset. They would ask why
they had been called. He thought that he would succeed in obtaining their
support, but felt that it was a better way not to pre-determine the issue. He
would do his best. In the meanwhile he would make every effort to see that the
people remained calm and that no disturbances to the peace took place any¬
where. He emphasized that he would go to his masters, the people, with no
intent of wrecking the Plan but with the sincere desire to persuade them to
accept it. He could only give his personal assurance that he would do his best.
He would try in his own way to bring round the people. The Viceroy wanted
him to do it, and he would do his best — in the way which was best for him, in
the manner which would ultimately result in what the Viceroy wanted.

his excellency the viceroy said that he presumed that Congress were
confronted with the same problem as that stated by Mr. Jinnah.

pandit nehru pointed out that he and Sardar Patel had been committing
themselves, step by step, to the present plan and had given their personal
assurances. It had been difficult for them to go ahead as individuals and in their
representative capacities without consulting their colleagues, including the
Congress President. The Congress Working Committee had also considered
the broad outlines of the Plan. He would let the Viceroy know what that
Committee felt of it later that day. The next stage would be a meeting of the
larger body, the all-India Congress Committee. This body might feel hurt that
they had not been consulted earlier. But owing to the peculiar nature of the
case, the leaders themselves had had to make decisions. They had had to take the
responsibility on their own shoulders. The difficulty lay in the circumstances.
He and his colleagues were caught in the tempo of events. The urgency of the
situation made it difficult for them to be vague.

JUNE I947

47

MR. kripalani signified agreement with what Pandit Nehru had said.

pandit nehru said that a letter would be sent in to the Viceroy that
evening giving an account of the Congress Working Committee’s reaction to
the Statement.

MR. jinnah said that he felt unable to report the opinions of the Muslim
League Working Committee in writing. He would, however, come and see the
Viceroy and make a verbal report.

the viceroy said that he would be satisfied with this. He summed up by
thanking the leaders for their loyalty and honesty. He much appreciated the
support which they were all giving him. He understood the difficulties which
Mr. Jinnah had mentioned concerning procedure.

Broadcasts

his excellency the viceroy said that he intended to make a broadcast
over All-India Radio at 7 p.m. the following evening. This would be recorded
in London and relayed by a “hook-up” system all over the world. He said that
he would be most grateful if Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah would follow him
by broadcasting immediately after the Announcement. They might give their
personal assurances of support for the Plan and say that they would use their
best endeavours to ensure a full peaceful acceptance of it by their respective
parties.

MR. jinnah agreed to make such a broadcast, although he said that it would
be difficult for him. pandit nehru also agreed to do so and said that he would
be definite in his broadcast, pandit nehru also made the suggestion that
Sardar Baldev Singh should broadcast, sardar baldev singh at first
demurred. He felt that he would have nothing to say. He could not make up
his mind about support for the Plan until he knew that Congress and the
Muslim League were going to support it. But he eventually agreed to make an
appeal for bloodshed to cease.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was prepared to let the leaders
know what he was going to say in his broadcast the following day.

sardar patel pointed out, with a smile on his face, that the general rule
was for the scripts of broadcast speeches to be submitted to the Honourable
Member for Information and Broadcasting before they were used! mr.
jinnah said that he would say in his broadcast what came from his heart.

It was finally agreed that Pandit Nehru, Mr. Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh
should bring their scripts to the meeting the following day and read them out
there.

48

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

24

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and

Mr Gandhi

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 142

secret 2 June 1947, 12. jo pm

I saw Mr. Gandhi immediately after the first session of the meeting with the
seven Indian Leaders. As this was a Monday, he was observing his day of
silence; and he apparently did not consider the occasion of sufficient impor¬
tance for him to break this rule, so he satisfied himself by handing me the
attached note. The original of this is in my possession; it is written on the back
of five separate old envelopes and will be, I feel, a document of some historic
importance.1

Enclosure to No. 24

I am sorry I can’t speak; when I took the decision about the Monday silence I
did reserve two exceptions, i.e. about speaking to high functionaries on urgent
matters or attending upon sick people. But I know you do not want me to
break my silence. Have I said one word against you during my speeches r If you
admit that I have not, your warning is superfluous.

There are one or two things I must talk about, but not today. If we meet each
other again I shall speak.

Badshah Khan is with me in the Bhangi Colony. He said “Do ask the Viceroy
to remove the Governor. We won’t have peace till he is gone”. I don’t know
whether he is right or wrong. He is truthful. If it can be done decorously, you
should do it.

1 For further accounts of this meeting see Nos. 39 and 91, paras. 14-15.

Mr Rowlatt to Mr Simpson
L/P&Jlioli2j:ff 418-20

SECRET 2 June 1947

My dear Simpson,

I enclose a letter I have written to Wilson Smith, after speaking to Turnbull. It
represents the horrid thoughts that occurred to me when I read the Com-
mander-in-Chief ’s paper1 over the weekend. I feel that I owe you, [as] well as

JUNE 1947

49

Wilson Smith, an apology for butting in like this but, in the circumstances, I am
sure you will forgive me. It would, I think, be a great pity if Wilson Smith
went ahead without being fully aware of the difficulty, to put it mildly, of the
solution propounded by IB (47) 89, 2 if the safeguards proposed are conceived of
as resting on any legal basis.

Yours sincerely,

J.R.

Enclosure to No. 25

SECRET AND PERSONAL 2 June 1$47

Dear Wilson Smith,

Your India Committee.3 You will forgive me for butting in on what is at first
sight not directly my affair but time is short and I am writing to you direct by
arrangement with Turnbull at the India Office who is instructing me about the
expected India Bill. In connection with that Bill I have read, amongst other
things, IB (47) 89 and I see, or think I see, a formidable misunderstanding arising
which it seems to me is not likely to be as obvious to anyone serving on your
committee as it is to me.

16(47)89 began by stating its assumptions, one of which is a common Gover¬
nor-General, but this statement is incomplete. The paper also assumes a com¬
mon Governor-General who can, in some degree, be responsible to H.M.G.
here. I have no doubt that the authors of the paper took it for granted, quite
naturally, that the later assumption flowed from the former. When one is
drafting a Bill about it, it hits one in the eye that it does nothing of the kind but
that, legally speaking, it cuts across the fundamental idea; and, what is more
important, I strongly suspect that for once the legalities of the situation corres¬
pond pretty closely to the realities.

Just think where we are by way of going to. The basic assumption of all is
that, in a few months’ time, there will be two self-governing member States of
the British Commonwealth. It is, of course, perfectly true that they cannot by
then have their affairs completely disentangled and that there will have to be
some kind of joint administration and control of certain matters, if there is not
to be chaos. From this it follows that, if they have any sense, they will for some
time have a common Governor-General with a white face and leave a good
deal to his individual discretion. This, so long as either of them can at any
moment they want demand a separate Governor-General, or demand a com¬
mon Governor-General who is acceptable to both of them and not necessarily
acceptable to His Majesty’s Government is not, in legal theory, inconsistent
with the establishment, in a few months’ time, of “two self-governing member

1 and 2 Vol. X, No. 547.

3 See Vol. X. No. 553, Minute 8.

50

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

States of the British Commonwealth” ; and I had, in fact, provided for it up to a
point in the first draft of my Bill. But when you once say that the common
Governor-General is to do what he is told in any respect from London, the
concept of “self-governing members” which Ministers regard as carrying with
it even if need be the right to secede, is immediately destroyed. In drafting the
Bill, the point hits one in the eye almost in every line. The whole structure of
what I had got was that, after the appointed day, which would take place in a
few months’ time, they could each of them, if they really wanted to, do what
they liked about anything, though, inasmuch as they will not be ready with
their own separate mechanisms, we provide (up to a point) a provisional legal
framework for them to be going on with until they get round to framing
something better. All this goes completely by the board if the Act is going to
force on them a common Governor-General appointed from London on
English advice and responsible to London on one of the most crucial subjects of
all.

Of course in my Bill I can say that it shall be so, because, so far as words go,
one can say anything. I think, however, that I ought to point out that the mere
fact that words to the effect in question are found in my Bill when it is intro¬
duced and when it becomes an Act is extremely unlikely to influence the course
of events in India in that direction. No one, after the great day, will pay the
slightest attention to what Parliament has said, just because Parliament has said
it; indeed, the tendency will be the other way — the fact that Parliament has
said a thing will be prima facie evidence that exactly the opposite ought to
happen. All paper “safeguards” can do is to give grounds for accusations by the
Indians of bad faith on the part of His Majesty’s Government. Of course, if you
could get a real agreement from the Indian leaders, that the position should be
as required by IB (47) 89 (an agreement, that is, which you could be sure they
could and would honour) it would be another matter : we would not have to
say anything in the Bill and my difficulties would not arise. But I allow myself
to say that I suspect, from what I have heard, and from what, using my intelli¬
gence, I can guess, that you would be well-advised not to assume too readily the
possibility of such an agreement.

As I said at the beginning, I hope you will forgive me for writing to you on
this subject, especially as I am aware that the above observations are not
helpful. It is, however, unavoidable that the India Office representatives on
your committee should be persons much more interested in and conversant with
the requirements of the Indian Army than the political side of the picture, and
though everyone knows, of course, the general nature of the dilemma, I am
not sure that the exact location of the point at which the ways part is equally
obvious.

I am sending copies of this letter to Turnbull at the India Office (who is

JUNE 1947

51

instructing me on the Bill) and to Simpson at the India Office who is in charge
of their military department.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN ROWLATT

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Seventh Staff Meeting , Item 2

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi , on 2 June
1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burmay Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville , Mr Abell , Rao Bahadur V.P. Menonf Captain Brockman , Mr I. D.
Scott , Mr Christie , Mr Campbell-Johnson , Sir G. Prior , Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

sir Geoffrey prior said that he had been considering different procedures
whereby the people of British Baluchistan could make their choice whether to
adhere to the existing Constituent Assembly or to join the new one. The
object, as he understood it, was to devise a body which would make the
decision and elect a representative to the Constituent Assembly; and that this
body should be based on a more popular platform. He pointed out that the
Shahi Jirga was to some extent hereditary, although a number of members
owed their position in it to their leadership in their tribes. It might be possible
to get a wider franchise starting at a level just above the village headmen. The
result would be a body similar to the Shahi Jirga but without the hereditary
members of the latter body.

sir Geoffrey prior went on to say that he considered that the issues at
stake should be reduced to writing and sent round to the headmen of the
sub-section [s]. They would then gather together in the agency headquarters
and elect representatives for the Jirga — about ten representatives per agency.
The Jirga would gather at Quetta.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that a solution on
the lines suggested by Sir Geoffrey Prior would probably be acceptable to
Pandit Nehru. He intended to ask Pandit Nehru officially to obtain Sir Geoffrey
Prior’s views after the latter had returned to British Baluchistan. A question
that arose was how either party was to make their appeal. Possibly accredited
representatives of Congress and the Muslim League might visit British Baluchi¬
stan and put their case. Money would play an over-riding part in the decision.
British Baluchistan cost a crore a year. The question arose as to whether Pandit

52

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Nehru would consider it worth while offering such a sum. Sir Geoffrey Prior
should see Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and explain the financial aspect to him.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to keep the question of the procedure in British Baluchi¬
stan under consideration.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/150: ff 185-6

most immediate ne w delhi, 2 June ig47, 5 pm

secret Received: 2 June, 1.50 pm

No. 125 8-S. The meeting with the Indian leaders started at 10 a.m. today and
lasted for two hours. It was all that I could possibly hope for. The full min¬
utes1 will follow by bag.

2. Both Nehru and Jinnah gave me their personal assurances, which were
endorsed by the other members of their respective parties who were present,
that while they could not agree to the plan, they were prepared to do their
utmost to make it work in a practical and peaceful spirit, and, above all, without
bloodshed. They also undertook to do their utmost to persuade their Working
Committees to adopt the same line.

3. They have taken copies of the plan away with them to discuss with their
Working Committees. The Congress Leaders prophesied that their Working
Committee would be in favour of acceptance, and undertook to let me have
their views in writing tonight. Mr Jinnah was rather more difficult on this
point. He said that the Muslim League Working Committee would not be able
to commit themselves to any formal resolution without prior reference to the
All India Muslim League Council. He undertook to convene this Council in a
week’s time. I said that we could not possibly afford a day, much less a week,
and eventually he promised to give me a verbal account of the reactions of his
Working Committee tonight.

4. We shall meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, by which time I shall have had
a few hours to consider the reactions of the Working Committees.

5. I am glad to say that Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh have all agreed to
broadcast after the announcement has been given out, and have allowed me to
announce this in this morning’s communique.

6. I ought to mention how Kripalani and Nishtar came to be present. Nehru
approached me the day before yesterday and urged that Kripalani, as President

JUNE I947

53

of the Congress, should be invited.2 He offered to stand down himself if
necessary. I told him that this was out of the question and asked Jinnah, who was
at the same party, whether he would agree to Kripalani coming as an additional
member. He said that he would do so, provided the Muslim League could also
have a third member and nominated Nishtar.

7. So far so good, but we must remember that in the past difficulties have
often arisen in the second and subsequent rounds.

8. God must be on our side, since Gandhi, who came to see me after the
conference (presumably to implement his declared policy of stopping the
present agreement)3 was afflicted by a day of silence. But he wrote me a friendly
note of personal regard.4

1 No. 23. 2 See Nos. 4 and 91, para. 2. 2 See No. 2, note 5.

4 See No. 24 and its enclosure.

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 63
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2 June I947

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

The attached paper has been redrafted on His Excellency The Viceroy’s
instructions.1

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

Annex I to No. 28

You will see from Paragraph 20 of the Announcement that Parliamentary
legislation setting up two Dominions, in the event of partition, will be intro¬
duced in Parliament during the current session, i.e. about the beginning of
August. The Act will contain a provision enabling the Governor-General to
bring it into operation at any time thereafter. It is my intention that the Act
should be brought into operation at the earliest possible date after its enactment,
in any case not later than 15 th August, 1947.

It is also my intention, as soon as the issue of partition is decided, to call for

1 The previous draft had been circulated as V.C.P. 60 of 1 June 1947 and discussed at the Viceroy’s 3 7th
Staff Meeting on 2 June at 4 pm. The covering note on the earlier draft stated that it had been
prepared by J.P.S.V. (Mr Christie) ‘as a result of discussions over a period of a month’, and that ‘the
general plan contained in this paper is in accordance with an outline scheme discussed and agreed by
P.S.V. in April with the Governor of the Punjab. P.S.V. points out that the latter has exceptional
knowledge of central and provincial administration’.

54

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the resignation of my colleagues in order that prospective leaders of the new
Government or Governments may be free without embarrassment to select
their colleagues. Meanwhile the Members of the present Executive Council
will, I hope, continue on the present basis as a Caretaker Government.

If we are to move according to this programme, we must move quickly, and
vital decisions must be taken in a very short time. The task ahead is formidable,
as is shown by the paper attached, which I have decided to circulate to my
colleagues for discussion at the next meeting of Cabinet.

Annex II to No. 28

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

I. This paper is written on the assumption that the decision will be in favour of
partition, including the partition of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam.

2. Before partition can be fully effective, decision, by agreement or if
necessary by arbitration, will have to be reached on the following matters : —

(i) Final demarcation of boundaries.2

(ii) Division of the formations, units and personnel of the Indian Armed
Forces.

(iii) Division of the staff , organisations and records oj Central Civil Departments ,
services and institutions , including , Railways, Posts and Telegraphs,
Broadcasting, Civil Aviation, Meteorology, Public Works, Income
Tax, Customs, Central Excise, Accounts and Audit, Scientific services,
Central Waterways and Inland Navigation Board and Central Power
Board.

(iv) Division of the assets and liabilities of the Government of India including
fixed installations and stores of the Defence Services, assets and pro¬
perty of the departments, services and institutions listed in (iii) above,
public debt funded and unfunded, Pensions, Provident funds etc.

(v) Division of Assets and Liabilities of the Reserve Bank including Currency,
Rupee securities, bullion and foreign exchange.

(vi) Economic Relations including freedom of trade and commerce, dis¬
tribution of food resources, use of port and railway facilities.

(vii) Jurisdiction of the High Courts and Federal Courts.

(viii) Determination of Domicile.

(ix) Diplomatic representation abroad.

3 . Similar decisions will be necessary as between parts of Provinces.

4. A ‘carry-on’ agreement will be necessary, as a first step, between the main
political parties, because it is clearly impossible to reach final agreement on all
these complicated matters before the transfer of power, and also because it is
necessary to preserve the continuity of administration. In respect of certain

JUNE 1947

55

essential subjects such as boundaries, the armed forces, administrative organisa¬
tion and staff, and finances, decisions must be reached before the date of trans¬
fer of power, for without decisions on these points the separate governments
will not be able to function.

In the course of examination of the subjects it should become possible to
determine more closely their relative degree of urgency, and the action which
may be desirable or essential by way of either interim adjustments or fmal
decisions, before the transfer of power.

5. The next step would be to set up machinery for examining the problems
involved and making recommendations, for co-ordinating and progressing this
process, and for deciding the terms of the agreements on each subject which will
be submitted for the ratification of the successor Governments.

It is suggested that such machinery should be under the control of an Inter-
Party Partition Committee , consisting of two members of the Congress, two of
the Muslim League and one minority representative, all from the present
Interim Government. This Committee will effectively represent the successor
authorities. It will be under the Chairmanship of the Governor General.

The machinery will consist of

(a) an Executive organisation, in the form of a Partition office or Steering
Committee, and

(b) Expert official committees.

The machinery should be such that the work relating to partition is kept
separate as far as possible, from the current administrative work of Government,
and that it should proceed without obstruction or delay. In view of the urgency
it should be recognised that the requirements of work relating to partition
should have absolute priority over those of the current administrative work of
Government.

The functions of the Partition Committee, and the functions and composition
of the Partition Office and Expert Committees are examined in more detail
below.

6. The functions of the Partition Committee will be to decide what adminis¬
trative measures and adjustments, final or intermediate, are necessary to make
fully effective the division of India into more than one sovereign state, and to
prepare agreements for the ratification of the successor Governments. It will
also decide all questions of policy and procedure relevant to its function.

The Partition Committee will appoint the Partition Office (Steering Com¬
mittee), [and] the Expert Committees (except the Committee for the Armed
Forces, vide (8) ii below). It will frame the terms of reference for these com¬
mittees, prescribe procedure, and fix dates by which reports must be sub¬
mitted.

2 Words italicized here are underlined in the original.

56

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

In case an agreed decision cannot be reached by this Committee, the Gover¬
nor-General will be empowered to give a final decision, if he thinks fit.

7. The Partition Office or Steering Committee.

This will have a function of extreme importance and must be composed of
men of undoubted ability, integrity and impartiality. It will direct and co¬
ordinate the work of the Expert Committees, and submit reports and recom¬
mendations in a form that will facilitate quick decisions by the Partition Com¬
mittee.

So long as it remains in being, it will also supervise the implementation of
decisions reached.

It will also be prepared to assist Provincial Committees with information and
advice if required.

The head of this organisation should have considerable latitude in the conduct
of his business and the choice of his staff. Quick results will require flexibility
and improvisation.

8. The Expert Committees.

(i) Demarcation of Boundaries.

The question of boundary delimitation may arise in the Punjab, Bengal
and Assam. Under the terms of Paragraph 9 of the Announcement,
Boundary Commissions will be set up by the Governor General, but he
will consult the Partition Committee about the membership and terms
of reference of the commissions.

(ii) Defence Committee for the division of the Indian Armed Forces.

This Committee will be set up by the Commander-in-Chief with as
many sub-committees as may be necessary and will report direct to the
Partition Committee. It should, however, keep the Partition office
(Steering Committee) in close touch with the progress of its work, and
should be directly associated with the Finance Committee dealing with
the division of installations and stores of the Defence Services. (See

(iii)(c) below).

(iii) Expert Committees.

Expert official committees will be set up to make recommendations on
the subjects enumerated below\ The terms of reference suggested are
provisional and intended only to indicate the scope of the respective
enquiries.

These Expert Committees will not be subject to the authority of the Depart¬
ments with which they are associated, but of the Partition office (Steering
Committee).

(a) Staff & Organisation , Records & Documents.

A committee empowered to call for information from all Departments of the
Central Government and the Central Board of Revenue, or alternatively a

JUNE I947

57

series of committees associated with the several Departments, should report to
the Partition office, by a given date, on the following terms of reference: —

(i) the basis on which existing staff should be divided;

(ii) the actual division of staff;

(iii) duplicate organisation of offices and departments;

(iv) requirements of buildings, furniture, stationery;

(v) separation or duplication of records and documents, international
agreements, etc.

(b) Railways , Communications & Miscellaneous Central Services & Institutions.

In the case of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Aviation, Meteorology
and other Central Services and Institutions, the terms of reference will in¬
clude : —

(vi) division of the administrative organisation of the services passing
through or situated in the divided territories.

(c) Assets and Liabilities.

A Finance Committee will deal with the division of the assets and liabilities of
the Government of India and of the Reserve Bank. It is essential that this
committee should include in its scope the Armed Forces as well as the Civil
departments, so that it may obtain a fully integrated picture of all assets and
liabilities. Where information is not available in the Finance Department, the
committee should be empowered to obtain the information from the depart¬
ments concerned.

The terms of reference of this committee should include : —

(i) the division, final or provisional, of Treasury and Bank balances;

(ii) the arrangements for the collection and distribution of Customs and
Income Tax and other items of revenue which are now central;

(iii) to ascertain the note issue liabilities of the two new Governments ;

(iv) facilities for transfer of funds from one area to another ;

(v) the effect of partition on exchange control;

(vi) currency arrangements for a smooth transition;

(vii) the basis for division of assets and liabilities ;

(viii) the enumeration and assessment of assets and liabilities ;

(ix) responsibility of each area for the public debt held by its nationals ;

(x) the nature of the financial settlements between respective govern¬
ments.

(d) Economic Relations.

An Economic Relations Committee associated with the appropriate Depart¬
ments should be set up to make recommendations on: —

(i) matters relating to freedom of trade and movement between the
territories of the new governments ;

(ii) effect of partition on the administration of existing controls, and alterna¬
tive arrangements necessary;

58

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(iii) the pooling and distribution of food resources, and other commodities
in short supply;

(iv) the sharing of port and railway facilities.

(e) Jurisdiction oj the High Courts & Federal Courts.

The Chief Justice of India should be invited to examine the effect of partition
on the jurisdiction of the High Courts and Federal Courts, and to make
recommendations.

(f) Domicile.

A special committee associated with the Home Department should examine the
effect of partition on the question of domicile and nationality.

(g) Foreign Relations.

A committee, associated with External Affairs Department and Common¬
wealth Relations Department, should make recommendations regarding the
effect of partition on diplomatic representation in foreign countries, and the
position of Indian nationals in Commonwealth countries.

9. As regards the partition of Provinces, the problems which would arise
would be in connection with : —

(1) delimitation of boundaries ;

(2) division of administrative and judicial services;

(3) division of financial assets and liabilities;

(4) division of material assets, e.g., buildings, food stocks, irrigation;

(5) jurisdiction of High Courts;

(6) Public Service Commissions;

(7) Educational, Medical, Research and Training Institutions.

As in the case of the Central Government, a ‘carry-on’ agreement would be
necessary.

Items (1) and (5) above would be covered by the action proposed above to be
taken by the Central Government. For the other matters, committees would
have to be appointed, probably by the Governor, who would stand in the
same relation to a Joint Committee representing the two parts of the Province,
as the Governor-General to the proposed Cabinet Committee.

10. The decision of Council is required on the setting-up of a Partition
Committee with the composition, functions and powers proposed in Para¬
graphs 5 and 6 above.

JUNE I947

59

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , jR/3/1/150:/ 198

most immediate 2 June 1947, 4.41 pm

secret Received: 2 June , 10.13 pm

PERSONAL

No. 7105. We have been discussing with Ranee reactions of proposed Indian
announcement on Burma. We have asked him to see Aung San after your final
meeting with British Indian leaders but before any announcement is made and
to give him general outline. We are informing him that your second meeting
with leaders will be at 10 a.m. on 3rd June and that you propose at 7 p.m. 1ST
to broadcast over All India Radio. We assume you will have concluded your
discussions with British Indian leaders by say 1 p.m. 1ST on Tuesday 3rd June
and can at once let Ranee know that you have done so and their outcome. I
suggest that you arrange a code word direct with him for this purpose and that
if there is a telephone to Rangoon you also telephone a message. It is essential
that before any public announcement is made he should see Aung San and
should have time for conversation with him. If your discussions are concluded
by say 1 p.m. it would be possible we assume to let Ranee know this by say
2 p.m. 1ST. He would then have up to 7 p.m. 1ST for his talk with Aung San.

We would be grateful if Ranee in any event would make a provisional date
with Aung San for say 3.30 or 4 p.m. 1ST on 3rd June without at this stage
disclosing what conversation is to be about.1

Addressed Viceroy repeated Government of Burma No. 1255.

1 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 1278-S of 3 June, drawing attention to No. 38 which had been
repeated to Sir H. Ranee, and promising to try to get information of any further developments that
day to him in time. He added that he had ‘kept in personal touch with Ranee during negotiations’.
R/3/1/150: f 229.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/PO^I 124: ff 4-3

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2 June 1947 , 4.30 pm

private Received: 3 June , 10.13 pm

66. Your 1249-S.1 Many thanks for making the omission from your broadcast.
The record is being corrected by the B.B.C. accordingly.

1 No. 19.

6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Quite apart from technical difficulties, I feel that it would be preferable not to
make the two insertions you propose. We do not feel sure that Gandhi would
unreservedly accept either proposition and experience in the past suggests that
it is dangerous to attribute opinions to him. It seems that Gandhi is at logger-
heads with the Working Committee at the moment and it may be that any¬
thing you achieve will be the result of the Working Committee rejecting
Gandhi's opinions. If that is the position, your references to him may give
Gandhi a platform for some public reply which will embarrass the Congress
leaders and may even endanger2 the stability of any settlement. I have consulted
the Prime Minister, who concurs. Please let me know whether you agree.3

2 ‘endanger’ deciphered as ‘harden’.

3 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed agreement in tel. 314-GT of 3 June. R/3/1/150: f 230.

31

Cabinet Committee Gen. i86jist Meeting
Future of the India and Burma Offices
MSS. EUR. D. 714/81

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 2 June 1947 at
5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison , Mr Ernest Benin , Mr
Hugh Dalton, Viscount Addison, Mr A. Creech Jones, the Earl of Lis towel, Sir E.
Bridges, Mr M. E. Dening; Mr W. S. Murrie, Mr S. E. V. Luke ( Secretariat )

The Meeting had before them a memorandum1 by an Official Committee
about the arrangements to be made for handling the relations of His Majesty’s
Government with India and Burma after their attainment of independence,
whether within or without the Commonwealth.

The memorandum pointed out that public opinion in those countries would
not accept any solution under which this responsibility would continue to
rest with the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for Burma.
The Official Committee had considered tentatively a suggestion that, as a
transitional measure, a new Secretary of State should be appointed to handle the
relations of His Majesty’s Government with India and a group of adjoining
countries, selected on a geographical basis irrespective of their exact constitu¬
tional status. It was thought, however, that such an arrangement would be
viewed with suspicion by the peoples of India and Burma, and the alternative
favoured by the Committee was that there should be a Secretary of State
charged with responsibility for Commonwealth Relations, to whom would be
assigned not only the duties at present entrusted to the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, but also the affairs of Ceylon, Burma and India, if those

JUNE I947

6l

countries, on attaining independence, desired to retain a link with the Com¬
monwealth. Even if Ceylon was the only one of these countries to wish to
preserve some form of association with the Commonwealth, there would still
be good grounds for the establishment of a new office on those lines as a tangible
proof of the sincerity of our policy of promoting gradual evolution towards
self-government and independence. The Official Committee had also reached
the conclusion that if the whole of India elected for independence outside the
Commonwealth, with the result that the Foreign Secretary had to handle our
relations with India, the volume of work involved would be such as to call for
the establishment of a special sub-department of the Foreign Office under the
charge of a Minister with the standing of the Minister of State. If, however, the
Foreign Secretary had to handle our relations with a part of India only, it might
be possible to arrange that many of the quasi-administrative problems arising
from the termination of British rule in India should be handled, for the whole of
India, by the organisation under the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations which was handling our relations with that part of India which re¬
tained an association with the Commonwealth.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS Said that he Was in
general agreement with the conclusions of the Official Committee. If, however,
a change on the lines proposed was to be made, it would be most desirable to
consult the Governments of the existing Dominions at an early stage. In par¬
ticular, he hoped that the creation of a new Commonwealth Relations Office
would not be conspicuously associated with the grant of Dominion status to
the successor States in India, since this would inevitably prejudice Dominion
Governments against the idea from the outset. It would be far more acceptable
to Dominion opinion if we were able to represent this as a proposal which had
originated quite separately from the development of the Indian situation.

the foreign secretary said that it would be most inadvisable to make
public any proposals for a change in the existing arrangements until firm
decisions had been reached about the future of India. A voluntary decision by
the successor States in India to accept Dominion status would undoubtedly have
a great effect on public opinion both in the Dominions and throughout the
world, and the proposal for the establishment of a Commonwealth Relations
Office would obviously have a more sympathetic reception against that back¬
ground. Such a development would also render easier the task of counteracting
the propaganda campaign which the Russians would no doubt at once launch
in response to any change in the existing system of Commonwealth relations.
Fie therefore thought that it would be inadvisable at this stage to consult the
Dominion Governments; there would, however, be no objection to acceptance
of the Committee’s report as a basis for planning purposes. As regards the

Dated 20 May 1947. Mss. Eur. D. 714/81

62

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

internal composition of the proposed Commonwealth Relations Office, it
might possibly be found advisable to create three distinct sections reponsible
respectively for our relations with the existing Dominions; with the Asiatic
territories (India, Burma and Ceylon) now approaching a position of inde¬
pendence within the Commonwealth ; and with certain Colonial territories in
the Middle East and Far East which would be in close political, economic and
defence relationship with the countries in the second group.

the secretary of state for India said that it seemed likely that the
Indian political leaders would agree to accept Dominion status as an interim
arrangement. They disliked, however, the title “Dominion” and would cer¬
tainly greatly prefer to have dealings with a Commonwealth Relations Office.
The establishment of such an Office might therefore influence them to remain
permanently in the Commonwealth.

Other points made in discussion were : —

(a) It had hitherto been the practice for major proposals affecting Common¬
wealth relations to be discussed in the first instance at a Commonwealth
Conference. Would it not be preferable to hold this question over for
such a Conference?

As against this, it was noted that at present there would be an initial
difficulty in deciding which members of the Commonwealth should be
invited to take part in such a Conference. Moreover, discussion of the
proposal by a Commonwealth Conference would invite attempts at a
more precise definition of the Commonwealth relationship from which
no advantage could be expected. Apart from this, the summoning of a
Commonwealth Conference would involve extensive discussions on such
matters as defence for which we were not at present ready.

(b) There were indications that the Dominion Governments were in¬
creasingly inclined to feel that the title “Dominion” implied some degree
of subordination, and that they would wish to discuss at some suitable
opportunity the possibility of an alternative title. For the same reason, the
possibility of a change in the Royal Title would no doubt also be raised ;
indeed, the Canadian Government had already made it clear, in a state¬
ment in the Canadian Parliament, that this question would be raised at a
suitable opportunity.

(c) In discussion with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the ques¬
tion of the precedence accorded to Dominion High Commissioners had
also been raised. Dominion Governments were very critical of the
existing arrangements under which their High Commissioners were
accorded precedence below the representative of the smallest foreign
State. Proposals had been made that the Dominion High Commis¬
sioners should be given the title of Ambassador; this, however, was open
to the objection that the latter title implied representation of a foreign

JUNE I947

63

country. It would clearly be necessary to consider sympathetically how to
meet the Dominion wishes in this matter.

(d) There was general agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 6 of
the Official Committee’s report that it would not be feasible to create a
department for the special purpose of handling the relations of His
Majesty’s Government with India and a group of adjoining countries.

The general opinion of the Meeting was that the Official Committee’s
report should be accepted as a basis for planning and that a detailed scheme
should now be worked out on the lines proposed by the Committee. The
matter would have to be further considered in the light of the decisions reached
in regard to the transfer of power in India; and at that stage the question of
consultation with Dominion Governments could be taken up.

JL.

The Meeting : —

(1) Agreed that the report of the Official Committee on the future of the
India Office and the Burma Office should be accepted as a basis for
planning purposes.

(2) Invited Sir Edward Bridges to arrange for the preparation of a detailed
scheme for the establishment of a Commonwealth Relations Office on
the lines suggested in the Committee’s report.

32

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee LB. {47) 29th Meeting , Minutes 4-3

L/POI6/121 : ff 44, 47

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 2 June 1947 at
9 pm were: Mr Attlee {in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander, Viscount
Addison, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley, Mr A.
Henderson, Lord Chorley

Also present were: SirE. Bridges, Sir G. Laithwaite, Sir D. Monteath; Mr S. E. V.
Luke, Mr G. M. Wilson, Mr A. F. Morley {Secretariat)

[Minutes 1-3, regarding Burma, omitted.]

Minute 4

Transfer of Power in India

(Previous Reference: I.B. (47)28^ Meeting, Minute i)1
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for

1 Vol. X, No. 553.

64

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

India (I.B.(47)95)2 covering the text of the announcement to be made in
Parliament on 3rd June on the arrangements for the transfer of power in
India. They also had before them telegram No. 1258-S of 2nd June3 from the
Viceroy reporting on his meeting with the Indian leaders that morning. In this
telegram the Viceroy pointed out that, so far, the position was very satisfactory
and that the Indian leaders had agreed to broadcast after the statement was made
public.

The Committee:

Took note of the position as set out in the memorandum by the Secretary
of State for India (13.(47)95), and the Viceroy's telegram No. 1258-S.

Minute 5

Broadcast by the Prime Minister

the prime minister handed to the members of the Committee a draft of the
broadcast which he proposed to make on 3rd June, immediately before the
broadcast of the Viceroy’s speech.

After discussion, the text of the proposed broadcast was agreed as follows :
[For text of broadcast: see No. 57

2 Not printed; it noted amendments to the proposed announcement made in recent telegrams (see No.
13 and notes thereto) and circulated a revised text incorporating them. L/P&J/10/80: ff 33-48. For
announcement as issued see No. 45.

3 No. 27.

Sir F. Burrows (Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal, Partition of, Part 11(a)

immediate 2 June 1947, 10.50 pm

secret Received: 3 June, 9.30 am

No. 142-S. Your telegram No. 123 7-S of June 1st1 paragraph 3. 1 do not want
to go into Section 93 at all if it can be avoided but in interests of maintaining
order I might be forced into Section 93 position for a short time at all events by
difficulty which I foresee in securing obviously ideal arrangement to manage
partition viz. a Coalition Ministry. As soon as it becomes clear that partition of
Bengal is probable I should expect that the Suhrawardy Ministry will resign
either of its own volition or by Jinnah’s order and in that case I may fmd it
impossible to get Muslim League here to participate in a Coalition. I should
then have to contemplate relying on a Minority Ministry and I should not wish
to do this till after meeting of Legislative Assembly likely to be called in

JUNE I947

65

pursuance of paragraph 7 of today’s state paper,2 as it is not free from doubt
whether meeting would be one at which a vote of no confidence could be
moved (vide my immediately succeeding telegram No. 143-C).3 1 might there¬
fore have to go into Section 93 for a short time almost straight away.

2. As I see it, probable course of action would be as follows : I postulate that
I can only retain a Ministry that will agree to work H.M.G.’s plan of today and
that a Coalition is the ideal to aim at if that plan admits of possibility of parti¬
tion of Bengal.

3. ( a ) If League acquiesces in the scheme offering possibility of partition,
Suhrawardy should be asked at once to form Coalition Ministry to work
scheme out from start in atmosphere of impartiality.

(b) If he fails to form Coalition in reasonable time he must be asked to resign
and if he refuses he must be dismissed. In either alternative Kiran Shankar Roy
must be invited to form a Ministry with Muslim representatives if possible but
otherwise without.

4. If League refuses to work plan involving the possibility of partition
Suhrawardy should be asked to resign and if he refuses he must be dismissed
and Roy must be asked to form a Ministry.

5. If under paragraph 3 (b) or 4 above Roy is invited but fails to form a
Ministry I should have to go into Section 93 for so long as deadlock lasted.

6. Your paragraph No. 5. I regard it as now too late to declare Calcutta a
free City or a City under Joint Control even for some interim period as such a
course if adopted now, instead of avoiding bloodshed, would almost certainly
precipitate it.

1 No. 18. 3 i.e. No. 45.

3 This telegram discussed the question whether a meeting of the Bengal Legislative Assembly sum¬
moned for the limited and extra-constitutional purpose of electing representatives to a Constituent

Assembly, and not including its European members, should be regarded as a formal summoning of

the Bengal Legislative Assembly as such.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &Jlio/8o: f 29

most immediate India office, 2 June 1947* 10.50 pm

Received: j June , 4.30 am

7132. As question is certain to be asked P.M. and I are anxious to forestall it by
prefacing our reading of statement in either House by saying that plan has

66

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

agreement of parties. At present we have para. 2 of your 125 81 which is very
useful as far as it goes but we should like to know from you after your morning
meeting Tuesday what we can say as to Working Committees also having
accepted plan and about their co-operation in working it successfully and their
attitude to decision to transfer power on Dominion basis.

1 No. 27.

35

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 64
LlP&Jlio/8i: ff 396-400

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY^ HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J June 1947

CONGRESS REACTIONS TO H.M.G.’s STATEMENT

Attached is the letter received by The Viceroy from the Congress President at
0015 hours on 3rd June, 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

6 JANTARMANTAR ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2 June 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

The Congress Working Committee have considered the statement which
H.M.G. propose to make tomorrow1 and a copy of which you were good
enough to give me this morning.2

2. The proposals contained in this statement are of far reaching importance
and affect the whole future of India. These envisage the possibility of certain
parts of India seceding from the rest.

3. As you know, the Congress has consistently upheld that the unity of
India should be maintained. Ever since its inception, the Congress has worked
towards the realisation of a free and united India. Any proposal, therefore,
which might bring about separation of a part of India from the rest is painful
to contemplate and, in the opinion of the Congress, is harmful to all the parties
concerned. Such a proposal would normally have to be considered by the
All-India Congress Committee. The Working Committee would make its
recommendations to that Committee, but the final decision would rest with the
All-India Congress Committee, or the full session of the Congress itself.

4. We have realised, however, that in the peculiar and abnormal situation of
today it is not possible to delay matters and decisions have to be reached rapidly.
There has been far too much uncertainty in the country and this has led to

JUNE 1947

67

instability and to violence on a large scale. We have also appreciated that the
negotiations that have been going on for some time between you and Indian
leaders had of necessity to be secret.

5. My Committee considered the principles underlying the present pro¬
posals about a month ago and generally accepted them. This acceptance was
conveyed to you in paragraph 12 of the letter dated 1st May 19473 which Shri
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to you.

6. As we have stated on many occasions, we accepted in its entirety the
Cabinet Mission’s Statement of 16th May 1946 as well as the subsequent
interpretation thereof dated 6th December 1946. We have indeed been acting
in accordance with it and the Constituent Assembly which was formed in
terms of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan has been functioning for nearly six months.
W e are still prepared to adhere to that Plan. In view, however, of subsequent
events and the situation today, we are willing to accept as a variation of that
Plan the proposals now being made.

7. I do not wish to enter into any detailed examination of the proposed
statement of H.M.G. It has been produced after considerable consultation and I
am desired to say by my Committee that we are prepared to accept it and to
recommend to the All-India Congress Committee to do likewise. We do so in
the earnest hope that this will mean a settlement. We feel that the situation in
India, political and economic, as well as communal, demands more than ever a
peaceful approach to all our problems. These problems cannot be solved by
methods of violence, and there can be no submission to such methods.

8. While we are willing to accept the proposals made by H.M.G. , my Com¬
mittee desire to emphasize that they are doing so in order to achieve a final
settlement. This is dependent on the acceptance of the proposals by the Muslim
League and a clear understanding that no further claims will be put forward.
There has been enough misunderstanding in the past and in order to avoid this
in the future it is necessary to have explicit statements in writing in regard to
these proposals.

9. We believe as fully as ever in a united India. The unity we aim at is not
that of compulsion but of friendship and cooperation. We earnestly trust that
when present passions have subsided our problems will be viewed in their
proper perspective and a willing union of all parts of India will result there¬
from.

10. There are some matters, however, to which I should like to draw your
attention. My Committee realise that the proposals being put forward may
result in injury to the Sikhs unless great care is taken and their peculiar position

1 No. 45. 2 See No. 23. 3 Vol. X, No. 267.

68

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in the Punjab is fully appreciated. We are aware that HMG and you are anxious
to protect all legitimate Sikh interests. The matter will have to be considered by
the Boundary Commission provided for and we earnestly trust that all other
factors, apart from population, will be taken fully into consideration. The
Sikhs have played a vital role in developing a considerable part of the Punjab.
They have been pioneers in the canal areas and have converted by their labours
the desert into the richest part of the Punjab. It has been made clear in the
document that the notional partition is of a purely temporary character and the
final boundaries will be determined by the Boundary Commission.

11. In the last sentence of paragraph 9 it is stated that “until the report of the
Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundary as
indicated in the appendix will be used”. It is not quite clear to what this refers
and what the use will be. It is well-known that the notional division ignores
other important factors and that the Sikhs are distressed by it. If any further use
is made of this notional division for administrative or other purposes, this will
inevitably affect the final division and will give rise to a great deal of appre¬
hension in the minds of the Sikhs. We would, therefore, urge you not to apply
that notional division for any administrative purpose during the interim
period. This would be in keeping with the spirit of the document and with
what you conveyed to us this morning.

12. In paragraph 11 of the Statement reference is made to a referendum in
the N.W.F. Province. There has been a growing demand in the Province for
independence and subsequent decision as to their relation with the rest of
India. The referendum should also provide for this.

13. In paragraph 20 of the Statement, which we are told is an addition to the
original draft, the last sentence refers to the right of the Constituent Assemblies
to decide in due course whether or not India or any part of it will remain
within the British Commonwealth. It seems to us extremely undesirable and
likely to lead to friction if the relations of Britain with the Indian Union and the
seceding parts of it are on a differential basis. We should, therefore, like to make
it clear that we cannot be consenting parties to any such development.

14. In view of the importance of the proposals and decisions being made, my
Committee intend to convene a meeting of the All-India Congress Com¬
mittee at an early date. They propose to recommend the acceptance generally
of the Statement of H.M.G. as a settlement of our political and communal
problems.

Yours sincerely,

J. B. KRIPALANI

JUNE 1947

69

36

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 63
L/P&Jlio/8i: ff 386-8

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J June 1^47

SIKHS ’ REACTIONS TO H.M.G.’s STATEMENT

Attached is a letter received by The Viceroy from the Sikh Leaders on the
morning of 3rd June, 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

SECRET I BHAGWAN DAS ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2 June 1Q47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have discussed with Sikh leaders the Statement which H.M.G. propose to
make tomorrow,1 a copy of which you were good enough to give me at this
morning’s Conference.2

The proposals in the Statement are of far-reaching character, envisaging the
possibility of a division of India into two sovereign States in both of which the
Sikhs will have vital stakes. As you know, we as a community have always
stood for a United India and all we have desired is that our particular interests
should be adequately safeguarded. The plan now made implies that a sub¬
stantial part of our community may go to the Muslim dominated area, where a
sovereign State based ostensibly on Islamic principles is likely to be established
as conceived by the spokesman of the Muslim League. The Sikhs have been
unable to obtain any coherent and acceptable guarantee of their security in such
a set-up and are therefore unable to contemplate being forced into it against
their will. I have made this clear to you. Recent happenings in the Western
Punjab have further proved that we can expect no security whatever under
Muslim domination.

You will therefore appreciate the anxiety of my community and their
demand that in the event of the division of India as contemplated, the plan
must be so devised as to ensure that Sikhs as a community are not subjected to
irreparable injury.

I must say that judged by this simple test the plan as it stands is far from
satisfactory. My Sikh friends and I, however, do appreciate that the principle
of the partition of the Punjab has been accepted and the anxiety you have
expressed to help the community. There are certain matters in this connection
which I consider it my duty to bring to your notice. These are: —

(i) In para 9, the last sentence of which reads: “Until the report of a

1 No. 45.

2 See No. 23.

70

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boun¬
daries indicated in the appendix will be used” it is not clear what this
refers to and in what respects this boundary is to be used. In this con¬
nection you will remember that in my previous letters, I have insisted
that nothing should be done to prejudice our case before the Boundary
Commission. My fear was that the proposed notional division would
prejudice the final partition of the Province. I now see it has been made
clear that the notional division is purely a temporary arrangement. If,
however, it is used for setting up of Interim Ministries it will embitter
communal relations and prove highly injurious to us, as I have already
explained. Such interim Ministries functioning at the time when the
Boundary Commission is also making its enquiries will make a fair
examination of our case impossible. It is imperative therefore that till
such time as the Boundary Commission has finished its work, no
Interim Ministries in either part of the Punjab should be formed. If,
however, it is considered expedient to form Interim Ministries, the
Eastern Punjab should have in addition to the Divisions of Ambala and
Jullundur, the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore in the
Lahore Division.

(ii) The plan suggests that the Boundary Commission will take “other
factors” into consideration when making its enquiries. This is far too
vague. It should be made clear that these other factors include exchange
of population with property and the basis of land revenue paid by
non-Muslims. Special note should also be taken of the religious and
cultural institutions of the Sikhs and the historic role played by them in
the Punjab.

(iii) As the partition of the Province has been necessitated to meet the Sikh
demand clear instructions should be given to the Boundary Commission
to ensure that as large a percentage of Sikh population as possible is
included in the Eastern Punjab.

I should like to bring to your notice that though assurances have been given
to us that we shall have equal rights with the two other major communities
for the safeguard of our communal rights and privileges, nothing tangible has
so far been done to give effect to these assurances. Our community is now in
danger of being riven in two. We have so far not been assured equal rights with
others in either the existing or the proposed new Constituent Assembly. We
request you to see that this is done.

You mentioned during the Conference that in the interests of India, the
Cabinet Delegation Plan of May 16, 1946, was still the best solution. You know
the conditions on which the Sikhs provisionally accepted the Plan and joined
the Constituent Assembly. If the major parties now revert to this Plan, the
Sikhs will be prepared to accept it only if they are given the same right in

JUNE I947

71

communal matters as has been accorded to the other two major communities.

Finally, my Sikh friends and I accept the principle of division as laid down in
the plan with the hope that in order to make it fully acceptable to my com¬
munity, care will be taken to meet the views expressed in this letter when
framing the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission.

Assuring you of my endeavour to help you in solving the difficult problems,
I remain

Yours sincerely,

BALDEV SINGH

37

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Rfe/ 1/150: f 209

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, io am

confidential Received : 5 June, 9.10 am

No. 1276-S. Your telegram 7132 of 2nd June.1

2. Reactions of parties are given in my immediately succeeding telegram.
Suggest formula for use of [?in] Parliament should be that Plan, including
offer of Dominion Status, has been favourably received by all three parties.

1 No. 34.

38

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/ 1/150: fj 227-8

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 10 am

secret Received: 3 June, 10.50 am

No. 1227-S. Jinnah saw me for an hour from 11 last night, and I had letters
during the night from the Congress and the Sikhs. All three naturally empha¬
sised points which they did not like, but their conclusions were generally
favourable.

2. In a long letter from Kripalani the operative paragraph reads as follows :

[There J olio ws the text of No. 35, para. 7]

3 . Baldev Singh finishes up :

[There follows the text of the penultimate para, of No. 36 \

72

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. Jinnah1 reiterated that he would support me personally and promised to
do his utmost to get the plan accepted. He said his Working Committee were
hopeful that the plan would be accepted by the All-India Muslim League
Council, which meets next Monday, but constitutionally they could not reply
now 011 behalf of the Council.

5. Dominion Status

Jinnah’ s delight was unconcealed. Congress included in their letter the fol¬
lowing point, which I hope to resolve this morning :

[There follows the text of No. 33, para. if\

Repeated to Governors and Governor of Burma.

1 For further accounts of this interview with Mr Jinnah see Nos. 39, 2nd para., 53, para. 6, and 91,
paras. 18-19.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian Leaders , Second Day

HP &J/i oj$i : ff 379-85

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting1 held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 3 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville ; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
(< Secretariat )

His Majesty’s Government’s Statement

his excellency the viceroy handed round copies of an amendment,2
which had been suggested by the Secretary of State for clarification purposes,
to Paragraph 20 of the Statement. There was unanimous agreement with this
amendment.3

Reactions of Working Committees

the viceroy said that he had been very happy and much relieved on receiving
the reports from the party leaders of the reactions of their Committees to the
Statement. Mr. Jinnah had come to see him at 11 o’clock the previous night and
stayed until midnight.4 They had had a long and frank talk, at which Lord
Ismay had also been present; and Mr. Jinnah had explained, to his (The Vice¬
roy’s) satisfaction, the procedure which the Muslim League invariably adopted
on occasions such as the present one — namely that the Working Committee

JUNE I947

73

would meet the All-India Muslim League Council without any formal written
resolution, but with the line which they intended to take clear in their minds.
Mr. Jinnah had given him a personal assurance that he would do all in his
power to persuade the All-India Muslim League Council to accept the Plan as a
settlement in its entirety. Mr. Jinnah had also undertaken to broadcast a per¬
sonal appeal that the Plan should go forward peacefully. The All-India Muslim
League Council was being convened as a matter of urgency for Monday, 9th
June, and would be able to give its formal answer on Tuesday, 10th June.

He hoped that all present at the meeting would agree with him that he had
been right in making up his mind to accept this procedure. He had only done so
after considerable thought and he trusted that everybody would have faith in
him to see the matter through.

his excellency went on to say that Mr. Kripalani, on behalf of Congress,
had written him a letter5 saying that the Congress Working Committee were
prepared to accept the Plan and to recommend to the All-India Congress
Committee to do likewise, mr. kripalani stated that the All-India Congress
Committee would meet in a fortnight’s time, the viceroy stated that Sardar
Baldev Singh had also, in a letter,6 expressed acceptance of the principle of
division as laid down in the Plan.

theviceroy added that all three parties had raised a number of points in the
Plan with which they felt that they could not be in complete agreement. This
was only natural, since had it been otherwise, the present negotiations would
have been unnecessary. A particular point was the Sikh request concerning the
terms of reference of the Boundary Commission. It was not possible to include
details of this kind in the Announcement, but clearly the terms of reference to
the Boundary Commissions would be drawn up in co-operation with all
parties. Everyone would agree that there was a great danger of using
the notional partition of Provinces in such a way as would lead to the supposi¬
tion that it was final. This danger would apply to both sides. It would be
misleading to the inhabitants. He therefore accepted the principle of trying to
avoid using the notional partition, except for voting purposes, and intended to
ask the Governors concerned to work out means of giving the right impres¬
sion.

his excellency said that another question which would arise would be
how to carry on the Government of the Provinces which might be partitioned.
In his opinion it would be best to form Coalition Governments in each. He was

1 See also Nos. 53, paras. 1-5 and 91, paras. 22-23, for Lord Mountbatten’s interview with Pandit

Nehru immediately before this Meeting.

2 See No. 13, note 2.

3 Lord Mountbatten notified Lord Listowel in tel. 315-G.T. of 3 June, 12.30 pm. He added: ‘There

are no repeat no more amendments. This is the last word.’ R/3/1/150: f 231.

♦ See Nos. 38, 53, para. 6, and 91, paras. 18-19.

5 No. 35. 6 No. 36.

74

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

much opposed to Government under Section 93, as were His Majesty’s
Government.

his excellency concluded with the observation that the Plan represented
as near 100% agreement as it was possible to get, and that in his judgement,
what was being done was in the best interests of the people of India.

MR. JINNAH, MR. KRIPALANI and SARDAR BALDEV SINGH all Stated that
they considered that The Viceroy had correctly interpreted and recorded their
views.

Speeches of Recrimination

his excellency the viceroy asked those present at the meeting to request
their subordinate leaders to refrain, from now on, from speeches of recrimina¬
tion which were likely to produce violent reactions. If the past could now be
buried, the prospect of building a fine future, would be opened up.

All those present at the meeting signified concurrence.

Mr Gandhi

MR. liaquat alikhan said that he fully agreed that it might be possible to
control the speeches of subordinate leaders. In addition, however, there should
be a request for restraint on the part of “super leaders” — for example Mr.
Gandhi at his prayer meetings. It was true that Mr. Gandhi preached “non¬
violence”, but that many of his speeches could be taken as an incitement to
violence.

the viceroy said that he had talked to Mr. Gandhi the previous day.7 He
had laid before Mr. Gandhi, very clearly, the steps which had led up to the
present situation. He had pointed out those steps taken as a result of Mr.
Gandhi’s advice; those points on which it had not been possible to follow
his advice; and the reasons for this. Mr. Gandhi’s emotions were those of a man
who had worked, lived and prayed for the unity of India. He (The Viceroy)
thoroughly understood and responded to Mr. Gandhi’s feelings. He had made
clear to Mr. Gandhi the immense effect which the speeches at his prayer meet¬
ings had. It had been Mr. Gandhi’s day of silence but he had written a friendly
note at the meeting. It was to be hoped that he would help the situation. He
always made it very clear that he was not even a 4 anna member of the Congress
Party.

MR. kripalani said that he was surprised at Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan’s
complaint, as all that Mr. Gandhi said was in advocation of non-violence. All
members of Congress held to the idea of a united India. All Mr. Gandhi’s
activities were non-violent.

the viceroy said that he was ready to agree with this if Mr. Gandhi’s
speeches were analysed carefully. But surely the emotion engendered by Mr.
Gandhi, particularly in the more unintelligent people, was to the effect “this
partition is wrong; we must resist it; we must not give in”.

JUNE 1947

75

sardar patel said that he considered that, once the decision was taken, Mr.
Gandhi would accept it loyally.

the viceroy said that he too was sure that Mr. Gandhi would re-empha¬
size the principle of non-violence, whatever the decision might be.

MR. liaquat ali khan pointed out that Mr. Gandhi had recently em¬
ployed words to the effect that the people should not look to the Viceroy and
the leaders for a decision. They were told instead to “do as they felt”. That kind
of statement was bound to give an indication to the people that they should go
ahead on their own lines if they personally felt that India should not be divided.
sardar patel thought that no such inference could be drawn.
mr . jinnah gave his view that, if Mr. Gandhi went on with his present line,
the impression would be created that the people should not submit to what was
being decided by the present conference. He himself did not think that Mr.
Gandhi’s intentions were bad. They might be of the best, but in fact the
language which he had adopted recently had insinuated that the Muslim League
were going to get Pakistan by force, mr. jinnah said that he had deliberately
refrained from criticising Mr. Gandhi in public.

the viceroy said that he thought that this particular subject had now been
ventilated sufficiently. On the one hand he accepted the special position of
Mr. Gandhi ; but on the other he was sure that the Congress Leaders would see
the point of what had been said and use their best endeavours.

The Administrative Consequences of Partition

Copies of a paper entitled “The Administrative Consequences of Partition”,8
were handed round, his excellency the viceroy suggested that there
might now be preliminary consideration of this paper before it was put up to
a Cabinet Meeting. (In using the word “Cabinet” The Viceroy was referring to
the Indian “Cabinet” or Interim Government. This was not realised by Mr.
Jinnah but was cleared up as a result of a question).

mr. liaquat ali khan asked how the Cabinet was concerned with the
questions raised in this paper.

his excellency suggested that this seemed the only sensible procedure. It
was obviously undesirable to set up an ultra vires body outside the Cabinet. He
considered that his own responsibility was to give all possible assistance, backed
up by his own small staff. Delegations and representatives of what were to be
the two new States would have to be brought together to decide the various
points. He emphasized the necessity for speed. Not a day should be wasted.
He, on his part, would continue to draw attention to those points which would
have to be settled and to be of what service he could.

MR. jinnah said that he did not wish to express any definite opinion on this
paper before he had studied it more carefully, but one general principle did

7 No. 24.

8 See No. 28.

7 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

strike him. The proposals would be examined between the parties, but finally
it would be the Cabinet which would decide. Possibly, there would be com¬
plete agreement. On the other hand there might be differences of opinion. He
asked whether the Cabinet would over-rule any points on which there was
agreement, the viceroy said that this was, of course, not the intention, mr.
jinn ah then expressed the view that, if there were points of disagreement, the
Cabinet in the United Kingdom was too far away to be the deciding authority.

It was then explained to Mr. Jinnah that The Viceroy was referring to the
Indian Cabinet or Interim Government, mr. jinnah complained that he had
been misled. “You mean the Viceroy’s Executive Council !” A spade should be
called a spade. His mind worked in constitutional terms.

mr.liaquat alikhan referred to the suggestion on Page 3 of this paper9
that an Inter-Party Partition Committee should be set up, consisting of two
members of the Congress, two of the Muslim League and one minority
representative. He asked how a decision would be taken if there was disagree¬
ment within this Committee. Would a majority vote decide the issue?

his excellency replied that it would not. There would have to be nego¬
tiation on the basis of what was fair. The representatives of what were to be
the two new States would come together with sovereign rights, and meet as an
international conference would meet. He did not want to begin by assuming
that impasses would be reached, but that negotiations would go forward on a
basis of friendship. After the main issue of partition had been finally settled, he
was sure that a new spirit would enter into the discussions.

mr.liaquat alikhan said that he did not think that it was a question of
a new spirit. There were unquestionably likely to be serious differences of
opinion.

his excellency explained that he had put this paper to the present meeting
so that the party leaders, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Kripalani, could give their views
before it went up to the Interim Government. He suggested that they might all
meet again on the morning of Thursday, 5 th June at 10 a.m. in order to get the
broad principles settled. This suggestion was agreed to.

Finally, mr. jinnah emphasized his view that a machinery would have to
be devised whereby somebody would be empowered to make a definite and
final decision in the event of differences of opinion.

his excellency the viceroy said that he would consider this point
and asked the leaders to do so also.

Division of the Armed Forces

the viceroy then turned to the question of the division of the Armed
Forces. The previous day he had held a conference with the Commander s-in-
Chief and the Army Commanders, and pointed out to them that, if the votes in
the Provinces produced partition, the logical consequence would be the divis-

JUNE I947

77

ion of the Armed Forces; and this would have to take place in such a way as not
so far to weaken the Armed Forces that the maintenance of internal security
would be compromised. All the officers whom he had met had emphasized the
serious danger that the present feeling of uncertainty among the Armed Forces
might have a most damaging effect on their morale. It had therefore been
suggested that Field Marshal Auchinleck should make a broadcast to set their
minds at rest on certain questions, his excellency pointed out that nothing
restored confidence so quickly as taking people into one’s confidence. With
this lord ism ay agreed. There was general agreement that it would be desirable
for Field Marshal Auchinleck to make a broadcast.

his excellency the viceroy said that the sort of question on which
Field Marshal Auchinleck would be able to announce a decision might be
whether the Army was to be divided on a communal or on a territorial
basis.

MR. kripalani pointed out that this was intimately connected with the
question of nationality. With this MR. jinn ah agreed. Fie said that it would be
his intention in Pakistan to observe no communal differences. All those who
lived there, regardless of creed, would be fully-fledged citizens.

MR. kripalani signified that the same principle would apply to their
territory too. the viceroy said that he was sure that this was the right prin¬
ciple. It was after all only elementary justice and common sense. However, the
question of the transfer of citizenship was one which would have to be settled.

the viceroy suggested, and it was agreed, that Sardar Baldev Singh should
circulate a fist of questions on which the Commander-in-Chief would require
guidance, together with suggested answers. This list could be considered at the
meeting on Thursday, 5th June. The following basis might be taken: —

(i) There would be an appeal for discipline in units, and loyalty to their
Command, wherever the units were, and until they were split up and
serving their new countries ;

(ii) The division would be made on the basis of citizenship, which in its turn
would be based on geographical considerations;

(iii) An opportunity might be given to volunteers, if they were now resident
in that part of India in which their community was in a minority, to
transfer their homes and citizenship to the other part.

Sterling Balances

On pandit nehru’s suggestion it was agreed that the Sterling Balances
Delegation should not leave for London on the planned date, his excellency
the viceroy said that he would inform the Secretary of State of this pre-

9 Ibid., para. 5.

78

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

liminary decision by telegram. It should then be confirmed at the Cabinet
Meeting on Friday, 6th June, 1947.10

10 It had been intended that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, with two other Members of the Indian Cabinet,
should lead a delegation to London for negotiations on the question of India’s Sterling Balances.
Following the decision recorded above, the Secretary of State for India was informed by the Vice¬
roy’s tel. 1289-S of 3 June and by the Government of India, Finance Dept’s confirmatory tel. 4446
of 7 June that, in view of the political developments now taking place, it would be impossible for
any Cabinet Member to leave India for the present. In the event, a party of Indian officials visited
London in July to make interim arrangements. L/F/7/2869.

40

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee (via India Office)

Telegram , Rfe/i/ifo: f 238

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 1.30 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1282-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

1. I informed meeting this morning1 that the replies I had received from all
three leaders indicated that although they did not agree to the plan, as indeed I
had anticipated, they had virtually accepted it. I explained Mr. Jinnah’s diffi¬
culty about it being only a personal assurance, but said I was personally pre¬
pared to accept that assurance.

2. I said that I had authority from H.M.G. to accept any amendments agreed
to by all the leaders but could not accept any others. I therefore did not intend
to discuss at this meeting the various points which each had raised. I asked them
to agree to extend their acceptance to the printed plan as it stood subject to
ratification by the All-India Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim
League Council, meetings of both of which are being called with extreme
urgency. This was accepted and I am going ahead with the broadcast followed
by Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev.

1 No. 39.

JUNE I947

79

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/151: f 255

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 2pm

en clair Received: 3 June , 1.50 pm

No. 3 17-GT. At request of Jinnah I am making following small amendment to
my broadcast1 in paragraph 10.

For “predominately Muslim” read “Muslim majority”.

2. If it is necessary to play recorded version2 of my speech in London there is
no need to amend record.

3. Please ensure however that printed copies of broadcast issued to press etc.,
are amended accordingly.

4. This evening’s broadcasts3 will be in the following order.

(a) Viceroy in English.

(b) Announcement in English.

(c) Nehru in English.

(d) Jinnah in English.

(e) Baldev Singh in English.

(f) Translation of Viceroy’s Speech and Announcement.

(g) Nehru in Hindustani.

(h) Translation Jinnah.

(i) Translation Baldev Singh.

1 No. 44.

2 i.e. the recording made by Lord Mountbatten while still in London. In the event, it appears that this
recording was not used; instead the B.B.C. played a recording of the broadcast as relayed from New
Delhi. L/PO/6/124: f 6.

3 Nos. 44-48.

42

Cabinet C.M.[47)5ist Conclusions, Minute 1
L/PO/6/i2i: f 28

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i , on 3 June at 11 am
were: Mr Attlee [in the chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Arthur
Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander, Viscount
Jowitt, Mr J. Chuter Ede, Viscount Addison, Mr. J Westwood, Mr A. Creech

8o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Jones , the Earl of Lis towel, Mr G. A. Isaacs , Mr E. Shinwell , Mr Aneurin Bevan ,
Mr T. Williams, Mr George Tomlinson, Lord Inman
Also present were: Viscount Hall, Mr F. J. Bellenger, Mr P. J. Noel-Baker, Mr

INDIA

Constitutional Position

(Previous Reference: C.M.(47)50th Conclusions)1

the prime minister informed the Cabinet that the Viceroy had reported2
that the plan for the transfer of power in India had been favourably received by
the leaders of the three political parties.

The Cabinet: —

Invited the Prime Minister to convey to the Viceroy on their behalf a
message of congratulation on the successful outcome of his negotiations.

1 Vol. X, No. 521. 2 See Nos. 37 and 40.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with Members of the States

Negotiating Committee1
L/P&Jlio/Suff 389-95

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House, New Delhi, on 3 June
ig47 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, the Nawab of Bhopal,
the Maharaja of Patiala, the Maharawal of Dungarpur, the Maharaja Jam Saheb of
Nawanagar, the Raja ofBilaspur, Sir Mirza Ismail, SirB. L. Mitter, Sir R. Mudaliar,
Rai Bahadur Ramchandra Kak, Mr M. A. Srinivasan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar,
Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar D. K.
Sen, Mir Maqbool Mahmood, Lord Ismay, Sir C. Corfield, Sir E. Mieville; Lieu¬
tenant-Colonel Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )

His Excellency’s Opening Remarks

his excellency the viceroy said that, although the negotiations which he
had been holding with the political leaders of British India in no way altered
the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12th May, 1946, 2 the outcome of these
negotiations could but have a certain effect on the position of the States. There¬
fore, he was anxious to report to representatives of the States, in person, the
way in which these negotiations had been carried out and how the Plan had
been devised. The Plan had now been broadly accepted by the Indian Leaders

JUNE 1947

8l

themselves. He was going to make a broadcast that evening, followed by Pandit
Nehru, Mr. Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh.

Account of Negotiations

his excellency said that it was not until he first arrived in India as Viceroy
that he realised that a speedy decision was required above all. There had been
no indication in London, before he left to take up the appointment of Viceroy,
of a need for urgency. He had been told there that it would be soon enough if
legislation was introduced at the beginning of 1948. However, since his arrival
he had acted as quickly as possible. He had tried first to get the Cabinet Mission
Plan accepted because he sincerely believed that that Plan was the best for the
future of India; and because, in his opinion, it was fairest to the States as it gave
them an opportunity of joining the sort of Centre which they could most
easily accept. It had proved impossible to obtain agreement on the Cabinet
Mission’s Plan — and the essence of that Plan was agreement. It could not be
imposed, the viceroy said that he had then started to find out what views the
different parties had in common. Mr. Jinnah wanted Pakistan. His prescription
for this was “a surgical operation”. He (The Viceroy) had tried to persuade
Congress that it was valueless for them to have, in their own territories, a large
section of the population which was bitterly hostile to them. This would only
be embarrassing to their own development. Congress had come round to the
view that they would accept Pakistan on the condition that no large non-
Muslim areas were forced into it. This involved the partition of the Punjab and
Bengal, the viceroy explained that he was as much opposed to the partition
of Provinces as he was to the partition of India as a whole. It would be a retro¬
grade step, but nobody who had seen the communal bitterness prevalent in the
country with riot, bloodshed, massacre and torture could believe that this
strong feeling could be healed. It was no good appealing to logic or reason. The
only way whereby the peoples of India could eventually live together would be
to split them now and start afresh.

the viceroy said that he was so bitterly opposed to any form of partition
that he had refused to take the responsibility for such a decision himself. He had
recommended to H.M.G. that the responsibility should be placed on the
shoulders of the people of India. It was unfortunately impracticable to hold a
plebiscite all over the country; but, in view of the special circumstances, there
would be plebiscites in the N.W.F.P. and Sylhet.

his excellency went on to say that both parties, particularly Congress,
had declared their desire for the transfer of power to take place as soon as
possible. Moreover, his own position at the present time was one of responsi-

1 Lord Mountbatten sent Lord Listowel a summary of this meeting in tel. 1294-S of 4 June 1947.

L/P&J/10/81: f 359.

^ Vol. VII, No. 262.

82

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

bility without the authority to fulfil it. His first idea had been to transfer power
before June 1948, on the basis of complete independence, but this was out of the
question as it would mean handing over to Units without Constitutions. The
only way in fact that power could be handed over in the immediate future was
on the basis of the 1935 Act with Dominion status. This solved many problems.
For example, the British would be enabled to remain as the servants of India for
so long as they were wanted.

his excellency then gave an account of his recent visit to London. He
emphasized that he had found the utmost goodwill in England towards India.
The main result of his visit had been that it had been decided to pass legislation
through Parliament this session. For this object the support of the Opposition
had been obtained.

his excellency stressed particularly the difficulties of dividing the Armed
Forces, especially from the morale viewpoint. He said that Field Marshal
Auchinleck was going to broadcast on this subject during the next few days.

He went on to state that the main consequences of the new Plan on the States
would be twofold. First, it was improbable that the two new Dominions
would have such loose Centres as that at present envisaged by the existing
Constituent Assembly. Secondly, the fact that two separate Dominions were to
be voluntarily accepted into the Commonwealth would, he hoped, represent a
measure of compensation to the States who were the old allies and friends of
Britain.

his excellency explained that he had that day put before the Indian
political leaders a proposal that power should be demitted on 15th August
(this was, of course, a secret and the date should not be repeated). It meant that
the leaders themselves would have to work night and day, but he felt that it
was in their own interests not to delay.

Copies of His Majesty’s Government’s statement,3 to be made later that day,
were then handed round the meeting.

The lapse of Paramountcy

sirc. p. ramaswami aiyar said that he wished to appeal to His Excellency
that paramountcy should be loosened or allowed to lapse in advance of the date
of the transfer of power. Such a course would enable the States to negotiate on
equal terms with the prospective Governments of the two Dominions. He felt
that there might be States which were not likely to join up with either Domin¬
ion. It was even more essential for the bargaining powers of these to be im-

his excellency the viceroy said that, in his opinion, the fact that
paramountcy was about to lapse made possible negotiations by the States on a
basis of complete freedom, even at the present time. His instructions were that
paramountcy should lapse on the transfer of power. He would, however,

JUNE 1947

83

consider the premature lapse of paramountcy in special cases if it could be
proved to him that its continuation constituted a handicap to negotiation.

sir conrad corfield gave his opinion that a number of States would be
glad to see paramountcy continue to function until the transfer, even though it
was relaxed before that date, the nawab of bhopal confirmed this view
subject to any opinion expressed by the Standing Committee of the Chamber.
sir conrad corfield pointed out that paramountcy was already in process
of retraction.

Economic and Commercial Agreements, Claims

and Contracts

sir b. l. mitter asked what would happen to economic and commercial
agreements when paramountcy lapsed, his excellency the viceroy said
that, in order that there might be no administrative vacuum, interim arrange¬
ments would be required for the period between the lapse of paramountcy and
the conclusion of fresh or modified agreements. These interim arrangements
could best be made on a stand-still basis with such modifications as were
necessitated by the reversion to the States of the rights surrendered by them to
the Crown. I11 negotiating these interim arrangements, he and the Political
Department would give all the assistance they could during the short remaining

the nawab of bhopal said that, apart from negotiations in regard to
agreements, there were also certain claims which would have to be settled in
advance of the lapse of paramountcy. He suggested that an ad hoc organisation
should be set up to deal with these, sir ramaswami mudaliar pointed out
that the need for agreement to be reached in all these matters was as essential
from the point of view of the two new Dominions as from that of the States.

sir conrad corfield gave some examples of the way in which interim
arrangements on a stand-still basis could be made. He said that, when the
Central Government had decided to abolish the salt duty, they had also decided
to continue to observe the terms of existing agreements and to make payments
due under these agreements until such time as new agreements were made.
That was an example of standstill interim arrangements. He next exampled
Posts and Telegraphs. When paramountcy lapsed, the States would be free, for
example, to imprison the Postmaster of an Imperial Post Office. If they did so,
however, they would run the risk of cutting themselves off from All-India
communications, so they would presumably agree to treat Post Offices with
sufficient consideration to ensure their continued functioning. Another example
was Railways and Cantonments in Indian States, where the Crown Representa¬
tive had at present the powers ofjurisdiction. These powers would revert to the
States on the lapse of paramountcy. Efforts were being made to persuade the

3 No. 45.

84

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Interim Government to negotiate arrangements whereby the reversion of
jurisdiction would not affect the working of the Railway and the accommoda¬
tion of the Indian Army pending the conclusion of fresh agreements, sir
conrad c orfield said that he was not clear to what claims the Nawab of
Bhopal referred. Claims arising out of the lapse of paramountcy would be a
matter of negotiation, and any decisions by the Crown Representative in such
matters would have no sanction behind them after the lapse of paramountcy.

sir c. p. ramaswami aiyar pointed out that there were a certain number
of agreements into which the States had entered which were not with the
Crown Representative. He suggested that it would be necessary for machinery
to be set up to deal with these, sir conrad corfield said that efforts had
been made to establish an All-India Consultative Committee for such purposes,
but the Interim Government had not agreed to this. He stated that existing
contractual agreements would be a matter for discussion with the opposite
party. There had already been a number of conferences with the relevant
Departments of the Central Government, regarding ‘paramountcy’ agree¬
ments. He had explained to these Departments that jurisdiction was about to
return to the States and had suggested that they should make interim arrange¬
ments based on that assumption. He understood that the Viceroy was going to
explain the matter to the Cabinet.

sir v. t. krishnamachari advocated the necessity for machinery for
joint consultation in regard to existing agreements, sir conrad corfield
said that efforts had been made to find a formula which would embody a
general stand-still agreement. If these were successful joint consultation for
fresh agreements could be arranged either within each Constituent Assembly or
by ad hoc negotiating committees.

Relations between the States and the two new Dominions

the raja of BiLASPUR asked whether the entry of States into either Domin¬
ion Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice. This the viceroy
confirmed, the raja of bilaspur then asked whether Constitutions were
likely to be drafted by the respective Constituent Assemblies before or after the
lapse of paramountcy. his excellency replied that the broad outlines of the
Constitution drafted by the existing Constituent Assembly for Hindustan were
likely to be ready before that date. In the case of the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly, he believed that Mr. Jinnah had been working on Heads of a
Constitution, but these would probably only be a guide and nothing concrete
would have appeared before the lapse of paramountcy. In any case para¬
mountcy would lapse as soon as the new self-governing Dominions came into
being: these would be set up under the 1935 Act (amended for this purpose).

the raja of bilaspur then asked what was likely to happen to States which
decided to join neither Constituent Assembly. Did His Majesty’s Government

JUNE 1947

85

envisage further relations with them? his excellency the viceroy stated
that, until it was known what shape the two Dominions would take, this was a
hypothetical question which he was not prepared, at the present stage, to refer
to His Majesty s Government; but it was clear that the first step should be for
these States to enter into practical negotiations for administrative arrangements
with one or other or perhaps both of the successor Dominion Governments of
British India. Whether a State actually joined either Dominion or not, it was
obvious for geographical and economic reasons that such arrangements would
be essential.

In answer to a further question, his excellency the viceroy said that
it was intended to recommend to the respective Dominions that their Con¬
stituent Assemblies should act as their Parliaments. The existing Legislative
Assembly would presumably be abolished; but he was not prepared to state
whether the new Governments would in fact make these decisions.

s 1 r r a m A sw ami mudaliar asked whether, in the event of the Constituent
Assemblies ta king over legislative functions, the States’ representatives could
withdraw from them for legislative purposes and remain only for Constitution
making, his excellency the viceroy said that the States were not
committed one way or the other on this point. He emphasized that the question
of any new functions for the Constituent Assemblies was still only in the pro¬
posal stage.

the viceroy enquired regarding the desirability of the States Negotiating
Committee remaining in being so that, during the next two and a half months,
a body would be available to consider the various broad principles of the
problems which were bound to arise. Perhaps it would be better to call the
States Negotiating Committee by another name.

sir c. p. ramaswami aiyar said that there was a practical difficulty in this
suggestion. Such a Committee had been suggested to the Interim Government
but the objection had been raised that the present States Negotiating Com¬
mittee was unrepresentative as the States people were not represented on it.
While all the members present were ready and willing to place their experience
at the disposal of the Viceroy, the reactions of the rulers of the two Dominions,
which it was proposed to set up, should first be ascertained.

the vi ceroy pointed out that the greater demand would be for a committee
of representatives of those States which were likely to adhere to the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly. Perhaps two Committees might be set up; one to
consider negotiations with each Constituent Assembly.

With this view there was general agreement — on the condition that the
Interim Government agreed to such proposals, thenawabof bhopal said
that he would put up the suggestion before the Standing Committee of the
Chamber of Princes and inform the Viceroy of their opinions.

Finally, the viceroy said that, whereas he did not wish to give any official

86

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

advice on what steps should be taken by States which were doubtful of whether
or not to join either Constituent Assembly, he would be willing to give
personal advice to anybody who came and asked him for it. He had one sug¬
gestion to make now. This was that, in coming to their decisions, the represen¬
tatives of the States should cast their minds forward ten years and consider what
the situation in the country and in the world as a whole was likely to be at that
time.

44

Text of Broadcast by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma on 3 June 1947

at 7 pm I.S.T. 1

Rfe/i/ifo: f 232

A statement2 will be read to you tonight giving the final decision of His
Majesty’s Government as to the method by which power will be transferred
from British to Indian hands. But before this happens, I want to give a personal
message to the people of India, as well as a short account of the discussions
which I have held with the Leaders of the political parties and which have led
up to the advice I tendered to His Majesty’s Government during my recent
visit to London.

Since my arrival in India at the end of March I have spent almost every
day in consultation with as many of the leaders and representatives of as
many communities and interests as possible. I wish to say how grateful I am
for all the information and helpful advice they have given me.

Nothing I have seen or heard in the past few weeks has shaken my firm
opinion that with a reasonable measure of goodwill between the communities
a unified India would be by far the best solution of the problem.

For more than a hundred years 400 millions of you have lived together
and this country has been administered as a single entity. This has resulted in
unified communications, defence, postal services and currency; an absence
of tariffs and customs barriers; and the basis for an integrated political economy.
My great hope was that communal differences would not destroy all this.

My first course, in all my discussions, was therefore to urge the political
leaders to accept unreservedly the Cabinet Mission plan of 16th May 1946.
In my opinion, that plan provides the best arrangement that can be devised
to meet the interests of all the communities of India. To my great regret it
has been impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet Mission plan,
or on any other plan that would preserve the unity of India. But there can be
no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority,

JUNE I947

87

to live against their will under a Government in which another community
has a majority. And the only alternative to coercion is partition.

But when the Muslim League demanded the partition of India, Congress
used the same arguments for demanding in that event the partition of certain
Provinces. To my mind this argument is unassailable. In fact neither side
proved willing to leave a substantial area in which their community have a
majority under the Government of the other. I am, of course, just as much
opposed to the partition of Provinces as I am to the partition of India herself
and for the same basic reasons.

For just as I feel there is an Indian consciousness which should transcend
communal differences so I feel there is a Punjabi and Bengali consciousness
which has evoked a loyalty to their Province.

And so I felt it was essential that the people of India themselves should
decide this question of partition.

The procedure for enabling them to decide for themselves whether they want
the British to hand over power to one or two Governments is set out in the
statement which will be read to you. But there are one or two points on
which I should like to add a note of explanation.

It was necessary in order to ascertain the will of the people of the Punjab,
Bengal and part of Assam to lay down boundaries between the Muslim
majority areas and the remaining areas, but I want to make it clear that the
ultimate boundaries will be settled by a Boundary Commission and will almost
certainly not be identical with those which have been provisionally adopted.

We have given careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs. This
valiant community forms about an eighth of the population of the Punjab,
but they are so distributed that any partition of this Province will inevitably
divide them. All of us who have the good of the Sikh community at heart
are very sorry to think that the partition of the Punjab, which they them¬
selves desire, cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The
exact degree of the split will be left to the Boundary Commission on which
they will of course be represented.

The whole plan may not be perfect; but like all plans, its success will depend
on the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out. I have always felt that
once it was decided in what way to transfer power the transfer should take
place at the earliest possible moment, but the dilemma was that if we waited
until a constitutional set-up for all India was agreed, we should have to wait
a long time, particularly if partition were decided on. Whereas if we handed
over power before the Constituent Assemblies had finished their work we
should leave the country without a Constitution. The solution to this dilemma,
which I put forward, is that His Majesty’s Government should transfer power

1 Indian Standard Time. It was 3.30 pm in the United Kingdom (Double British Summer Time).

2 No. 45.

88

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

now to one or two Governments of British India each having Dominion
Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made. This I hope will be
within the next few months. I am glad to announce that His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment have accepted this proposal and are already having legislation prepared
for introduction in Parliament this session. As a result of these decisions the
special function of the India Office will no longer have to be carried out, and
some other machinery will be set up to conduct future relations between His
Majesty’s Government and India.

I wish to emphasise that this legislation will not impose any restriction on the
power of India as a whole, or of the two States if there is partition, to decide in
the future their relationship to each other and to other member States of the
British Commonwealth.

Thus the way is now open to an arrangement by which power can be trans¬
ferred many months earlier than the most optimistic of us thought possible,
and at the same time leave it to the people of British India to decide for them¬
selves on their future, which is the declared policy of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment.

I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of
His Majesty’s Government are concerned with the transfer of power in
British India.

If the transfer of power is to be effected in a peaceful and orderly manner,
every single one of us must bend all his efforts to the task. This is no time
for bickering, much less for the continuation in any shape or form of the
disorders and lawlessness of the past few months. Do not forget what a narrow
margin of food we are all working on. We cannot afford any toleration of
violence. All of us are agreed on that.

Whichever way the decision of the Indian people may go, I feel sure any
British officials or officers who may be asked to remain for a while will do
everything in their power to help implement that decision. His Majesty as
well as his Government have asked me to convey to all of you in India their
sincere good wishes for your future and the assurance of their continued
goodwill.

I have faith in the future of India and am proud to be with you all at this
momentous time. May your decisions be wisely guided and may they be
carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.3

3 Vol. X, No. 152.

JUNE 1947

89

Statement of 3 June 1947 [as published)1

Cmd. 7136
Indian Policy

INTRODUCTION

1. On 20th February, 1947, 2 His Majesty’s Government announced their
intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands by June
1948. His Majesty’s Government had hoped that it would be possible for
the major parties to co-operate in the working-out of the Cabinet Mission’s
Plan of 1 6th May, 1946, 3 and evolve for India a constitution acceptable to all
concerned. This hope has not been fulfilled.

2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras, Bombay,
the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Orissa
and the North-West Frontier Province, and the representatives of Delhi,
Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have already made progress in the task of evolving
a new Constitution. On the other hand, the Muslim League Party, including
in it a majority of the representatives of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, as also
the representative of British Baluchistan, has decided not to participate in the
Constituent Assembly.

3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty’s Government that power
should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people
themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if there had been
agreement among the Indian political parties. In the absence of such an agree¬
ment, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the Indian people
can be ascertained has devolved on His Majesty’s Government. After full
consultation with political leaders in India, His Majesty’s Government have
decided to adopt for this purpose the plan set out below. His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment wish to make it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame
any ultimate Constitution for India; this is a matter for the Indians themselves.
Nor is there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between communi¬
ties for an united India.

THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

4. It is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to interrupt the work

1 This statement was made by Mr Attlee in the House of Commons and by the Earl of Listowel in the
House of Lords at 3.30 pm (Double British Summer Time) and was published in India at the same
time.

2 Vol. IX, No. 438. 3 Vol. VII, No. 303.

90

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is made for certain
Provinces specified below, His Majesty’s Government trust that, as a con¬
sequence of this announcement, the Muslim League representatives of those
Provinces, a majority of whose representatives are already participating in it,
will now take their due share in its labours. At the same time, it is clear that
any Constitution framed by this Assembly cannot apply to those parts of the
country which are unwilling to accept it. His Majesty’s Government are
satisfied that the procedure outlined below embodies the best practical method
of ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether their
Constitution is to be framed —

(a) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or

(b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the represen¬
tatives of those areas which decide not to participate in the existing
Constituent Assembly.

When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the authority or
authorities to whom power should be transferred.

BENGAL AND THE PUNJAB

5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab (excluding
the European members) will therefore each be asked to meet in two parts,
one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the
Province. For the purpose of determining the population of districts, the
1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative. The Muslim majority
districts in these two Provinces are set out in the Appendix to this Announce¬
ment.

6. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting
separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should
be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition,
division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desirable that
the representatives of each part should know in advance which Constituent
Assembly the Province as a whole would join in the event of the two parts
subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if any member of either
Legislative Assembly so demands, there shall be held a meeting of all members
of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision will
be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole
wou Idj oin if it were decided by the two parts to remain united.

8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the Legis¬
lative Assembly will, on behalf of the areas they represent, decide which of
the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt.

JUNE 1947

91

9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the
members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit
in two parts according to Muslim majority districts (as laid down in the
Appendix) and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary
step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of
final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions
will be needed ; and, as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for
either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-
General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in
consultation with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the
boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be in¬
structed to take into account other factors. Similar instructions will be given
to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report of a Boundary Com¬
mission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries indicated in the
Appendix will be used.

SIND

10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European members)
will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives in
paragraph 4 above.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. Two of
the three representatives of this Province are already participating in the
existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geographical
situation, and other considerations, that, if the whole or any part of the Punjab
decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to
give the North-West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its
position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the
electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier
Province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above
they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Gover¬
nor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government.

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

12. British Baluchistan has elected a member but he has not taken his seat in
the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical situation, this
Province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to
choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency
the Governor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be done.

92

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

ASSAM

13. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of
Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predominately Muslim. There has
been a demand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal, Sylhet should be
amalgamated with the Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if it is decided that
Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district,
under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Assam
Provincial Government, to decide whether the district of Sylhet should con¬
tinue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the
new Province of Eastern Bengal, if that Province agrees. If the referendum
results in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Com¬
mission w ith terms of reference similar to those for the Punjab and Bengal will
be set up to demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet district and con¬
tiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts, which will then be
transferred to Eastern Bengal. The rest of the Assam Province will in any case
continue to participate in the proceedings of the existing Constituent Assembly.

REPRESENTATION IN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES

14. If it is decided that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, it will be
necessary to hold fresh elections to choose their representatives on the scale of
one for every million of population according to the principle contained in the
Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16th May, 1946. Similar elections will also have to be
held for Sylhet in the event of its being decided that this district should form
part of East Bengal. The number of representatives to which each area would be
entitled is as follows : —

Province

General

Muslims

Sikhs

Total

Sylhet District

1

2

Nil

3

West Bengal . .

15

4

Nil

19

East Bengal . .

12

29

Nil

4i

West Punjab . .

3

12

2

17

East Punjab . .

6

4

2

12

15. In accordance with the mandates given to them, the representatives
of the various areas will either join the existing Constituent Assembly or form
the new Constituent Assembly.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on administrative
consequences of any partition that may have been decided upon : —

(a) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities
about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government, including
Defence, Finance and Communications.

JUNE I947

93

(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty’s Government
for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power.

(c) In the case of Provinces that may be partitioned as to administration of all
provincial subjects such as the division of assets and liabilities, the police
and other services, the High Courts, provincial institutions, &c.

THE TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

17. Agreements with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India will have to
be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority.

THE STATES

18. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that the decisions
announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards
Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May,
1 946, 4 remains unchanged.

NECESSITY FOR SPEED

19. In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare themselves
to take over power, it is important that all the above processes should be
completed as quickly as possible. To avoid delay, the different Provinces or
parts of Provinces will proceed independently as far as practicable within the
conditions of this Plan, the existing Constituent Assembly and the new Con¬
stituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame Constitutions for their
respective territories : they will of course be free to frame their own rules.

IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER

20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasised their desire that
there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India. With this
desire His Majesty’s Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing
to anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting
up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier
date. Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable,
way of meeting this desire His Majesty’s Government propose to introduce
legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a
Dominion status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the
decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice
to the right of Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether
or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain
within the British Commonwealth.

FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL

21. His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make such
4 Vol. VII, No. 262.

94

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

further announcements as may be necessary in regard to procedure or any other
matters for carrying out the above arrangements.

APPENDIX

Muslim Majority Districts of Bengal and the Punjab

according

i. Bengal

Chittagong Division
Chittagong.
Noakhali.

Tippera.

Dacca Division
Bakarganj.

Dacca.

Faridpur.

Mymensingh.

Presidency Division
Jessore.
Murshidabad.
Nadia.

o the 1941 Census

2. The Punjab

Lahore Division
Gujranwala.
Gurdaspur.
Lahore.
Sheikhupura.
Sialkot.

Rawalpindi Division
Attock.

Gujrat.

Jhelum.

Mianwali.

Rawalpindi.

Shahpur.

Rajshahi Division
Bogra.
Dinajpur.
Malda.

Pabna.

Rajshahi.

Rangpur.

Multan Division
Dera Ghazi Khan.
Jhang.

Lyallpur.

Montgomery.

Multan.

Muzaffargarh.

46

Text of Broadcast by Pandit Nehru on 3 June 1947

L/P&Jliol 81 : f 363

Friends and comrades, nearly nine months ago, soon after my assumption of
office, I spoke to you from this place.1 I told you then that we were on the
march and the goal had still to be reached. There were many difficulties and
obstacles on the way, and our journey’s end might not be near, for that end

JUNE 1947

95

was not the assumption of office in the Government of India, but the achieve¬
ment of the full independence of India and the establishment of a cooperative
Commonwealth in which all will be equal sharers in opportunity and in all
things that give meaning and value to life.

Nine months have passed, months of trial and difficulty, of anxiety and
sometimes even of heartbreak. Yet, looking back at this period with its suf¬
fering and sorrow for our people there is much on the credit side also for India
has advanced nationally and internationally, and is respected today in the
councils of the world.

In the domestic sphere something substantial has been achieved though the
burden on the common man still continues to be terribly heavy and millions
lack food and clothes and other necessaries of life. Many vast schemes of
development are nearly ready, and yet it is true that most of our dreams about
the brave things we were going to accomplish have still to be realised. You
know well the difficulties which the country has had to face — economic,
political and communal.

These months have been full of tragedy for millions and the burden on those
who have the government of the country in their hands has been great indeed.
My mind is heavy with the thought of the sufferings of our people in the areas
of disturbance, the thousands who are dead and those, especially our women¬
folk, who have suffered agony worse than death. To their families and to
innumerable people who have been uprooted from their homes and rendered
destitute, I offer my deep sympathy and assurance that we shall do all in our
power to bring relief. We must see to it that such tragedies do not happen again.
At no time have we lost faith in the great destiny of India which takes shape
even though with struggle and suffering. My great regret has been that during
this period owing to excess of work I have been unable to visit the numerous
towns and villages of India as I used to do to meet my people and to learn their
troubles at first hand.

Today, I am speaking to you on another historic occasion when a vital
change affecting the future of India is proposed. You have just heard an an¬
nouncement on behalf of the British Government. This announcement lays
down a procedure for self-determination in certain areas of India. It envisages
on the one hand the possibility of these areas seceding from India; on the other
it promises a big advance towards complete independence. Such a big change
must have the full concurrence of the people before effect can be given to it, for
it must always be remembered that the future of India can only be decided by
the people of India and not by any outside authority, however friendly.

These proposals will be placed soon before representative assemblies of the
people for consideration. But meanwhile the sands of time run out and decis-

1 On 7 September 1946. Printed in Independence and After: A collection of the more important speeches of
Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949 (New Delhi, Govt of India, 1949), pp 339-43.

96

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

ions cannot await the normal course of events. While we must necessarily
abide by what the people finally decide we have to come to certain decisions
ourselves and recommend them to the people for acceptance. We have,
therefore, decided to accept these proposals and to recommend to our larger
committees that they do likewise.

It is with no joy in my heart that I commend these proposals to you, though
I have no doubt in my mind that this is the right course. For generations we
have dreamt and struggled for a free and independent united India. The
proposals to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is painful for any of us
to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our present decision is the
right one even from the larger viewpoint.

The united India that we have laboured for was not one of compulsion and
coercion, but a free and willing association of a free people. It may be that in
this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise and that she will
have a stronger and more secure foundation. We are little men serving great
causes, but because the cause is great, something of that greatness falls upon us
also. Mighty forces are at work in the world today and in India, and I have no
doubt that we are ushering in a period of greatness for India. The India of
geography, of history and traditions, the India of our minds and hearts cannot
change. On this historic occasion each one of us must pray that he might be
guided aright in the service of the motherland and of humanity at large.

We stand on a watershed dividing the past from the future. Let us bury that
past in so far as it is dead and forget all bitterness and recrimination. Let there be
moderation in speech and writing. Let there be strength and perseverance in
adhering to the cause and the ideals we have at heart. Let us face the future not
with easy optimism or with any complacency or weakness, but with confidence
and a firm faith in India. There has been violence — shameful, degrading and
revolting violence-— in various parts of the country. This must end. We are
determined to end it. We must make it clear that political ends are not to be
achieved by methods of violence now or in the future.

On this the eve of great changes in India we have to make a fresh start with
clear vision and a firm mind, with steadfastness and tolerance and a stout heart.
We should not wish ill to anyone, but think always of every Indian as our
brother and comrade. The good of the 400,000,000 of India must be our
supreme objective. We shall seek to build anew our relations with England on a
friendly and cooperative basis, forgetting the past which has lain so heavily
upon us. I should like to express on this occasion my deep appreciation of the
labours of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, ever since his arrival here at a
critical juncture in our history.

Inevitably on every occasion of [crisis and difficulty we think of]2 our great
leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who has led us unfalteringly for over a generation
through darkness and sorrow, to the threshold of our freedom, to him we once

JUNE I947

97

more pay our homage. His blessing and wise counsel will happily be with us
in the momentous years to come as always. With firm faith in our future I
appeal to you to cooperate in the great task ahead and to march together to the
haven of freedom for all in India. Jai Hind.

2 Words in square brackets supplied from the Statesman, 4 June 1947, p. 8, col. 1.

47

Text of Broadcast by Mr Jinnah on 3 June 1947
L\P f 364

1 am glad that I am afforded the opportunity to speak to you directly through
this radio from Delhi. It is the first time, I believe, that a non-official has been
afforded an opportunity to address the people through the medium of this
powerful instrument, direct, to the people on political matters. I hope that in
the future I shall have greater facilities to enable me to voice my views and
opinions, which will reach directly you, life warm rather than in the cold print
of the newspapers.

The statement of Government, embodying the plan for the transfer of power
to the peoples of India, has already been broadcast and will be released to the
press and will be published here and abroad tomorrow morning. It gives the
outline of the plan for us to give it our most earnest consideration. We have to
examine it coolly, calmly and dispassionately. We must remember that we
have to take the most momentous decisions and handle grave issues facing us
in the solution of the complex political problem of this great sub-continent
inhabited by 400,000,000 people.

The world has no parallel of the most onerous and difficult task which His
Excellency had to perform. Grave responsibility lies particularly on the shoul¬
ders of Indian leaders. Therefore we must galvanise and concentrate all our
energies to see that the transfer of power is assisted in a peaceful and orderly
manner. I most earnestly appeal to every community and particularly to
Moslems in India to maintain peace and order. We must examine the plan, its
letters and spirit and come to our conclusions and take our decisions. I pray to
God that at this critical moment He may guide us to enable us to discharge our
responsibilities in a wise and statesmanlike manner having regard to the sum
total of the plan as a whole.

It is clear the plan does not meet in some important respects our point of
view, and we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with
some of the matters dealt with by the plan. It is for us to consider whether the
plan as presented to us by His Majesty’s Government should be accepted by us

98

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

as a compromise or a settlement. On this point I do not wish to prejudge. The
decision of the Council of the All India Moslem League which has been sum¬
moned to meet on Monday, 9th June, and its final decisions can only be taken
by the conference according to our constitution precedents and practice.

But so far as I have been able to gather, on the whole, reaction in the Moslem
League circle in Delhi has been hopeful. But for us the plan has got to be very
carefully examined in its pros and cons before a final decision can be taken. I
must say that I feel that the Viceroy has battled against various forces very
bravely — and the impression that he has left on my mind is that he was actuated
by the highest sense of fairness and impartiality, and it is up to us to make his
task less difficult, and help him, as far as lies in our power in order that he may
fulfil his mission of the transfer of power to the peoples of India in a peaceful
and orderly manner.

Now that plan has been broadcast already, and makes it clear in paragraph
eleven that a referendum will be made to the electorate of the present Legis¬
lative Assembly in the N.W.F.P., who will choose which of the two alterna¬
tives in paragraph four they wish to adopt.

The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General, in
consultation with the Provincial Government. Hence it is clear that the verdict
and the mandate of the people of the Frontier Province will be obtained as to
whether they want to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances I request the Provincial Moslem
League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the employment of peaceful civil
disobedience which they had perforce to resort to, and I call upon all the leaders
of the Moslem League and the Mussalmans generally to organise our people to
face this referendum with hope and courage, and I feel confident that the people
of the Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly.

I cannot but express my appreciation of the sufferings and sacrifices made by
all classes of the Mussalmans, and particularly the great part that the women of
the Frontier played in the fight for our civil liberties. Without a personal bias,
and this is hardly the moment to do so, I deeply sympathise with all those who
have suffered and those who died and whose properties were subjected to
destruction, and I fervently hope the Frontier will go through this referendum
in a peaceful manner, and it should be the anxiety of everyone to obtain a fair,
free and clean verdict of the people of the Frontier.

Once more I most earnestly appeal to all to maintain peace and order.
Pakistan Zindabad.

JUNE 1947

99

Text of Broadcast by Sardar Baldev Singh on 3 June 1947

L/P &Jlio/8i : f 363

You have just heard the broadcasts of His Excellency the Viceroy and two of
our distinguished countrymen, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah. You also know
the terms of the plan which his Majesty’s Government have formulated to end
the long drawn political deadlock that has stifled us these many months and
years.

It is a great day today. The occasion is historic. We have closed a dreary
chapter. A new leaf is now turned. We seem to see gleaming on it the fulfil¬
ment of what till yesterday was but a dream. Today we enter the heritage that
was ours. The heritage of freedom we have found as our birthright.

It would be idle for me to pretend that the day is bright and joyous as indeed
we might well have hoped it would be. It would be untrue if I say we are
altogether happy. Seldom, perhaps, has a settlement like this been tarnished
with so much of fear and sorrow. I say seldom because, even though we
struggled and even though the struggle was long and heavy, our common
quest for freedom need never have divided and torn us asunder one from
another. This has actually taken place.

The shadow of our differences has thrown a gloom over us. We have let
ourselves be rent apart. We witness today, even on the day of our freedom,
fears of mutual conflict and all the horrors that conflict brings, in so many parts
of India. Neighbour has risen against neighbour. Thousands of innocent lives
have been lost. Men, women and children roam from one place to another,
homeless and without shelter.

Untold losses — financial, cultural and spiritual — have been inflicted in wide
areas. We look as if we are a house divided against itself. The day indeed finds
us an unhappy people. It is not necessary for me today to go into the reasons
for this affliction. We each have our faults — let us own it — we each need advice
on what is priceless — the willing surrender of our best for the common good of
us all. That is why we fell foul of one another. But that was yesterday. Till
yesterday, we were preoccupied with our little selves. The plan that has now
been announced steers a course obviously above the conflicting claims.1 It is not
a compromise : I prefer to call it a settlement.

It does not please everybody, not the Sikh community, anyway. But it is
certainly worths while. Let us take it. Taken in that spirit, this plan should
halt the dismal gloom that shrouds our Motherland and so many other stricken
spots today. In that spirit, we shall find in it the many tasks that await us in

1 ‘case’ in text on file; the word ‘claims’ lias been taken from the Statesman, 4 June 1947.

100

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

every sphere of our national life — tasks that need doing not only to repair the
damage we have inflicted on ourselves, but to raise us in stature before the
nations of the world.

We are poor. Let us not forget that we have no apology to let poverty
continue to afflict our people now that we shall be masters of our affairs.

We have tasks big and small of reconstruction on our hands. Let us remember
that it is only when the minds of our leaders are not deflected by internal
quarrels that they can effectively handle these tasks for our common good. Our
people have many needs that have lingered unmet for years : let us settle down
to meet these needs and relieve the distress that haunts us. Meanwhile, whatever
our own preferences, let us grow above our petty outlooks and work together
to put our country on the way to greatness that certainly belongs to it.

We too have to live as brothers or as neighbours. We all do want to live in
peace and strive for the modicum of ease and comfort in our homes, whether
in villages or in towns. We have had enough of quarrels and troubles. Let us
now turn from an ugly past and help one another to build a great and glorious
future.

This is my counsel to men and women of goodwill — Hindus, Moslems,
Sikhs, Christians and others. For thousands of years our ancestors lived together
in this land in tolerance and neighbourly relations. Let us restore the old glory
of our traditions in order, as I have said, that we may equip ourselves to face the
bright future that has now opened.

I believe with all my heart that the divisions which tend to keep us apart now
will not last long. I believe, also, that even though we should choose to remain
apart at present, we have so much in common — economically, geographically
and even spiritually — that the very blueprint of our plans so soon as we view it
with care, will bind us together. We have to forget the unhappy past to see this
with precision. Let us concentrate on the common interests. I say this with all
honestness.

I will add that, while making this appeal, I am not unaware of the existence
in our midst of those discordant elements who are inhuman enough to imagine
that their prosperity lies in the misfortune of their fellow men and women.
Such people should be shown that they will, in fact, soon meet their fate.

As you must have heard, we have taken the strongest measures to enforce law
and order and to apprehend the mischief-makers wherever we can lay our
hands on them. During the last few weeks, large contingents of armed troops
have been deployed in various parts of the country to aid the civil administra¬
tion. These troops consist of trusted men. They will give succour to those in
need and act also as stern keepers of the peace in troubled areas. I want you to
look upon the soldier as your friend. He will not fail you. And to you, sailors,
soldiers, airmen also, I must say a few words. You are obviously not unin¬
fluenced by the greatest events that are taking place in India today. These

JUNE I947

IOI

include many political changes which will concern you. As trained men,
trained in life by discipline and fortitude, you will obviously not allow your¬
selves to be needlessly perturbed. Let me say with all the authority I can
command that your interests will in no circumstances be allowed to suffer. You
have earned a name for yourselves throughout the world by your valour and
high tradition. India will not and cannot forget the debt it owes to you. Some
of you, today, are having to perform unpleasant duties on internal security
work. No-one is more conscious of this than I. Our Motherland is passing
through a period of transition and strain. Your patriotism and high sense of
loyalty will help you to steer clear through these difficult times. Do not forget
that India’s honour is your honour.

Serve India in her hour of trial with good conscience and to the best of your
ability and remain confident that we stand by you today as we have done in the
past.

The Commander-in-Chief will, in the next few days, broadcast a special
message to you. He will deal with some of the specific problems that may now
be impressing your minds. Meanwhile, I have no doubt that whatever political
conditions may shape the future of India, your interests will be protected by all
sides.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

Rfel 1/151: f 105

1446/2 3 June ig47

Dear Mr. Nehru,

Will you please tell Dr Khan Sahib that I am asking the Commander-in-Chief
to provide nine British Officers of the Indian Army to supervise the referendum
in the N.W.F.P.1

2. It is, of course, a matter of great urgency to get the referendum carried out
in the least possible time, and I hope to arrange that the officers will join in
Peshawar in a few days’ time.

1 On 2 June Mr Abell, after consulting Mr Menon, had put up a note stating that they both agreed
with Sir O. Caroe (with whom arrangements for the Referendum had been under discussion) that
there must be a completely British staff to conduct it. ‘Any Indian is likely to be accused of partiality.
Mr Menon suggests that the best thing would be to get one senior British military officer to be in
charge of the Referendum and eight military officers of the rank of about Major to compose the
staff in the Districts. I think this is very sound as military officers would be regarded by the Congress
as less likely to be prejudiced than members of the I.C.S. or the Political Service. Lord Mountbatten
had accepted this proposal at the Staff Meeting on 2 June. R/3/1/151: f 100.

102

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governor’s Secretary, N.W.F.P.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

50

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sardar Patel

Rl3li/i5o:f 245

3 June 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

I very much hope that as the Member of Cabinet in charge of Information and
Broadcasting you will do me the honour of taking the chair at my meeting
with the Press to-morrow, in the same way as the Minister for Information
does in London. The meeting is at 10 a.m. to-morrow morning in the Council
House.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA1

1 Sardar Patel replied on 4 June saying he much appreciated Lord Mountbatten’s invitation and would
‘be delighted to come’. R/3/1/150: f 257.

Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3j 1/150: / 253

MEMBER OF COUNCIL, INFORMATION & BROADCASTING,

new Delhi, 3 June 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am deeply distressed at the abuse by Mr. Jinnah of the hospitality extended to
him by the All-India Radio1 and his breach of the rules of broadcast which, as
you are aware, are almost as inviolable as the laws of the Nature. I had not seen
the script before the broadcast but I noticed later that not only did he depart
from the script but he has also committed a sacrilege by making a political,
partisan and propagandist broadcast. Had I known it in time I would certainly
have prevented him from turning the All-India Radio into a Muslim League
platform by not only justifying a movement which has resulted in so much
bloodshed and destruction of property but also by appealing to Frontier voters
to vote according to League persuasion. I am sure you will agree that this was
grossly unfair to the Frontier Ministry.

JUNE 1947

103

I fully realise that you yourself did not expect, or had not sufficient notice to
prevent it, but I am really disappointed that he should have taken undue
advantage of the courtesy and consideration extended to him by you, particu¬
larly on a solemn occasion when India and the whole World were watching us.
I only hope that its consequences will not be equally mischievous and that he
stood before the listeners self-condemned.

Yours sincerely,

VALLABHBHAI PATEL2

1 See No. 47.

2 Dr Khan Sahib also wrote on 3 June to Lord Mountbatten protesting at the references to the N.W.F.P.
in Mr Jinnah s broadcast. Lord Mountbatten acknowledged Sardar Patel’s letter on 5 June remarking
that they had discussed the matter at the Press Conference (see No. 59). He acknowledged Dr Khan
Sahib’s letter on 9 June mentioning that he had discussed the subject with Sardar Patel. R/3/1/150:
ff 255-6, 282, 284.

52

Mr Bevin to the Earl oj Listowel
LlPOfilug: f 27

SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, J June I947

F 6535/905/G
Dear Listowel,

My attention has been drawn to a decision reached on the 2nd May by the
India and Burma Cabinet Committee, on which at that time we were not
represented, which conflicts with the advice given by the Foreign Office as a
result of discussions between your department and my Legal Adviser.

2. The decision in question, which deals with the proposed treaty providing
for matters arising out of the transfer of power, is contained in paragraph 2(b)
of the meeting on the 2nd May I.B.(47)20th Meeting.1 It is to the effect that the
extent to which the Government of India would assume international obliga¬
tions would be a matter for them to decide and that it would be inadvisable to
include any general provision in this treaty regarding the observance by the
Government of India of obligations under treaties (concluded in the name of the
Crown or of the United Kingdom Government) which can only be fulfilled
in India or only wholly fulfilled if India observes them.

3 . The advice given by my Legal Adviser, in consultation with your depart¬
ment, is contained in paragraph IV(b) of I.B.(47)422 which your predecessor
submitted to the Committee. It is as follows: “ . . . The specific undertaking of

1 Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2, para. (b).

2 The reference should be to Section A(iv) para. 6 of 1.13.(47)42. L/P &J/10/90: ff 12-42.

104

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the new Indian Government should be obtained by Treaty provision that they
will accept and observe all treaties with foreign states concluded in the name of
the Crown or of the Government of the United Kingdom, including those
made by the East India Company, which can only be fulfilled in India or only
wholly fulfilled if India observes them”. This advice was based on the opinion
he gave gave in March 1946 at the request of the India Office (“State Succession
in the matter of Treaties: Obligations of a future Indian Government”) for the
guidance of the Cabinet Mission.3 It also follows the practice we found it
expedient to adopt in the case of our Treaties with Iraq and Transjordan. We
consider that without such an undertaking diplomatic claims and political
difficulties of a grave character were likely to arise for His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment. Our two departments had already, in the circumstances, gone some way
towards producing a draft clause which might be suitable for India.

4. I think you will agree that this is a matter in which it is right that weight
should be given to the experience of our department. I therefore very much
hope that you may be able to persuade the Prime Minister, as Chairman of the
Committee, to have this decision reconsidered and to approve of the adoption
of the procedure recommended in paragraph IV(b) of I. B. (47)42.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST BEVIN

3 See Vol. VI, No. 528.

53

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Rfc/ 1/130: jf 239-41

immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 10.20 pm

confidential Received: 3 June, 10.30 pm

No. 1284-S. My telegram 1277-S.1 Congress point contained in paragraph 5 2
seemed to me so dangerous that it might well have wrecked the whole chance
of agreement, since it was clear that Congress wanted HMG to give an assur¬
ance that Pakistan would be expelled from the Commonwealth if the rest of
India wished to secede.

2. V. P. Menon — whose services in all these negotiations have been beyond
price — rushed round to Patel and pointed out that HMG could never be expec¬
ted to agree to such a proposal which negatives the whole principle of Dom¬
inion Status, and urged him to drop it.

3. I sent for Nehru half an hour before the meeting and told him the same

JUNE I947

105

thing.3 I told him that I did not even intend to mention at the meeting that this
suggestion had been made. Both Patel and Nehru agreed to this course.

4. In the Congress letter the following paragraph also appeared:4 “In para-
graph 11 of the Statement reference is made to a referendum in the N.W.F.
Province. There has been a growing demand in the Province for independence
and subsequent decision as to their relation with the rest of India. The referen¬
dum should also provide for this.” V. P. Menon pointed out to Patel and I
pointed out to Nehru that since it was at Nehru’s own request that I had
dropped the original proposal to allow every province to vote for Pakistan,
Hindustan or independence, they could hardly expect me to reintroduce it at
this stage. Nehru quite openly admitted that the N.W.F.P. could not possibly
stand by itself, and it became clear to me that this was a device to free Khan
Sahib’s party from the odium of being connected with Congress during the
Referendum period, since Nehru spoke about Khan Sahib wishing to join the
Union of India at a subsequent stage. I told Nehru I had no intention of raising
this at the meeting, and he accepted my ruling on this.

5. He also asked that the Referendum should be based on Adult Franchise. I
told him that this was quite impracticable in the time available, and rejected it.

6. Jinnah’s great point was that a Referendum should be held in Bengal in
order to give the Scheduled Castes the chance of showing that they sided with
the Muslims and not Caste Hindus. I presented him with all the arguments
against this with which Burrows had provided me, and told him I had no
intention of raising this at the meeting.5 He accepted my ruling.

7. Baldev Singh wanted the instructions to the Boundary Commission
included in the printed plan, and wished them to take Sikh interests more fully
into consideration.6 I rejected this at the meeting and he accepted my ruling.

8. One of my difficulties has been to prevent the leaders from talking too
much. For example, Liaquat started an attack on Gandhi in the second meeting7
which nearly wrecked the proceedings. When I think of the number of points
over which the meetings could have been shipwrecked, I realise how miracu¬
lously lucky we have been.

9. At the end of the meeting I handed them a copy of a paper on the adminis¬

trative consequences of partition,8 much on the lines I left with you drafted by
Christie to which I had added a preliminary statement9 to the effect that
parliamentary legislation setting up two Dominions would be introduced in
Parliament during the current session and that the Act would contain a pro-
1 No. 38. 2 i.e. No. 35, para. 13.

3 For a further account of this meeting with Pandit Nehru see No. 91, para. 23.

4 No. 35, para. 12. 5 See No. 91, para. 18. 6 See No. 36. 7 No. 39.

8 Annex II to No. 28. 9 Annex I to No. 28.

io6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

vision enabling me to bring it into operation at any time thereafter. It was my
intention that the Act should be brought into operation not later than August
15 th 1947. I purposely mentioned a very early date for tactical reasons as I am
anxious to make them realize that they must move quickly and that vital
decisions would have to be taken in the very near future. I have given them
copies of the paper to take away with them and I have arranged to meet them
again at 10 o’clock on Tursday morning, June 5th, in order to have a general
discussion on the items contained therein, before taking it in Cabinet at 6 p.m.
on Friday.

10. The meeting agreed that Auchinleck should be invited to broadcast in
the near future a steadying message to the armed forces giving them a broad
outline of their future. I told the leaders that the working committees would
have to give Auchinleck answers on several points such as whether the Army
was to be divided on a geographical or communal basis, and whether a Muslim
soldier living in Bombay would serve the Hindustan or Pakistan army, and if
the latter, whether he would have to transfer his domicile. It was clear from the
reactions at the meeting that none of the leaders present had even begun to
think of the complications with which we are all going to be faced. Perhaps this
is lucky, since it will enable us to hold the initiative in Viceroy’s House during
the coming difficult period.

Repeated to all Governors and to Governor of Burma.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal , Partition of Part 11(a)

important new Delhi, 3 June 1947 , 10 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

1287-S. Your 142-S of 2nd June.1 It now appears that League will acquiesce in
the scheme. I hope you will be able to persuade Suhrawardy to form a Coalition
Ministry. I may be able to see him myself before he returns to Calcutta and if
so will work on him.

1 No. 33.

JUNE I947

107

55

Mr Abell to Mr Turnbull
Telegram , Rffij 1/130: f 242

important new Delhi, 3 June ig47, 10 pm

confidential Received: 3 June , 11.43 pm

1288-S. Menon has ascertained that Congress will not repeat not object to use
of term Dominion in draft bill.

56

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office)

Telegram , L/POI6/i2i: f 30

most immediate India office, 3 June 1947, 7.23 pm

Received: 4 June , 2 am

No. 7185. Following personal from Prime Minister.

Your telegram No. 1282-S1 arrived in time for me to announce this very
good news to Cabinet this morning.2 We agreed that I should send you on
behalf of the whole Cabinet a message of sincere congratulations. We all realise
how much the success achieved to date is due to your own great efforts.

Statement was well received in both Houses this afternoon.3 Winston made a
useful reply.

1 No. 40. 2 No. 42.

3 Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 35-46, and H. of L., vol. 148, 3 June 1947,
cols. 19-28.

57

Text of Broadcast by Mr Attlee on 3 June 1947 at 9 pm D.B.S. T.1

Rffio/i/n: Jf 8-9

announcer: This afternoon the Viceroy broadcast a personal message to the
people of India. Before broadcasting a recording of the Viceroy’s message,2
here is an introduction to it, recorded today by the Prime Minister:

1 The Broadcast went out at 9 pm (Double British Summer Time) on the B.B.C/s Home Service and
at 10 pm (D.B.S.T.) on the Light Programme.

2 No. 44 (the recording began with the second para.).

io8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

prime minister: India, after many centuries of internal disunion, was
united under British rule. It has been a prime object of British policy to main¬
tain the unity which has for so long preserved peace in that great sub-continent.
It has been our hope that this unity might continue when India attained the full
self-government, which has been, for long years, the goal of British policy in
India.

The Cabinet Mission’s plan,3 which we still believe offers the best basis for
solving the Indian problem, was designed to this end. But, as Indian leaders
have finally failed to agree on a plan for a united India, partition becomes the
inevitable alternative, and we will, for our part, give to the Indians all help and
advice in carrying out this most difficult operation. The two-fold purpose of
the plan4 which is now put forward is to make possible the maximum degree of
harmony and cooperation between the Indian political parties, in order that
the partition of India, if decided upon, may involve as little loss and suffering as
possible. And, secondly, to enable the British Government to hand over its
responsibilities in an orderly and constitutional manner at the earliest oppor¬
tunity.

It will, I am sure, be obvious to you all — Indians and British alike — that the
decision having been made to hand over power, the sooner new governments
can be set up to take over the great responsibilities which they are assuming,
the better. In order to accomplish this, the plan provides for the handing over of
power this year to one or two governments of British India, each having dom¬
inion status.

I would make an earnest appeal to everyone to give calm and dispassionate
consideration to these proposals. It is, of course, easy to criticise them, but weeks
of devoted work by the Viceroy have failed to find any alternative that is
practicable. They have emerged from the hard facts of the situation in India;
they are the result of long discussions by the Viceroy with the Indian political
leaders, who will later be broadcasting on the plan. And in putting them forward
the Viceroy has the full support of the British Government. The Indians will, I
believe, recognise that they’re put forward solely in the interests of the Indian
people. They may be assured that whatever course may be chosen by India,
Great Britain and the British people will strive to maintain the closest and
friendliest relations with the Indian people, with whom there has been so long
and fruitful an association.

3 Vol. VII, No. 303.

4 No. 45.

JUNE I947

109

58

Mr V. K. Krishna Menon to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

R/31 1/156: ff 13-14

VERY URGENT 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 June ig47

STRICTLY PERSONAL

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I do hope you feel that your efforts have been successful, and that the first
bridge has been crossed.

(1) Gandhiji had a rather long talk with me yesterday. He is very disturbed.
He has asked to speak to you about certain matters. Some of the difficulties
could have been dealt with, without prejudice to whatever has been achieved,
if we had thought about it. It is important that he should be assured that the
perils on which he is distressed is [are] in your mind. I think that much can be
done to allay his reasonable anxieties.

(2) It is rather a pity that he will speak about them today before I have seen
you and you have time to send for him again. But this cannot be helped and
perhaps will have to be remedied in some other way.

(3) Jawaharlal also had talks with me about the “hereafter” and wants me to
talk them over with you. They involve detail and important issues of principle
which are vital to the furtherance of the success you have achieved. I hear
matters are causing some anxiety.

I shall keep myself available and come over whenever required. Perhaps you
will let me know some time today.

Yours sincerely,

KRISHNA

no

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House , New Delhi , on 4 June

ig47 at 10 am

Opening Remarks by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1

R/j/i/i^o: ff 261-8

Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the Honourable Member for
Information and Broadcasting for coming here and taking the chair at this
Press Conference today.2 1 have no prepared address to deliver nor have I any
notes. I have already delivered my prepared address on the Radio last night.3
Today I propose to confine my few introductory remarks to clear the back¬
ground and then answer any question that you may care to ask.

When I suddenly found myself going to India, we had some preliminary
discussions in London and we settled on a programme that I should spend the
first six months in becoming acquainted with the problems4 and then I should
send my recommendations to HMG to enable them in due course to prepare
the necessary legislation for introduction early in 1948 in Parliament. But when
I arrived out here I discovered almost at once that the one point on which every
community was agreed and on which all the British officials were agreed and
with which I very soon agreed myself was that a decision at the earliest possible
moment as to how we were to transfer power was a prime necessity if we were
to put a stop to communal strife and bring back the atmosphere of peace and
friendliness without which no progress can possibly be made. So, I set to work
harder than I ever remember having done during the war. I saw as many people
as possible. First of all, I gave them background information and then I asked
for their views. My own feeling was that a united India was, of course, the
right answer but only if communal feeling and goodwill allowed it. So, while I
did my very best to get the Cabinet Mission scheme accepted, a scheme which
at one time had been accepted by every community, the riots and bloodshed
throughout the country made the prospects of its acceptance obviously pretty
remote. The Cabinet Mission plan is not an enforceable plan. It depends on
goodwill and mutual cooperation. You cannot make the Cabinet Mission plan
work any more than you can make a horse drink after taking him down to the
water. So, when it became clear that it could not be made to work with the
complete free-will of at least one of the major communities, I started to find
out an alternative. All the Muslim League leaders to whom I spoke made it
absolutely clear that they desired partition. Once that fact was inescapably
established in my mind, my next point was to see whether the Congress would
agree to abandon the principle of unity for which they had stood for so long to
the extent of allowing those areas that did not wish to stand for unity to form a

JUNE I947

III

separate Constituent Assembly. I found that they stuck by the principle of
non-coercion. They said that any province or area which did not wish to come
into the existing Constituent Assembly could form a separate Constituent
Assembly, but they very naturally insisted that no large non-Muslim areas
should be brought into the new Constituent Assembly. When I spoke to Mr
Jinnah and the other Muslim League leaders on that point, they were, of course,
as much distressed as were the Congress leaders at the prospect of the partition.
Mr Jinnah then asked5 whether the same principle would be extended beyond
the Punjab and Bengal. I accepted that, of course. The idea was that if Assam
was to be partitioned, then Sylhet and possibly contiguous areas in which there
is a definite Muslim majority should be separated. I felt from every point of
view that the people of India should take it upon themselves to make up their
own minds what they wanted to do for the future of their country. The next
problem was how to produce the mechanism to ascertain the will of the
people. Clearly the adult franchise plebiscite, would be the democratic idea. But
such a process was utterly impracticable at this moment when we wanted a
very quick answer and speed was the one thing which everybody desired.
Elections were held last year and the Legislative Assemblies appear to me
to be the right people to give a quick decision as to the wishes of the people.
And so we devised the scheme the details of which you have read in the
statement6 made by His Majesty’s Govt. But I want to point out that at every
stage and every step when this plan was developed I worked hand in glove with
the leaders with whom I was ultimately going to discuss the plan. The plan
came as no shock to them and no surprise to them, for although I did not
actually produce a written plan, I continued to make notes when they saw me
and I asked them whether this was the right way or whether that was the right,
and together we gradually constructed a plan which obviously cannot meet the
complete approval of everybody because if it did my services would have been
quite unnecessary. Ages ago the solution would have been found between the

1 The text of Lord. Mountbatten’ s remarks reproduced here is taken from his tel. 324-G.T. of 4 June
to Lord Listowel. The India Office was informed that this text had not been checked by the Viceroy
and was not for publication but could be used for guidance. Important answers to questions would
follow (see No. 60), the delay being due to ‘faulty shorthand recording’. On 9 July in reply to an
enquiry from the Governor’s Secretary, Punjab, the Viceroy’s Private Office explained that they had
‘no verbatim report of the Press Conference’ but enclosed copies of Nos. 59 and 60, adding that the
best press account was contained in the Statesman of 5 June. Campbell-Johnson to Joyce, tel. 323-
G.T. of 4 June; C. P. Scott to Abbott, 9 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence
Files: Transfer of Power, Publicity Arrangements for Announcement of. A copy of the speech,
together with the Questions and Answers (No. 60), edited from transcripts of several shorthand
versions, will be found in Time Only to Look Forward. Speeches of Rear Admiral The Earl Mountbatten
of Burma, (London, Nicholas Kaye, 1949), pp 19-48.

2 See No. 50. 3 No. 44.

4 See e.g. Vol IX, Enclosure to No. 543, fifth para.

5 Possibly a reference to Vol. X, No. 116, eighth para.

6 No. 45.

1 12

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

leaders themselves. The only service I can claim has been to try as honestly and
as impartially as possible to reconcile the various points of view and find out to
what extent their views meet the views of the other parties.

There are two main parties to this plan — the Congress and the Muslim
League, but another community much less numerous but of great importance —
the Sikh community — have of course to be considered. I found that it was
mainly at the request of the Sikh community that Congress had put forward the
Resolution on the partition of the Punjab,7 and you will remember that in the
words of that Resolution they wished the Punjab to be divided between pre¬
dominantly Muslim and non-Muslim areas. It was therefore on that Resolution,
which the Sikhs themselves sponsored, that this division has been provided for.
I was not aware of all the details when this suggestion was made but when I
sent for the map and studied the distribution of the Sikh population under this
proposal, I must say that I was astounded to find that the plan which they had
produced divided their community into two almost equal parts. I have spent a
great deal of time both out here and in England in seeing whether there was any
solution which would keep the Sikh community more together without
departing from the broad and easily understood principle, the principle which
was demanded on the one side and was conceded on the other. I am not a
miracle worker and I have not found that solution. All I have been able to say
is that the leaders of the respective communities shall appoint a committee
which will draw up the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission which
has been suggested in the Plan.8 The Boundary Commission shall have repre¬
sentatives of all the parties. So far as it is humanly possible there will be no
interference or dictation by the British Government. If we can be of service in
advancing impartial views and helping in this work, we shall not be afraid to do
so, but this is your country and it is up to you to decide what to do with it. The
most gratifying part of the whole procedure has been the absolute determina¬
tion of every responsible leader with whom I have spoken that whatever the
solution finally adopted it was going to be adopted peacefully and without any
bloodshed, and they were going to throw all their weight to stop any further
trouble. Every single member of my Cabinet individually and together has
expressed to me the strongest possible wish that the Armed Forces of India
should be used to ensure that there was no further bloodshed, and that is the
reason and the only reason why the Defence Member, Sardar Baldev Singh,
announced last night the transfer of additional troops particularly into the areas
about to be partitioned, the most important being the move of the Fourth
Infantry Division into the areas which are about to be partitioned in the Punjab.
I do not need to tell you that this is not a British move.

Now comes probably the most interesting of all the developments in the
course of these very high-speed talks. After a while it became apparent to me
that next to an acceptable solution or settlement all leaders wanted speed in the

JUNE 1947

113

actual transfer of power. All leaders were anxious to assume their full responsi¬
bility at the earliest possible moment, and I was anxious to let them do so,
because once the decision has been taken, why should we wait? Waiting would
only mean that I should be responsible ultimately for law and order whereas in
point of fact however much you may talk about responsibility it is never the
same thing unless you are really legally and completely in control.9 How to
produce that very quickly was a legal conundrum of the first order. You cannot
transfer power to one or two separate Governments unless those Governments
have a constitution. One of the Governments was not even in being, nor was it
certain it was coming into being. The other Government would presumably
take some time in framing their constitution because [a] constitution is a thing
which should not be hurried as it has to be there for all time. Therefore I was
faced with the first difficulty : was I to turn over to two Governments without a
constitution? If not, was there any other constitution which can be possibly
used for the time being, and I do not think I need tell you, because you have
studied this problem very closely, that the Government of India Act 1935
provided the obvious answer. Some of the best brains had framed that Act.
When the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, was in the Witness Box of the
Joint Select Committee, he answered up to 15,000 questions on this Act and
he was able to answer every one to the satisfaction of the questioner without
having to alter the framework of the Act. That is a very remarkable achieve¬
ment, and that is the Act which will ultimately confer Dominion Status. That is
the Act under which the Government has been functioning up-to-date and
that is the Act which will be worked until such time as the two respective
Governments have made up their minds in regard to what sort of constitution
they want and what sort of amendments they will require in the Act in the
meanwhile. I rather labour this point because I would not be a bit surprised if
some of you would get up and say quote the British are not going to quit at all ;
they are just dropping us into Dominion Status unquote. You are entitled to
think that until I have given my explanation. I hope you will not think in that
strain after I have given my explanation. I can assure you that it is the only
solution of the problem, and if you want a proof of that, do you imagine for a
moment that the responsible political parties could accept such a suggestion if it
was not the only sound solution on which we could proceed ? The curious part
is, as you know, that independence through Dominion Status is complete and
the different administrations are at liberty to opt out of the Commonwealth
whenever they please. Therefore, I mean it most sincerely when I say that power

7 See Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 511, Item 3. 8 See No. 28, Annex II, paras. 5 and 8(i).

9 According to the Statesman this passage read:

‘Waiting would only mean that I should be responsible ultimately for law and order and the
general conduct of Government. In point of fact, however much you might use the Interim Govern¬
ment, it would never be the same thing unless they were legally in control of the responsibility.’ cf.
the Statesman , 5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 5.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

114

will be transferred as completely this year as it ever would have been by June
1948. It is a true anticipation of the transfer of power and I hope with this
added advantage that instead of the British having — I mean the officials — to
get out by a certain date, whether the Indians wanted it or not — and I put it to
you that although in theory some of the officers might have remained if you
asked them — they would have had to resign their commissions and they would
not have been re-employed back home.10 So in practice this solution enables the
Indians to pick whom they want to stay here, for how long, on what terms of
service and the rest of it. The British will leave whenever they are told to leave.
It may be we shall all be out by the end of this year. It may be that it may be
useful for some of the British to stay on. But the one thing [that] would have
been wrong to say [was] that we are going out and we are going to leave you in
this mess and we are not going to give you any help. That would have been
inexcusable. This means that the British will stay so long as they can be of use
and when they are not wanted they will go exactly when they are asked to go.
I cannot really put it in a fairer proposition, I fear, to the people of India, [sic] .

Now there is a third party to all these negotiations and that is the party
which sits in London, Whitehall, and are legally and constitutionally respon¬
sible. I refer to His Majesty’s Government. And so I took the opportunity of
flying home to see them. I arrived home at lunch time on a Monday, some
sixteen days ago. By tea time I was right in the midst of the India-Burma
Cabinet Committee11 going strong. The idea of a Dominion Status solution
was completely novel because it had originally nothing to do with this plan
wdiich never contained paragraph 20. I brought it home as a surprise. The
immediate answer was that it would take six or seven months to frame the
necessary Act, to introduce the legislation, to pass it through the whole Com¬
mittee stages and get it accepted. I asked the Prime Minister if he would
kindly produce the necessary legislation in this session — that means within the
next two months. The session finishes in about two months time.12 He said he
would do his best and invited me to come back the following day. The Lord
Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown were there13 with the first
rough outline of the new Act on which they had worked all night. The only
thing that will delay the working of this Act is the uncertainty about what the
provinces are going to decide. Until, in fact, the people of India have outlined
their own future and the shape of any separate State, the final terms of the Act
cannot be drawn. But they can all keep the Act ready in skeleton form, filling
in the bits of information that come. Then by agreement of the Opposition —
as you heard in the statement made in the House by the Leader of the Opposi¬
tion14 — this Bill will be rushed through in record time. If in fact a complete Act
of Parliament of this complexity and importance can be framed and passed into
law from start to finish in a matter of two months, I am told it will be a legis¬
lative record, and I think it is because of the measure of extreme goodwill that

JUNE I947

US

exists among all parties in England today and the sincerity of the feeling they
have for the good of India that this can be achieved.

10 This passage is not grammatical, but Lord Mountbatten’s meaning evidently was that, instead of
British officials having to leave, they would be able to continue in service (if the Indians wanted
them) without difficulty because they would be serving a Dominion under the Crown rather than
a foreign power.

11 Vol. X, No. 485.

12 The Times of India (5 June 1947, p- i» col. 5) reported Lord Mountbatten as having said that: ‘He
expected to see the legislation passed in Parliament by August 15 this year’.

13 Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2.

14 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 41-3.

Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi,

on 4 June 1947

Questions and Answers1

jR/j/ 1/150: ff 272-81

Q. Is Your Excellency in a position to say whether Mr. Jinnah has accepted the
plan ?

A. The position about Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League is this. By the
Constitution and precedents of the Muslim League no final decision is taken
until the Muslim League Council has an opportunity of taking that decision. I
am not going to say anything today to prejudice the free discussion of that
Council. I will put it this way. I took full personal responsibility for men¬
tioning about it in my broadcast after my conversation with Mr. Jinnah. I do
not want you to twist that in such a manner as to make it difficult for the Muslim
League.

Q. Reference the Indian States, in view of the fact that there are two Con¬
stituent Assemblies likely to come into existence, is it open to any of the
Indian States to choose to come into either or into neither if they wish to remain
units of the British Commonwealth?

A. The answer is that the policy about the Indian States is contained in
Para 18.2 That is to say, that the policy of HMG remains unchanged and that
has been made clear in the declaration of May 12, 1946, 3 and if you read that

1 The text of the Questions and Answers reproduced here is taken from Lord Mountbatten’s tel.
326-G.T. of 5 June to Lord Listowel. The same limitations on its use applied to it as to the Viceroy’s
opening remarks (see No. 59, note 1), and the India Office was further informed that the Questions
and Answers contained in it were ‘only a selection of the more important ones.’ Campbell-Johnson
to Joyce, tel. 1313-S of 5 June and tel. 331-G.T. of 6 June. L/I/1/768: ff 271-2.

2 Of No. 45. 3 Vol. VII, No. 262.

ii 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

memorandum you will see that by the time the date comes to transfer power, it
will be my duty to hand back paramountcy to each of the States.

After that the States are free agents to enter either Constituent Assembly or
make such other arrangements as they deem necessary.

I think you also asked me whether they could enter the Commonwealth
separately as Dominions. The answer is that they cannot, as Dominions. If you
ask me whether they can have any relations with the Commonwealth apart
from that, that is a hypothetical question, which has not yet arisen. If it does I
will have to refer it to HMG.

Q. I do not want to embarrass Your Excellency. Even the Congress Working
Committee has also to consult the All India Congress Committee and we find
that Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader, has stated that the statement is not
very satisfactory. My point is whether His Excellency has received from each
of the three leaders the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikhs, that
measure of support which gives him the satisfaction that when these matters are
referred to their bigger bodies they will receive satisfactory ratification or
whether H.E. is feeling more satisfied in the case of one and less in the case of the
other?

A. Let us put it this way. I am the person who is carrying the responsibility
of going ahead with tills business. If I have gone ahead it is because I feel that
that was the right thing to do. If you are trying to find out what was given to
me in confidence I am not going to be taken in for the simple reason that I do
not want to prejudice the deliberations that may be carried out by the various
parties. The main point is and I repeat it, that I have gone ahead and I have
taken, if you like, the risk in doing so but I have spent the last five years in
taking what you might call calculated risks.

Q. Will it be open to any Province which may be participating in either
Constituent Assembly to feel free, after the constitution is framed, to vote itself
out of one union and join the other or join neither?

A. The answer is that after discussing this particular point with the leaders of
both the parties I find that the leaders do not wish to have any other option
than to join one or the other of the constituent assemblies for the good and
sufficient reason that they do not wish this plan to encourage what I might call
‘Balkanisation’.

Q. I should like Your Excellency to clear up a point of procedure. The object
of the Boundary Commissions is to carry out the wishes of the individual areas
concerned. I should have thought that the proper authority for doing this would
be the Constituent Assemblies of the two States. It is for them to assume this
responsibility.

A. The question is a good one but the Answer is ‘Speed’. To begin with, it is
not certain how long it would take to set up Constituent Assemblies for the two
parts of India. The function of the committee4 which will be set up in this

JUNE I947

II 7

connection is to give instructions. It will not prejudge the issue at all. I should
take the Chair at the first meeting of the Committee and I shall probably
express no views at all about it. All the way through, what I am trying to do
with my staff is to be of service in working the mechanism. I do not like to take
the driver’s seat myself. I will give you an example. The first thing I did
yesterday before broadcasting was to hand round a paper5 to the leaders which
simply showed them the necessary decisions which will have to be taken on
points of detail in regard to partition and the subjects which I suggested they
should take up. This is in relation to what I may call the administrative con¬
sequences of partition, although partition is not yet decided upon. If there is no
partition the problem is comparatively simple. I am really trying to get ahead
and be of the best possible service to you. I am only thinking out the problems.
It is for you to say how you would like them to be solved and we can help you
in the process. I want to assure you that there are two reasons why I sincerely
want the Indians themselves to settle this problem. The first is that this is your
own problem and secondly there is absolutely no desire on our part to interfere
in any way with the most suitable method that Indians themselves may adopt
for this purpose.

Q. The question is how to keep the integrity of the Sikh community intact.
What is the provision that you have made in this plan to keep the integrity of
the Sikh people intact ?

A. I must point out that the people who asked for the partition were the
Sikhs. The Congress took up their request and framed the Resolution6 in the
form they wanted. They wanted the Punjab to be divided into predominantly
Muslim and non-Muslim areas. I have done exactly what the Sikhs requested
me to do through the Congress. The request came to me as a tremendous shock
as I like the Sikhs, I am fond of them and I wish them well. I started thinking
out a formula to help them but I am not a magician. I am an ordinary human
being. I believe that it is the Indians who have got to find out a solution. You
cannot expect the British to solve all your problems. I can only help you to
arrive at the correct solution. A lot can be done by a Chairman but he cannot
impose a decision on anyone. It is up to the Sikhs who are represented on the
Committee to take up the case. It is not I who is responsible for asking for
partition.

Q. Howr is it that in the case of Bengal and the Punjab the legislators have
been asked to decide which Constituent Assembly they should join, but a
different procedure has been proposed in the case of the N.W.F.P. where the
electors wrill have to decide the issue ?

A. The reason for that is contained in the paragraph7 which has been
appropriately worded and in addition to that please remember that in the case

4 See No. 28, Annex II, para. 5. 5 See Nos. 28 and 39.

6 Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 511, Item 3. 7 i.e. para. 11 of No. 45.

1 1 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of the N.W.F.P. there is the heaviest weightage for the minority community
which is not to [be] found in any other province of India. So much so, that out
of fifty six seats twelve or thirteen have been given to the minorities, although
they represent only something like five per cent. In fact, you have got a weight-
age of four times the number of minorities. That is one reason. The other reason
is that it is a perfectly straightforward referendum on this particular question.

Q. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor General
and in consultation with the provincial Governor [? Government].8 Does the
Provincial Governor [ ? Government] mean the Governor [ ? Government] in
consultation with the Ministry or the Governor alone ?

A. It means that I am going to send up officers whom I am going to select
myself.9 1 am proposing to select British officers in the Indian Army who speak
the language and who never had anything to do with politics ; so far as I know,
they have no interest in politics. I am trying to get such impartial men to go
out to these places to assure a complete impartial referendum.

Q. If the result of the referendum in the N.W.F.P. goes against the Muslim
League and the League consequently tries to withdraw its acceptance, then may
I know whether Your Excellency would advise the British Government to
force this plan, or alter the same to suit the sweet will of the Muslim League ?

A. The question as far as I can make out is this : If the referendum in the
N.W.F.P. goes in favour of the Congress instead of the Muslim League, will I
agree to the Muslim League going back on this plan. The answer is that
referendum in the Frontier Province is a matter of six to eight weeks. Long
before the referendum to the N.W.F.P. is finished, the Muslim League will
have taken its decision.

Q. Will ‘negotiations on the administrative consequences’ also include
immediate negotiations with reference to Indian States ?

A. The Indian States will be given every facility to negotiate as quickly as
they desire. In my opinion, for what it is worth, it will have to be done on the
interim basis of standstill agreement. Let me give you a very simple example in
history. The last partition of this sort occurred in Ireland. After the division
between Northern and Southern Ireland was complete, you will be surprised to
hear that the Irish have not finished making all their agreements. Among others
there was no agreement over the railways. But you think one train stopped on
that account? They ran on. The General Managers rang each other up and said
we would go on the basis of a standstill agreement. Gradually the thing has
been built up. The world is really a sensible place once you get heat out of it
unless I have a complete wrong estimate of the Indian Cabinet.

Q. If communal strifes in provinces do not subside in spite of HMG’s
announcement of their plan and Your Excellency’s appeal to the people of
India, will Your Excellency allow the Centre to intervene for quelling the
disturbances ?

JUNE I947

119

A. I have already discussed this. With the knowledge of the Home Member
I am in a position to tell you that there has been a unanimous decision in the
Cabinet that we shall not allow any more violence or strife.8 9 10 Sardar Baldev
Singh broadcast as Defence Member on that point yesterday.11 There have been
many times when there have been more troops. Now we know the bad spots
and there the troops are being sent. The Centre has therefore already inter¬
vened in the most effective way possible by passing a unanimous decision in the
Interim Government not to tolerate any more violence.

Q. When you withdraw paramountcy, would you regard that sovereignty
would thereafter vest with the princes or the people of the States, because there
is the British Labour Party in power?

A. It is no question of parties in power. It is a question as to with whom the
treaties were made. This is a matter for lawyers. I must know exactly what the
legal position is. Please remember that treaties if they are going to be honoured
must be honoured in the letter.

Q. You are aware that some of the States have joined the Constituent
Assembly. What will be their position after this statement of HMG, whether
they will be free to join either Constituent Assembly and they will be allowed
to do so?

A. The States are at liberty to send their duly qualified representatives to the
existing constituent assembly or if they so desire to the other constituent
assembly if formed. If they are already in the existing constituent assembly they
have come into it to take part in the work of framing the constitution. In
passing I would refer to the “Hindustan Times'’ report today on the question
whether the Legislative Assembly or the Constituent Assembly would be the
body to deal with this matter. In my opinion it can only be the Constituent
Assembly. The Legislative Assembly contains European Members whereas the
position will not be so in the Constituent Assemblies. The weightage will be in
exact proportion to the populations of the territories which form the two States.
It automatically provides the same amount of representation for such States as
join the Constituent Assemblies. So, I assume that the two Constituent Assem¬
blies will deal with this — I say I assume because these things have still got to be
considered.

Q. In view of the decision to leave and to partition India I feel that it is
absolutely essential that on the question of Dominion Status there should be a

8 cf. No. 45, para. 11, last sentence.

9 See No. 49.

10 On 6 May 1947, at the conclusion of a discussion on a scheme of insurance against civil commotion

and riot risks, the Indian Cabinet ‘agreed that if violence broke out in any part of the country in

future it should be put down with a firm hand, and that His Excellency should take the necessary
action to this end, consulting the Cabinet beforehand where time permitted.’ Mountbatten Papers,
Minutes of Indian Cabinet Meetings, Case No. 129/28/47. See also Vol. X, No. 354, para. 26.

No. 48.

11

120

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

declaration which is more specific than is contained in paragraph 20. In fact
paragraph 20 is perhaps the only disappointing paragraph in the plan. It is
possible that it is a matter of drafting. It is absolutely essential that it should be
made quite clear that in regard to Dominion Status you make no overtures to
or accept no overtures from fragments of India.12

A. If you people meet together and ask for one single Dominion Status that
can be done. But if you insist on two States what are we going to do? I do not
quite follow. I am not trying to be funny. If there is one India then we can
transfer power to one India. If there are two parts, then we must transfer power
to two parts. What else can we do?

Q. I am sorry I did not make myself clear. There is a great potential for
mischief in regard to Dominion Status once you are prepared to deal with
different parts of India in regard to the final choice about membership of the
Commonwealth.

A. What you mean is that [ ? what happens if] as a result of paragraph 20, one
part comes in and the other does not.

Q. You should reject any offer on the part of any single individual State to
become a Dominion. You should not also make any efforts to induce any
separate state of India to come into the Commonwealth. You should insist on
India as a whole coming to a decision on the question of membership of the
Commonwealth or not.

A. That is exactly the point. We won’t allow any separate part of India to
come into the Commonwealth. But if the whole of India decides to break into
two independent states, they could both come in. Before this paragraph was
framed I had most careful talks with the leaders of parties. It was only then that
I discovered that this particular solution was one that commended itself as a
fair and just one — the only solution for speedy transfer of power which both
parties desired. I must say that I do honestly think that we have done everything
in our power to meet the very point you have mentioned.

Q. It is said here13 that the respective constituent assemblies have the right
to ultimately elect to remain within the British Commonwealth or not. I want
to point out that there is mischief in that provision ?

A. I absolutely disagree. The British Commonwealth of Nations is a com¬
pletely free association of peoples. Each State is completely independent. There
is absolutely no sort of power that I know of to force them to stay in if they
want to go out. The whole essence of independence is that you must have
complete freedom to do what you like. I would again repeat that the British
Commonwealth of Nations is a free association of different nations and the
British Government have no control over them. The only connecting link is the
King. I honestly think that we have done all we can to transfer power and to
give each of the Indian States the greatest possible measure of freedom.

Q. May I know whether the Congress leaders and the League leaders have

JUNE I947

121

agreed, as was pointed out by Mr. Devadas Gandhi in the particular sentence
which he quoted, that the two States can remain members of the British
Commonwealth, because Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru very recently made it
emphatically clear that they would not like any foreign power to have bases in
any part of India. I would like to know whether that particular clause in this
statement has the approval of the party leaders ?

A. It is good that you have put that question. It is known all over the world
that so far as the British Commonwealth of Nations is concerned, you cannot
compel any part to remain inside it, if it wants to go out.

Q. Nobody objects to interim dominion status. Suppose there are two
constituent Assemblies. Is it open to one of them to declare itself absolutely
independent and the other to declare itself a dominion? That is the point that
Mr. Devadas Gandhi made.

A. If you grant independence and at the same time try to impose restrictions,
the independence becomes a mockery.

Q. Will the Governor General be appointed on the advice of the Dominion
Governments ? If so, is there any bar against there being separate Governors
General for the two States?

A. The moment any State acquires dominion status, it chooses its own
Governor General. That Governor General is chosen by the Prime Minister of
the Government or [? of] the Dominion concerned. He submits his name to the
King, who being a constitutional monarch may discuss it but finally acts on the
advice of the Government concerned. We have many examples of that. It is
complete and absolute freedom to do exactly what you like.

There is one more point which I was asked and which I have not
yet answered. I was asked whether HMG were to make no provision for the
protection of the minorities, because it is not referred to in this pact [plan]. [The
position about minorities is that since the desire of the British to quit power is
not going to be effected quickly, there is some reason that the British can afford
protection to the minorities. But I should like to add that on the question of the
minorities I have talked to the principal leaders and I am absolutely certain that
so long as the power rests with me to look after the interests of the minorities,
I will use it as a matter of conscience, honour and fair play.]14 1 have also talked

12 cf. No. 35, para. 13. The questioner here and for the next two or three Questions was probably Mr
Devadas Gandhi: see A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mounthatten, (London, Robert Hale Ltd.,
1951), p. 109.

13 i.e. in the last sentence of No. 45, para. 20.

14 The report in the Statesman , 5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 6, corresponding to the passage in square brackets,
reads as follows :

‘The British decision to quit was not insincere. Since this was so, they had no legal means to
enforce any protection for the minorities. But he had talked to the leaders of the country and was
absolutely certain that, so long as they were in power, “they personally mean to look after the
interests of the minorities as a matter of conscience, honour and fair play.” ’

122

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

to them and told them if I could help them in any way. I have told the leaders
of the minorities to see me while I am here and I will do my best to help them. I
have got great faith in the future of India and that faith remains. I do believe
that the minorities are going to have fair play and a decent chance in the
country.

Q. May I ask whether each Dominion will have full responsibility for its own
defences ?

A. Basically, each State, when it gets its independence, is wholly and solely
responsible for its own defence. I must tell you that the process of partition of
forces, if it is to be done in a way that will not cause the collapse of the morale
and the disintegration of the army, must be done in an orderly and well-
disciplined manner. When the partition has taken place, the States are absolutely
at liberty whether they want to get together and have a combined plan for the
defence of India or whether they want to make their own simple plan for co¬
ordination. From all the questions that have been asked, there is one thing
which I sincerely believe is not yet clear to the people. Somehow people seem
to have some doubts about this word “Dominion Status”. It is absolute inde¬
pendence in every possible way, with the sole exception that the Member
States of Commonwealth are linked together, in effect they look for support
from each other and they are pulled together in mutual trust and in due course
affection.

I would like to conclude with one more word. 1 am really sincere in my
desire to help the Sikhs; I really believe that the leaders of both the parties are
equally sincere and intend to do what they can to help them. In fact I think there
will be a revolution in feeling; whereas before there was mistrust and strife. I
think we are going to see the leaders come together in a friendly spirit of
co-operation.

One more word. In putting out your news and your leading articles [? I
hope] you will all aim at one thing — peaceful, quick and speedy settlement
which all of us so sincerely desire.

6 1

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rfe/i/i 70: f 18

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd June1 about the referendum in
the N.W.F.P. I have informed Dr. Khan Sahib of what you have written.

2. Dr. Khan Sahib’s immediate question was about the change in Governors

JUNE I947

123

in the N.W.F.P. This matter has been before you for some time now.2 There
has been progressive deterioration in the relations between the Provincial
Government and the Governor and it is hardly possible to carry on the adminis¬
tration with this continuous conflict going on. You know how strongly the
Provincial Ministry feel about this.

3. Quite independently of that Ministry and for reasons connected with
External Affairs Department, I have been suggesting a change of Governors
even before you assumed charge of the Viceroyalty.3 My experience during the
last nine months has convinced me of this and I feel that any delay in this is
harmful. Indeed this applies to some other senior officers also serving in the
Tribal Areas. I have had personal experience of them both during my visit to
the Frontier and later, and I feel that they are totally unsuited for their present
positions.

4. For the present, however, I should like to draw your particular attention
to the case of the Governor. You will find, if you have the opportunity to do so,
that there is very wide-spread feeling in this matter quite apart from any party
or group. This exists in many circles which have come in contact with the
present Governor of the N.W.F.P. during the past years in Delhi and else¬
where.

The part that Sir Olaf Caroe played as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar in
193 o4 when there was large-scale shooting and killing of peaceful demonstrators
still evokes bitter memories.

5. I would beg of you, therefore, to give urgent consideration to this matter.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 49. 2 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 108, para. 7, 114, 133 and 325.

3 Vol. IX, No. 549.

4 For an account of the incident which may have been in Pandit Nehru’s mind see: Transcript of

B. B.C. recording of an autobiographical memoir by Sir O. Caroe, pages 90-91 (MSS. EUR.

C. 273/5) in conjunction with the India Office file No. 1897 of 1930 (L/P &J/6/2003).

62

Mr Fraser to Viscount Addison
Telegram , L/P &Jjioj8i: J 367

immediate 4 June 1947, 4.32 pm

Received: 4 June , 8.30 am

No. 109. Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, (repeated High
Commissioner for New Zealand in London).

124

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

No. 993.

I have just given statement contained in my immediately following message
to the press. Would you please give a copy to Mr Attlee, and convey to him
my congratulations on the success which has attended the announcement by the
Viceroy and himself?

63

Mr Fraser to Viscount Addison
Telegram , L/P&Jlio/Si: f 368

mmedi ate 4 June 1947, 5.18 pm

Received: 4 June , 10.30 am
No. no. Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs London No. no,
repeated High Commissioner for New Zealand in London No. 994.

Following is text of press statement on India. Begins.

In commenting upon the Viceroy’s statement on India, the Prime Minister,
Right Honourable P. Fraser, said that the New Zealand Government had been
following recent developments with close attention, and particularly those
relating to the process by which India is to assume independence. “I consider”,
said Mr. Fraser, “that as a means to expedite that process the United Kingdom
Government are taking the right course in proposing to introduce legislation
during the coming session for the transfer of power on the basis of Dominion
status. As a member of the British Commonwealth, New Zealand is naturally
and deeply interested in any decision designed to give India or parts of India
the same privileges as we ourselves enjoy. It is, however, not for us to advise
India as to whether she should remain within the fellowship of the Common¬
wealth or separate herself from it. On behalf of the New Zealand Government,
however, I would like to make it abundantly clear that we in New Zealand
would welcome the continuation of our partnership with India on this new
basis. I would like to add”, said Mr. Fraser, “that the people of the British
Dominions do not regard Dominion status as an imperfect kind of indepen¬
dence. On the contrary it is independence with something added, and not
independence with something taken away. It carries with it membership of a
free and powerful association, from which every element of constraint has
vanished, but one in which a way has been found for the practice of mutual
confidence and co-operation in the full respect for the independence, sovereignty
and individuality of each member. The New Zealand Government therefore,
in acclaiming the approaching consummation of India’s independence, express
the hope that that independence may be exercised within the British Common-

JUNE 1947

125

wealth of Nations, to the greatly increased benefit of all members of the
Commonwealth and of the whole world, and they assure the people of India
in all circumstances of their friendship and goodwill.” Ends.1

1 For General Smuts’s statement commenting on the announcement of 3 June see No. 87. Reports of
statements made by the Canadian Prime Minister on 3 June and by the Australian Minister for
External Affairs on 6 June may be found on L/PO/6/121: ff 7-9. Mr Mackenzie King said that:
‘The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and good will of the Govern¬
ment and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve self-government’. Dr Evatt commented,
inter alia , that: ‘Australia’s view on broader problems confronting India must remain as expressed in
my statement to House on 26th February last when I said that Australia, as member of British
Commonwealth enjoying status of complete freedom of autonomy in both domestic and foreign
policies, looked forward to achievement by India of similar status and similar freedom. Peoples of
India could pursue all their national aspirations while maintaining link by which all members of
British Commonwealth are bound together. Complete severing of links which join British and
Indian peoples would be greatly prejudicial to them both and to all mankind.’

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Nawab of Bhopal
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: States , Relations with , Part 1(b)

4 June 1947

My dear Nawab Sahib,

I write to acknowledge Your Highness’ letter of the 3rd June, 1947, 1 tendering
your resignation of the Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes. I am very
sorry to learn of the decision at which Your Highness has arrived, but I presume
that you did not reach it without a very full and careful consideration of the
whole position. In the circumstances I feel that the only course open to me is to
accept Your Highness’ resignation, though I do so with regret.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 Not traced.

126

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

65

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

Telegram , i^/3/1/151: ff 110-11

important 4 June 1947 , 4.4s pm

confidential Received : 5 June , 4 am

No. CA/105. Your telegram 1223-S of 31st May para. No. 9.1

Premier is still absent but I have discussed with Qazi Attaullah and Mehr
Chand position arising in this province as a result of announcement.2 As
anticipated they have taken position suggested in my telegrams CA 92 of 27th
May and 98 of 30th May.3 They say that Ministry will never accept issue as
stated in para. No. 4 of announcement. They have decided against joining
Hindustan and issue for them is between (a) independent Pathanistan and (b)
joining new Constituent Assembly for Pakistan.

They add that release of Abdul Qayum and Samin Jan referred to in my
telegram CA 99 of 3 1st May4 was result of negotiations with these League
Leaders in hope that revised issue as Ministry wished it to stand should be put
before Jinnah, in which case they would have agreed to coalition. They add that
if referendum is on issue as stated in para. No. 4 of announcement Khudai
Khidmatgar Party (it is significant that they no longer refer to it as Congress)
will decline to take part in voting. They are preparing representation to be sent
to Governor-General. They envisage separate Constituent Assembly for
NWFP with a larger number of members which according to them would
place province in stronger position to make good bargain with Pakistan.

2. I informed them that issue whether NWFP could stand alone had already
been considered, with result that definite decision had been reached that it
could not, and I saw no hope of revision. They referred to para. 21 of announce¬
ment, and asked me to (gr. om.) [^forward] views of Ministry, which I under¬
took to do.

3 . I have no doubt that Premier, when he returns, will take same line, and it
is unlikely that Governor-General will be able to secure cooperation of Ministry
in putting referendum through. Qazi Attaullah also (gr. om.) that holding of
referendum on present issue might lead to Ministry’s resignation. I should
expect them in any case to use private army to reduce as far as possible number
of voters at poll.

M5 Question of legality of referendum without legal cover was also raised.
I said that point had already been examined by law officers6 and it had been

JUNE 1947

127

decided that legality could not be challenged. Point that referendum was
dependent on Punjab decisions mentioned in para. 11 was also made and
countered by my saying that this did not prevent activity going ahead without
delay.

5. Ministry’s representation will be fo warded as soon as received, but it seems
that time should not be lost in public statement that issue (? gr. om.) (?is) that
stated in para. 4 of statement.

6. Qazi Attaullah added that Ministry considered making point on receipt of
Viceroy’s letter 1446 (3) of 10th May,7 but did not do so. Fact that they did not
take this opportunity is weak point in their case, for substantial issue was clearly
stated in that letter.

1 i.e. No. 15, para. 12. 2 No. 45.

3 In these telegrams Sir O. Caroe warned that there might be an attempt to interpret the terms of the
announcement as allowing the N.W.F.P. the option to vote for a separate N.W.F.P. Constituent
Assembly. R/3/1/151: ff 86, 88.

4 No. 14.

5 New para, should presumably begin here, though number not shown in original.

6 See No. 15, note 3.

7 This was a letter from Lord Mountbatten to Sir O. Caroe in similar terms to his letter of the same
date to Pandit Nehru (Vol. X, No. 384). R/3/1/151: f 47.

Mr Campbell-] ohnson to Captain Brockman
RI31I1I156: f 12

4 June ig47

Captain Brockman

I. FIRST REPORTS OF WORLD REACTIONS JUST COME IN FROM REUTERS

Acceptance of Plan1 front page news in all American Press.

Paris says : —

“Leading French Government Officials are saying it is a great triumph
for British Statesmanship.”

Smuts has said : —

“The approval of Churchill2 stamps the Settlement as a National one,
and I assume it will be approved by the British Commonwealth.

2. reactions to h.e.’s press conference3 are quite the most enthu¬
siastic I have ever known.

1 No. 45.

2 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June i947> cols. 4I-3-

3 Nos. 59 and 60.

128

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mellor of the Daily Herald describes himself as “stunned by the
performance”, and has never heard anything like it, and does not expect to
do so again.

Stimson of the B.B.C. said it made a most tremendous impression on
Indian and foreign Correspondents, in particular on the Americans, who
have been deeply impressed by the argument that Dominion status pro¬
vided the best constitutional means for transfer of power, and spelt
genuine freedom for India, and was not just a device enabling the British
to hold on.

Perhaps the thing that impressed the Correspondents most of all was
H.E’s mastery of his subject, and his capacity to quote facts and figures
without a note.

Britter of The Times described it as a “ tour deforce' ’.

Among Correspondents there was a certain amount of malicious
satisfaction that H.E. was able to deal some blows at Durga Das, who is
not popular with his Indian and foreign colleagues.

A. CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

67

Mr Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ofB urma

RI3I1I136: f 195

4 June 1947

I gather that Pandit Nehru gave notice that he would raise at to-morrow
morning’s meeting the question of the Central Government inheriting the
machinery of the political department.

2. There are three claims that are liable to get mixed up : —

(a) the claim to inherit paramountcy ;

(b) the claim to inherit secret files about matters between the British adminis¬
tration and the States;

(c) the claim to inherit facilities, such as buildings and clerical staff.

3. (a) and (b) have, I think, been finally turned down.1 There remains (c).
On this I have consulted the Political Adviser, and he will put up a considered
brief.

4. Meanwhile, the position is as follows. Many of the offices of residents,
political agents, etc. are in State buildings which cannot be inherited by the
Central Government as a matter of course. Similarly, the clerks are often housed
in State buildings. This brings one to the obvious fact that if the Central

JUNE 1947

129

Government, after the transfer of power, are to have their own representatives
in the States it can only be done by agreement with the States. In other words,
whereas it is for you, as Crown representative, to turn down the first two claims
mentioned above, the decision on the third claim is really one to be negotiated
with the States; and without their consent no action by the political department
can be effective.

5. It seems to me quite likely that those States which intend to be represented,
or are already represented, in the existing Constituent Assembly, may be
perfectly willing to grant the facilities which Pandit Nehru wants. They will
all, however, probably want to make it clear that paramountcy cannot be
inherited by the Central Government, and for this reason they may be sticky
at first.

6. I gather that a list of the buildings owned by the Government of India,
that will become available, has already been furnished to the Department of
Works, Mines and Power, which deals with accommodation.

7. The line to take is, therefore, that you will look into the matter, and
naturally want to facilitate the work of the new Government, but that you
cannot be expected to commit yourself at once, since you do not know the full
facts, and since the agreement of the States will be required.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 Lord Mountbatten minuted in the margin here: ‘(b). Surely not. After scrutiny they should be
available for historical records — but previous S. of S. concurrence is needed. M.’ Mr Abell noted:
‘(b). I meant by secret the ones that on scrutiny would be eliminated on the ground that they would
cause embarrassment if handed over. N[o] A[ction]. G.A. 5/6/ For previous correspondence with
Pandit Nehru on the disposal of Political Department records see Vol. IX, Nos. 496, 535 and 542,
and Vol. X, Nos. 266 and 304.

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhlili37:ff 3~4

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 4 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am informed that His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal has written to you1
tendering his resignation from the office of the Chancellor of the Chamber of
Princes on the ground that the Chamber will now become functus ojficio.2
Further he has stated that Bhopal State would, as soon as paramountcy is
withdrawn, be assuming an independent status.

1 The Nawab of Bhopal’s letter has not been traced; for Lord Mountbatten’s reply see No. 64.

2 ‘having served its purpose’ ; ‘of no further official authority .

130

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It seems clear that the Chamber of Princes, as constituted, cannot continue to
exist for long. But it is also clear that unless complete administrative chaos is to
be avoided, some machinery has to continue to deal with States problems as a
whole during this transition period and before other arrangements are made.

I have written to you on several occasions previously about certain steps being
taken by the Political Department in regard to the winding up of Residencies,
Agencies, etc. in the States.3 I have pointed out that while these Residencies
represented the Paramount Power in regard to certain matters, they also
represented the Government of India in regard to a very large number of other
matters. If these Agencies suddenly disappear, there will be no point of contact
left between the Government of India and the numerous States, and adminis¬
trative chaos will result. If you so wish I can send you a fuller note on this
subject. For the present I would point out that there are numerous matters such
as Railway jurisdiction in the States, Customs, etc., distribution of food, cloth,
etc., extradition and so on, which will be difficult for anyone to handle if these
Agencies disappear and the States suddenly consider themselves independent.
Innumerable pockets will be created in India which would encourage smug¬
gling and criminal activities.

It has been proposed that each State should deal direcdy with the various
Departments of the Government of India. This is an extraordinary proposal, for
no Department will be able to deal with hundreds of letters from a large
number of units. And even if it could deal with them, there would be no
common coordinated policy. There has therefore to be not only some centra¬
lised Agency of the Government of India to deal with all such matters at
headquarters, but also their Agents in the various States. They may cease to be
Residents answerable to the Paramount Power, but they will continue to be
Agents of the Government of India till such time as other arrangements are
made. The whole administrative structure dealing with the vast number of
complicated matters cannot be wound up in this way without having something
to take its place.

The whole policy of the Political Department has caused us a great deal of
uneasiness. It can only be described in Mr. Winston Churchill’s language as
operation scuttle. It seems to be deliberately intended to break up the adminis¬
trative unity of India which the Government of India and paramountcy have
maintained. It must be remembered that paramountcy matters are very limited
in scope and at least 95% of the dealings of the States through the Residents are
with the Government of India. If this policy of the Political Department is
pursued, it can only mean introducing anarchy into India by the back door.
Some machinery must be created to deal with these matters and till this is
created, the present machinery should carry on with necessary alterations. We
have today to deal with Railways, Posts & Telegraphs and so many other

JUNE I947

131

matters. Are Railways to stop when they cross States' boundaries, or is the
postal system not to operate in certain States ?

The States are so situated that if they are independent entities they can create
very great difficulties in the administration of even the rest of India. It is
impossible for us to admit the right of any of these States to independence and to
do just what they will. That affects the whole of India’s administration,
defence and other problems. We are prepared to deal with them in as friendly a
manner as possible, but we cannot admit the right of a declaration of indepen¬
dence by a State such as Bhopal apparently intends to do. It must be remem¬
bered also that the right of protection which the States possess will also go with
paramountcy.

I am writing to you more or less briefly on an intricate problem about which
a very great deal can be said. But I want to draw your attention urgently to
these developments that are taking place at the instance of the Political Depart¬
ment and without any reference to the Government of India. This is going to
lead to a great deal of friction and possibly to worse consequences.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

3 See Vol. X, Nos. 266 and. 541; also Nos 102, 218 and 236.

69

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ol Burma and

Mr Gandhi

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 143

secret 4 June 1947t 6 pm

In connection with the last sentence in Paragraph 20 of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment’s statement,1 Mr Gandhi suggested the possibility of a tripartite agreement
between Great Britain and the two new Dominions — or two bi-lateral agree¬
ments.

Mr Gandhi also spoke to me of “you and your magic tricks” in getting
Congress and the Muslim League to agree on anything.

Mr Gandhi said that he was very keen on going to Kashmir. I pointed out
that Pandit Nehru had also declared such an intention and suggested that
perhaps the best course might be for me myself to go.

Addendum to No. 69

I had received an urgent letter2 from Krishna Menon warning me that Mr
Gandhi was in a very unhappy and emotional mood, and that some of the

1 No. 45.

2 No. 58.

132

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Congress leaders feared he might denounce the plan and its acceptance at his
prayer meeting that evening.

I immediately sent a message inviting Mr Gandhi to come and see me at any
time before the prayer meeting. He arrived at 6 with the prayer meeting due at
7 p.m.

He was indeed in a very upset mood and began by saying how unhappy he
was.

I replied immediately that whilst I could quite understand and indeed shared
his upset feehngs at seeing the united India he had worked for all his life
apparently destroyed by the new plan, I hoped to convince him that this plan
was nevertheless the only possible course.

I told him that although many newspapers had christened it “The Mount-
batten Plan”, they should really have christened it “The Gandhi Plan”, since all
the salient ingredients were suggested to me by him. I enumerated these as
follows :

(a) Mr Gandhi advised me to try and get the Cabinet Mission Plan or any
other plan retaining the unity of India accepted by all the leaders provided it did
not involve coercion or violence. I had bent every effort to follow the first part
of his advice; but when no agreement could be reached I had followed the
second part of his advice and not insisted on a plan which would involve
coercion with its attendant risk of violence.

(b) Mr Gandhi had advised me to leave the choice of their own future to the
Indian people. It was therefore he who gave me the idea for letting the Provin¬
ces choose, and the method proposed seemed the simplest and fairest way of
carrying out his suggestion.

(c) Mr Gandhi had told me that the British should quit India and transfer
power as soon as possible and not later than the end of this year. I told me [him]
that this had been the most difficult of all of his ideas to carry out, and I was
very proud to have found a solution.

(d) I told him that I had understood that in his earlier days he had not been

averse to dominion status. Mr Gandhi was kind enough to say that this was
indeed so, and that even during the war he had expressed himself as not being
against it; and he later sent me an extract from Harijan dated i6th December
1939, in which appeared the words: “Similarly, I have said to a friend that if
dominion status was offered, I should take it, and expect to carry India with me.”
Note: I subsequently reported this conversation to both Mr Krishna and Mr
V. P. Menon, and asked them to work on similar lines in talking to Mr Gandhi.
Both reported that the line I had taken had been remarkably successful, since
Mr Gandhi now felt that I had honestly tried to follow his advice, and that he
had taken a far greater part in shaping the future of India than had at first sight
appeared to him from the way the Plan was worded. m.of b.

8/6/47

JUNE 1947

133

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Eighth Staff Meeting

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi, on 4 June
1947 at 7.30 pm1 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D.
Scott, Mr Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

THE NAWAB OF BHOPAL

his EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that it was with regret that he had
received a letter2 from the Nawab of Bhopal resigning his position as Chan¬
cellor of the Chamber of Princes. This letter was addressed to him (the Viceroy)
as President of the Chamber of Princes. He said that he had made every effort
to convince the Nawab of Bhopal of the folly of this action, and of declaring
that his State would adhere to neither of the Constituent Assemblies.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

directed Press Attache to issue to the Press suitable information concerning
the resignation of the Nawab of Bhopal.

Item 2

MR GANDHI

his excellency the viceroy stated that Mr Gandhi had come to see him
at 6 p.m. that evening.3 In connection with the last sentence in Paragraph 20
of H.M.G.’s statement, Mr Gandhi had suggested the possibility of a tripartite
agreement between Great Britain and the two new Dominions — or two bi¬
lateral agreements. Mr Gandhi had also spoken to the Viceroy on “you and
your magic tricks” in getting Congress and the Muslim League to agree on
anything !

Mr Gandhi had been very keen on going to Kashmir. The Viceroy pointed
out that Pandit Nehru had also declared such an intention. Perhaps, as either of
these visits was bound to lead to complications, the best course might be for he
himself to visit that State.

1 The original has ‘19.70 hours’; according to A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten , p. hi,
the meeting took place at 7.30 pm.

2 Not traced. 3 No. 69.

134

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 3

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION (v.C.P. 63)

The meeting had before them the paper4 on this subject which had been
handed to the Indian Leaders at the meeting on Tuesday, 3rd June,5 and
was to be reconsidered with them the following day.

his excellency the viceroy stated that Mr Krishna Menon had told
him6 that Pandit Nehru was most upset because there was no indication in this
paper of the suggestion that the Cabinet might be split into two committees.7
Mr Krishna Menon had said that Pandit Nenru felt that it was of the utmost
importance that this step should be taken at the earliest possible moment. He
(the Viceroy) had replied that he would look further into the proposition.
lord is may stated his belief that Pandit Nehru’s worry was all due to a

j

misunderstanding. He pointed out that the paper under discussion referred to
highly technical matters. Moreover, it had been put up only as a basis for
discussion.

rao bahadur menon stated that Sardar Patel’s opinion was that there was
no point in reconstructing the Interim Government during the two and a half
months left before it was intended to transfer power. .Moreover, it was ob¬
viously out of the question to take tills step before the decision on Partition had
been made. As this was not likely to be done for a month, the remaining period
would then be only six weeks. Other objections to reconstruction of the
Government were that all the members were likely to be extremely busy on the
problems of Partition over the coming period; and that the Muslim League
Ministers would object very strongly to such a step as they would after it have
no portfolio worth the name, rao bahadur menon suggested that the two
new Governments should be formed on or about 1st August.

rao bahadur menon stated that Sardar Patel had told him that he thought
that Mr Krishna Menon was becoming a busybody. He pointed out that
Sardar Patel and Pandit Nehru were invariably in complete agreement on
fundamental issues, his excellency the viceroy said that he was not
altogether surprised at Sardar Patel’s opinion. This was a very possible solution.

The meeting then took the paper paragraph by paragraph and decided on the
line to be taken at the Conference with the Indian Leaders the following day.

4 No. 28. 5 No. 39.

6 Lord Mountbatten bad presumably bad a talk with Mr Krishna Menon following receipt of No. 58.

7 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 406, para. 21; 466, Item (6); 471; 472; 517, Minute 7; and Enclosure to No.

JUNE 1947

135

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10 Ji 17; ff 213-14

immediate India office, 4 June 1947, 8.40 pm

secret Received: 5 June , 6 am

7251. Foreign Office have drawn attention to following points in memorandum
1.13.(47)87 of 27th May1 about Interim Government of which I assume you
have a copy. Points are as follows : —

(i) Suggestion in (v) for appeal to U.N.O. or Hague Tribunal.2 Foreign
Office presume that International Court of Justice is meant and point out that
this Court would not be able to settle a boundary dispute for following
reasons —

(a) Boundaries in such a case are not a question of international law to which
the Court is confined.

(b) Court can only decide disputes between parties already recognised
internationally as States.

Reference to U.N.O. would presumably be to Security Council. This would be
possible under Article 3 8 of the Charter but matter would not be free from
difficulty for similar reasons to (b) above. The Sikhs, though an interested
community, will not be a State and Pakistan will only be in course of becoming
a State.

(ii) Foreign Office consider arbitral tribunal under (k) best solution3 but feel
that proposal in regard to its composition should be developed. They consider
it essential to provide how a neutral Umpire shall be selected failing agreement.
This could be by President of International Court or by Security Council.
Former is probably preferable. Foreign Office also suggest that as tribunal deals
with cases on appeal from Boundary Commission in a case where latter has
only reached decision by Chairman’s casting vote, there will be much to be said
for having a slightly larger tribunal with two neutral members so as to give its
decision greater weight. These should be persons chosen from outside India. In

1 Vol. X, No. 545.

2 Para, (v) proposed that, in the event of any decision of the Boundary Commission being carried only
by the Chairman’s vote or by his casting vote, the minority might appeal to U.N.O. or the ‘Hague
Tribunal’.

3 ‘(k) best solution’ deciphered as ‘it would not be best solution’. Para, (k) of Vol. X, No. 545 proposed
the setting up of an Arbitral Tribunal to decide matters of dispute arising from the processes of
partition, and in para, (w) it was suggested that if U.N.O. and the ‘Hague Tribunal’ both refused to
entertain appeals against decisions of the Boundary Commission, then the minority might appeal to
this Arbitral Tribunal. It was proposed (para, (k)) that the Tribunal should consist of three arbitrators
of high judicial standing — one chosen by each of the three Governments (the paper assumed an
independent Bengal) — and an Umpire selected by agreement by these three arbitrators.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

any case they suggest increasing membership from 3 to 5 though this was on
assumption that Bengal would be a third independent State and that it would be
suitable to have 3 Indian and two neutral members.

2. I telegraph these comments in case you are talking to leaders on these
subjects on Thursday.4 I agree with Foreign Office that arbitral tribunal should
be final authority but I see difficulty in increasing its size. With total of 3 you
can have 1 Hindu, 1 Muslim, t neutral. In any larger figure one must I think
bring in a Sikh. If so, at least two neutrals must be included but I doubt if
quality of5 tribunal as a whole would be as good.

4 i.e. at the meeting on 5 June (No. 73). 5 ‘quality of’ deciphered, as ‘international’.

Sir E. Jenkins {Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R^/i/go: f 137

immediate 4 June 1947 , 11.30 pm

confidential Received: 3 June , 9 am

No. 118-G. Lahore reports five dead one injured and five fires.

2. Amritsar has had two communal riots and four fires. Casualties four dead
nine injured apparently due to firing by police and troops.

3. Gurgaon disorders still widespread. People still resentful and truculent.
Total number of villages burned now estimated at sixty. Casualties unknown
since parties removed dead and wounded. Known dead over one hundred
including sixty three brought into hospitals and about forty three disposed of
by magistrates in villages. Troops not yet reinforced.

4. General situation unchanged. Reception of partition plan very mixed in
Lahore and Amritsar. Hindus acquiesce. Sikhs angry and bellicose; statement1 by
Tara Singh in morning papers has not helped. Muslims also angry and critical
of their leaders and threatening to destroy Amritsar completely. These are only
first intelligence reports which may prove wrong as I hope they will. Reactions
from other districts not yet reported.

Addressed Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State, Governor U.P., Governor
of Sind, Governor N.W.F.P.

1 In a statement on 4 June 1947 Master Tara Singh complained of the ‘total lack’ of any provision in the
plan to give the Sikhs ‘any power or status anywhere, or for safeguarding their position and interests’.
He went on to state that the ‘ultimate acceptance or rejection’ of the plan by the Sikhs would depend
a good deal on the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission; that the Sikhs would not be
satisfied ‘unless the dividing line is the River Chenab;’ that they would continue the struggle till
their objective was obtained; that the ‘very existence’ of the Sikhs was at stake; and that the Khalsa
would ‘prove to the world that the spirit of Guru Govind Singh still lives in them’. Times of India ,
5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 2.

JUNE 1947

137

Minutes of Viceroy's Sixteenth Miscellaneous Meeting

L/P &J 1 10/81 : jf 370-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 3 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville ; Lieutenant-Colonel Er shine Crum
(Secretariat)

Item 1

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

The Meeting had before them a paper1 entitled “The Administrative Con¬
sequences of Partition”, copies of which had been handed to the Indian Leaders
at the meeting on Tuesday, 3rd June.2 his excellency the viceroy
emphasized that this paper was only a basis for discussion.

Matters on which a decision will have
to be reached

Paragraph 2 of this paper gave a list of matters on which a decision by agree¬
ment or, if necessary, by arbitration, would have to be reached, his excel¬
lency the viceroy asked whether it was considered that these matters were
correctly set out here. He pointed out that the list was not necessarily exclusive.

pandit nehru said that he did not understand the reference to a “division
of the staff, organisations and records of Central Civil Departments”. As he
saw it, there was at present an Entity of India. Certain parts of India were being
given the opportunity to secede from this Entity. The functions of the Govern¬
ment of India would continue. The seceding parts would have to build up their
own Government.

mr jinnah said that he and Pandit Nehru were starting off from com¬
pletely different premises. It was not a question of secession, but of division.

pandit nehru said that he did not agree. It was a fundamental point that
India, as such, would continue.

Concerning Pandit Nehru’s misunderstanding of Paragraph 2, his excel¬
lency the viceroy explained that it would be necessary for those members
of the staff of Central Civil Departments who lived in Pakistan to transfer to the
Pakistan Service. Similarly, British officials would have to be divided between
the two States. Back files would have to be copied. It was to be presumed that
many of the laws at present in existence for India as a whole would be left in

2 No. 39.

1 See No. 28.

138

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

force in Pakistan until they were replaced. Copies of files appertaining to such
matters would obviously have to be made available to the Pakistan Govern¬
ment.

Government in the Interim Period

pandit nehru asked how it was intended to carry on Government during the
period from the decision on Partition, which would probably take place
towards the end of June, until the two new Dominion Governments were set
up — a period of say six weeks. When the Partition decision was reached, a
vital change would have taken place. The two new States would already then
come into existence in embryo. When this happened, the whole nature of the
Government of India would change. Some arrangements would then have to be
made immediately, as certain members of the Interim Government would be
interested in one State and some in the other. There would be a complete
division of interest. It would become very difficult to carry on as at present.
Arrangements would have to be made so that neither side would feel that the
other was interfering in their business. The question definitely arose as to how
the processes of Government could be carried on from then onwards.

his excellency the viceroy said that this point had been stressed to him
by the Congress Leaders before he had left for London.3 But now that the
interim period before the transfer of power was to be so much shorter, the
seriousness of the problem had diminished. He felt that this question should be
considered separately at a later stage.

Decisions in connection with the partition

of Provinces

Paragraph 3 of the paper before the meeting read “Similar decisions will be
necessary as between parts of Provinces”, pandit nehru gave his opinion that
the problem of the division of Provincial subjects was part of the main central
problem. He did not agree that the Governors of the Provinces concerned
should be solely responsible.

The Partition Tribunal

MR jinnah said that there were many things to do. He wanted to try to
understand which was the first. They could not all be done at once.

his excellency suggested that the first step should be to set up a Partition
Committee. (It was subsequently provisionally decided to call this the ‘Partition
Tribunal’; and it will be referred to as such in these Minutes). The Partition
Tribunal would decide the order of priority with which to deal with the various
other matters.

At first mr jinnah took the line that no steps could be taken, not even with
regard to setting up the Partition Tribunal, until the respective Constituent

JUNE 1947

139

Assemblies were complete. Later, however, he agreed to the suggestion that the
Partition Tribunal should be set up forthwith. He referred to the representatives
appointed by either side to the Partition Tribunal as ‘"quasi-arbitrators”. He
was, at first, in favour of only one member being nominated by each side, but
later agreed to two; and that a third substitute should be nominated in case of
sickness, pandit nehru also agreed with this. It was further agreed that the
members of the Partition Tribunal should be the highest political leaders. MR
jinn ah was violently opposed to ?the proposal that] there should be a
fifth member of the Tribunal in the shape of a minority representative.

MR jinnah gave his view that the Partition Tribunal should be the supreme
and final authority. It should not be responsible to the present Interim Govern¬
ment. He visualised that the present Government would continue to work only
on a caretaker basis. Neither the present Executive nor the present Legislature
could undertake any question of policy or planning.

HIS excellency the viceroy said that the question of to whom the
Partition Tribunal should be responsible was a very interesting constitutional
point. In his opinion, it could be resolved by saying that, in the first instance,
it would be responsible to the Governor-General in Council, but that all its
decisions should later be ratified by the two Governments after power had been
transferred.

pandit nehru said that he disagreed that the functions of Government
could be completely stopped during the interim period, as he had understood
Mr. Jinnah to suggest. He further stated that he considered that the All-India
Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim League Council should ratify
the appointment of the members of the Partition Tribunal and of the Umpire.

mr. jinnah suggested that the decisions reached by the Partition Tribunal
should be signed by the members thereof, who would afterwards be bound to
see that their respective Constituent Assemblies ratified them.

the viceroy pointed out that the existing Constituent Assembly could
immediately ratify agreements on behalf of Hindustan, pandit nehru agreed
that the Hindustan Constituent Assembly might want to have a say in the
matter. He asked what would happen to the Partition Tribunal after Dominion
status had come into operation. The general feeling of the meeting was that the
two new Governments would then have to decide whether to continue the
previous system, or whether to change it.

The Umpire

his excellency the viceroy stated that His Majesty’s Government had
declared themselves averse to him acting as Umpire,4 empowered to give a
final decision. He also was averse to this procedure. The Umpire would

3 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 406, para. 21, 471 and 472.

4 Possibly a reference to Vol. X, No. 545, para. (k).

140

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

undoubtedly very soon become the subject of considerable odium. Without
any disrespect to either party, he wished to point out that completely impartial
decisions were very seldom welcomed by both sides. The Umpire should be
somebody agreed to by both sides — somebody who was willing to give true
and fair service, his excellency suggested that a man experienced in
judiciary affairs would be most suitable. With this suggestion there was general
agreement, his excellency said that he was prepared to enter the discus¬
sions if required by both sides, but not to give final decisions. All the Leaders at
the meeting expressed their complete agreement that His Excellency should not
be the Umpire, his excellency asked them to send him a list of names in
order of preference for those whom they suggested should be appointed to this
position.

The Steering Committee

It was provisionally decided that the next highest Committee should be called
the “Steering Committee”.

lord ismay put forward the suggestion that this intermediate body,
instead of being called “Steering Committee”, should be a Joint Secretariat.

mr. jinn ah expressed himself in favour of this suggestion. He thought that
a highly efficient secretariat would be sufficient. There was not, in his opinion,
any question of the intermediate body taking preliminary decisions. Eventually,
however, he appeared to give his consent to the formation of a Steering
Committee.

pandit nehru was opposed to the suggestion that ajoint Secretariat should
take the place of the Steering Committee. He considered that the Partition
Tribunal would be unable to cope with its task unless there was a whole-time
intermediate Committee immediately subordinate to it to undertake all func¬
tions except the final decision.

MR. liaquat ali khan suggested that the Steering Committee should
consist of experts or officials.

pandit nehru said that he considered that reference to “officials” or
“non-officials” was confusing. He agreed, however, that the Steering Com¬
mittee should be composed of experts. It was, he suggested, up to the two sides
to nominate anybody they wished to serve on this Committee.

lord ismay suggested a further alternative — that the Steering Committee
should consist of two political leaders as joint chairmen and, for its members,
the chairmen of the sub-committees. The general feeling of the meeting was
opposed to this suggestion although it was considered that the chairmen of the
sub-committees might well be ex officio members of the Steering Committee.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was inclined to agree with the
Congress viewpoint that something more than a Joint Secretariat would be
required. He felt that a Steering Committee of experts was the right solution.

JUNE I947

141

He suggested that the Steering Committee might consist of three members
from each side, including perhaps a minority representative from each.

The meeting agreed that the Viceroy should give an account of the decisions
reached, in the form of a written paper, at the Cabinet Meeting the following
day.

Resignation of Members of the Interim Government

his excellency the viceroy asked whether both sides agreed that he
should call, after the decision on Partition, for the resignation of the members
of the Interim Government in order that the prospective leaders of the new
Governments or Government might be free, without embarrassment, to select
their colleagues, mr. jinnah emphasized that he did not consider himself
responsible nor a party to anything which the Executive Council or the
Governor-General in Council might decide.

The Constituent Assembly

In answer to a question from His Excellency, mr. jinnah said that he agreed
that the Muslim League representatives of the Provinces of Hindustan should
take their places in the existing Constituent Assembly if Partition was decided.

The Boundary Commissions

his excellency suggested that the Boundary Commissions should not, as
was envisaged in the paper before the meeting, report through the Steering
Committee and the Partition Tribunal to the Governor-General, but rather
that it should report direct. This suggestion was generally accepted, his
excellency also suggested that one Sikh representative from either half of
the Punjab should be appointed to the body which would set up terms of
reference for the Western Boundary Commission. He said that he would
confer with the different parties in turn concerning these terms of reference,
before convening a full meeting.

his excellency the viceroy added that the State of Bahawalpur would
have to give evidence before the Western Boundary Commission, in connection
with arrangements for water supplies for that State.

IT WAS AGREED : —

(i) That a Partition Tribunal should be set up forthwith; that it would
consist of four members (with a reserve from either side in case of
sickness) ; they would be chosen from among the highest political
leaders; and that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah would forward the
names of their choice to The Viceroy;

(ii) That, after the transfer of power, the two new Governments would
consider whether to continue the Partition Tribunal procedure, or to
introduce a new one;

142

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(iii) That the Governor-General should not be the Umpire, but that a
man experienced in judiciary affairs should be chosen for this appoint¬
ment; and that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah should send to the Viceroy
a hst of nominees for this post;

(iv) That a Steering Committee, consisting of experts, should be set up ;

(v) That the Viceroy should inform the Cabinet the following day of the
decisions reached at this meeting; and that The Viceroy’s Staff would
prepare a paper for this purpose;

(vi) That the Boundary Commissions should report direct to the Governor-
General ; and that His Excellency should consult the different parties in
turn before convening a full meeting to consider the terms of reference
of the Boundary Commissions;

(vii) That a further meeting would be held at io a.m. on Saturday, 7th June,
1947.

Item 2

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy gave a brief account of his meeting with
members of the States Negotiating Committee on Tuesday, 3rd June.5 He
said that he had done nothing to encourage any of the States to stand out alone
and to join neither Constituent Assembly. He had given no official advice on
this point, but was prepared to give his personal advice if and when he was
asked for it. He said that he had advocated the desirability of arrangements
being made for interim agreements on a stand-still basis pending the ratification
of existing agreements or the preparation of new ones. Both mr. jinnah and
pandit nehru declared themselves in favour of this.

pandit nehru complained that the procedure at present being adopted by
the Political Department in connection with the lapse of paramountcy was
sabotaging all the existing machinery and was likely to produce administrative
chaos. He pointed out that by far the greater part of the work done by the
Residents was not in connection with paramountcy, but to do with the Govern¬
ment of India. Some machinery was essential to carry on this co-ordination.
There was a degree of such machinery in existence for those States which had
joined or would join the Constituent Assembly; but it was essential for the
Government of India to have contacts with all the States after the lapse of
paramountcy.

his excellency the viceroy said that he would give the points raised
by Pandit Nehru his serious consideration.

5 No. 43.

JUNE 1947

143

74

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell

Rl3lili37: f 6

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

My dear Abell,

Please refer to your endorsement, No. 592(89) without date, forwarding a copy
of a letter dated the 4th June 19471 from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to H.E. the
Viceroy about the Political Department and retraction of paramountcy.

Pandit Nehru’s letter contains so many misconceptions, which we have
attempted to clarify in correspondence with Lord Wavell and His Excellency
during the last eight months, that I feel it would be valueless to comment on the
contents of this letter in detail.

The programme for the retraction of paramountcy in all its aspects has been
carefully and thoroughly examined, has been approved by the Crown Repre¬
sentative and the Secretary of State, and has been in operation for two months.2
The whole object of the programme was to ensure that the least possible
administrative chaos resulted therefrom. This object is well on the way to being
secured except in regard to questions over which the Central Government
refuse to cooperate and which I have already reported3 to His Excellency. If
there is a counter-attack on this programme as a whole as well as non-coopera¬
tion on particular aspects, there will certainly be administrative chaos, which I
shall be powerless to prevent.

As regards the specific proposal that the Central Government should take
over the machinery of paramountcy for the purpose of coordination, I have
already stated more than once4 the objections. If these are inadequate, I suggest
that His Excellency should see the Standing Committee of the Chamber of
Princes some time tomorrow and sound them on this proposal.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. CORFIELD

1 No. 68.

2 See Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 556 for a full summary by Sir C. Corfield of the development of the
Political Department’s policy.

3 Ibid., para. 9.

4 See e.g. Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 25, and Enclosure to No. 556, paras. 4 and 12.

144

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

75

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Transfer of Power , Part IV (b)

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947* 3-30 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1307-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

2. I am most grateful for the message of congratulations1 from the whole
Cabinet which you have sent me.

3. I can never tell you how much your personal backing and that of the
whole Cabinet has meant to me in these difficult negotiations.

1 No. 56.

76

Mr Abell to Mr Turnbull

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
International Status of the New India

immediate new Delhi, 5 June ig47, 3.30 pm

secret Received: 5 June , 4.30 pm

No. 1308-S. It is already clear that Nehru holds strongly that Hindustan will
succeed to India’s position as an entity in international affairs1 and will be
represented automatically at U.N.O. I believe that official view is that two new
states will be created and that neither of them can claim to be India.

The matter is obviously of great importance and likely to lead to trouble
here. Can you get any advice on this ?

1 cf. No. 73, 3rd para.

JUNE 1947

145

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal, Partition of Part II [a)

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 3.30 pm

SECRET

No. 1312-S. I saw Suhrawardy to-day.1 He said lie had spoken to K. S. Roy,
who did not think it worth while forming a coalition for a few months. No
doubt you will discuss the matter further with leaders after Suhrawardy’s
return.

1 See No. 54.

78

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 5 June 1947

Dear Mountbatten,

I would like first of all to add to the message1 from the Cabinet already tele¬
graphed to you by the Prime Minister an expression of my personal congratula¬
tions on what you have achieved. Although no well-informed person would be
so foolish as to minimise the risks attendant upon the policy that has been
announced or the scope for mischief still left to fanatics and those elements in
Indian politics which do not sincerely desire a settlement broadly acceptable to
all the main parties, there can be no denying that at the present moment the
prospects of such a settlement appear to be more real than they have ever been
before and we are all deeply conscious of the degree to which this is due to you
personally. I greatly hope that during the coming critical months you may be
enabled to complete the work which you have so successfully begun.

2. It was of the utmost value that the Prime Minister and I were able to
preface our reading of the announcement in Parliament by saying that the plan
had been received favourably by the leaders of all parties.2 It was, of course,
only after the announcement had been made that we received your telegram3
reporting in detail the course of your meeting with the leaders of the three
parties on the morning of 3rd June and learnt of the awkward corners you had

2 See Nos. 34, 37, and 40.

1 No. 56.

3 No. 53.

146

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

had to turn with each of them and of the help you received from V. P. Menon
in dealing with Nehru and Patel. It looks very much from here as if Gandhi,
having failed in his efforts to sabotage agreement on this occasion, has now
thought it wise to try and get in on the ground floor before it is too late; but,
even if this is the correct interpretation of his actions, his support will be no less
valuable for that. There would seem to be good ground for hoping that
acceptance of the plan will now be ratified by the All-India Committees of
Congress and the Muslim League since a failure to ratify on the part of either
would involve the throwing over of its Working Committee and an immediate
prospect of large scale civil strife. If the plan is ratified, the broadcast appeals4 of
all three leaders should contribute substantially to the preservation of order
during the transition period.

3 . Thanks to the promptitude with which you informed us of the changes in
the text of the announcement,5 all the arrangements went very smoothly at this
end and we actually succeeded in getting the White Paper released immediately
after the actual making of the announcement.6 You will doubtless have seen
full press reports of the reception of the announcement in both Houses and
will, I know, share my pleasure at the compliment paid by Winston Churchill
to the Prime Minister, which created a very favourable impression in the
House.7 I hope you noticed the pleasant tributes paid you in the Lords by
Bobbety Salisbury and Perth.8 Thanks very largely to Joyce’s efforts, the pub¬
licity arrangements at this end proved most satisfactory and the maximum
possible coverage was obtained both from the B.B.C. and the Press. Perhaps
you were able to listen to the B.B.C.’s 9 p.m. broadcast which contained an
excellent summary of the plan besides the Prime Minister’s broadcast9 and relays
of your broadcast10 and of extracts from the broadcasts by the Indian leaders.11
The press reactions have been uniformly favourable, save only for the “Daily
Worker” !

4. As you have pointed out in one of your telegrams,12 it will be of vital
importance to ensure that there is no “resting on oars” now that the announce¬
ment has been made but that all necessary consequential action is pressed ahead
as fast as possible. You may rest assured that we shall do all we can at this end
to help you retain the initiative and make full use of the advantage gained.

5. I was very grateful to you for keeping Ranee in touch with developments
in Delhi in the final stages.13 We have just received a telegram14 from him
reporting the first reactions of his Council to the Indian announcement which
are not unpromising. If, as we really believe, it would be as advantageous to
India and Burma themselves as to this country that they should remain within
the Commonwealth, everything will depend on our ability to bring home to
the leaders of both countries during the next few months the validity of this
belief.

JUNE 1947

147

6. To turn to other matters, you will be glad to hear that, on a joint mem¬
orandum from the Colonial Secretary and myself, the Cabinet this week agreed
to raise the ban on the admission of persons of non-European descent to per¬
manent engagements in the Royal Navy and the British Army and an an¬
nouncement to this effect was made in Parliament yesterday.15 This change of
policy is, of course, of much greater significance to the Colonies than to India
but, so far as India is concerned, it will be a real gain both in principle and
because it will enable Indians resident in this country to join all three Services.

[Paras. 7-9, on re-employment prospects for members of the Indian Forest
Service; and para. 10, on preparations for the Indian Art Exhibition, omitted.]

11. I understand that it was at your suggestion that Chundrigar originally
decided to visit London on his way to Geneva. You will be glad to hear that
we secured agreement to his being treated as a guest of H.M.G. during his stay
and that, before leaving for India, he wrote me a letter which showed that he
had enjoyed his visit. A number of social functions were arranged in his
honour.

12. At your request Ismay brought to my attention while he was in London
your desire to obtain a generous allotment of honours for the next two lists
and I assured him that, although proposals of this kind have to be submitted for
the approval of the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and
Medals, I would consider your proposals when they are received with the
utmost sympathy and give them all the support I could. You will no doubt
have already realised that the likelihood that the successor authorities in India
will have obtained Dominion status before the end of the present year has a
bearing on this question and that it may be that your wishes in regard to
honours will have to be met by a special “Transfer of Power List” in advance of
the next New Year List. Doubtless I shall be receiving your recommendations
on this matter before long.

[Para. 13, on recommendations for honours for members of the British
mercantile community in India, omitted.]

4 See Nos. 46, 47 and 48. 5 See Nos. 13 and 39, note 3.

6 See No. 45 and its note 1 .

7 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, col. 43.

8 Ibid., H. of L., vol. 148, 3 June 1947, cols. 26-7.

9 No. 57. 10 No. 44. 11 Nos. 4 6, 47 and 48.

12 No. 53, para. 9. 13 See No. 29. 14 Not printed.

15 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 4 June 1947, c°l- I9°-

148

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

LIP&JI10I141: f 180

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

1446(16)

My dear Listowel,

I am proposing to send a letter on the following lines to the Provincial Gover¬
nors1 and should be glad to know if this is correct and in agreement with the
wishes of the King and His Majesty’s Government.

“On the date of the transfer of power to the two new Indian Dominions I
intend to offer my resignation as Viceroy and Governor-General of India to
His Majesty. I should like you to send me an offer of resignation of your
Governorship, which I shall forward at the same time as mine. When the
time comes you should inform your Chief Minister of the action you are
taking.”

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 [Note in original by Lord Mountbatten:] and, of course, Chief Commissioners.

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Mounthatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Administrative

Consequences of

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have given a great deal of thought to the talks we had at this morning’s
conference1 and I feel that it would be desirable to clarify the position further.
I am afraid I do not like at all the idea of carrying on more or less in our present
way for another two months. This [is] not merely a question of time, but
deeper issues are involved. I shall, of course, discuss this matter with V. P.
Menon when he comes to see me. May I suggest to you to discuss this matter
with Krishna Menon who might perhaps be able to help? I understand that
some discussions on these subjects took place with him in London.2

2. I have had occasion to discuss briefly with a few of my colleagues the
proposals to form Partition Councils and the like. Their reactions confirmed

JUNE 1947

149

my own way of thinking 011 the subject. We propose to consider this matter
more fully tomorrow with our colleagues, and if necessary I shall let you know
what they think about it. It is obviously a vital matter and it may make a great
deal of difference.

3 . As I view it, we are trying to provide a procedure for two Governments
or two embryo Governments to settle this cjuestion of division. We should,
therefore, follow the normal procedure in such cases, i.e., representatives of
Governments should meet together and come to political decisions. Essentially
most of the decisions will be political and only some of a judicial character. In
case of lack of agreement on a particular point, the matter might be referred to
a Tribunal which may be created previously for this purpose. I should like to
separate the Tribunal from the high-powered supervising political committee
representing the two embryo States. Mixing the two functions up does not
appear to be desirable.

4. The representatives of the two embryo States may for the present be
representatives of the major parties. They should function normally as such
representatives do, that is to say they will take their directions from their
principals whenever necessary. Those principals may even change their repre¬
sentatives if they consider it necessary just as representatives of Governments
may be changed. This will give reality to the picture and the committee or
council will be in close touch with the forces that matter in dealing with political
problems. To appoint a permanent committee with full powers would be to
isolate it from those forces.

5. Thus I would suggest that there should be a Partition Council consisting
of four persons or some such number. This council will be the final authority
subject to disputed matters being referred to a separate Tribunal of say three
senior Jud ges whose decision 011 those points should be final. Then there would
be a Steering Committee and the other committees as proposed this morning.

6. This would involve a separation of the judicial and political functions and
instead of an umpire we would have a small ad hoc judicial tribunal for special
purposes referred to it.

7. These are my personal suggestions for the present. As I have said above, I
am discussing this matter more fully with my colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 73.

2 See e.g. Vol. X, No. 551.

150

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Dr

Khan Sahib

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 144

secret 3 June 1947 , 6.30 pm

(Note: — Lt. Colonel Erskine Crum was in attendance during the latter half of
this interview and dictated the record.)

I showed Dr Khan Sahib the telegram1 which had arrived from Sir Olaf Caroe
that afternoon, saying that he had seen two members of the N.W.F.P. Govern¬
ment who said that they refused to accept paragraph 4 of the Announcement2
and would not in any circumstances co-operate in the referendum unless a third
choice for an independent Pathanistan was included. I explained to Dr Khan
Sahib that this third choice had been excluded for all Provinces on the express
request of Congress ; and that I had asked Pandit Nehru how he suggested that a
Province of three million people could stand out alone with a reasonable chance
of success. I told him that Pandit Nehru had agreed that it could not and would
have to join one or other of the new States after a while. I had asked Pandit
Nehru why it should not do so now. He had seen my point.

Dr Khan Sahib said that I should take no notice of this telegram from the
Governor. He said that he would go straight back to the N.W.F.P. and let me
know what the true situation was. He seemed to grasp the reasons for my refus¬
ing to change paragraph 4 but he stated categorically that the N.W.F.P. would
never join Pakistan. He said that he did not understand how Pakistan was going
to be run. I pointed out to him that the fact that the Western Punjab would be
between the N.W.F.P. and the rest of Hindustan in no way made it impossible
for the N.W.F.P. to join Hindustan. A similar situation prevailed as between
Western and Eastern Pakistan.

He told me that he considered it absolutely necessary that Sir Olaf Caroe
should be replaced before the referendum took place. He felt that the appoint¬
ment of a new Governor would make an immense difference to the way the
referendum was carried out.

I recalled that Dr Khan Sahib had previously told me that he would not trust
I.C.S. officers to run the referendum. I informed him that I had arranged for 9
British officers of the Indian Army to be made available for this purpose. He
appeared very pleased about this and said that he “preferred military people”.3

Finally, I asked him whether he would really co-operate in the running of the
referendum. He replied quite sincerely “I will do my best”.

1 No. 65. 2 No. 45.

3 On another copy, Lt. Col. Erskine Crum noted ‘for the edification of PSV, DPSV and APSV :

“Wise man”.’ Mr Abell rejoined: ‘I wonder he didn’t ask for sailors.’ R/3/1/151: f 118.

JUNE I947

151

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) and

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram, R^/i/i^pf 3

immediate new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 9pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1318-S. At my press Conference there were a good many questions about
the provisional nature of the boundaries in the Punjab and Bengal. Although it
may be impossible to get the decisions of any Boundary Commission imple¬
mented before the transfer of power it is important that in your conversations
you should stress the provisional nature of the boundaries, and the fact that the
notional partition has only been used in order to enable us to get ahead with the
necessary speed. It should also be stressed that the Boundary Commission will
obviously not consider the matter pre-judged by the fixing of these arbitrary
boundaries, but will go into the merits.

83

Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

ofB urma

Telegram, R/j/ 1/131: f 113

immediate 5 June 1947, 10 pm

secret Received: 6 June, 6 am

No. CA/106. My telegram CA/1051 para. No. 5.

2. My Chief Secretary and other officials have suggested that peaceful
referendum would be far more likely if the three issues of Hindustan, Pakistan
and Pathanistan could be put before electors. Apart from probability that
alteration of this kind would secure ministerial cooperation it is argued that
introduction of new issue might split vote on both sides.

3. I understand that Your Excellency in press interview yesterday said that
you were willing to consider Pathanistan issue if all parties agreed.2 From my

1 No. 65.

2 At his Press Conference on 4 June, Lord Mountbatten, in the course of exchanges with press repre¬
sentatives on the demand for an independent Pathan State, was asked: ‘Are the Frontier people free
to select the issue on which they will vote in the referendum?’ He replied: ‘If they can get the High
Commands of the two parties to agree to it, and if they want to vote for independence, I will agree.
If on the other hand only one wishes it, then we stick to what we agreed on originally.’ The Statesman ,
5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 5.

152

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

limited knowledge it seems to me impossible that League could agree and that
introduction of third choice might upset large measure of agreement already
secured between the parties on all-India basis. Moreover reality of case is that
Frontier could never stand alone.

4. Since however those in favour of Pathanistan will carry opposition to
great lengths if issue stands as at present I think considerations here given should
be fully weighed. I think too many advocates of Pathanistan are sincere and
some of Jinnah’s local supporters are not without sympathy for this idea. As
matters stand I shall naturally give no encouragement to suggestions on these
lines.

84

Mr Campbell-] ohnson to Mr Joyce

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power ,

Publicity Arrangements for Announcement of

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 10.20 pm

confidential Received: 5 June, 10.4s pm

No. 1316-S. His Excellency’s Press Conference1 was a tremendous success, and
has done much to clarify and stabilise the situation and control the whole tone
of press comment.

Over 200 correspondents were present, and their reactions were quite the
most enthusiastic I have ever experienced. His Excellency’s performance was
described as a Quote tour de force Unquote.2 He spoke throughout without a
note, and his mastery of his subject made the deepest impression. The Statesman
reports Quote It was a remarkable performance, physical, rhetorical as well as
logical, and a great majority of the journalists must have come away deeply
impressed by the Viceroy’s evidently profound understanding of the Indian
problem. Unquote. Leader comment in the Statesman called it Quote An
Extraordinary achievement of intellect and personality, and by it many lurking
misconceptions should be removed from the public mind. Unquote.

Two critical comments should be noted : —

(1) Hindustan limes, whose Leader states Quote We still hope that it will be
made quite clear in due course that membership of the Commonwealth would
be open only to India as a whole. Unquote. This Leader, undoubtedly inspired
by Devadas Gandhi who asked H.E. the first question on these lines regarding
para. 20 at the Press Conference.3 This subject will need careful background
treatment.

(2) Indian News Chronicle, which stressed Balkanisation danger, arising from

JUNE I947

153

future partition of the States, the argument being that if there is no independent
choice for the NorthWest Frontier Province on the grounds of Balkanisation
danger, what about the States. His Excellency is asked to throw the whole
weight of his influence Quote on the side of progress and fair play, and prevent
the States Ruler [s] playing an anti-national role. Unquote.

On present form, I consider these are likely to be the two most dangerous
points of criticism at this end.

Partition of Punjab as it affects Sikhs, Calcutta and support of Pathanistan
claims in North West Frontier Province will also need watching.

Many thanks for your 7 194, 4 delighted all went so well your end. Release
plans worked very smoothly here and broadcast reception apparently excellent,
your prompt help and advice invaluable.

1 Nos. 59 and 60. 2 See No. 66, penultimate sentence.

3 See No. 60, note 12.

4 In tel. 7194 of 3 June, Mr Joyce described the favourable reception given to the announcement by
the House of Commons, and reported on the smooth operation of the publicity arrangements.
L/I/1/768: f 342.

85

Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: North-West Frontier

Province , Situation in , Part 1(b)

immediate 5 June 1947, 11.10 pm

confidential Received: 6 June , 9 am

192-CB. Moslem League agitation officially called off throughout province by
provincial War Council. No activities 4th except picketing Mansehra where
instructions apparently arrived late. Moslem League jubilant but depression
continues among minorities.

Addressed to Viceroy, Secretary of State, Governor of Punjab, Governor of
Sind.

86

Sir A. Hydari (Assam) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of Assam

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SHILLONG, 3 June I947
2. I am very sorry that what in recent months seemed inevitable, namely the
rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan, has in fact happened and the unity of
India has at least for some time to come been broken; but my Ministers, while

154

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

regretting in principle the partition of India, were relieved at the rejection of
the Cabinet Mission Plan with the possibility of Assam having to join a Group
with Bengal. They, both Hindu and Muslim (these belong to the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema), were pleased with the Announcement and Assam’s share in it. Mooker-
jee, B. K. Das, Abdul Rashid and Abdul Matlib Majumdar, who all belong to
the Surma Valley, are confident that Sylhet will elect to remain with the rest of
Assam. Medhi and the others do not mind if Sylhet goes to Eastern Bengal;
in fact I suspect that Medhi would be quite pleased if it did. I put the chances at
fifty-fifty.

87

Sir Evelyn Baring 1 to Dominions Office
Telegram , LlP&Jlioj8i: f 333

en Clair 3 June 1947, 6.43 pm

Received: 3 June, 10.23 pm
No. 168. Following is text of statement on India by General Smuts in House of
Assembly 4th June. Begins .

In spite of India’s recent attitude towards South Africa, I hope that she will
not resent my expression of deep interest in settlement2 which Mr Attlee has
just announced in British Parhament. The approval of Mr Churchill3 stamps
that settlement as a national one, and I assume that it will also be approved by
British Commonwealth as a whole. Its principal feature is that British Parlia¬
ment will without delay pass Legislation conferring Dominion status on India,
whether as one state, or as partitioned into two states. The new India will
therefore start as a member of British Commonwealth, but with all freedom
which Dominion status implies. Whether India will be united or divided into
Hindustan and Pakistan will be a decision for Indians themselves to make. Even
the Pakistan Provinces may elect to remain as they are, or to be partitioned
according to their communal affiliations. In these stormy and uncertain times it
must be a matter of no small importance to India that she starts her career
within the grand community of Commonwealth with all the stability and
prestige which that fact implies, and it may well be that, whether as one or as
two Dominions, she may find the advantages of the Commonwealth associa¬
tion outweigh all other considerations and inducements to charter her future
course alone. In that association she will have all the goodwill, sympathy and
co-operation from her fellow members, which may be a precious asset in the
dangerous years to come, and the vast changes they may bring. Ends.

1 British High Commissioner in South Africa. 2 No. 45.

3 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 41-3.

JUNE I947

155

Mr R. A. Butler to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence Files:

Misc. BU-BY

RACQUET AND TENNIS CLUB, 37O PARK AVENUE,

new york, 5 June 1947

My dear Viceroy,

I write from America to congratulate you on what appears from this distance
to have been a most successful start for the future.

The American Press has “carried” very full reports indeed and our country’s
stock appears to have risen.

Please give my regards to Edwina.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. BUTLER1

1 Lord Mountbatten replied on 17 June thanking Mr Butler for his congratulations. He added:

‘I am trying to keep up the momentum of our good start, and hope to be able to carry the thing
through without any major troubles.

I was interested in what you say about the reactions in the American Press. That country is,
generally speaking, more alive than most to the magnitude and complexity of the Indian problem.’

89

Sir A. Clutterbuck to Dominions Office
Telegram , L/POI6li2i: f 9

5 June 1947 , 8.04 pm
Received: 6 June , 7.40 am

No. 496. Your telegram Z. No. 31 of 3rd June.1 India.

Prime Minister released statement to Press on 3rd June and repeated this in
reply to Parliamentary question on following day. Following is text. Begins.

The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and
good will of the Government and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve
self-government.

It is of the utmost importance to the future peace and prosperity of other
countries, as well as of India, that this end should be peacefully achieved, and it
may be taken for granted that once the Indian people as well as their leaders
have reached agreement on their future political status they will find Canada

1 Not traced. Probably a circular notifying text of statement.

156

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

generously pre-disposed towards self-government. The result may be to enlarge
the number of states within the British Commonwealth. Ends.

2. In reply to supplementary question as to whether Canada has “consented”
to new proposals for India, Mr Mackenzie King said that in accordance with
general procedure Canadian Government had been kept fully informed and had
been asked if they wished to make any comment, but that this to his mind meant
something different from consultation. The reply given to the United Kingdom
Government would be clear from the statement he had just read.2

3 . Full text of Prime Minister’s remarks follows by air mail.3

4. Initial comments of press in Eastern Canada generally express great
pleasure at the possibility of India remaining in the Commonwealth, though
there is some anxiety about the prospects of partition. Warm praise is given to
the Prime Minister and to the Viceroy. Editorials emphasise this further proof
of Britain’s sincerity, saying that the Prime Minister’s announcement “is
stamped indelibly with good faith of Britain” ( Ottawa Journal). The Montreal
Daily Star commenting on the offer of Dominion status says “They will be as
free in the Commonwealth as they would be outside and at the same time enjoy
the inestimable advantages of close association with Britain and the Dominions.
Our experience can help India to find peace and unity even if it should be
necessary to find them in diversity of Government”. News reports have given
prominence to tributes to Mr Attlee and Viceroy and to Mr Churchill’s
expression of satisfaction at the latest developments.

5. The only hostile criticism so far appeared in the insignificant and Com¬
munist controlled Daily Tribune which declared that the new plan is a deliberate
manoeuvre to retain British imperial control and that its outstanding achieve¬
ment “is to assure that the vast treasures of India will continue to pour into
British coffers”.

6. I will report further on press reactions.

2 On 7 June 1947 Sir E. Maclitig sent a copy of this telegram to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary
drawing attention to para. 2, and adding : ‘It establishes that we should have run into considerable
difficulties if our statement [No. 45] had contained the words “after consultation with Dominions”,
as was at one time proposed.’ [see Vol. X, No. 518]. R/30/1/11: f 96.

3 For the full text of Mr Mackenzie King’s remarks, see the Canadian House of Commons Debates , 4 June
1947.

JUNE 1947

157

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET 5 June I947

I see from his letter of the 26th May1 that Sir John Colville kept you in the
picture during my time in England of what was happening out here. My letter
this week will be brief as I naturally have none from you to answer, and the last
few days have been fully occupied with the meetings with the Indian leaders,
to which I have referred in the attached Personal Report.2

2. I think you will like to know that the Honourable Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the
Labour Member, is leading the Indian Delegation to the next Session of the
International Labour Conference at Geneva on the 19th June, 1947. This will be
his first visit abroad and Sir John Colville, who saw him recently, told me that
he was quite excited about it. He is particularly looking forward to his visit to
London and I should be very grateful if he could be given the opportunity to
meet people and to see something of London, where I gather he intends to be
from 27th June to 2nd July. He is a charming little man and quite remarkable
for an “untouchable”.

3. The question of dealing with outstanding appeals from the Privy Council
after demission of power has been exercising attention out here. This is a matter
for which provision must be made in the future constitutions drawn up by
successor authorities and also I suggest might appropriately be included in any
Treaty drawn up by H.M.G. with such authorities.

4. If the whole or any part of India remains within the Commonwealth then
I understand that it is possible by agreement for the Privy Council to be used by
Commonwealth members as the final appellate authority. This matter cannot
be the subject of a definite recommendation at present, but I thought it might be
useful if I mentioned it to you, in order that you could have a preliminary
examination made at your end.

5. Sir John Colville returned to Bombay on Sunday; this is the fourth time
he has officiated in the absence of the Viceroy in England and I have heard from
all sides since my return that he has officiated once again with his customary
ability and charm. I think Ramamurty had a very good fortnight’s experience
at Bombay and I have just received a useful fortnightly report from him, of
which I think you have a copy.3 I understand that he brought 16 members of
his family to live in Government House during his fortnight and had all three
Government houses in the Bombay Presidency opened, and entertained
lavishly.

1 Vol. X, No. 542. 2 No. 91. 3 Dated. 30 May 1947* L/P &J/5/168: ff 51-6.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

91

Viceroy's Personal Report No. 8l
L/POI6/12J: ff 114-21

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 5 June I947

I got back from London late on the night of Friday the 30th May, but decided
I would not see any leader, formally, before the meeting on Monday. It was
essential, however, to find out the latest position about Bengal, so I arranged
for Mieville to see Suhrawardy and bring him into me (so that the interview
would not appear in the Court Circular).2 I was distressed to learn from
Suhrawardy that Kiran Shankar Roy had been unable to persuade the Congress
High Command to allow Bengal to vote for independence. Suhrawardy
pleaded for Calcutta to be allowed to be a free city during the period of
partition, since he felt that in this period communal bitterness would thus be
relaxed and sufficient confidence might be re-established for the Congress
eventually to decide to leave it a free city. Otherwise he feared that nothing he
could do would prevent riots and great damage in the City before partition. I
sent V. P. Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint
control of Calcutta. Patel's reply was very firm: “Not even for six hours !”

2. On Saturday evening I attended a cocktail party given by the new Chinese
Ambassador, which gave me an opportunity of meeting all the political leaders
socially. They were not slow to attack. Nehru insisted that the Congress
representation at the meetings should include Kripalani, and he said that if I
would not increase the numbers he would himself stand down in favour of
Kripalani.3 I then tackled Jinnah and Liaquat, who were most averse from
allowing Kripalani in. Finally, however, all-round agreement was reached that
Kripalani should be added to the Congress team and Nishtar to the League.

3. Jinnah tackled me on the need for a referendum on the question of Bengal
or at least Calcutta, to give the Scheduled Castes the chance of expressing their
dissatisfaction with Caste Hindus. I refused to be drawn.

4. My wife bought a series of small presents in London for the women folk
of all the leaders which were despatched on Saturday and received the most
enthusiastic letters back on Sunday.

5. Very bad riots were in full swing once more in the Gurgaon District of
the Punjab, not far from Delhi. I sent an aeroplane for the Governor, Jenkins;
met him at Palam airfield ; and motored with him to the riot areas.4 The trouble
appears to have been started by the Hindus this time, who, four days after a
Peace Committee meeting, which was reported to have passed off very satis¬
factorily, attacked a Meo village. (The Meos are the aborigines of this district

JUNE I947

159

and Muslims by religion). Naturally, this led to reprisals by the Meos and
fighting was at that time in full swing up and down a 50 mile front; with only
three companies of Sikhs and one of Gurkhas to try and quell it. I visited the
Battalion and two Company Headquarters, and talked to a young officer who
with half a dozen men had dispersed an armed crowd of 5000.

6. A new feature of the fighting has been the increase in the use of fire arms
and home-made trench mortars, and direct unprovoked attacks on soldiers.

7. The District Commissioner reported to me that the Home Member,
Patel, and the Defence Member, Baldev Singh, had visited the battlefront two
days previously and had invited the District Commissioner to stamp out this
lawlessness ruthlessly. The District Commissioner took them to a village which
at that time was ablaze and the two Members found that it was the Hindu
community which was busy setting the village on fire.

8. However, each community appears to have destroyed almost an equal
number of the other’s villages, the total now exceeding sixty. I could not help
feeling that this renewed outbreak of violence, on the eve of the meeting with
the leaders, might influence them to accept the plan which was about to be laid
before them.

9. We went round the Baptist Mission hospital at Palwal, where there were a
lot of horribly wounded and mutilated casualties from the fighting. The
hospital was not equipped for such an additional influx and my wife, who had
accompanied us, arranged to have all their shortages and supplies made good as
soon as possible.

10. On my return from Gurgaon I had the Nawab of Bhopal and the
Maharaja of Bikaner to lunch and saw them separately afterwards.5 Bikaner of
course was delighted to hear the way things were going and said that the pros¬
pect of Dominion Status would make the greatest difference to the feeling of the
Princes who had joined, or were about to join, the Constituent Assembly.

11. The Nawab of Bhopal, after I had explained the plan to him said “Once
more His Majesty’s Government have left the Princes in the lurch, because we
could have joined the weak Centre envisaged by the Cabinet Mission scheme,
but now there will be a tight Centre, whichever Dominion we join, which will
utterly destroy us.” I tried to impress on him that the only certain destruction of
the Princes’ personal position would be if they tried to stand out as independent

1 On 10 June Mr Attlee sent Lord Mountbatten the following personal message: ‘I have read your
personal report No. 8 with great interest. I am impressed with the great skill you have shown in these
critical proceedings. We are working hard on the draft legislation/ India Office tel. 7463 of 10 June
1947. P.R.O. PREM 8/578.

2 See Nos. 2, Item 2, and 10. 3 cf. No. 4.

♦ On 1 June 1947. 5 See No. 17, Item 1.

i6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

areas; but nothing I could say could shake him from his intentions to do so.

12. On Monday at io o’clock the first meeting6 of the Indian leaders took
place in my study, with the following present : —

Congress: Nehru, Patel, Kripalani.

League: Jinnah, Liaquat, Nish tar.

Sikhs : Baldev.

The eight of us sat round a small table, while Ismay, Mieville and my Conference
Secretary sat immediately behind me. The atmosphere was tense and I got the
feeling that the less the leaders talked the less the chance of friction and perhaps
the ultimate breakdown of the meeting. After a tense beginning the atmos¬
phere became generally friendly and distinctly hopeful; particularly when I
reported on the most helpful attitude of His Majesty’s Government and the
Opposition.

13. I asked the leaders to let me have their replies before midnight. Kripalani
and Baldev promised me letters and Jinnah said he would come in person at
11 p.m. after they had seen their Working Committees. I kept back Jinnah
after the meeting on Monday morning, both to counter-balance the fact that I
was seeing Gandhi separately (he never comes with the Congress leaders), and
to impress on him that there could not be any question of a “No” from the
League.

14. Since Gandhi returned to Delhi on the 24th May, he has been carrying
out an intense propaganda against the new plan, and although I have always
been led to understand he was the man who got Congress to turn down the
Cabinet Mission plan a year ago he was now busy trying to force the Cabinet
Mission plan on the country.7 He may be a saint but he seems also to be a
disciple of Trotsky. I gather that the meetings of the Congress Working
Committee have been most acrimonious in consequence, and I believe the
leaders were quite apprehensive of my seeing Gandhi on Monday. I certainly
was. Judge then of my astonished delight on finding him enter the room with
his finger to his lips to indicate that it was his day of silence !8

15. I spent 45 minutes explaining to him why the Cabinet Mission plan
could not be enforced against the will of any community, and generally trying
to break down his resistance to the new plan. He scribbled me a few notes on
the back of used envelopes, of a friendly nature, but once more called on me to
remove Caroe from the N.W.F.P., a request which has now been renewed by
both Nehru9 and Khan Sahib10 (the Premier of the N.W.F.P.).

16. On Monday evening between the two meetings by a happy coincidence
General Slim and I had arranged large reunions of the holders of the Burma
Star to take place simultaneously in London and Delhi. I collected over a
thousand of all ranks, all services and all communities — British and Indian. We

JUNE I947

l6l

exchanged messages of goodwill with the London gathering, which received
favourable publicity in Tuesday’s Delhi press and which helped to create a good
atmosphere for His Majesty’s Government’s announcement.

17. I had invited the Commanders-in-Chief and Army Commanders to
come to this party and gave them dinner after it. I then had a meeting with
them, gave them the plan, and discussed the steps which would be needed to
ensure the maintenance of law and order in the interim period and also how to
carry out partition of the armed forces without loss of morale. I need hardly
say that the plan proved a great surprise to everybody (except of course to
Auchinleck) and was enthusiastically received as the only possible solution to the
problem.

18. At 11 o’clock that night Jinnah came round.11 He spent half an hour
conveying the protest of his Working Committee against the partition of the
Provinces and saying that if His Majesty’s Government were really going to
insist on this scandalous move, then his Working Committee hoped most
strongly that they would at least do justice to the Scheduled Castes in Bengal
by insisting on a proper referendum. I reminded him that I had explained at
great length at the meeting that morning the Governor’s reasons against a
referendum and that I did not in any case intend to accept any amendment of
the printed plan unless it was agreed to by all parties.

19. I then asked him straight out whether his Working Committee were
going to accept the plan. He replied that they were “hopeful”. I then asked
him whether he intended to accept it himself, to which he replied that he would
support me personally and undertook to use his very best endeavours to get the
All-India Muslim League Council to accept it. He had called an urgent meeting
next Monday for this purpose. I finally asked him whether he felt I would be
justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and make the announce¬
ment, to which he replied very firmly “Yes”. Ismay, who was present, and I
both felt that this was as much of an acceptance as we should ever get out of
him until his Council met.

20. Shortly after Jinnah left, the letter12 came on behalf of the Congress
Working Committee from Kripalani. It was quite a long letter, a copy of which
has been sent home. Although it contained various objections and reservations
it was a firm acceptance on behalf of the whole Congress Working Com¬
mittee; subject of course to general ratification by the All-India Congress
Committee in about a fortnight’s time.

21. Baldev Singh’s letter13 was only received on Tuesday morning and also

6 No. 23. 7 See No. 2, note 5. 8 No. 24. 9 No. 61.

10 No. 81. 11 See Nos. 38 and 53, para. 6. 12 No. 35. 13 No. 36.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

162

contained reservations about instructions to the Boundary Commission on
behalf of the Sikhs, though it accepted the plan in other respects.

22. I called an early morning meeting14 of my Staff to discuss the two main
objections raised by Congress, and I despatched V. P. Menon to see Patel,15
and invited Nehru to come at 9.30 a.m. to see me before the meeting.

23. The line I took about these two points with Nehru was as follows: —

(a) The Congress request to allow the N.W.F.P. referendum to include a
third choice — for independence — could not be accepted unless the Muslim
League leaders agreed to it, which Nehru admitted was out of the question. I
further pointed out that it was at Nehru’s own request that I had removed the
choice of independence in the case of Bengal and other provinces to avoid
“Balkanisation”. I expressed surprise that he should have been a party to such a
manoeuvre, the more so since he admitted that this Province could not stand on
its own, and would eventually have to join up with one side or the other in any
case.

(b) The last sentence of the new paragraph 20 produced a strong reaction.
This reads as follows: —

“This will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent

Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect

of which they have authority will remain within the British Common¬
wealth.”

It may be remembered that this was the sentence which I thought in London
might give trouble and which I had favoured omitting.16 Nehru began by
saying he did not doubt my sincerity or that of His Majesty’s Government, but
that this sentence drew attention to the fact that Pakistan would be allowed to
remain within the Commonwealth even if Hindustan wished to withdraw. I
pointed out that what the sentence really drew attention to was the fact that
either side could withdraw whenever they liked. Nehru replied “But everybody
knows that; why did you have to draw public attention to the fact that one
side could stay in if the other side withdraws?”.

I replied that this was done from motives of honesty. He argued that His
Majesty’s Government could not be a party to allowing Pakistan to remain in
the Empire if Hindustan wished eventually to withdraw7. 1 pointed out that His
Majesty’s Government did not run the Commonwealth; that all the States in
it were free and equal partners; and that the only method open to him for
getting Pakistan out would be either by persuading them to withdraw at the
same time as Hindustan, or raising the matter at a Commonwealth conference
and getting the other Dominions to agree to this course. Finally I told him that
I had no intention of raising such a controversial matter which would only
infuriate Mr. Jinnah. We then went into the meeting.17

24. Once more at this second meeting I was afraid to let the leaders speak and

JUNE I947

163

so I spoke for each of them in turn, pointing out that as we had all expected
all three parties had grave objections to the various points in the plan, and that I
was gratified to find that they had aired them to me. Since, however, I knew
enough of the situation to realise that not one of the suggestions would be
accepted by either of the other parties I did not propose to raise them at this
meeting, and asked all the leaders to signify their consent, which they did.

25. The very moment I felt that I had got enough agreement on which to
go ahead I announced this decision and then threw on the table copies of a
lengthy paper prepared by my staff entitled “The Administrative Consequences
of Partition”.18 The severe shock that this gave to everyone present would have
been amusing if it was not rather tragic. I arranged to call another meeting on
Thursday to consider it, and then broke up the meeting as quickly as I could.

26. On Tuesday afternoon I saw Giani Kartar Singh. He surprised me by
saying that when the bitterness had died down he would be prepared to see Mr.
Jinnah and make the best terms he could for the Sikhs, who would come into
Pakistan. Needless to say I much encouraged this. He also promised that the
Sikh community would not fight so long as the British were present. While
expressing my gratification at this, I pointed out that they would be hit just as
hard by the Indian armed forces after the transfer of power as before, and I
hoped the Sikhs would not be so foolish as to commit virtual suicide.

27. At 4 o’clock on Tuesday afternoon19 I saw the fourteen members of the
States Negotiating Committee and gave them the printed plan, and explained
it. It was surprisingly well received considering the difficulty pointed out by the
Chancellor, His Highness of Bhopal.20 In general the Committee agreed that
the next two months must be utilised for negotiating temporary agreements on
a stand-still basis to allow time for proper agreements to be entered into in due
course.

28. The three leaders had promised to broadcast that evening after me,
asking that the plan should be accepted as peaceably as possible by their
followers. At 7 o’clock I met them at the All-India Radio studio, and we made
our broadcasts.21 The faces of the Muslim Leaguers when Nehru talked about
allowing parts of India to secede from the Union were matched only by the
expressions of dismay on the faces of the Congress members present when
Jinnah made a violent electioneering speech about the N.W.F.P. However, I
succeeded in jollying them out of their gloom.

14

15

16

17

20

There appears to be no record of this meeting among the Minutes of the Viceroy’s Staff Meetings
in the Mountbatten Papers.

See No. 53.

The relevant India and Burma Committee Minute (Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3) does not record
Lord Mountbatten’s view on this point, but cf. Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2, p. 918.

No. 39. 18 No. 28.

See above, para. 11.

19 No. 43.
Nos. 44-48.

21

164

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

29. At ten o’clock on Wednesday morning I held a Press conference in the
Constituent Assembly Hall, attended by upwards of 200 press men.22 For two
and a quarter hours I was under violent cross-fire on every conceivable subject,
but mostly about the Sikhs, about the States, and about Pakistan being allowed
to retain dominion status. I luckily knew my subject pretty well, having been
immersed in it for two months, and feel I was able to answer all the questions
to most people’s satisfaction. At all events the follow up in all sections of today’s
press has been more favourable than the most sanguine of us could have hoped
for.

30. Suhrawardy came to see me again after the announcement.23 For a
Muslim leader living in West Bengal he showed surprising courage and
determination to build a worthwhile Eastern Pakistan. He was already full of
plans, the principal one being to mortgage the whole of the jute crops of Bengal
to acquire the necessary machinery, power plants etc., to put Eastern Bengal
on its feet. He said he had already had a number of interesting offers from
American business men, but had been disappointed that no British interests
had come forward. I arranged for Mieville to put him in touch with Shone
since I pointed out that I was not here to look after British interests myself.

31. This morning24 I held my third meeting with the leaders to discuss the
paper on the administrative consequences of partition. We made very slow
progress as each side appeared to be anxious to make political speeches. Jinnah
was at pains to explain that both States would be independent and equal in every
way. Nehru pointed out that the whole basis of approach must be different;
India was continuing in every way the same, and the fact that dissident Pro¬
vinces were to be allowed to secede must not interrupt the work of the Govern¬
ment of India or its foreign policy. Feeling was very tense.

32. Both sides were still very anxious to obtain my services as arbitrator in
all matters of dispute in working out the partition. But I pointed out that since
both sides were already approaching the problem from such widely divergent
points of view it was clear that I should have to give a decision which one side
or the other side would dislike practically every day, and however much they
now professed to believe in my impartiality, such a procedure could not fail to
undermine their confidence in me within a very short time. I therefore felt I
should not be of much use to them in this capacity and I am glad to say they
agreed to try and find a mutually acceptable High Court Judge to fulfil this
role.

33. This afternoon I received a telegram25 from Caroe saying that in the
absence of the Premier he had seen two members of the Government who said
they refused to accept paragraph 4 of the announcement and would not in any
circumstances co-operate in the referendum. I immediately sent for Khan

JUNE 1947

Sahib26 and told him that I could not possibly accept his attitude and he
promised to fly back to the Frontier to-morrow and get their people to accept
paragraph 4 and help with the referendum.

34. A number of people whom I have met since the announcement have all
told me they believe the communal tension to have been greatly relieved by
this announcement and that a new feeling of hope and expectancy was abroad,
at all events throughout Delhi. I am under no illusion that to retain this spirit
will require the most careful handling of the situation; for the smallest high
level incident could upset it again.

M OF B

22 Nos. 59 and 60. 23 No record of this interview has been traced.

24 No. 73. 25 No. 65. 26 No. 81.

92

Sir T. Shone to Sir N. Brook
Telegram , L/E/^/4^75: ff 161-2

no cop new Delhi, 6 June 1947, 2.30 am

personal and confidential Received: 6 June , 11.40 am

IRKU 360. Your UKRI 292.1

I fully agree with what you say in paragraph 1 about importance of post which
will presumably have to be set up in capital of Pakistan and was about to write
to you on the subject. (Indeed I have been wondering whether it may not prove
impracticable to have one High Commissioner for the whole of India as a
permanent arrangement in the conditions which seem likely to develop). It had
also occured to me that Gfrafftey] Sfmith] might now be better placed in
Pakistan (wherever its capital is to be), than in Calcutta. I also think we shall
need an outpost in Pakistan at Karachi (if it is not the capital) at an early date
and probably Peshawar or Rawalpindi as well. If Eastern Bengal is to be
covered, I do not think this can be done from Calcutta if Calcutta is in Hin¬
dustan. We may therefore need an outpost at Chittagong.

2. Even if Hindustan and Pakistan stay in the British Commonwealth, I
think they will present very different problems from those in any other

1 Tel. UKRI 292 of 3 June dealt with the provision of staff for outposts of the U.K. High Commission
in Calcutta and elsewhere in the sub-continent. Its first para, stated that: ‘Foreign Office are bringing
Gfrafftey] Sfmith] home from Jedda with a view to his taking up post at Calcutta. Recent develop¬
ments in the Indian situation, however, make it likely that in addition to the posts to be filled at
Calcutta and Bombay, there will be a post at Lahore or elsewhere in N.W. Pakistan of at least equal
political status and importance to that of Calcutta and it may be that G.S. would be suitable for this
post.’ L/S &G/7/1285.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1 66

Dominion. We ought not I feel to appear to be treating Pakistan scurvily in
comparison with Hindustan especially as it will have more need of help to get
on its legs — at least economically — for which I imagine it will look primarily to
us. And its position on the map gives it strategic importance. These are only
first thoughts about what is admittedly a rather uncertain future, but I think it
as well to let you have them.

Paras. 3-6, on the provision of staff for various outposts in India and
Pakistan, omitted.]

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Ninth Staff Meeting , Items 11 and 14

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 6 June
ig47 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Mr Christie, Captain Brockman, Mr L D. Scott, Mr
Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 11

Pakistan's diplomatic representation
his excellency the viceroy said that it was his hope that Pakistan, which
was bound to be a poor country, at any rate in the initial stages, would not set
up diplomatic missions in too many foreign countries. They would probably
wish to have their own representation in the United Kingdom, U.S.A. and
certain Middle East Muslim countries; but it was to be hoped that they would
share either British or Hindustan representatives elsewhere.

Item 14

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

Copies were handed round of a letter1 which had been received from Pandit
Nehru that morning concerning the previous day’s discussion in a meeting2
with the seven Indian Leaders, of the paper entitled “The Administrative
Consequences of Partition”.3 In this letter Pandit Nehru also reiterated his
view that he did not like the idea of the Interim Government carrying on in the
present manner for another two months.

his excellency the viceroy said that he had arranged for Rao Bahadur
Menon to discuss this matter with Pandit Nehru. He noted that in his letter the

JUNE 1947

167

latter suggested that he (The Viceroy) should discuss it with Mr Krishna
Menon. He pointed out that Pandit Nehru was continually asking him to see
Krishna Menon. Whatever the merits of using the latter as a “contact man”
might be, it was clear that Mr Krishna Menon was Pandit Nehru’s right-hand
man.

lord ismay gave his view that such contact through Mr Krishna Menon
had been extremely useful in London, where political issues had been under
discussion and where Pandit Nehru was not available. On the other hand,
Pandit Nehru was nearly always available in Delhi and the present discussions
were on administrative and not political matters. Perhaps The Viceroy might
wish to point this out to Pandit Nehru and to suggest that Mr Krishna Menon’s
services as a link were no longer of such value as they had been.

Copies were then handed round of two notes by The Viceroy’s Staff on the
Administrative Consequences of Partition. Copies of one4 of these had been
circulated to Honourable Members for discussion at the Cabinet Meeting that
evening. It was intended to circulate the other5 to the seven Indian Leaders for
discussion at the conference the following day. To the latter The Viceroy
dictated certain amendments. He said that he would see Mr Jinnah and Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan after the meeting the following day, for a preliminary
discussion of the personnel and terms of reference of the Boundary Commis¬
sions.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

invited C.V.S. to circulate to the seven Indian Leaders the note prepared
by the Staff on the Administrative Consequences of Partition, for the
meeting the following day; and to invite the Muslim League representa¬
tives to stay behind after the meeting for a preliminary discussion of the
personnel and terms of reference of the Boundary Commissions.

1 No. 80. 2 No. 73, Item 1. 3 No. 28.

4 This note explained the conclusions reached in No. 73, Item 1. Mountbatten Papers, Official Corres¬
pondence Files: Partition, Administrative Consequences of.

5 Not traced.

94

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell

R/3l1l137: f $

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI , 6 June 1 947

My dear Abell,

Please refer to my secret letter of the 5th June1 dealing with Pandit Nehru’s
objections2 to the States dealing directly with the various Departments of the
Central Government.

1 No. 74.

2 No. 68.

i68

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The question was discussed by His Excellency today with certain Rulers and
Dewans,3 and it was agreed that His Excellency should explain to Pandit
Nehru that the unanimous view of States was that for the purpose of such
dealings they would be opposed to the location of agents of the Central or
Dominion Government in their territories, but that if any additional liaison was
considered necessary by those Governments, beyond that already being ar¬
ranged by direct correspondence ( vide Political Department Memorandum, No.
F.24-R(S) / 47 of the 17th April 1947 of which a copy is enclosed)4 they would be
prepared to locate their own agents at the headquarters of the appropriate
Government, to represent either a single State or a group of States as they
thought best.

It was mentioned during the discussion that the appointment of local agents
in States by a Dominion Government would lead inevitably to paramountcy
being inherited by that Government : that States had the right of first refusal for
the purchase of any property in States now belonging to the paramount
power: that though this property had been acquired at the cost of Central
Revenues, those revenues were subscribed to by States through the payment
of tribute and other indirect contributions to the Central exchequer : and that
this property would in many cases be required for administrative purposes by
individual States and by the joint organizations which they were setting up for
regional groups.

It was suggested that as soon as these representatives had been located at the
headquarters of the appropriate Government paramountcy could well lapse in
respect of the States so represented, i.e. in advance of the 15th August. It should
be possible to make these appointments by the 1st July and it was all the more
necessary therefore that the arrangements for retroceding jurisdiction in States
should be expedited.

His Excellency thought it might be as well, after warning Pandit Nehru, to
discuss this question with the seven British Indian political leaders as a general
issue affecting both Dominions. After that discussion a letter on the lines of the
enclosed draft5 (which was considered suitable by Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar
and Mr Sreenivasan) could issue to Residents.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. C ORFIELD

3 Those present at this meeting were: Lord Mountbatten, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, the Raja of
Bilaspur, Sir R. Mudaliar, Mr Sreenivasan, Sir C. Corfield, Lord Ismay and Sir E. Mieville. Note by
Sir E. Mieville, 6 June 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Interviews (2).

4 R/3/1/136: f 56.

5 This draft explained to Residents that, as doubt had been expressed whether direct correspondence
would ensure adequate liaison between the States and the Central Governments, it was suggested
that each State or group of States should appoint an officer to be located at the headquarters of the
appropriate Government. Residents were asked to enquire whether States would be prepared to do
this, and the draft concluded by stating that it had been suggested that the only satisfactory alternative
would be the location of agents of the Central Governments in the territories of the States.

JUNE I947

Meeting of the Indian Cabinet Case No. 1 37/30 / 47

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition , Administrative

Consequences of

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 6 June 1947 at 6 pm were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Pandit Nehru, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Mr Chundrigar, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar, Maulana Azad, Mr
Rajagopalachari, Dr Matthai, Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr
Jagjivan Ram, MrBhabha, Mr Mandal; Mr Abell, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Osman Ali
(. Secretariat )

Case No. 137/30/47. Administrative Consequences of Partition

MINUTES

His Excellency said that he wished to explain the reasons that prompted him to
discuss the paper on the administrative consequences of partition at his meeting
this morning1 with the 7 Indian leaders before putting it to his colleagues. Speed
was of the essence since the target date fixed was the 15th August both for
putting through the Parliamentary legislation and for the work that had to be
done here, and he thought it would help in setting up the requisite machinery
with the utmost expedition, if he could ascertain the views of the leaders, five of
whom were, in any case, members of the Cabinet. It was almost certain that the
vote in the Provincial Legislatures would be for Pakistan. Consequently, we
should very soon have two sovereign Governments in existence. The only
bodies which at present could be said to represent them were the Congress and
the League. He had, therefore, felt that there were good and sufficient reasons
for including the respective Presidents of those organisations in those discus¬
sions. He had now taken the earliest opportunity of placing before the Cabinet
the paper2 prepared by his staff on the administrative consequences of partition
as revised in the light of those talks.

Continuing, His Excellency said that the time factor was so pressing that he
considered it essential that the proposed partition committee should be a whole
time body and, should, therefore, be separate from the Cabinet. He sought the
approval of his colleagues to its being given plenary powers by means of an
order in Council to call for such information as it required and to take decisions.
He himself would offer the benefit of his own experience and that of his per¬
sonal staff to assist in working out and putting in a clear form before those who

1 Actually the previous morning: see No. 73, Item 1.

2 See No. 93, note 4.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

170

would have to make the decisions, the details and possible alternatives which
they would, of course, be at liberty to accept or reject. A possibility which had
since occurred to him was that it might be desirable to have both a partition
committee and a tribunal of carefully selected judges.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —

(1) The Partition Committee, which might more appropriately be called a
Separation Committee, would deal with an existing Government on the one
hand and an embryonic State on the other. Partition, moreover, would cover
the whole range of Governmental activity, and it would create an anomalous
position for the Cabinet to have a Committee independent of itself. The
Committee should, therefore, be formed by and derive its powers from the
Cabinet. Its composition would, of course, have to be decided by agreement
between the parties.

(2) Differences, when they arose, would be very largely on a political plane,
and it would be more expeditious if the Committee were to be presided over by
His Excellency the Viceroy. If these differences were referred to a Judge
Umpire or a judicial tribunal, there would arise serious delay.

His Excellency did not, however, wish to be placed in a position when he
would have to arbitrate. With the best will in the world, very soon, he would
displease one or the other, if not both parties, since the tendency inevitably
would be for each side to forget decisions given in its favour, and only to
remember those given against it ! His Excellency would, of course, be prepared
to assist by presiding and in his capacity as Chairman endeavour to get the
differences resolved by argument and discussion, and when agreement proved
impossible, at least to get the differences reduced to a minimum, and thereafter
to refer them to a judicial tribunal, which would be an impartial body (but not
a higher authority) and which would be directed to give its decision within a
specified period of time.

(3) it was inadvisable to create a new standing tribunal to which every one
would look for final decisions. If it was considered desirable to refer any
particular problems to the tribunal for a decision, an ad hoc body could be set
up for that purpose. The composition of such a tribunal or tribunals would, of
course, have to be settled beforehand so that it or they could be called into being
at a moment’s notice. It was essential that the embryonic Governments should
bind themselves to accept the decision of such a tribunal.

(4) Since the Committee would have to enquire into the business of the
Government of India which was only in official knowledge, it was undesirable
that outsiders should be associated with it. Moreover, the tendency would be
for the Secretariat staff to regard the Committee as a supreme body and it would
not be possible for Hon’ble Members to carry out their ordinary administrative
duties in that atmosphere. Consequently, if any persons had to be appointed on
the Committee who were not already members of the Cabinet, they should

JUNE 1947

171

first be made members of the Cabinet. It was contended that the Committee
would only be collecting material and no question of divided allegiance among
the Secretariat staff need arise.

(5) Prior to the legal decision on the question of partition it would be odd to
set up a body composed of persons not in the Cabinet, thereby giving to the
world the incorrect impression that division had already been decided upon. It
would, however, be in keeping with normal practice for the Cabinet to appoint
a Committee of its own. This could proceed to create the detailed machinery
necessary but need not take decisions until the question of partition had been
legally decided by the vote of the Provincial Legislatures, and a Partition
Committee set up.

Summing up, His Excellency said that we were dealing with an unprece¬
dented problem. We had only 71 days in which we had to solve it. He would
put the procedure which appeared generally to be agreed upon before the
leaders tomorrow for their acceptance.

DECISION

The Cabinet agreed:

(1) that a Committee of the Cabinet should be appointed with H.E. the
Viceroy as Chairman to work out the machinery for implementing the parti¬
tion (and that H.E. should consult the leaders informally regarding its composi¬
tion).

(2) that the Committee’s report should be completed as early as possible and
placed before the Cabinet for consideration, (and that H.E. should, if possible,
obtain the leaders’ reaction to it beforehand).

(3) that when the question of partition had been legally decided, and after the
members of the existing Cabinet had resigned, a Separation Committee should
be set up by His Excellency in consultation with the leaders, with H.E. as
Chairman. It was noted that H.E. would not act as arbitrator in this Committee
but would merely assist in resolving differences between the two parties or at
least in reducing them to the minimum.

(4) that there should be set up along with the Separation Committee a
standing tribunal or a panel of umpires to whom points of difference, which
could not be resolved, could be referred.

(5) The material collected by the Cabinet Committee and details of the
machinery set up will be placed before the Partition Committee for ratification.

172

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

96

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir O. Caroe (North-West

Frontier Province)1

R/jI 1/170: ff 21-2

strictly personal 6 June 1947

No. 1450
Dear Sir Olaf,

When we first met2 in India, I gave you my assurance that I would give you my
utmost support and backing so long as you held your present difficult appoint¬
ment: but I thought it only fair to give you warning that circumstances might
arise in which I should be compelled to ask you for your resignation, since, in
these momentous days, personal considerations are a small thing compared to
the public weal.

I am afraid that I have recently been bombarded again by representations3
from your detractors (whom I need not name) to the effect that there is no hope
of peace, nor of a fair and orderly referendum, in the NWFP so long as you
hold the reins of office. I do not have to tell you that I myself have a high
opinion of your capacity, integrity and selfless devotion to duty under an
immense strain: but I feel that the time has come when I must, for the moment
at any rate, replace you as Governor of the NWFP.

On the other hand, I am most anxious that this grave step should be taken so
far as possible without injury to yourself, and without closing the door to your
further employment in India if you were so to desire: and in this matter
developments have presented me with the possibility of a satisfactory solution.

I am aiming at transferring power to Hindustan and Pakistan by 15 th August,
and shortly before that date I shall call on all the present Governors and Chief
Commissioners to place their resignations in my hands. It will then be a matter
for the Governments of the two new States to reappoint those Governors
whom they wish to retain. My proposal, therefore, is that you should go on
leave as soon as it can be arranged for your temporary successor to arrive, and
that you should remain on leave until 15th August, or such date as the two new
Governments are in a position to select the new Provincial Governors. It is
clear to me that if Congress win the NWFP, there would not be the slightest
chance that they would reappoint you as Governor. On the other hand, if the
Province goes to Pakistan, it may very well be that the Pakistan Government,
who, I believe, share my high opinion of you, would ask for you to be re¬
appointed.

I suggest to you that the course that I propose has solid advantages. In the
first place, it will strengthen my hand with Congress, who will not hesitate to

JUNE 1947

173

say, if you are Governor during the referendum and if they lose, that you
enabled the League to win with a view to your remaining as Governor on the
League s advice. Secondly, it will give you the respite that you have richly
deserved. Thirdly, it does not close the door to your future employment.
Fourthly, it will mean that the referendum will be carried through entirely by
soldiers, since I am proposing to H.M.G. that General Lockhart should be
seconded— not retired — from the Army in order to officiate as Governor,
NWFP, until the transfer of power.

I am sure that you will understand my motives in making this suggestion and
I shall be glad to have your reactions as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 When Lord Ismay submitted the draft of this letter he stated that it had been agreed by Sir E. Mieville
and Mr Abell. R/3/1/170: f 20.

2 Vol. X, No. 143. 3 See Nos. 24, 61 and 81.

97

Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(a)

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 6 June 1Q47

No. 680

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Abell will no doubt have told Your Excellency of our discussion on the
evening of 5th June1 about the further time-table for proceedings in the Punjab
under the partition plan.

2. I have today sanctioned the appointment of a Partition Commissioner, a
member of the Indian Civil Service named Sachdev, who will, I think, do very
well. Sachdev has recently been employed as Secretary of our Civil Supphes
Department, and I can ill-spare him for the new appointment. But the Depart¬
ment has a capable Additional Secretary who will, I hope, be able to carry on.
I had thought of securing Mr. Justice Cornelius of the Lahore High Court, a
very able Indian Christian who has been Legal Remembrancer, and I told
Abell of this. But on further reflection I felt that it might be embarrassing to a
judge to be involved in what may be highly controversial discussions.

This morning I held a conference with the Heads of Departments and set up
a number of expert committees to initiate the examination of the main partition

1 See No. 98.

174

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

problems. Each committee has been given a time limit within which its first
report must be ready.

3. This afternoon I saw Sachar, Mamdot and Swaran Singh separately in
that order, and put three questions to them, which are set out in the enclosure
to this letter, together with their replies.

On these replies I hope to despatch the summons to Members of the Legis¬
lative Assembly on 10th June for meetings of the two separate halves of the
Assembly2 on (say) 19th June. Mamdot obviously did not wish me to despatch
the summons until the Muslim League Council had ratified the Plan, and I do
not think I can exceed the fastest pace of the slowest horse.

The replies to my question about the formation of a Coalition Ministry were
interesting. I explained that a great deal of work had to be done in a very short
time, and that there must be political guidance at all stages. Such guidance
could clearly be given by a Coalition Ministry, and the Ministry might be
formed in such a way that it could, when the time came, be divided into two
parts for the Western and Eastern Punjab respectively. Sachar, without promp¬
ting from me, said that a Ministry would lose itself in squabbles about law and
order and other controversial matters. The Muslim League Ministers would
wish to withdraw all criminal proceedings against their followers and to cancel
other punitive measures. Though he was attracted by the idea of a “zonal”
Ministry (I told him I thought this quite impossible in the conditions prevailing
and in the time available) , his own personal opinion was that we should remain
in section 93 , and that the political guidance required in partition matters should
be given by a special Partition Committee representing the parties.

Mamdot seemed hardly to comprehend the question and said he would have
to consult his colleagues and see me again.

Swaran Singh took the same view as Sachar and, as I expected, urged that
very little could be done until the Boundary Commission had reported. I
gathered from him that the Sikhs might be satisfied if the terms of reference to
the Boundary Commission seemed favourable to them. But Swaran Singh’s
main argument was that it would be impossible to apportion assets and lia¬
bilities, to distribute the services, and so on until the boundary between the two
new Provinces was accurately known. I argued that we could certainly proceed
on the “notional” boundary in order to determine the principles of the division,
and that comparatively simple adjustments could be made as soon as the
Boundary Commission reported. Swaran Singh was very friendly, as he
always is, but I am almost sure that the Sikhs will refuse to commit themselves
on the administrative aspects of partition until the boundary is known. They
will argue, as Swaran Singh argued in his talk with me, that H.M.G. have made
it clear that the “notional” boundary is simply a device to ensure a quick
decision on the principle of partition and is not to be used for any other purpose.

JUNE I947

175

Swaran Singh mentioned letters to Your Excellency from Nehru and Baldev
Singh on this subject.2 3 If we are to wait for the report of the Boundary Com¬
mission and the “notional5’ boundary cannot be used for the purpose of
preliminary calculations of the financial adjustments, etc., we shall be unable to
get through our work by 15 th August next — in fact partition may be delayed
indefinitely.

Both Sachar and Swaran Singh asked me to see them again after Mamdot had
had his further talk with me, and I agreed.

4. To sum up, it seems that it should be possible to get the decision of the
two halves of the Assembly by about the end of the third week in June. It will
not be easy to get a Ministry or a Partition Committee going ; but so far the
Partition Committee appears to be the easier alternative. Swaran Singh told me
that he did not think that the Committee would agree on anything at all, and
began talking about the representation of the parties on it. I said that the
Committee, if formed, could obviously not proceed by individual votes — it
would exist simply to give two equal parties an opportunity to negotiate, and I
thought it should be as small as possible, provided that the representatives of the
parties had the full confidence of their followers. Swaran Singh’s doubts about
the Committee’s proceedings and his views about the Boundary Commission’s
report show that there may be various troubles ahead of us.4

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

2 See No. 45, paras. 5-9.

3 Presumably the letters from Congress (actually signed by Mr Kripalani) and Baldev Singh accepting
the plan: see Nos. 35, para. 11 and 36; also Lord Mountbatten’s remarks in No. 39, p. 73.

4 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged this letter on 8 June. He noted what Sir E. Jenkins said about the

attitude of the three leaders to a coalition government, agreed with the programme for summoning
the Legislative Assembly outlined in para. 3, and also remarked that: ‘I suppose we shall have to put
up with a continuation of the Section 93 regime in the Punjab if the parties refuse to co-operate in a
coalition but clearly their co-operation in a Partition Committee is in any case essential.’ Mountbatten
Papers, loc. cit.

176

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

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Committee. Said that the
Partition Committee could do
little until the Boundary-
Commission had reported.

JUNE 1947

177

Note by Mr Abell on a discussion with Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part 11(a)

7 June 1947

I flew to Lahore yesterday evening1 and had a long talk with the Governor
after dinner. I flew back to Delhi this morning before breakfast.

2. I attach a copy of a note by the Governor.2 The main points are discussed
below.

3. I promised that 1 would ask H.E. to speak to the Leaders on Saturday
about the question of summoning the two halves of the Assembly in advance of
formal ratification. I think myself that public opinion expects immediate
invitations and that these might go out immediately after the acceptance by the
League on Monday. If the Sikhs are going to cut up rough I rather doubt
whether the fact of summoning them now will make much difference. The
Governor was prepared to accept this view provided the Leaders in Delhi were
agreeable.

4. Coalition Government. I said the Governor’s intentions were exactly in
accordance with what, I thought, H.E. wanted.

5. Administrative Work on Partition. It is satisfactory that the Governor is
working on the same plan as ourselves. I took the Minutes of H.E. ’s Meetings
with me and described the latest developments to the Governor. I said I was
sure that a lot of work at the official level could be done before the decision
about partition was reached and the Governor agreed.

6. The Services. What the Governor said about this subject was the most
important part of the discussion. He said that the behaviour of Punjab people
in the recent disturbances had been so revolting that very few British officials
were now prepared to stay on at all after the transfer of power. He is very
doubtful whether appeals would move them because many of them feel it is
morally wrong to do the work which they will probably be expected to do or
to get involved in disturbances between the communities which are likely to
occur, even in the best circumstances, in the disputed areas. The British mem¬
bers of the Services are also tired of being told that they are to blame for any
riots that take place and that the worst disturbances only happen where there
are British officials.

I tried to point out to the Governor how the matter was viewed in London
and throughout the commonwealth. He said he would do his best but

1 Actually on evening of 5 June: see No. 97, para. 1.

2 See Annex.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

neither he nor his Secretary were optimistic about the results of asking men to
stay on even for a few months after the transfer of power.

Incidentally, General messervy has his Headquarters in Government House
and the view was expressed by a British member of his Staff and supported by
him (though this should not be quoted to the Commander-in-Chief) that only
about one in 400 British officers of the Indian Army will be likely to stay on
after the transfer of power.

Though the Services have done splendidly in the Punjab during the
disturbances they are evidently fed up at the moment and I think the very
strong reactions I have quoted may be temporary. It is probable that if a strong
appeal is made a better response will be forthcoming than the Governor
suggests. I do not believe that men would insist on going immediately if they
were told that to stay on for a few months would be a real service to the
empire and to India. It is not, however, yet certain that the new Govern¬
ments will want men just for a month or two.

7. Two new Governors. Sir Evan jenkins was most emphatic that he must
make it known very soon that he would not serve on in either of the Punjab
Provinces after the transfer of power. He has to judge between the communities
every day and it must be clear to everyone that he has no personal axe to grind
at all. I tried to shake him about this but he was quite immovable and I do not
think he would yield to persuasion to stay on in either of the two Provinces,
since to do so would identify him with one community or the other.

8. Programme oj Action in the Punjab. I agreed generally to the Governor’s
programme, subject to the possibility of advancing the date for the meeting of
the two halves of the Assembly.

9. Boundary Commission. I explained the difficulties about timing to the
Governor. The Bill which will be presented in parliament will have to
define the territories of the two Dominions, though it will of course say that
they are subject to adjustment as the result of the Boundary Commission.
There is, however, no hope that the Boundary Commission will reach results
and these be accepted in time for them to be incorporated in the Bill. I antici¬
pate myself considerable delay over the framing of the terms of reference and
the securing of a neutral Chairman. It seems to me to follow that the Boundary
Commission will not report, or at any rate that accepted decisions will not be
available, until after the transfer of power or at any rate that we must go ahead
on the assumption that this may happen and that the notional boundaries must
stand as the administrative boundaries until the report is accepted. I put this to
the Governor as my own idea. He said that the Sikhs had been led to suppose
that no important action would be taken on the basis of the notional boun¬
daries but he admitted the difficulty about the time factor. He also admitted
that it would be practically impossible for the Boundary Commission to reach a

JUNE 1947

179

decision that was acceptable to the Sikhs, so that it was not necessarily an
advantage to have that decision at an early date; it might be better to face the
matter when the two Governments had settled down a little.

10. As the result of these discussions I suggest the following action:

(i) Party Leaders should be told on Saturday3

(a) to express a view whether the two halves of the Punjab Assembly
could be summoned at once ; and

(b) that the Governor of the Punjab felt he could not continue as
Governor after the transfer of power and that therefore early steps
should be taken to nominate two Governors.

(ii) Steps should be taken to ascertain the attitude of both the major parties
about keeping on members of the Civil Service and Police for a few
months, even if they did not want to stay on permanently. It was
suggested at CVS’s Staff Meeting yesterday that letters might be
written immediately to Pandit nehru and the Finance Member but I
would prefer, if there is no objection, to make informal enquiries first.

(iii) The question of the Services should be discussed further by me with
H.E. the Governor of Bengal on Monday.

G. E. B. ABELL

3 See No. 100, Item 1, conclusions (vii), and Item 2.

Annex to No. gS
Note by Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )

SECRET 5 June 1947

The transfer of power may now take place as early as 15 th August 1947. If we
are to complete within a period of 71 days the very complicated measures
necessary to settle and give effect to the partition of the Punjab, we must be
clear about our time-table.

2. The essential measures to be taken are as follows : —

(a) The summoning of the two halves of the Assembly and the taking of the
initial decision for or against partition (it may be assumed that the decision will
be for partition) ;

(b) The appointment of the Boundary Commission, the conduct of pro¬
ceedings by the Commission, and the decision on the Commission s recom¬
mendations.

Before going further it must be stated that the timings of (a) and (b) require
great care. It does not seem that the two halves of the Assembly can be sum¬
moned until all parties have formally ratified the acceptance by their leaders of
H.M.G.’s announcement. It is clear that ratification by the Muslim League will

i8o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

not take place before 9th June. I have heard, though this has not been con¬
firmed, that ratification by one of the Congress bodies (presumably the
A.I.C.C.) may be expected about i6thjune. The Sikhs, to be in the fashion, may
also decide on formal ratification of some kind. It may therefore be impossible
to summon the two halves of the Assembly until 16th June or even later, and
the meetings could hardly be held until 26th June or 28th June.

An added complication is that the Sikhs probably and the Muslims possibly
may decline to cooperate in (a) until (b) has been completed. It would be a
great mistake to summon the two halves of the Assembly until we are clear
that the parties will cooperate.

In the circumstances I propose to consult the Party Leaders in a preliminary
way tomorrow, 6th June,4 or as soon as possible thereafter, and to secure the
earliest dates I can for the meetings of the Assembly Members. The question for
decision is whether I am to force the pace and risk a crisis or give the parties
reasonable time.

(c) The establishment (if possible) of a “divisible” Coalition Government.

A partition settlement could be effected by a committee of the Party leaders

with myself as Chairman, but it could be effected more simply, and I think
more amicably, by a committee of Ministers. I propose to sound the Party
leaders on the possible formation of a Coalition Government to see us over the
short period now remaining, and to provide a committee to deal with the
partition settlement. A “zonal” arrangement would be far too complicated and
distracting to be effective. The kind of Coalition I have in mind is a “divisible”
one consisting of Ministers who could, when the time comes, fall into two
groups and form, perhaps with certain additions, the Ministries of the two new
Provinces.

(d) The negotiation and conclusion of the “partition settlement”.

I propose to follow the model laid down by the Viceroy at the Centre. I hope
to complete my plan by tomorrow and to appoint the personnel of the expert
committees, but little real work can be done until either a Coalition Govern¬
ment or a committee of politicians has been appointed to control policy. If the
Party Leaders are sticky about the ratification of their acceptance of H.M.G.’s
announcement and will not co-operate with one another until the two halves
of the Assembly have met, it seems improbable that serious work can begin
until about 1st July at the earliest. This will reduce the period available to 46
days.

(e) The financial adjustments and the reorganisation of the services necessi¬
tated by the partition settlement.

Much will depend on how far the Party Leaders are prepared to accommo¬
date one another, e.g. by maintaining joint cadres for a limited period and
leaving details for more leisurely decision. One difficulty will be that in the
Punjab few, if any, British officers will be prepared to stay on after the transfer

JUNE I947

l8l

of power. The Inspector General of Police has told me that no British officers
will wish to stay on, and I have reason to think that sentiment is much the same
among British officers of the I.C.S. The time available for reorganising the
services, and particularly for the elimination and replacement of British officers,
will be very short. There is no legal method by which British officers can be
coerced into staying on. H.M.G. cannot compel them to serve under a Dom¬
inion Government; nor does it seem that the Dominion Governments can
coerce them in any way.

(f) The installation of two new Governments including two new Governors.

If I am able to secure a “divisible” Coalition Government, the nucleus of a
Ministry for each of the two new Provinces should be available and the
Ministers should have at least some experience. Governors are not easy to come
by and will have to be laid on without delay.

3. To sum up, it seems that of the 71 days available something like 25 may
be consumed in formalities, and that this period may be even longer if the
Sikhs insist on the Boundary Commission reporting before they vote on
partition. Once the formalities are over, everything will depend on the willing¬
ness of the Party Leaders to co-operate v/ith one another either in a Coalition
Government or in some independent committee under my chairmanship. We
cannot count on any British officers remaining after the date on which power is
transferred for any purpose whatever. I frankly do not see how the work is to
be done in the time, and if any Party insists on a postponement of the sum¬
moning of the two halves of the Assembly, the work cannot be done in the
time. Provisionally I propose to try for the following programme: —

(1) Summoning of the two halves of the Assembly . . . 17th June for (say)
26 th June.

(2) Meeting of the two halves of the Assembly . . . 26th June.

(3) Decision on the principle of partition (allowing time for joint meeting if
demanded) . . . not later than 30th June.

(4) Formation of Coalition Ministry . . . Any date, but not later than 1st

July-

(5) Negotiation of “partition settlement” (essential items only) by 31st July
(the expert work can be put in hand now, though it cannot be effective
without policy guidance).

(6) Paper reorganisation of services (to be carried on during negotiation of
partition settlement) by 12th August.

(7) Transfer of power . . . 15th August.

This assumes that an acceptable report by the Boundary Commission will
have been presented some time before 15th August.

E. M. j.

4 For the results of Sir E. jenkins’s consultation with the party leaders, see No. 97, para. 3 and its

Enclosure.

182

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Interviews ( 2 )

7 June 1947

H.E.

I submit herewith the results of my talk with Mr Gandhi last night. You will
see that when we got down to reducing his suggestions to writing, they were
very different from your first impression of them.1

2. I cannot really think that anything could be gained by Your Excellency
speaking to Mr Jinnah about the NWFP on the lines that Mr Gandhi suggests:
nor do I see how the resignation of the Ministry in that Province would avoid a
referendum.

3 . As regards the question of agreements or treaties between HMG and the
two Indian Dominions, I have now had a talk with Mr V. P. Menon, who has
just come back from two hours with Mr Gandhi, which included a reference to
the above.

Mr V. P. Menon and I both feel strongly that it would only arouse suspicion
if you were to issue an announcement on this subject out of the blue. The time
and place for such an announcement would be the debate in the House of
Commons on the new Bill, and we have no doubt that a categorical assurance
by the Prime Minister or Sir Stafford Cripps to the effect that there was no
intention whatsoever of differentiation between the two Dominions would do
the trick.

4. I am sending a copy of the enclosure to Mr Gandhi as he particularly asked
for it.

Annex to No. pp

ISMAY

mr gandhi’s suggestions to h.e. the viceroy
1. NorthWest Frontier Province

Mr Gandhi suggests that H.E. should speak to Mr Jinnah in the following
sense :

“I am extremely anxious lest the referendum in the NWFP should lead to
bloodshed and blood feuds between brother and brother pathan, and I have
been wondering whether it could possibly be avoided. Now that you have got
your Pakistan, would it not be wise for you to go to the NWFP and speak to
the people of the Province of whatever party they may belong, including the
present Ministry and their followers. You could explain what Pakistan, which

JUNE I947

183

has hitherto been a vague expression, really is, and present your case in an
attractive manner, in the hope that you will be able to woo them to become a
Province of Pakistan, with perfect freedom to frame their own provincial
constitution.

If you are successful in your persuasion, the proposed referendum and all that
it involves would be avoided. If you felt disposed to adopt this suggestion, I
could, I think, give you a positive assurance that the Khan brothers and their
followers would meet you as friends and give you an attentive hearing/ ’

Mr Gandhi asked that if this appeal to Mr Jinnah was unsuccessful, he (Mr
Gandhi) might be informed of the fact, in order that he might consider the
position again. Mr Gandhi added that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was so anxious about
the permanent blood feuds which would result from the referendum, that he
would go to almost any lengths, consistent with honour, to avoid it. In the last
resort, he would be prepared to advise his brother and his colleagues in the
Ministry to resign, and then to ask the Viceroy to put the NWFP under Section

93.

Mr Gandhi emphasised that he had not discussed the above with his col¬
leagues, and therefore that it should not be mentioned to anyone at this stage.

2. Bengal and the United Provinces [? Punjab]

Mr Gandhi suggested that Mr Jinnah should be advised to try to win over
West Bengal and Eastern Punjab to Pakistan by the same methods.

3. Co-operation between Mr Jinnah and the Congress Leaders

Mr Gandhi suggested that H.E. the Viceroy should speak in the following
sense to Mr Jinnah, when he found him in the right mood to listen :

“I am here to help both parties to reach agreement in any way that I can, and
I regard this task not only as a pleasure, but as a duty. You must remember,
however, that I cannot, in any event, be here forever. Now, therefore, that the
decision has been made and you have your Pakistan, why do you not go your¬
self and talk with the Congress Leaders as friends, and try to get a settlement
between yourselves on all the various points at issue. This would make for a
much better atmosphere than adhering to the practice of only meeting together
under my Chairmanship.”

4. Agreements between HMG and the two Indian Dominions

Mr Gandhi said that there was a lot of loose talk going about that HMG might
have different agreements with Hindustan and Pakistan which would possibly
tend to favour one over the other. It was, therefore, important that an an¬
nouncement should be made to the effect that it was HMG s wish either to

1 These suggestions were evidently made at an interview between Lord Mountbatten and Mr Gandhi
on 6 June: see Times of India, 7 June 1947.

184

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

enter into tri-partite arrangements with both the Dominions, or to have identi¬
cal bi-lateral agreements with each of them : and that, in any event, there would
be no question of differentiation.

IOO

Minutes of Viceroy's Seventeenth Miscellaneous Meeting

Mounthatten Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 7 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinn ah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
( Secretariat )

Item 1

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

his excellency the viceroy said that he wished to explain, for the benefit
of those leaders who had not been present at the Cabinet Meeting the previous
evening,1 that the Cabinet had shown a certain air of slight grievance that it had
not been taken into confidence with regard to the previous discussions2 on the
Administrative Consequences of Partition. He said that he had taken full
responsibility for having handled the matter as he had. The Cabinet had also
felt that, until a decision on Partition was taken, it was necessary to go circum¬
spectly. It had been pointed out that, until it was known that Partition was an
accomplished fact, it would be acting prematurely if the highest tribunal and
council to deal with Partition were set up. He had accepted this view, but there
was so much spade- wrork to be done in the meanwhile that it had been proposed
that a Cabinet Committee should be formed of four members, possibly two
from Congress and two from the Muslim League, who should prepare the
mechanics for setting up the other bodies. The paper produced by this Com¬
mittee would be discussed with the leaders before it was considered by the
Cabinet. In fact, the only new proposal arising from the Cabinet Meeting the
previous evening was that the preliminary work to establish the mechanism
should be done by a Cabinet Committee, the viceroy said that he wanted
to keep the balance between meetings with the Indian Leaders and Cabinet
Meetings. He wanted to get policy guidance at the former, as they consisted of
a body of men who would be responsible for picking the Governments of the
two new States which were to come into existence. On the other hand, the

JUNE I947

185

Cabinet provided the legal authority for setting up Government Committees
and the Secretariat that would be required.

PANDIT NEHRU, SARDAR PATEL, MR LIAQUAT ALI KHAN and MR
NISHTAR stated that they considered that His Excellency had correctly reported
what had happened at the Cabinet Meeting the previous evening.

mr jinnah said that he could not agree that this matter had been handled
correctly in the Executive Council. It was first necessary to get a clear concept.
Under the Plan contained in His Majesty’s Government’s Statement, it was the
Crown and His Majesty’s Government who proposed to transfer power to the
successor authorities. With regard to the method, and the machinery which was
to be set up for the transfer of power, there should be an independent body. The
Interim Government was working under the present Constitution. It was for
the Crown and His Majesty’s Government to set up such machinery as would
go [sic] to carry out the division of all assets and liabilities which were vested by
the Government of India Act, 1935, so far as it had come into operation. For
this partial transfer under the Act, the Government had been given certain
powers for certain purposes. The Government could only carry on within these
limitations. After the announcement of the Plan, it could undertake no new
policy or legislation. If there was a crisis it would be for His Excellency as
Governor-General, in collaboration with his Executive, to take such steps as
were considered necessary ; but, barring that exception, no planning or policy,
administrative or legislative, could be undertaken because it was clear that it
was a question of only two or three months. The Interim Government must not
assume a status of power which they did not possess. The Interim Government
must realise its own position first. Therefore, the Crown and His Majesty’s
Government should, with no delay, tackle the business of partition. He could
not see how the Interim Government came into this at all.

his excellency the viceroy emphasised that, until Partition was
legally settled, the issue should not be predetermined. Such anticipatory action
as he took must be confined to what he was empowered to take as Governor-
General-in-Council. Any instructions which were issued must be in the form
of Orders in Council.

MR jinnah said that the point was which authority was really responsible for
making all the arrangements — the Interim Government or His Majesty’s
Government, the viceroy said that he believed that legally it was the
Govemor-General-in-Council. MR jinnah said that he disagreed. It was
entirely the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government, sardar patel
pointed out that much of the property to be divided was vested in the Central
Government of India.

pandit nehru said that there were various authorities in law — for instance
His Majesty’s Government, the Governor-General and the Governor-General-
1 No. 95. * See Nos. 39, and 73, Item 1.

i8 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in-Council. In law, however, the Presidents of Congress and the Muslim League
counted for nothing. They only came into the discussions because they repre¬
sented powerful forces. Therefore, Mr Jinnah was out of court.

sardar patel remarked that Mr Jinnah only “came into court” at all by
civil disobedience, mr jinnah retaliated “in which you are an expert”. He
said that if the Governor-General-in-Council went beyond the limits of the
Government of India Act, he, as a citizen, would come in and challenge his
authority, pandit nehru said that this question might arise if and when any
legal action was taken, but meanwhile it did not arise, mr jinnah said that he
had not insinuated that it was intended to do anything illegally. He was quite
sure that nothing illegal would be done, but the point was, which authority
had the power and responsibility to carry out the Plan, mr liaquat ali
khan pointed out that in Paragraph 21 of His Majesty’s Government’s State¬
ment3 it was laid down that the Governor-General would from time to time
make such further announcements as might be necessary, his excellency
the viceroy said that he, as Governor-General, would indeed make such
announcements — but not the decisions.

MR jinnah repeated that it was the Governor-General who had the authority
and the responsibility and the power, pandit nehru pointed out that, if the
Governor-General went beyond the scope of the Government of India Act, he
could be called to account. If he interfered with any Department of the Govern¬
ment beyond the limit of his powers, he would be infringing the Act.

the viceroy said that it seemed absolutely clear to him that it would be
for the Governor-General-in-Council to issue whatever orders were necessary.
He would naturally, however, consult the leaders before so doing, mr jinn ah
said that His Excellency could consult anybody that he liked; but it would be
the Governor-General and not the Governor-General-in-Council who would
issue the orders.

MR v. P. menon was then called in and gave his opinion that the responsi¬
bility lay with the Governor-General-in-Council. He quoted Section 314 of
the Government of India Act. mrjinnah said that this was entirely the wrong
section and referred to the Act of 1919. He suggested, and it was agreed, that
the matter should be referred to the Chief Justice.

mr jinnah said that he wished to assure the Congress representatives that
he had not been giving the foregoing advice as a partisan. He did not wish to
minimise the work of the Executive Council or to undermine it. He wanted to
do the right thing.

sardar patel said that since the formation of the present Government Mr
Jinnah had continually taken up the attitude of challenging its status and
powers. The Government had promises from H.M.G. that it would function
as a Dominion Government. If this authority was then challenged and its
members were insulted, they were led to thoughts of resignation, mrjinnah

JUNE 1947

IS?

said that he did not mean what he had said as an insult. He was purely giving
his view, to the best of his ability. He never meant to insult anybody.

his excellency said that one of these days he would get Mr Jinnah on to a
Naval Committee and then defeat him properly, mr jinnah said that in such
circumstances he would be utterly ignorant and would talk nonsense.

HIS excellency the viceroy said that, pending the decision on the
legal point, he intended to set up a Committee containing two representatives
of Congress and two of the Muslim League — all of whom should be members
of the Interim Government. He would act as Chairman himself. With this
course of action there was general agreement.

mr liaquat ali khan said that he understood that the duties of the
Committee would be to prepare a scheme for consideration later by the
Partition Council, mr jinnah said that he understood that the Committee
would be a fact-finding body and would make its recommendations to the
superior body. The latter would be the entity which would take decisions. He
made it clear that he did not accept calling the Committee a “Cabinet Commit¬
tee”. There was general agreement that the Committee should be a fact-finding
body and make proposals ; but that it should not take final decisions.

His excellency pointed out that immediate action was necessary on the
provision of Secretariat accommodation; the securing of clerical staff, type¬
writers and stationery ; and consultation with Departments so that personnel for
Expert Committees were put on special duty and given facilities at once. He
asked whether the Leaders would agree to the Cabinet Secretariat undertaking
this preliminary work. With this there was general agreement.

There was also general agreement on the names “Partition Council” and
“Arbitral Tribunal” for the bodies to be set up as soon as a decision on partition
was known, mr liaquat ali khan asked whether by this it was meant when
all Provinces had expressed their view, his excellency said that this was not
his intention; that this time would come when one Province had declared in
favour of joining a new and separate Constituent Assembly.

his excellency the viceroy said that it had been suggested that he
should take the chair for the administrative work of the Partition Council ; but
he would only agree to do this if the leaders endorsed this request and did not
ask him to act as arbitrator, mr jinnah said that he would like the Viceroy to
take the chair at meetings of the Partition Council. It would work better that
way. There was general agreement on this point.

mr liaquat ali khan suggested that the Arbitral Tribunal should be the
final authority for matters not agreed by the bodies set up for Partition of the
Provinces, and there was general agreement with this suggestion. It was pointed
out, however, that the Partition Council would have no jurisdiction in dealing
with matters connected with the Partition of the Provinces.

3 No. 45.

1 88

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It was agreed that there would be no objection to the Governor of the
Punjab issuing invitations to the members of his Legislative Assembly forth¬
with.

his excellency said that the question of how to deal with the Interim
Government, after the decision on Partition had been made, also arose. He
had asked the members of the Interim Government to take no action which
they felt might have implications on one or other of the future Governments,
without referring to the representatives of the latter. He said that he would have
to ask, at a suitable time, either party to select names for their future Govern¬
ments. He asked to whom he should address himself. It might be possible to
set up two Sub-Committees of the Cabinet. It would be desirable to pass the
minimum amount of legislation during the interim period. In any case this
time would be almost wholly occupied by the processes of Partition.

IT WAS AGREED : —

(i) that a legal opinion, if possible that of the Chief Justice, should be obtained
on the issue whether it was the Governor-General, or the Governor-General-
in-Council, who was the responsible authority for making the necessary
arrangements and issuing the various orders with regard to Partition;

(ii) that a Committee 4 should be set up forthwith consisting of two represen¬
tatives of Congress and two of the Muslim League, all of whom should be
members of the Interim Government, and with His Excellency as Chairman ;
that Pandit Nehru and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan should send in to His Excellency,
as soon as possible, the names of the representatives of Congress and of the
Muslim League, respectively, to be appointed to this Committee; that the
duty of this Committee should be to make an examination of the steps to be
taken to set up machinery, including the formation of Sub-Committees, for
carrying out Partition; and that this should be a fact-finding body, whose duty
it will be to make proposals and not to reach final decisions;

(iii) that the present Cabinet Secretariat should undertake the immediate
action which was necessary in regard to the provision of secretariat accommoda¬
tion; the securing of clerical staff, typewriters, stationery, etc; and consultation
with Departments so that personnel for expert Committees were put on special
duty and given facilities at once;

(iv) that, as soon as a decision on Partition was known (i.e. immediately any
one Province had declared in favour of joining a new and separate Constituent
Assembly), a Partition Council should be set up; that it should consist of two of
the top ranking leaders of Congress and twro of the Muslim League; that His
Excellency should be Chairman of it, with no arbitral functions ; and that the
recommendations of the Partition Committee above should be subject to
acceptance by the Partition Council;

(v) that an Arbitral Tribunal should be set up at the same time as the Partition
Council; that it should consist of three members, all men of great judicial

JUNE 1947

experience; that the composition of it should be settled by the Partition
Committee; that Sardar Baldev Singh should consult the other Sikh leaders
about the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal, and inform the Partition
Committee of their views; and that the services of the Arbitral Tribunal should
be offered to the Provinces which were to be partitioned;

(vi) that Pandit Nehru and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan should inform the Viceroy
as soon as possible to whom he should address himself in calling for names for
the two Governments which would be set up (if there was Partition) when
Dominion status was granted;

(vii) that there was no objection to the Governor of the Punjab issuing
preliminary invitations now to the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly
to meet to decide the issue of the partition of that Province.

Item 2

SIR EVAN JENKINS

his excellency the viceroy explained that it was his intention to ask all
Governors to resign on the date of the transfer of power. He had asked the
Secretary of State to sanction this course.5 He stated that Sir Evan Jenkins had
declared his intention of leaving India altogether; this was regrettable, as he
was a highly competent man. Whilst agreeing with Sir Evan that he should not
serve either new State individually after the transfer of power, his excel¬
lency said that he was wondering whether there was any job in connection
with partition which Sir Evan might fill.

Item 3

BROADCASTS

sardar baldev singh said that the broadcast which he had made on 3rd
June6 had been translated entirely wrong. It was after hearing the incorrect
translation that Master Tara Singh had made his statement to the press;7 he
had afterwards apologised for this, on hearing the correct version in English.
pandit nehru stated that his broadcast had also been badly translated.
sardar patel said it was the responsibility of those who broadcast to
translate their speeches themselves.

Item 4
the press

his excellency the viceroy drew the attention of the Indian Leaders to
certain objectionable and inflammatory articles which had appeared in the

4 Words in italics are underlined in the original. 5 No. 79.

6 No. 48. 7 Possibly a reference to the statement summarized in No. 72, note 1.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

190

Press recently, and asked them to redouble their efforts to the best of their

j 7

ability to prevent such articles being published in future,
the Indian leaders agreed to do this.

Item 5

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy said that he [had] received a most logical
letter8 from Pandit Nehru containing suggestions to prevent administrative
chaos in the relations between the two new Governments and the States. He
said that he intended to send a letter to all the States asking for their concurrence
that there should be an over-all stand-still order on all present agreements after
the transfer of power, until it was possible to frame new agreements or confirm
the existing ones ; and asking for them to inform him whether they would send
representatives to the new capitals of the Dominions or would prefer that the
Dominions should set up representation in the States.9

There was general agreement that such a letter would be helpful.10

8 No. 68. 9 cf. No. 94, note 5.

10 The same day Mr Abell wrote to Sir C. Corfield quoting the above minutes on the letter which
Lord Mountbatten intended to send to the States, and asking for the necessary action to be taken.
R/3/1/137: f 12.

IOI

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Mr

Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Nishtar

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 143

7 June 1947 , 11.43 am

The Dewan of Bahawalpur was present for the latter half of this interview.

Lord Ismay and Sir Eric Mieville were also present. Lt Col Erskine Crum was
in attendance and dictated the record.

This interview lasted 2 hours.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal
should be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, preferably
without previous experience of India. I said that I would consult the Congress
Leaders about this, and put up the suggestion to H.M.G.

Mr Jinnah suggested that the Chairmen of the Boundary Commissions should
be people with experience of the broad principles whereby boundaries were
demarcated. I agreed to this, and said that I would suggest to the Congress
leaders that all three members of each Boundary Commission should be pro-

JUNE 1947

191

vided by U.N.O. Representatives of Congress, the Muslim League and other
interested parties would be in attendance on the Commissions as expert assessors
— probably 3 from each side of each partitioned Province. I asked Mr Jinnah
to suggest the paragraph in the terms of reference of the Western Boundary
Commission which would refer to the Sikhs.

I put forward the suggestion that H.M.G. and the two new Dominions
should enter into tripartite agreements. Mr Jinnah objected to the word
“tripartite”; he preferred the expression “identical bilateral agreements”.

I asked Mr Jinnah to show me the terms of the resolution which he intended
to put before the All-India Muslim League Council at its meeting on 9th June.
He replied that this resolution would probably be short, and contain the
following points: —

(a) We accept the plan as the only possible solution.

(b) We can never agree to an united India.

(c) We do not agree to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, but we have
to take the plan as a whole into account when considering this.

The Dewan of Bahawalpur then entered and gave an account of the diffi¬
culties which that State would face as a result of the partition of the Punjab.
These difficulties were in connection with water supply and irrigation. I asked
Sir Eric Mieville to keep in touch with him. He also suggested that there should
be a time limit of, perhaps, five years for the continuation of present agreements
with the States.

Mr Jinnah was strongly of the opinion that existing contractual agreements
with the States would be legally binding on the successor authorities. I said that
I would take this point up with Congress and ask for a ruling from the Secretary
of State.

102

Mr Abell to Mr Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Administrative

Consequences of

7 June IQ47

Dear Mr Jinnah,

H.E. asks me to send you the enclosed copy of a legal opinion by Sir G. Spence.

He hopes you will be good enough to let him see the draft resolution for the
All-India Muslim League Council.

Yours sincerely,

G. E. B. ABELL

192

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 102

I understand that a question has arisen regarding the authority competent to vest
the contemplated Partition Tribunal and various ancillary committees with the
authority which they are designed to exercise. I understand further that the
Partition Tribunal is designed to be authorized to take binding decisions and
require the Departments of the Government of India to take action on those
decisions as if they were decisions of the Government of India.

2. I understand the contention to have been advanced that the authorization
of the Tribunal and the committees should emanate from the Governor-
General and not from the Governor-General-in-Council. I am very clearly of
opinion that this contention is untenable. The vesting of an extra governmental
body or bodies with power to issue binding directions on Department [s] of the
Central Government clearly involves the exercise of the executive authority of
the Central Government and that executive authority is required by sub¬
sections (1) and (3) of Section 313 of the Constitution Act to be exercised by the
Governor-General-in-Council.

3 . It has, I understand, been suggested that authority to issue the authoriza¬
tion accrues to His Excellency the Governor-General from paragraph 21 of the
statement of the 3rd June 1947. 1 This suggestion is very clearly untenable.
Paragraph 21 embodies merely a statement of fact that His Excellency the
Governor-General will from time to time make such further announcements as
may be necessary and it will of course be open to His Excellency to make an
announcement of the fact that the Partition Tribunal has been constituted and
authorized in the manner proposed. But paragraph 21 manifestly does not
purport, and cannot operate, to render exercisable by the Governor-General
functions which under the Constitution Act cannot be exercised otherwise than
by the Governor-General-in-Council.

G. H. SPENCE

7.6.47

1 No. 45.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

R/jI 1/188:/ 7

India office, 7 June

Dear Mountbatten,

In the proceedings of the Special Committee of your Cabinet held on the 24th
April, 1947 (No. 90/CF/47),1 at which the compensation question was dis¬
cussed you are reported as having said that —

JUNE I947

193

“there was in any case no question of linking up any further talks that there
may be on the subject of responsibility for the payment of compensation with
the negotiations in regard to sterling balances”.

As a matter of fact it was agreed at the meeting of the India and Burma
Committee here on the 13 th March (at which you were present) that —

“if the Government of India declined to accept the expenditure involved as a
charge on Indian funds, it should be made clear to them that such expenditure
would have to be taken into account in connection with the negotiations for
the settlement of India’s sterling balances”.2

Pethick-Lawrence also referred to the probable advantage of thrashing the
matter out in the sterling balances context in paragraph 2 of his private tele¬
gram No. 42 dated 4th April3 about the composition of the Indian sterling
balances delegation.

We have not yet finally made up our minds whether to link the two matters
together, and it might well be that we should not do so until the sterling
balances negotiations were actually in progress. If, however, we raised the
matter and the Indian delegates were still under the impression given by your
statement, they might well feel aggrieved and be unnecessarily difficult. We
should be grateful, therefore, if you would take such steps as you think fit to let
those concerned know4 that H.M.G. do not 5 regard themselves as debarred
from raising, during any negotiations relating to the sterling balances, the
questions of financial liability arising out of paragraph 10 of the Prime Minister’s
Statement of 30th April.6

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

1 L/S &G/7/914: fF 171-5. 2 Vol. IX, No. 529, Minute 3, Conclusion (3), p. 936.

3 L/F/7/2869: fF 256-7.

4 On 25 June Lord Mountbatten circulated a note to the Indian Cabinet informing them of the gist of
this letter. R/3/1/188: fF 10-11.

5 Emphasis in original. 6 Cmd. 7116.

104

Sir F. Mudie (Sind) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of Sind

D.0.NO.453 /fr government house, Karachi, 7 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I had hoped to be able to give you an account of the reaction to HMG’s latest
statement, but I find it extraordinarily difficult to do so. The local press has been
particularly futile. I think that it was just too much for them. Also they are not

194

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

quite certain which way the cats of their respective High Commands are to
jump. My general impression however is that the Sindhi Muslim is very
pleased. Pirzada Abdus Sattar issued quite a good statement urging acceptance.
There is some pro forma criticism of the partition of the Punjab and of Bengal,
but Sindhis care little about the Punjab and nothing at all about Bengal.

The Hindus are, I think, resigned, a little hurt that the Congress has done so
little for them. Their press is less truculent. I attach some significance to the fact
that one or two prominent Hindus who had previously refused nomination to
the Sind University Senate, in response to Congress agitation against it, have
now accepted. There is some movement of bank balances to “Hindustan” and a
certain fall in the value of real property in Hindu areas. There is also vague talk
about emigration to Hindustan. Some Gujeratis, Kachchis and other non -
Sindhis may retire to their original homes, but I don’t expect many real Sindhis
to leave the Province. There are signs of a growing feeling that the proper line
for the Hindus in Sind is to co-operate with and not to continue to fight the
League on all fronts. There are some, though not very definite, signs of a
response.

The British community and the Muslims are very pleased about Dominion
Status. They recognise that it is the only possible alternative to the civil war,
which everyone, until your latest announcement, assumed to be inevitable.

The great thing is that the tension is over. Some decision has been arrived at
and the main political parties have agreed or at least acquiesced. No one is
prepared to go back to the old state of affairs.

105

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/j/i/go: f 144

immediate 7 June 1947, 11 pm

confidential Received: 8 June , 6 am

Tel. No. 121-G. Lahore reports 3 killed 2 wounded and 3 fires and Amritsar 2
killed 2 wounded and 9 fires.

2. Lull in hostilities continues in Gurgaon but Commissioner who is on spot
reports that, at meeting of Assembly members of district, Hindus were sullen
and uncooperative and Moslem “numbed and hopeless” but prepared to fight
to a finish. Commissioner thinks that, with reinforcements provided or in view,
further large scale attacks should be prevented.

3 . General situation unchanged and unsatisfactory. Reactions to partition are
now clearer. Hindus in West and Moslems in East are dissatisfied but Congress

O

JUNE I947

195

and Moslem League both claim that plan is master-stroke of their respective
leaders and that all will be well in the end. Sikhs pin their faith on Boundary
Commission and say they will accept no western boundary short of Chenab.
Moslem League will be faced with minor revolt against Jinnah which he will
probably suppress with ease.

Addressed Viceroy reptd. S/S, Governors [of] U.P., Sind and N.W.F.P.

106

Lord Ismay to Sir D. Monteath
Telegram, Rfe/i/iyo: f 23

immediate new Delhi, 8 June ig47, 1.30 pm

secret Received: 8 June , 2.10 pm

1354-S. On 9th May I sent you a minute1 asking whether the Secretary of
State would agree to Sir Olaf Caroe being replaced by General Lockhart at a
time to be determined by the Viceroy. We subsequently discussed this question,
but you did not give me a firm reply before I left London.

2. Situation has now become urgent as Viceroy has decided that Sir Olaf
Caroe must be replaced as Governor of the N.W.F.P. as soon as possible. Fie
has suggested2 to him that he should take leave as soon as his relief arrives,
without prejudice to the possibility of his being asked by the Pakistan Govern¬
ment, if they win the referendum, to resume his Governorship of the Province
at the end of his leave.

3 . Caroe has not yet replied, but Viceroy considers it most important that
King’s unofficial approval should be obtained, so that action can be taken
immediately he thinks the moment ripe.

4. As you know, Commander-in-Chief has agreed, but Defence Member
will, of course, be consulted before any announcement is made.

1 Not printed; but see Vol. X, No. 417 and its note 2.

2 No. 96.

196

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

107

Mr Rajagopalachariar to Sir S. Cripps

LjP&Jlylio88g: f 8

NEW DELHI, 8 June 1947

My dear Sir Stafford,1

I need hardly tell you that I more than share the general satisfaction felt over
the solution now officially accepted and feel that a great incubus is off our
chests.

However, there is one point which is fraught with great potentiality for
immediate mischief and about which I wish to write to you. This is private, but
I would like you to share it with any friends and colleagues who can help. The
doctrine laid down without consulting us, that with the withdrawal of British
Sovereignty ‘paramountcy’ ends and that as a consequence the 565 Indian
States automatically attain a chaotic independence is indefensible. Legally,
historically, politically and morally it is wrong. Until 1935 there was no
distinction drawn between the Crown and the Governor-General in Council
in regard to the treaties and obligations between the Indian rulers and the
Paramount authority. A new doctrine of distinction was invented in 1935 in
view, I believe, of the unavoidable and progressive transfer of power from
Britain to the people of India.

It is not correct to say that the treaties entered into by the Indian Princes were
with the Crown, irrespective of British Indian governance. The Crown did not
act in that context in an abstract capacity or in the capacity of Sovereign of
England. The Governor-General acted with reference fully and exclusively to
the governance of India. The treaties do not create a personal right or obliga¬
tion, but impose obligations on the rulers for the time being of the Indian
States and of India. Under the earlier Government of India Acts the existence of
political relations between the Executive Government of British India and the
Indian States was clearly contemplated and the Government of India was fully
empowered to transact business with the Indian States. The entire expenditure
incurred in the exercise of these functions was and is charged to the revenues of
British India. An incorrect doctrine has been incorporated and is being re¬
enforced by repetition without adequate discussion or investigation. Many of
the Indian States which are now encouraged by this pronouncement to claim
independence did not exercise it or claim it before they came under British
Sovereignty. The British withdrawal cannot suddenly become the basis for a
status which they had not in history. Yet by parity of application 565 indepen¬
dent States are brought into being, every one of which can claim the right to
bargain individually and to resist the imposition of outside authority except on
its own terms.

JUNE 1947

197

Paramountcy came into being as a fact and not by agreement and on British
withdrawal the successor authority must inherit the fact along with the rest of
the context. The East India Company acquired territory by conquest or other¬
wise and they chose to assume direct authority over some areas and preferred
to hold paramountcy over other areas. A single paramount power was evolved
which was responsible to the British Parliament.

The relations of the Crown with Indian States comprise a large number of
important matters which are really relations between Indian States and British
India, e.g. Railway Agreements, Jurisdiction over Railway lines in regard to
civil and criminal administration, unification of Posts and Telegraphs, system
of Currency and Coinage, etc. It cannot be contended that all these are matters
of no concern to the successor Government of British India and that they can
be terminated at the will of H.M.G. when they withdraw their authority from
India. The right to wage war and to determine external relations cannot be left
in a chaotic condition for each one of the 565 States. It would endanger the
peace of India and cannot be tolerated.

It can be argued that it is open to the successor Governments to make terms
and enter into treaties, but the question of policy as to what should be the
attitude of the British Government at the time of their withdrawal is very
important. Encouragement to disruption has to be avoided.

Indian States have had no international status, and is H.M.G. now going to
sponsor them and create conditions which they themselves had regarded as
impossible when they were in charge of the Government of India? All these
thirty years no major modification was contemplated except on the basis of a
Federation or a Union consisting of both British India and the Indian States.
There is no reason now for evolving a disruptive doctrine and for bringing to
sudden termination all existing relations which are based on contract or
circumstance.

If indeed existing relations between British India and Indian States are
traceable to the Crown in England and not to the Government of India, one
might ask why on the establishment of British India as one or two independent
States, it is necessary for the Crown to terminate its relations with the Indian
States. Those relations ought to be capable of being continued irrespective of
what has happened to British India. H.M.G. have admitted that this would not
be possible. The real fact of the matter is that the so-called relations between the
Crown and the Indian States are matters of vital concern to the Government of
India on the one hand and the Indian States on the other. The Crown in the
United Kingdom has no interest in them except as long as it was the paramount
authority in British India. It follows therefore that that interest must devolve
on the successor Government. The enormity of the new doctrine that para-

1 Sir S. Cripps sent a copy of this letter to Lord Listowel asking the latter to let him have an answer.

L/P &J/7/10889: f 7.

198

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

mountcy should end and cannot be handed over to the successor Government
will be obvious if it is realised that out of the 565 States, more than 350 are just
estates. The so-called rulers of these States have not exercised powers beyond
an ordinary Third Class Magistrate. Is it suggested that all the residuary juris¬
diction which had been exercised by the Crown in India should now ‘revert' in
an illegal manner to these chiefs who had never exercised them before ?

Something should be done to prevent this chaos and discourage tendencies
on the part of more powerful States to declare what they call ‘Independence’.
If the people of these States had been behind the rulers, the position could be
understood, though not favoured, but as things stand these ambitions on the
part of some of the rulers of the States cannot but lead to widespread disorders.
It camiot be the intention of H.M.G. to create such a condition in India. It
should therefore be considered an obligatory duty to prevent such declarations
of independence on the part of Indian States by every legitimate means.

I have written a somewhat rambling letter. I hope you will bestow your
attention on this subject and do something immediately to prevent what I
gravely apprehend.

Yours sincerely,

C. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR

108

Minutes of Viceroy s Fortieth Staff Meeting , Items 1-4, 6 , 8-10

Mounthatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi , on 9 June
ig47 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Lord Ismay ,
Sir E. Mieville , Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon , Mr Christie , Captain Brockman , Mr
I. D. Scott , Mr Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

HYDERABAD AND KASHMIR

his excellency the viceroy said that it had been preliminarily arranged
for him to visit Hyderabad from 10th- 14th July.

his excellency the viceroy said that he had seen reports in the Press
that Mr Thompson was to be appointed Dewan of Hyderabad. He stated that
he strongly disapproved of an Englishman taking such an appointment.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

(i) directed D.P.S.V., in consultation with the Political Adviser, to draft

JUNE 1947

199

for his approval a telegram to the Residents in Hyderabad and Kashmir,
asking them to make every effort to ensure that the Rulers of those
States did not make any public announcement, before he had visited
them, that their States were going to be independent and join neither
Constituent Assembly;1

(ii) directed Prin. Sec. to find out whether it was true that Mr Thompson
had been offered the appointment of Dewan of Hyderabad; and, if it
was true, whether he had yet accepted this appointment.2

Item 2

DOMINION STATUS

HIS excellency the viceroy said that he felt that it was essential for the
Legislation, which was going to be introduced amending the Government of
India Act to confer Dominion Status upon Hindustan and Pakistan, to include
provision for the two Dominions to have the same man as Governor-General,
at any rate in the initial stages. It would have to be made clear that only an
interim period was envisaged, and that this could be brought to an end on the
wish of either party. He was equally sure that in this matter his